The Mishnah discusses the laws pertaining to a Mesit, an individual who attempts to seduce others into worshipping idolatry. Several distinctions must be clarified: first, who qualifies as a Mesit? Is it an ordinary person, or a prophet who seduces others in the name of God? Second, what is the punishment for a Mesit? The punishment differs based on whether the seduction targets an individual or a group, such as an entire city, which is referred to as an Ir Nidachat.
The Mishnah begins by stating, "HaMesit Zeh Hedyot," meaning the Mesit is an ordinary person. We are not referring to the victim of seduction, but the one actively performing it. The Mishnah specifies that if an ordinary person seduces an individual, the punishment is stoning. Rashi clarifies that this refers to an ordinary person who seduces someone. The law differs for a prophet who performs seduction; such a person receives strangulation. The Gemara will later elaborate on the source for this distinction between an ordinary person and a prophet. The Mishnah further specifies that the stoning applies when an individual is seduced. If a group, like an Ir Nidachat, is seduced, the punishment is strangulation. Rashi explains that the stoning is for seducing an individual, while seducing an entire city, an Ir Nidachat, results in strangulation.
Rashi also addresses a potential misunderstanding: one might think the distinction lies in whether the Mesit is an ordinary person or a prophet. However, Rashi clarifies that the Torah does not differentiate between an ordinary person and a prophet on the receiving end of seduction. The crucial distinction is between seducing an individual and seducing a multitude.
The Mishnah then details the specific words a Mesit must utter to be liable. The Mesit says, "Let us go worship the deity in such-and-such a place; it eats, it drinks, it does good, and it punishes people." As we have learned, a Mesit typically invents a story about a distant idol, attributing various powers to it, as part of their incitement.
A significant distinction exists between the punishment of a Mesit and that of other offenders. For most capital offenses, formal witnesses must issue a warning to the perpetrator. The witnesses must be present, visible to the offender, and clearly state that if the forbidden act is committed, the offender will incur a specific punishment. This is the general rule: no ambushing. However, for a Mesit, the Torah explicitly states, "You shall not pity him, nor shall you conceal him." This is an exception. Therefore, we set up the Mesit. Witnesses are hidden behind a fence, allowing them to overhear the incitement. The Mesit is then brought to the court and sentenced to stoning.
The Gemara provides an example: if the Mesit speaks to two people, saying, "Let us go worship this idol; it eats, it drinks," and so on, those two individuals themselves become the witnesses. They bring him to the court, and he is stoned. Rashi emphasizes that no one warned them, "Listen, if you commit this transgression, you will be liable for stoning." There is no formal warning for a Mesit. Once he speaks to two people, those two say, "We heard it," and they go directly to court. As the verse states, "You shall not pity him, nor shall you conceal him," this is an exception to the usual requirement of a warning.
Now, consider a different scenario: what if the Mesit speaks to only one person? One person cannot establish guilt, as two witnesses are required. In this case, the single person sets up the Mesit. He tells the Mesit, "I have friends who are also interested in this. Come and talk to them." If the Mesit is cunning and suspects a setup, knowing that speaking to more people could lead to public exposure and capture, he might be reluctant to speak in front of others. So, the single person arranges for two witnesses to hide behind a fence. The single person then says to the Mesit, "Tell this person what you told me in private. Repeat it." The Mesit repeats his incitement. Then, the single person responds, "What? You want us to leave our God?" If the Mesit retracts, saying, "No, I didn't mean it," then there is no problem. But if he insists, "Yes, this is our obligation, and this is what is good for us to do," then he is liable.
A key difference between the two cases emerges: in the first case, where the Mesit spoke to two people directly, his incitement alone was sufficient. In the second case, where he initially spoke to one person and then was set up, he must not only repeat his incitement but also respond affirmatively to the question, "Do you think we should leave the God of the heavens and the earth?" Why this difference? Because liability for stoning requires the Mesit to initiate the incitement. In the first case, he initiated it directly to two witnesses. In the second case, he initiated it to only one person, which is insufficient. When the single person brings him to others and asks him to repeat himself, that is a form of entrapment, not initiation. Therefore, to ensure he is liable for initiation, he must actively reaffirm his intent by responding to the question, "You mean we should leave our God?" with "Yes, absolutely, that is our obligation." This response constitutes his renewed initiation, making him liable.
The Gemara further clarifies the setup. The first person, having heard the Mesit, cannot be one of the two witnesses, as witnesses must be aware they are testifying. The Mesit, wanting privacy, speaks to one person. That person then says, "I have a friend who is also interested; come talk to him." The first person then steps away, and the Mesit speaks to the second person, while two witnesses are hidden behind a fence, overhearing everything. These two hidden witnesses are the ones who testify. When the Mesit is caught, he might protest, "You didn't warn me!" The reply is, "We don't have to warn you; you are a Mesit."
The Mishnah concludes by listing various phrases that constitute incitement, all falling under the category of Mesit, making the speaker liable: "Let us go worship idolatry," "I will worship idolatry," "Let us go and I will worship," "I will go and I will worship," "Let us bring a sacrifice," "I will go and bring a sacrifice." These phrases, whether spoken in the singular or plural, incur liability. The Mishnah specifies that it does not matter if the idol is physically present or if the Mesit suggests going to worship it elsewhere. Any of these statements constitutes incitement.
The Gemara then clarifies that the Mesit receives a trial. The witnesses testify, and the court ensures their testimony is valid before proceeding with the punishment.
The Gemara revisits the Mishnah's statement, "HaMesit Zeh Hedyot." This means the Mesit is an ordinary person. If it were a prophet, the punishment would be strangulation. The Gemara asks for the source of this distinction. It is established that an ordinary person receives stoning, while a prophet receives strangulation. The Mishnah's statement that a Mesit is an ordinary person implies that this refers to a Mesit who seduces an individual, for whom the punishment is stoning. If he seduces an entire city, the punishment is strangulation. Rashi reiterates that the Mishnah's emphasis on "ordinary person" is to teach that if the Mesit seduces a multitude, like an Ir Nidachat, the punishment is strangulation, not stoning.
The Gemara then discusses the authorship of this Mishnah. One opinion, that of Rabbi Shimon, holds that a prophet who seduces receives strangulation, while others hold that a prophet also receives stoning, making no distinction. The Mishnah aligns with Rabbi Shimon's view, differentiating between an ordinary person and a prophet. Similarly, Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between seducing an individual (stoning) and an Ir Nidachat (strangulation). The Gemara then questions this, pointing to the end of the Mishnah, which seems to contradict Rabbi Shimon's view by implying that even in the case of an Ir Nidachat, the punishment is stoning, which aligns with the Rabbis' opinion. The Gemara offers several resolutions, including that the Mishnah might follow Rabbi Shimon in its beginning and the Rabbis in its end, or that the Mishnah presents a progression of cases, not a distinction of authorship.
Rabbi Papa offers a different interpretation: the phrase "Mesit Zeh Hedyot" does not refer to whom the Mesit seduces, but to the Mesit himself. It means a Mesit is considered a "worthless person" in the eyes of the court, akin to a fool. This implies that his life is not taken seriously, allowing for the ambush method of obtaining testimony and the swift application of punishment. This interpretation explains why the Mishnah does not explicitly exclude a prophet from the category of Mesit, as the term "Hedyot" here describes the legal status of any Mesit, regardless of whether he is an ordinary person or a prophet, allowing for the ambush. The end of the Mishnah, then, clarifies that this applies even when seducing a multitude.
The Gemara describes the ambush technique: lights are on in the front room, where the Mesit and the single person are, while the witnesses are in a dark back room, able to see and hear without being seen. The single person asks the Mesit to repeat his incitement, then challenges him, "How can we abandon our Father in Heaven for idolatry?" If the Mesit retracts, he is free. If he insists, "That is our obligation, and this is proper," he is stoned. Both Rav Papa and Rav Yina agree that the Mishnah presents a graded teaching, not an absolute exclusion of cases. Rav Papa specifically clarifies that "Mesit Zeh Hedyot" means the Mesit is considered worthless, allowing for easy execution, and this applies whether he seduces an individual or a multitude.
The Mishnah then defines Mekhashef (sorcerer) as one who performs an act of witchcraft, not merely an optical illusion. Rabbi Akiva gives an example: two people uproot gourds from the ground. One uproots it through witchcraft (without touching it, using incantations) and is liable. The other performs an optical illusion, making it seem as if he uprooted it, but without actually doing so, and is exempt. To be liable, a sorcerer must perform an actual act of witchcraft, not just create a mirage. If he merely creates an image of gourds where there are none, or makes it appear as if he uprooted them without actually doing so, he is exempt. But if he uses incantations and the gourd visibly comes out of the ground, that is a punishable act.
The Gemara clarifies that the term Mekhashifa (sorceress) in the Torah, referring to a female, is used because witchcraft was predominantly practiced by women. However, men are equally liable for witchcraft. Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Akiva dispute the punishment for a Mekhashef. Rabbi Yosef learns from the verse "A sorceress you shall not keep alive," comparing "you shall not keep alive" to the command to kill the Canaanites upon entering Israel, which was done with a sword. Thus, he concludes the punishment is by sword. Rabbi Akiva, however, compares it to the law regarding touching Mount Sinai, where it states "he shall not live," and the punishment was stoning. Rabbi Yosef argues his comparison is more precise, as both verses use "you shall not keep alive," and he compares a Jew to a Jew (the sorcerer being Jewish, and the Sinai case involving Jews), whereas Rabbi Akiva compares a Jew to a non-Jew (the Canaanites). Rabbi Yosef also notes that non-Jews only have one capital punishment (by sword), while Jews have many. Therefore, it is better to learn from a case involving Jews.
Ben Azzai offers a third opinion, learning from the juxtaposition of verses: "A sorceress you shall not keep alive" is followed by "Whoever lies with an animal shall surely be put to death." Since bestiality is punished by stoning, Ben Azzai concludes that witchcraft is also punished by stoning due to their proximity in the Torah. However, this is challenged: deriving the most severe punishment merely from juxtaposition is a stretch. The Gemara then presents another approach: the Torah singles out certain types of witchcraft, like Ovi and Yidoni, which are known to be punishable by stoning. These specific cases serve as paradigms, teaching that all forms of witchcraft are punishable by stoning. This is based on the principle that when the Torah singles out a specific instance from a general category, it often serves as a model for the entire category.
However, a counter-argument exists based on the principle of Shnei Ketuvim HaBaim Ke'Echad Ein Melamdim (two verses that come together do not teach a general rule). If the Torah had singled out only one type of witchcraft (e.g., Ovi) to be punished by stoning, we could infer that all witchcraft is similarly punished. But since it singled out two (Ovi and Yidoni), it implies that these two are exceptions, and other forms of witchcraft are not necessarily punished by stoning. This highlights a dispute over the application of this hermeneutic rule.
The Gemara explains that sorcerers, or Kishafim, are considered to deny the heavenly order. They attempt to subvert the system God created, even trying to override divine decrees of life and death. God grants them powers to maintain free will, allowing individuals to be tested, but ultimately, their power is subjugated to God's will. This is why, when the Jewish people left Egypt, the verse states that there is no power besides God, even concerning Kishafim. God controls witchcraft, preventing it from truly overriding His will. Rav Hanina demonstrated this: when a woman tried to perform witchcraft on him using dirt from under his feet, he was unafraid. He declared his belief in "Ein Od Milvado" (there is none other than Him), and her witchcraft could not affect him. This is a source for the principle that if a person truly believes in God's sole power, witchcraft cannot harm them.
The Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction: if Kishafim can go against divine decrees, how could Rav Hanina subjugate them? The answer is that Rav Hanina possessed immense merit. While generally Kishafim can affect ordinary people, his great faith and trust in God allowed him to break the power of witchcraft.
The Gemara then distinguishes between two types of Egyptian witchcraft mentioned in the Torah: Belatehem and Belahatehem. Belatehem refers to witchcraft performed with the help of demons (Shedim), who are invisible and summoned through incantations. Belahatehem refers to witchcraft performed solely through the sorcerer's own powers, without the aid of demons, as exemplified by the spinning sword guarding the Garden of Eden, which moved on its own through inherent powers. The Gemara also notes that if a sorcerer requires a physical vessel or equipment for his trick, it indicates he is using Shedim. If he uses only words and incantations, it is pure witchcraft.
The laws of witchcraft are compared to the laws of Shabbat, having three levels: acts punishable by stoning (like performing actual witchcraft), acts that are forbidden but not punishable by death (like optical illusions, which create a mirage), and acts that are permitted from the outset (mutar lechatchila). An example of permitted "witchcraft" is the creation of a calf by Rabbis Chanina and Oshaya using Sefer Yetzirah (a mystical text), which they would eat. This is not considered punishable witchcraft. The Gemara also recounts a story of a sorcerer who could pull silk cloths from his nose, and another of an Arab who appeared to cut a camel into pieces and reassemble it. The latter was an optical illusion, as there was no blood or refuse, indicating no actual cutting. In Alexandria, known for witchcraft, a rabbi bought a donkey that turned into a plank when it touched water, revealing it was a magical illusion. The seller refused a refund, arguing that buyers in Alexandria should test items for witchcraft. Another story tells of Yanai, who, offered drugged water by an innkeeper, spilled it, turning it into scorpions. He then gave her his own water, turning her into a donkey, which he rode through the market until her friend reversed the spell with water. This demonstrates the power of witchcraft and counter-witchcraft.
Finally, the Gemara discusses the plague of frogs in Egypt. One opinion holds that a single frog appeared and reproduced until it covered Egypt. Rabbi Eliezer ben Azarya rebukes Rabbi Akiva for engaging in Aggadah (non-halachic narrative) and insists that it was one frog that whistled, and all its friends came. The difference matters because if the frog reproduced, the Egyptian sorcerers should have immediately recognized it as a divine act they could not replicate, as witchcraft cannot create life. They should have surrendered then, rather than waiting until the plague of lice. But if it was one frog summoning others, the sorcerers could have believed their demons could gather animals, hence their delay in admitting defeat.