We are discussing the laws of circumcision and the preparatory acts required for circumcision. The central question is: How do we know that circumcision overrides Shabbat? We take it for granted that a circumcision performed at the proper time is carried out on Shabbat, but what is the source for this law? There is no explicit verse that simply says so. We have a tradition from Sinai that circumcision overrides Shabbat.
This leads to another question: How do we know that saving a life overrides Shabbat? Life-threatening danger overrides Shabbat in order to save a life, but what is the source for that principle?
Rabbi Eliezer says that we derive it by means of an a fortiori inference. Circumcision involves only one limb of a person, and nevertheless it overrides Shabbat. All the more so, saving an entire person’s life should override Shabbat. If concern for one limb allows Shabbat to be violated, certainly concern for the entire person allows Shabbat to be violated. Thus, the law that saving a life overrides Shabbat is derived from circumcision.
But if you tell me that the law of circumcision overriding Shabbat is itself a law given to Moses at Sinai, there is a problem. Can one derive an a fortiori inference from a law given at Sinai? Perhaps one can, but the Gemara seems to indicate that one cannot derive an a fortiori inference from such a law. The thirteen hermeneutical principles are used to derive laws from the Torah, but one does not ordinarily derive new laws from an oral tradition given at Sinai.
The Gemara brings a proof that an a fortiori inference can, in fact, be made from a law given at Sinai. A baraita says that Rabbi Elazar asked Rabbi Akiva: How do we know that a bone fragment the size of a barley grain conveys impurity through contact and by being under the same roof as a corpse? The answer is that this is a law given to Moses at Sinai, and Rabbi Akiva derived by an a fortiori inference that a quarter-log of blood also conveys impurity.
Rabbi Akiva’s reasoning was as follows. A bone the size of a barley grain conveys impurity through being under the same roof as a corpse, even though a bone of that size does not ordinarily convey impurity in every situation. Certainly, a quarter-log of blood, which does convey impurity through being under the same roof, should convey impurity to a nazirite. Thus, Rabbi Akiva made an a fortiori inference from a law given to Moses at Sinai.
There is a further baraita in which Rabbi Akiva makes the same inference. He says: If a bone the size of a barley grain conveys impurity through being under the same roof as a corpse, and a nazirite becomes impure through that bone, then certainly a quarter-log of blood from a corpse, which conveys impurity through being under the same roof, should make the nazirite impure. The Gemara therefore appears to demonstrate that one may derive an a fortiori inference from a law given at Sinai.
At first, this seems to resolve the difficulty. Perhaps the law that circumcision overrides Shabbat is a law given to Moses at Sinai, and from that law we can derive that saving a life overrides Shabbat. But there is still a problem. The thirteen hermeneutical principles are used to expound the Torah; they are not used to derive laws from the oral Torah. One does not normally construct an a fortiori inference from a law transmitted independently of a biblical verse.
We therefore return to the original question: What is the source that circumcision overrides Shabbat? Rabbi Eliezer’s position cannot simply be that it is a law given at Sinai, because then we would not be able to derive from it that saving a life overrides Shabbat. Yet Rabbi Eliezer does derive the law of saving a life from circumcision by means of an a fortiori inference.
The Gemara offers another derivation. It says that the word “sign” appears both in connection with circumcision and in connection with Shabbat. Just as the sign mentioned regarding Shabbat refers to Shabbat, so the sign mentioned regarding the covenant of circumcision also teaches that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat. This is a verbal analogy based on the repeated word “sign.”
However, the Gemara objects that if this is a legitimate verbal analogy, the same reasoning should apply to phylacteries. The Torah says regarding phylacteries, “It shall be a sign upon your hand.” Since the word “sign” appears there as well, perhaps we should derive that phylacteries are worn on Shabbat. Yet the halachah is that phylacteries are not worn on Shabbat.
The Gemara then proposes a different verbal analogy: the word “covenant” appears in connection with Shabbat and also in connection with circumcision. Just as the covenant mentioned regarding Shabbat refers to Shabbat, so the covenant of circumcision should be performed on Shabbat.
But this derivation also encounters a difficulty. The word “covenant” is used regarding an adult circumcision as well. An adult who was not circumcised at the proper time is circumcised when he becomes obligated, but that circumcision is not performed on Shabbat. If the derivation is based merely on the word “covenant,” we would incorrectly conclude that every circumcision, including an adult circumcision performed after its proper time, overrides Shabbat.
The Gemara therefore suggests another verbal analogy, based on the word “generations.” The word “generations” appears in connection with Shabbat and in connection with circumcision. But this too presents a difficulty, because the word “generations” appears in other contexts as well. For example, a similar expression appears regarding ritual fringes. If the word alone were sufficient, we might incorrectly derive that ritual fringes override Shabbat.
Rabbi Nachman resolves the problem by requiring all three expressions together: “sign,” “covenant,” and “generations.” Shabbat is associated with all three expressions, and the circumcision of a child is also associated with all three. Phylacteries are associated with only one of them, and the circumcision of an adult is not associated with all three. Therefore, only the circumcision of a child at the proper time is derived as overriding Shabbat.
According to this explanation, the source that circumcision overrides Shabbat is not the familiar derivation from the verse “On the eighth day,” but rather a threefold verbal analogy involving “sign,” “covenant,” and “generations.” The Gemara is presenting a different source from the one that is usually cited when someone asks how we know that circumcision overrides Shabbat.
The Gemara then identifies the authorities responsible for the different derivations. Rabbi Eliezer is the one who initially treated the matter as a law given to Moses at Sinai. Rabbi Nachman is associated with the derivation based on the three expressions. Rabbi Yohanan offers another derivation from the verse, “And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.” The word “on the day” teaches that the circumcision is performed even on Shabbat.
Rabbi Yohanan understands the phrase “on the eighth day” to mean that the circumcision takes place during the day rather than at night, while the additional expression “on the day” teaches that the day may even be Shabbat. Thus, according to Rabbi Yohanan, the source is a verse, not a law given to Moses at Sinai.
This distinction has an important consequence. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the law concerning the preparatory acts of circumcision overriding Shabbat is a law given to Moses at Sinai. Therefore, one cannot derive from circumcision that saving a life overrides Shabbat by means of an a fortiori inference. According to the other authorities, however, the fact that circumcision overrides Shabbat is derived from a verse. Once there is a verse establishing that circumcision overrides Shabbat, one can derive by an a fortiori inference that saving a life overrides Shabbat.
The Gemara then examines whether Rabbi Yohanan’s derivation from “on the day” can be applied elsewhere. There are cases involving a person who is lacking atonement and must bring a sacrifice. The verse there also says “on the day.” Perhaps that expression teaches that the sacrifice may be brought during the day but not at night. If so, it is not available to teach that the sacrifice overrides Shabbat; it is needed to distinguish day from night.
One might respond that another verse already teaches that sacrifices are brought during the day. The verse says, “On the day of his offering,” and this teaches that all sacrifices are offered during the day. If so, the expression “on the day” in the passage concerning the person lacking atonement could be used to teach something else, such as that the sacrifice may be brought even on Shabbat.
The Gemara rejects that possibility. The repeated expression “on the day” is needed because the sacrifice of a person lacking atonement has a special feature: even a poor person can bring the less expensive offering. One might have thought that because the Torah is lenient regarding the cost of the offering, it is also lenient regarding other restrictions and permits the sacrifice to be brought at night. The additional verse therefore teaches that, despite the financial leniency, the sacrifice must still be brought during the day.
At this point, another difficulty arises. If that verse is needed to teach that the sacrifice must be brought during the day, perhaps it should also permit other normally disqualified people to bring the sacrifice. If the Torah makes an exception for a poor person, why should it not also make an exception for an impure person, or for a priest who is an onen?
The answer is that the verse specifically teaches “during the day and not at night.” It does not come to remove any other disqualification. The possibility that night might be permitted is rejected, and once that possibility is rejected, the other disqualifications remain in force as well. The verse is limited to the distinction between day and night.
The Gemara then considers a derivation from the word “eighth.” Perhaps the phrase “on the eighth day” teaches that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat. But the word “eighth” is already needed to exclude the seventh day and to establish that the circumcision takes place specifically on the eighth day.
Moreover, two expressions are needed to exclude both the seventh and the ninth days. If there were only one expression, one might have thought that the circumcision could not take place on the seventh day but could take place beginning on the eighth day and continuing afterward. The wording therefore establishes both that the seventh day is too early and that the ninth day is too late. Consequently, the word “eighth” cannot be used to teach that circumcision overrides Shabbat.
We are therefore left with two principal sources for the law that circumcision overrides Shabbat: Rabbi Nachman’s threefold verbal analogy involving “sign,” “covenant,” and “generations,” and Rabbi Yohanan’s derivation from “on the day.” The attempt to derive the law from a tradition given to Moses at Sinai was rejected, and the attempt to derive it from the word “eighth” was also rejected.
The Gemara brings a baraita in support of Rabbi Yohanan and against Rabbi Yaakov, who had derived the law from the word “eighth.” The baraita begins by saying that “on the eighth day” teaches that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat. It then discusses another expression that might appear to exclude Shabbat. The Gemara asks what the initial reasoning of the baraita was and why it later reconsidered its conclusion.
Why would the baraita initially say that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat and then turn around and suggest that perhaps Shabbat is excluded? The answer is that the initial position was based on an a fortiori inference.
The proposed inference was as follows. The affliction of leprosy overrides the Temple service. A priest who has such an affliction cannot perform the service, and the presence of the affliction can prevent the offering of a communal sacrifice. The Temple service, in turn, overrides Shabbat, because the daily and additional communal offerings are brought even on Shabbat. Circumcision overrides the affliction, because if the affected area is on the place of circumcision, the circumcision is performed even though doing so removes the affected flesh. From this chain, one might conclude that circumcision should certainly override Shabbat: the affliction is more stringent than the Temple service, the Temple service overrides Shabbat, and circumcision overrides the affliction.
That was the initial reasoning of the baraita. But then the baraita reconsidered the first link. Who says that the affliction is more stringent than the Temple service? Perhaps Shabbat is more stringent, since Shabbat contains many prohibitions and carries severe punishments. The fact that the affliction prevents a priest from serving does not necessarily prove that it is intrinsically more stringent than the Temple service.
There is another reason the affliction might prevent the priest from serving. Even if the affected area were removed, the priest would still be impure and would have to wait until nightfall. Therefore, perhaps the reason he cannot serve is not that the affliction is more stringent than the Temple service, but simply that removing it would not solve the practical problem. Since the first link in the chain is uncertain, the entire a fortiori inference collapses.
The baraita then applies the same type of analysis to the relationship between circumcision and the affliction. We had assumed that circumcision overrides the affliction because the verse says that one must guard against the affliction, and the positive commandment of circumcision overrides that prohibition. But perhaps the matter is not so simple.
The initial thought is based on the general principle that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. The positive commandment is, “He shall be circumcised,” while the negative commandment concerning the affliction is, “Take care regarding the affliction.” Since the circumcision and the affliction occur at the same time, the positive commandment of circumcision should override the prohibition.
But the verse concerning the affliction may contain both a positive and a negative commandment. It is not merely a prohibition; it also commands a person to observe the laws of the affliction. The usual rule that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment applies when there is one positive commandment against one negative commandment. Here, however, there may be both a positive and a negative commandment on the side of the affliction. That is why the baraita reconsidered its initial conclusion.
The baraita therefore has to explain what the commandment to observe the affliction means. It refers to following the laws of the affliction as they are set out in the Torah. Once the positive commandment and the negative commandment are both taken into account, the matter is no longer a straightforward case of a positive commandment overriding a negative commandment.
The Gemara then offers another explanation of the initial and final positions of the baraita. Perhaps circumcision overrides the affliction because of a comparison with Shabbat. Shabbat is more stringent than the affliction, and yet circumcision overrides Shabbat. Therefore, circumcision should certainly override the affliction.
But again, the comparison can be challenged. The fact that a certain aspect of the Temple service overrides Shabbat does not necessarily show that Shabbat is less stringent than the affliction. Perhaps the affliction is more stringent in the relevant respect, or perhaps its effect on the priest is due to impurity rather than to the severity of the affliction itself. Once that possibility is raised, the a fortiori inference is no longer conclusive.
The baraita’s initial reasoning was therefore that circumcision overrides the affliction, and that the affliction is more stringent than the Temple service, while the Temple service overrides Shabbat. But its later reconsideration was that the assumptions underlying that chain had not been established. Perhaps Shabbat is more stringent, or perhaps the affliction does not prevent service because of its intrinsic severity. In either case, the a fortiori inference cannot prove that circumcision overrides Shabbat.
The Gemara also presents a different approach. Perhaps the law that circumcision overrides the affliction is derived from the general principle that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. The commandment of circumcision is the positive commandment, and the commandment concerning the affliction supplies the prohibition. But the reconsideration is that the passage concerning the affliction includes both positive and negative elements, so the ordinary rule does not apply in its simple form.
At this stage, the Gemara returns to the verse concerning circumcision. It says that the flesh must be circumcised even when the affected area is present. The verse itself establishes that circumcision overrides the affliction. The question is then how far that principle extends: Does it apply only to a circumcision performed on the eighth day, or does it also apply to a circumcision performed after the proper time?
Regarding an adult, the verse says that his uncircumcised flesh must be circumcised. This teaches that even an adult circumcision performed after the proper time overrides the affliction. Regarding a child circumcised on the eighth day, the verse says that on the eighth day his flesh must be circumcised. That teaches that the circumcision at the proper time also overrides the affliction.
There remains an intermediate case: a circumcision performed after the proper time but before the person has reached adulthood. For example, what is the source that a circumcision on the ninth day overrides the affliction? It cannot be derived entirely from the case of an adult, because an adult circumcision involves the severe consequence of being liable for excision if one remains uncircumcised. Nor can it be derived entirely from the case of a child circumcised on the eighth day, because that case has the special feature that the circumcision is being performed at its proper time.
The answer is to derive the intermediate case from a common denominator shared by the two cases. Both the adult circumcision and the circumcision of a child on the eighth day override the affliction. We set aside the special stringency of the adult case and the special feature of the circumcision performed at the proper time. What remains common to both is that the person is required to be circumcised, and the circumcision overrides the affliction. From that common denominator, we derive that a circumcision performed after the proper time but before adulthood also overrides the affliction.
Thus, the Gemara ultimately establishes the relevant principle through the combination of the adult case and the child’s circumcision at the proper time. The common denominator teaches that the presence of the affliction does not prevent a required circumcision, whether the circumcision is performed at the proper time, after the proper time in the case of a child, or in the case of an adult.
These discussions explain both the source of circumcision on Shabbat and the relationship between circumcision and the other laws that may conflict with it. The Gemara considers a tradition from Sinai, several verbal analogies, derivations from the words “on the day” and “eighth,” and a series of a fortiori inferences. Each proposed source is examined carefully, and each is accepted or rejected according to the precise distinctions between circumcision at the proper time, circumcision after the proper time, an adult circumcision, Shabbat, the Temple service, and the laws of the affliction.