We begin our study on Daf Gimmel Amud Bet of Gemara Shabbat. Today’s Daf Dalet is dedicated by Freddy Kassab in memory of Yitzchak ben Mazal; may his soul rest in Eden. The page is also sponsored by Yosef Daniel Moskiker in memory of Todros ben Aharon HaLevi, Binah bat Abba Yosef HaLevi, Moshe ben Yaakov Meir, Le’abba Yitzchak Aryeh Lev, Yitzchak ben Aharon HaLevi, Yaakov ben Yosef HaLevi, Avner ben Yitzchak, Adiel ben Moshe, Sarah bat Esther, Frida bat Simbul, Eliyahu ben Salcha, and Ben Tzion Shmuel Vidah Rafael ben Avraham. This study of Masechet Shabbat has been dedicated by Benjamin Stabrash for the complete recovery of the Jewish people.
Our current discussion continues to explore the legal status of a person’s hand. The Gemara has already established that a hand is neither a Private Domain nor a Public Domain, proving this from the Mishnah. The question now is whether the Sages gave the hand the status of an Intermediate Domain. The practical difference of such a status would be seen in a case where a person extends his hand into a different domain. For example, if a person is in a Public Domain and extends his hand into a Private Domain, would he be permitted to bring it back? Normally, retrieving one's hand is not a problem. However, if the hand is treated as an Intermediate Domain, bringing it back from a Private Domain to a Public Domain might be forbidden as a penalty imposed by the Sages.
The Gemara identifies two conflicting external teachings on this matter: one states that a person may not retrieve his hand, while the other states that he may. This appears to be a dispute over whether the hand is treated as an Intermediate Domain. However, the Gemara suggests that the status of the hand itself is not the issue; rather, the dispute concerns whether the Sages imposed a penalty. One resolution is that the ruling depends on whether the person acted unintentionally or intentionally. If he extended his hand unintentionally, the Sages did not penalize him, but if he did so intentionally, they did. Another possibility is that both cases involve unintentional action, but the Sages differ on whether to penalize an unintentional act on account of an intentional one, to ensure people do not claim they acted unintentionally when they actually meant to violate the law.
A third reconciliation suggests that no penalty was intended in either case. Instead, the distinction depends on where the hand is being retrieved. If the person is retrieving his hand to the same courtyard where he is standing, it is permitted by law, and the Sages saw no reason to forbid it. The case where retrieval is forbidden involves a person who extends his hand into a different domain and then attempts to move it into a different, adjacent courtyard. Although moving an object between two Private Domains is technically permitted, the Sages were concerned that if a person is allowed to move an object to a different courtyard, he might mistakenly throw it into the Public Domain. Therefore, they made a rabbinic decree specifically for a different courtyard.
This distinction is supported by a dialogue between Rava and Rav Nachman. Rava asked if a person whose hand is full of fruit and extended outside may bring it back to the same courtyard. Rav Nachman answered that it is permitted. When asked about bringing it to a different courtyard, Rav Nachman answered that it is forbidden. When Rava asked for the reason for this difference, Rav Nachman jokingly told him that he would only provide the logic after Rava performed a service for him, such as measuring a load of salt. This was a humorous way of suggesting the answer was straightforward: in the first case, the person’s intent to remove the fruit from the courtyard was never fulfilled because the fruit returned to its origin. In the second case, however, his intent to remove the fruit was fulfilled. Once his intent is realized, the Sages applied a decree to prevent him from eventually throwing fruit into the Public Domain on the Sabbath. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that a person's hand is not an Intermediate Domain; it is simply "his hand."
The Gemara then analyzes a new inquiry from Rav Bibi bar Abaye regarding a person who sticks bread to the wall of an oven on the Sabbath. If he leaves it there, it will bake, which would constitute a capital transgression or require a sin offering. The question is whether the Sages permit him to remove the bread—an act normally forbidden by rabbinic decree—before it bakes, in order to save him from a more severe biblical violation. Rav Acha bar Abaye asked Ravina to clarify the circumstances. If the person acted unintentionally and remained unaware of the Sabbath or the prohibition, he would not be asking the question. If he acted unintentionally but then realized his mistake before the bread baked, he would still not be liable for a sin offering, as that liability only applies if the act remains unintentional from beginning to end. Rav Bibi’s question, however, specifically mentions "before he becomes liable for a sin offering."
If the case involves an intentional act, the phrasing should have referred to "capital punishment" rather than a "sin offering." Rav Sheshet suggests returning to the unintentional case, proposing that the question is not asked by the violator himself, but by a third party who sees him and wants to save him from the severe sin. However, Rav Sheshet objects to this, noting that we do not tell one person to commit even a minor sin to save another from a major one. Finally, Rav Ashi clarifies that the case indeed involves an intentional act. The terminology "before he becomes liable for a sin offering" should be understood as "before he reaches the point of a capital transgression." Rav Acha brei deRava notes that in the version of the teaching transmitted by Rav Avivai, this was not a question but a definitive statement: if a person sticks bread in an oven intentionally, he is permitted to remove it to prevent the more serious biblical violation.
Returning to the Mishnah, we previously learned that if a poor man sticks his hand into a house and the homeowner places an object into it, the poor man is liable for a transgression if he then withdraws his hand. The Gemara asks why the poor man is liable, given the rule that "uprooting" and "placing" an object must occur in a significant place measuring at least four by four handbreadths. A person's hand is smaller than this. The Gemara suggests that the author of our Mishnah must be Rabbi Akiva, who holds that a significant area is not required. We see this in Rabbi Akiva's ruling regarding one who throws an object from one Private Domain to another through the airspace of a Public Domain. Rabbi Akiva rules that the thrower is liable because he considers an object enveloped in the air of a domain as if it had been placed there. This implies that a physical landing on a 4x4 area is unnecessary.
However, this proof is difficult to sustain. If Rabbi Akiva considers the air to be a place of "placing," the thrower should be liable for two transgressions: one for taking the object out of the first Private Domain into the Public Domain, and another for bringing it from the Public Domain into the second Private Domain. Since he only mentions one liability, perhaps he only waives the 4x4 requirement for "placing" but still requires it for the initial "uprooting." Rav Yosef suggests that the Mishnah follows the view of Rebbe. In one teaching, Rebbe rules that if a person throws an object and it lands on a small protrusion of any size, he is liable. This would seem to prove that a 4x4 area is not required. However, Abaye explains that Rebbe's ruling there refers to a branch of a tree whose trunk is four handbreadths wide; since the trunk is significant, the branch is treated as significant as well. This does not prove that a hand, which has no such "trunk," would be considered a significant place.
The Gemara attempts another proof from Rebbe. In a case where one throws an object from a Public Domain to another Public Domain with a Private Domain in between, Rebbe rules that the person is liable for two transgressions: one for taking it out and one for bringing it in. Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that this proves Rebbe does not require a 4x4 area for uprooting or placing. But Rav and Shmuel both clarify that Rebbe only rules this way when the Private Domain is roofed. There is a principle that a house is considered as if it were full of objects; therefore, the airspace under a roof is legally treated as a solid, significant place. This principle, however, cannot apply to our Mishnah's case involving the Public Domain, which is not roofed. If a roof is required to waive the 4x4 rule, the poor man standing in the open street would not be liable. Thus, the identity of the Mishnah's author remains an unresolved question.