Today’s study of Shabbat, page 142, is dedicated by Benjamin Stabrash for the recovery of Ashirema and all the ill among Israel. Amen. The study is also in memory of Shimon ben Julia. Today we begin the twenty-first chapter, with the Mishnah.
The Mishnah teaches that a person may carry his child even though the child is carrying a stone. Similarly, if a basket contains produce together with a stone, one may carry the basket. The same applies when a basket contains pure terumah together with impure terumah, or pure terumah together with ordinary produce. Although the items are mixed together, one may carry them.
Impure terumah normally has no permitted use for an Israelite; it is supposed to be burned. Nevertheless, it may be carried together with ordinary produce or with pure terumah. Rabbi Yehudah says that one may even elevate the status of a mixture of terumah on Shabbat when the proportion is one part terumah to one hundred parts ordinary produce. Since terumah becomes nullified only in a hundred parts, one may add the necessary amount on Shabbat, thereby making the mixture permissible for non-Kohanim to eat.
Rashi explains that when a child carries a stone, the discussion is not about carrying from one domain to another. The child is being carried within a private domain, so the issue is whether the stone is considered an independent object of prohibited carrying, or whether it is subordinate to the child. The Mishnah teaches that the stone is subordinate to the child.
With regard to impure terumah, the Mishnah is saying more than merely allowing one to carry the mixture. Once the terumah has become mixed with ordinary produce, one must remove one seah from the mixture and designate it for the Kohen. Although the entire mixture is technically affected by the terumah, we treat one portion as the terumah that belongs to the Kohen. The Mishnah permits this arrangement on Shabbat, even though one is thereby making the remainder edible.
The Gemara begins with a statement of Rav: if a person carries a living child into the public domain and the child has a purse hanging from his neck, the person is liable for carrying the purse. He is not liable for carrying the child, because a living person carries himself. However, the purse is considered an important object, and the person is liable for carrying it.
The Gemara then considers the parallel case of a dead child with a purse hanging from his neck. In that case the person is exempt. There is no principle that the dead child carries himself. The Gemara explains that the exemption is for a different reason: moving the dead child is a labor that is not needed for its own purpose. The person is not transporting the child because he needs the child at the destination; he is merely removing the child from where he is. This is a labor whose result is not needed for its usual purpose.
The Gemara asks why, in the case of a living child carrying a purse, the purse is not considered subordinate to the child. If a person carrying a living child is not liable because the child carries himself, perhaps the purse should also be subordinate to the child, just as a bed or stretcher is subordinate to the person lying on it.
The Gemara answers that a bed is subordinate to the person because the person needs the bed in order to be carried. The purse, however, is not an integral part of the child. Although the child may be holding it or playing with it, it is an independent and important object. Therefore, the child is considered to carry himself, while the adult is considered to be carrying the purse.
This returns us to the stone in the Mishnah. Why is the stone subordinate to the child, while the purse is not? The Gemara explains that the Mishnah is dealing with a special circumstance. The child wants his father to pick him up, is crying, and may become ill if his father does not do so. Because of this concern, the Sages suspended the rabbinic prohibition of moving an object that is normally forbidden to move. Ordinarily, the stone would not be subordinate to the child, just as the purse is not. In this particular case, however, the Sages were lenient because of the child’s distress and possible illness.
It is not enough simply to say that the prohibition is rabbinic and that the Sages can therefore be lenient. A specific reason is needed for setting aside the ordinary rule. The general principle remains that an object held by the person being carried is considered as though the carrier himself is carrying it. The leniency for the stone is therefore limited to the circumstances described by the Mishnah.
The Gemara raises another possibility. Perhaps the Mishnah is referring only to an object whose prohibition is rabbinic. The answer is that even when the prohibition is rabbinic, the Sages ordinarily establish their rules according to the same logical principles that apply to Torah prohibitions. Therefore, the mere fact that the prohibition is rabbinic does not automatically eliminate the distinction between the stone and the purse.
The Gemara next discusses the case of a child holding money. If a child is holding a stone and the father carries him, one might be lenient because the father will not care if the stone falls. He will not stop to retrieve it. If the child is holding money, however, the father may stop to pick it up if it falls. Therefore, the same leniency cannot be applied to money.
The Gemara responds that a stone is different because, if it falls, the father will not retrieve it. Money is different because the father will want to recover it. The concern is therefore not only the object itself, but also what the father may do if the child drops it. This is not a matter of danger to life; it is a concern that the person may come to carry the money. In a case of danger to life, the restrictions would not apply in this way.
The discussion also touches on preventive treatment. One does not always have to wait until a person becomes dangerously ill before taking action. If a person has a known medical condition and failing to take medication will predictably lead to illness—for example, a diabetic who needs insulin—he may take the medication beforehand. The fact that the illness has not yet developed does not require him to wait. The case of the child in the Mishnah is similar in that the concern is that the child may become ill if he is not picked up.
The Gemara then cites a teaching concerning clothing and jewelry. If a person carries clothing folded over his shoulder, or carries shoes or rings in his hand rather than wearing them, he is liable for carrying them. They are not considered clothing or jewelry when they are not being worn. If, however, the person being carried is wearing the clothing, shoes, or jewelry, the carrier is exempt with regard to those items, because they are subordinate to the person wearing them.
But if the person being carried is holding clothing, shoes, or a ring, the carrier is liable for those objects. This supports the principle that whatever the lower person is carrying is considered as though the upper person—the one carrying him—is carrying it. The same applies to a child holding a stone or a purse.
The Gemara distinguishes between an object held in the palm and an object worn on the fingers. The first verse uses the singular expression “in his hand,” which refers to the palm. The later expression uses the plural form “in his hands,” which refers to the fingers. Thus, the wording distinguishes between carrying an object in the hand and wearing it on the fingers.
The exemption for carrying a person who is wearing clothing does not mean that carrying a living person is entirely permitted. A living person carries himself, but this is still prohibited rabbinically. People sometimes mistakenly think that because a person carries himself, one may freely carry a child in the public domain. The Mishnah Berurah, citing the Chafetz Chaim, emphasizes that this is not correct. Nevertheless, in a situation where people will not listen if they are told the full prohibition, one may sometimes avoid turning an inadvertent violation into an intentional one. Outside such circumstances, however, people must be taught that carrying a living person remains prohibited.
The Mishnah’s next case concerns a basket containing a stone together with produce. At first glance, the basket should be a base for a forbidden object. Since the stone is resting in the basket, perhaps the entire basket should become forbidden to move.
The Gemara answers that the basket is a base for both a permitted and a forbidden object. Since the produce is more important than the stone, the permitted object is the primary object, and the stone is subordinate to it. The basket may therefore be carried.
The Gemara asks why one may not simply remove the produce from the basket, allowing the stone to fall out, and then return the produce to the basket. The answer is that the Mishnah is dealing with soft, ripe produce, such as grapes or figs, which would be damaged if thrown onto the ground. One might suggest removing the produce gently, but the Gemara explains that this does not solve every case. Sometimes the stone is lodged in the basket or is needed to block a hole, so it remains connected to the basket.
Ultimately, the stone is permitted because it is treated as subordinate to the basket itself, or to the walls of the basket. The basket is a permitted utensil, and the stone is no longer viewed as an independent rock but as part of the basket. Therefore, the basket remains permitted to move.
This also means that the basket can be moved even without produce inside it. The initial discussion assumed that the produce was the permitted object that made the basket a base for a permitted and forbidden object. But once we understand that the stone has become part of the basket, the basket itself is a permitted utensil. It is not forbidden merely because it is empty.
The Mishnah also permits carrying a basket containing pure terumah together with impure terumah, or pure terumah together with ordinary produce. The Gemara asks what case is being discussed. If the pure terumah is on top, one can simply remove it. If it is on the bottom, one must move the entire basket in order to reach it.
Rav Chisda explains that the Mishnah is discussing a case in which the pure terumah is needed for its own sake. If it is on top, one takes it out directly. If it is on the bottom, one may move the entire basket in order to reach it. Again, if the produce is so soft that it would be ruined by being poured onto the ground, removing it is not an available solution.
A baraita seems to say that the basket may be carried whether the pure terumah is on top or on the bottom. The Gemara answers that the baraita is discussing a person who needs the location occupied by the basket. In that case, it does not matter what is on top or on the bottom; the entire basket must be moved to clear the place. The Mishnah, however, is discussing a person who needs the terumah itself. Therefore, the position of the pure terumah makes a difference.
The distinction is between needing the object itself and needing the place it occupies. When one needs the place, the entire basket may be moved regardless of its contents. When one needs the pure terumah, one should remove it directly if possible. Only when it is inaccessible may the entire basket be moved.
The Gemara supports this reading from the final clause of the Mishnah, which discusses money lying on a pillow. If a person needs the pillow, he may shake the money off and then use the pillow. This clearly concerns needing the place of the money, rather than needing the money itself. Since the final clause concerns the need for the object’s place, the first clause must also be read as dealing with a defined need rather than as a general permission to move any basket under all circumstances.
Rabbi Yehudah then teaches that one may elevate a mixture of terumah on Shabbat. The case is that a seah of pure terumah fell into one hundred seahs of ordinary produce. The terumah is not fully nullified until one removes a seah and designates it for the Kohen. The remainder is then permitted for non-Kohanim to eat. Rabbi Yehudah permits performing this act on Shabbat, even though the food thereby becomes edible.
The Gemara asks how this can be permitted. It appears to be a prohibited act of rectification: before the seah is removed, the mixture may not be eaten; after it is removed, the mixture becomes permitted. The Gemara considers whether Rabbi Yehudah is following the view that the terumah is regarded as though it is already separate from the mixture.
A Mishnah in Trumot discusses a seah of terumah that fell into less than one hundred seahs of ordinary produce. The mixture becomes forbidden. If part of that mixture then falls into another mixture, the second mixture must contain one hundred times the amount of terumah that fell into it. The first seah is treated as though it remains a complete seah of terumah, rather than as though it has been reduced proportionally by the first mixture.
At first, one might have thought that only the proportion of terumah contained in the first mixture should be considered. If a seah of terumah fell into sixty seahs, perhaps only one-sixtieth of the seah that later fell into the second mixture should be treated as terumah, requiring one hundred times that smaller amount for nullification. The teaching rejects this. The seah that leaves the first mixture is treated as a complete seah of terumah, as though it were standing separately.
The Gemara asks whether this principle can be used for a leniency. Perhaps it was stated only to produce a stringency. The answer is not immediately clear, and the Gemara searches for a source showing that terumah may be regarded as separate even for a leniency.
One possible source is a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon. If one seah of terumah falls into one hundred seahs and is not removed, and another seah of terumah then falls into the mixture, Rabbi Yehudah says that the mixture is forbidden because the two seahs combine. Rabbi Shimon permits it, because the first seah is regarded as standing separately, and the second seah falls into one hundred seahs of ordinary produce and is nullified.
One explanation of Rabbi Shimon is that each seah is nullified separately. The first seah becomes nullified in the original hundred, and the second seah then falls into a mixture that is already permitted. Thus, one may continue to add small amounts, each of which becomes nullified in the larger mixture.
However, the Gemara says that this does not necessarily prove that the principle of regarding terumah as separate is used for every leniency. Rabbi Shimon may have a different explanation. The Gemara therefore examines another teaching in which Rabbi Yehudah explicitly permits removing the terumah.
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that when one seah of terumah falls into one hundred seahs of ordinary produce, one need not physically remove it. It is sufficient to designate one side as containing the terumah and eat from the other side. Rabbi Yehudah, however, says that one may raise the mixture by removing the terumah itself. This appears to show that Rabbi Yehudah requires an actual act of separation, while Rabbi Shimon is satisfied with designation.
One might therefore say that Rabbi Yehudah is more lenient than Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon says that the terumah must remain in place and that one may simply eat from the other side. Rabbi Yehudah says that because the terumah is already considered separate in principle, one may even remove it physically. The removal is not viewed as creating the permission; the permission already exists, and the removal merely expresses it.
This distinction is important for Shabbat. If the food becomes permitted only through the act of removing the terumah, the act may appear to be prohibited rectification. If, however, the terumah is already regarded as separate and the remaining mixture is already permitted in principle, the removal is not considered a new act of rectification.
The Gemara then returns to the case of the stone on a barrel. If the stone is placed on top of a barrel and a person needs the wine, he should not lift the barrel immediately. He should tilt it so that the stone falls off, after which he may take the wine. If the barrel is located among other barrels and tilting it would cause the stone to fall onto another barrel and damage it, he may lift the entire barrel, move it away from the other barrels, and then tilt it.
The question is why one may move the barrel while it still carries the stone. Why not remove the stone directly? The answer is that when one has a choice between moving a permitted object together with a forbidden object and moving the forbidden object by itself, one should handle the permitted object. In this case, the barrel is permitted and the stone is the forbidden object. Therefore, one moves the barrel with the stone rather than lifting the stone alone.
The Gemara compares this to the laws of separating food from refuse on Yom Tov. Beit Shammai says that one removes the edible food and eats it, leaving the refuse behind. Beit Hillel permits separating in the ordinary manner when the edible food is more abundant than the refuse. The guiding principle is to choose the method that involves the least exertion and the least direct handling of the forbidden material.
If the refuse is more abundant, one removes the edible portion. If the edible portion is more abundant, one may remove the refuse. The same principle is applied here: one should choose the method that involves less exertion and that handles the permitted object rather than the forbidden one.
In the barrel case, although there is more wine than stone by quantity, the stone is an obstacle that prevents access to the wine at the bottom. If the person wants all the wine, he will eventually have to lift the barrel anyway. Therefore, the stone is treated as the more significant obstruction, and moving the barrel with the stone is the preferable method. If there were a spigot or another way to obtain all the wine without lifting the barrel, the analysis could be different.
When the barrel is among other barrels, the Mishnah says that one may lift it and move it far enough away to avoid damaging the surrounding barrels. The Gemara adds that he may return it to its original place afterward. The permission is not limited to moving it away permanently; once the barrel has been moved in the permitted manner, it may be returned.
The Gemara then returns to money lying on a pillow. Ordinarily, the pillow might be considered a base for the money, and therefore forbidden to move. The Mishnah nevertheless permits shaking the money off when the person needs the pillow. The Gemara explains that this concerns a case in which the money was placed on the pillow without the intention that it remain there for Shabbat. A base is created only when the forbidden object is intentionally placed there with the intention of remaining there during the onset of Shabbat.
If the money was placed there temporarily and the person intended to remove it before Shabbat but forgot, the pillow does not necessarily become a base. Therefore, he may shake the money off and use the pillow.
The Gemara discusses a person who forgot a wallet containing money in an exposed place and is concerned that it will be stolen. He may place a loaf of bread or a child on the wallet and move the wallet together with the permitted object. The wallet is thereby moved incidentally through a permitted object.
This is a significant principle: in certain circumstances, one may create a base for a permitted object on Shabbat itself. The wallet was already holding the money, but when bread is placed on it, the bread becomes the permitted and more important object for the purpose of moving it. The preference is not necessarily because the bread has greater monetary value; it is because the bread has a permitted use on Shabbat, while the money does not.
The same principle applies to a brick or another object that is normally not useful. If a person forgot a brick in a place where it needs to be removed, he may place a loaf of bread or a child on it and move it together with the permitted object. The leniency applies because the object is being moved for the sake of the permitted item placed upon it.
There is, however, an important limitation. The permission to move a forbidden object with bread or a child was stated in the case of a corpse. A corpse is difficult to move, and the Sages permitted placing bread or a child on it so that it could be moved. The same leniency should not automatically be extended to every ordinary object that one forgot to put away before Shabbat.
The Gemara discusses a person who found a sack of money in the public domain. Since he cannot simply carry the money, he may move it in stages, stopping every four cubits. The discussion concerns whether the object may be moved in this way and whether the presence of a permitted object changes the status of the money.
Rav Mordechai says that one may rely on these leniencies only when the object was genuinely forgotten. One may not deliberately leave a wallet in the public domain before Shabbat with the plan of placing bread or a child on it later. These permissions address an unexpected situation, not a planned method of moving forbidden objects.
The Gemara also discusses placing a spoon on raw wheat or a knife on raw meat in order to move the material. Rav Yosef criticizes people who think they have found a clever leniency. If the wheat can itself be used as a place to sit or rest, and the meat is suitable for an animal, there may be no need for such a device. The object is not necessarily forbidden to move in the first place.
Rav’s servant was instructed to roast the inner parts of an animal and give them to a cat. This shows that food that is unsuitable for a person but suitable for an animal may still have a permitted use. However, the Gemara distinguishes between food that was designated before Yom Tov for an animal and food that was originally intended for human consumption but later became less suitable.
If a person had already intended before Yom Tov to give the inner parts to an animal, they were prepared for that use and are not considered forbidden to move. If he had intended to use them for human consumption and only later decided to give them to an animal, the change may create a problem of an object that came into a new status on Yom Tov.
The Gemara gives a similar example involving pieces of wood that broke on Yom Tov. Wood prepared as a utensil and then broken may become fuel, but the change in status can be considered a new occurrence. This is the principle of an object acquiring a new status on Yom Tov. The discussion indicates that Rav follows the stringent opinion of Rabbi Yehudah in matters of such changes.
The practical distinction is whether the object was already designated for its present use before Shabbat or Yom Tov. If it was prepared for that use in advance, it may be available for use. If its status changed only after Shabbat or Yom Tov began, it may be considered newly created for that purpose and therefore forbidden.
The Gemara’s discussion of the raw meat therefore depends on the intention that existed before Yom Tov. If the inner parts were always intended for the cat, they were prepared for that use. If they were originally meant for a person and only afterward became animal food, they may retain the more restrictive status. This is why the Gemara examines precisely what Rav had said before Yom Tov.
The central themes of these cases are the distinction between a permitted object and a forbidden object, the principle that an object may be subordinate to the person or utensil carrying it, the difference between needing an object and needing its location, and the role of intention before Shabbat. The Gemara repeatedly looks for the least burdensome way to handle the situation while preserving the underlying rules of carrying, forbidden objects, bases, and rectification.