Today we begin the Gemara in Shabbat, on page 61b, beginning with the bottom line: “Ulla said: According to the one who says that a definite guilt-offering requires prior knowledge...” We now begin a new subject: the laws of the guilt-offering.
There is a major dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon. Let us begin with the regular case. A person is uncertain whether he committed a transgression. For example, he does not know whether he ate forbidden fat. What does he do? He brings what is called a pending guilt-offering. “Pending” means that the matter remains unresolved. He does not want to be punished, so he brings an offering just in case he ate the forbidden fat. He is essentially buying time: “Let me bring this offering now, while the matter is still pending, until I find out exactly what I did.”
At that point, he does not yet know whether he committed the transgression. Then, two months later, he discovers that he did in fact eat the forbidden fat. The standard law is that he now brings a sin-offering. The pending guilt-offering was brought when he was uncertain, and the sin-offering is brought once he knows that he sinned.
Now let us consider a different case. A person has two pieces of meat in front of him. One is consecrated and one is ordinary. He eats one piece, but he does not know which one he ate. If he ate the consecrated meat, he must repay the principal and add a fifth, and he must also bring a guilt-offering. The question is what he should do while he is still uncertain.
According to one opinion, the case follows the same pattern as the previous one. He first brings a pending guilt-offering. He does not yet repay the principal and the additional fifth, because he does not know whether he ate the consecrated meat. Once he discovers that he did eat it, Rabbi Akiva says that he brings a definite guilt-offering and then pays the principal and the additional fifth.
Rabbi Tarfon disagrees. In the case of a sin-offering, I understand why the person must first discover that he sinned before bringing the definitive offering. The pending sin-offering and the definite sin-offering are different types of offerings. In this case, however, the pending guilt-offering and the definite guilt-offering are the same type of offering. Therefore, Rabbi Tarfon says that he should bring one offering now and make the following stipulation: “If I did not eat the consecrated meat, this offering is a voluntary offering. If I did eat the consecrated meat, let this offering serve as my definite guilt-offering.” At the same time, he should repay the principal and the additional fifth.
According to Rabbi Tarfon, the person may bring a definite guilt-offering without prior knowledge of the transgression. That is a distinction between a guilt-offering and a sin-offering. With a sin-offering, knowledge that the person sinned is required. With a guilt-offering, according to Rabbi Tarfon, one may bring the definite offering conditionally even before knowing exactly what happened.
The Gemara now wants to establish an important principle from this case. Here we are dealing precisely with a person who ate one of two pieces and does not know whether the piece he ate was consecrated or ordinary. He has no knowledge that he ate consecrated meat, and yet Rabbi Tarfon allows him to bring a definite guilt-offering, at least conditionally. What does that prove? It seems that prior knowledge does not play a role in the laws of guilt-offerings.
If knowledge does not divide cases with regard to guilt-offerings, perhaps the same should be true of a person who had relations with a designated maidservant. The punishment in that case is also a guilt-offering. Suppose he had relations with her five times, and he had knowledge between each act—that is, he knew after each act that he had committed the transgression. If prior knowledge does not divide guilt-offerings into separate obligations, perhaps he should bring only one offering.
Normally, with sin-offerings, we have the principle that separate acts of knowledge divide the transgressions. If a person committed the same transgression five times and became aware of each act separately, he brings a separate sin-offering for each one. The question is whether the same principle applies to guilt-offerings.
The case of the designated maidservant is particularly significant because the Torah specifies a special offering in that situation. If a person had relations with her several times, the question is whether each act generates a separate obligation or whether one offering covers everything. If only one offering is required, that would support the principle that knowledge does not divide obligations in the realm of guilt-offerings.
The Gemara responds that the case involved five acts, with knowledge between each one. The crucial point is that, according to the opinion being cited, the person brought the definite guilt-offering without prior knowledge that he had eaten consecrated meat. From this we might infer that knowledge has no role in guilt-offerings and therefore does not divide the obligations.
But Rav Minuna challenges this conclusion. If that is true, then the principle should extend even further. Suppose a person set aside an offering and then committed another act of the same transgression. He tells the priest, “Wait before offering it. I may forget again, so let me keep it aside and add another act.” If separate acts of knowledge do not divide the obligations, then an act committed after the offering was set aside should also be included in the same offering. Why should the act after the designation of the offering be any worse than an act that followed a separate awareness?
In other words, if prior knowledge does not divide the obligations, perhaps even an act committed after the offering was designated should be covered by that same offering. The person would have intended the offering to atone for the earlier and later acts together.
Ulla responds that the comparison goes too far. He did not say that an act committed after the offering was designated is included. The designation of the offering concludes the earlier matter. Once the offering has been set aside, anything done afterward creates a new obligation. Ulla’s statement applies only to the question of whether prior knowledge divides the acts; it does not apply after the designation of the offering.
Rav Dimi later cites this discussion. According to Rabbi Akiva, a definite guilt-offering requires prior knowledge. In the case of the two pieces of meat, where the person does not know whether he ate the consecrated piece, Rabbi Akiva requires him to bring a pending guilt-offering first. Once he discovers that he ate the consecrated meat, he must bring a definite guilt-offering. Thus, according to Rabbi Akiva, knowledge does play a role in the laws of definite guilt-offerings.
Rav Dimi then asks: If a person had five acts with the designated maidservant and had knowledge between each one, should he be liable for five offerings? If knowledge divides the obligations for guilt-offerings, it would seem that each act should require its own offering.
But this seems difficult. Everyone agrees that, in the case of a sin-offering, prior knowledge is required. Nevertheless, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish about whether separate acts of knowledge divide the obligations in the case of the designated maidservant. If even in the realm of sin-offerings there is a dispute about whether knowledge divides the acts, how can we say so confidently that knowledge divides obligations in the realm of guilt-offerings?
We learned previously that if a person ate one measure of forbidden fat, then another measure, and had knowledge between the two acts, Rabbi Yohanan says that the knowledge divides them, while Resh Lakish says that it does not. Therefore, perhaps the same dispute applies here. Why assume that everyone agrees that the five acts with the designated maidservant generate five separate obligations?
One possible answer is that the case concerns acts committed after the offering was designated. According to the earlier explanation, everyone agrees that once the offering has been set aside, the matter is closed. Any act committed afterward is a new obligation. That would explain why the person is liable separately for each act with the designated maidservant.
Rav Dimi says that everyone agrees regarding the designated maidservant, but there is a dispute in another case. He presents the matter as a three-part riddle: sometimes everyone agrees that there is one obligation, sometimes everyone agrees that there are separate obligations, and sometimes there is a dispute.
According to Ulla, everyone agrees in the case of the designated maidservant that there is only one obligation when the acts occurred before the offering was designated. That follows Rabbi Tarfon, who says that prior knowledge does not play a role in the definite guilt-offering. Since knowledge does not divide the acts, five acts would generate only one offering.
According to Rav Minuna, everyone agrees in the case of the designated maidservant that there are separate obligations when the acts occurred after the offering was designated. Even Resh Lakish would agree that the offering designated earlier cannot cover later acts. The dispute would concern the case in which the person had five acts and knowledge between them, but before designating the offering.
In that case, according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that a definite guilt-offering requires prior knowledge, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish. Rabbi Yohanan says that knowledge divides the acts, while Resh Lakish says that it does not. Thus, the three statements are not contradictory. They describe three different situations: a case in which everyone agrees that one offering is sufficient, a case in which everyone agrees that separate offerings are required, and a case in which the authorities dispute the effect of knowledge.
The commentary explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, everyone agrees that knowledge does not divide the acts, because knowledge has no role in the definite guilt-offering. Everyone also agrees that designation of the offering does divide the acts. The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish arises according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that prior knowledge is required for a definite guilt-offering. Rabbi Yohanan maintains that knowledge divides the acts even in the case of the sin-offering, while Resh Lakish maintains that it does not.
The discussion then turns to the principle of an unintended act on Shabbat. A person intends to pick up a detached knife lying on the floor. Picking it up would be permitted. Instead, he accidentally pulls out an object that is attached to the ground. His intention was to perform a permitted act, but he performed a prohibited act. This person is called one who is occupied with an unintended act: his intention and the act he performed do not correspond.
The Gemara asks: Is this considered an ordinary inadvertent act? No. It is a case in which he was occupied with a permitted act. Give us a case of a regular inadvertent act. The answer is that he intended to cut something that was detached, but he mistakenly cut something attached. His intention was directed toward a prohibited type of act, but he mistakenly performed it in a different way or on a different object.
The question is whether the person is liable when his intention was to perform one act and he actually performed another. The discussion distinguishes between an unintended act in the context of something permitted and an inadvertent act in the context of something prohibited.
The Gemara then discusses a person who intended to throw an object two cubits in a private domain, where throwing it that distance would be permitted, but he accidentally threw it four cubits in a public domain. Some authorities say he is exempt because his intention was only to throw two cubits. Others say he is liable because the object passed through the prohibited distance on its way to four cubits. This becomes another dispute regarding the relationship between intention and the act that was ultimately performed.
Before continuing, the discussion compares the severity of Shabbat with the severity of other commandments. There are aspects in which Shabbat is more stringent than other commandments, and aspects in which other commandments are more stringent than Shabbat. We are looking specifically at an inadvertent act performed without the intention to carry out the prohibited act.
With regard to other commandments, a person may be liable even when he did not know that the object or practice before him was prohibited. For example, a person may eat forbidden fat while thinking that it is ordinary fat. His intention was to eat ordinary fat, but he actually ate forbidden fat. Since he benefited from eating it, he may be liable for a sin-offering.
The parallel case on Shabbat is a person who intends to pick up a detached object but accidentally pulls out something attached. Since he did not intend to perform the prohibited labor, he is exempt according to the relevant opinion. This demonstrates one way in which Shabbat is more lenient: in certain cases, an unintended prohibited act does not create liability.
The Gemara asks for a case in which another commandment is more stringent than Shabbat. The proposed example is idolatry. If a person performs two different forms of service for an idol, he may be liable for only one offering, because all forms of service to the same idol are included under one general prohibition. The question is whether this can provide the parallel case.
A person once thought that an idol was actually a synagogue. He bowed to it and worshipped it because he thought he was serving God. In such a case, he would not be liable for idolatry, because his intention was to serve Heaven. That cannot be the example of an inadvertent act that creates liability.
Another possibility is that he bowed to a statue of a king. The statue itself was not necessarily being worshipped as a deity; people bowed to it out of respect for the king. If he bowed while believing that the king was a deity, then he would be considered intentional. If he did not believe it was a deity, then he did not perform an act of idolatry. Again, this does not provide the required case.
The Gemara therefore suggests a person who believed that idolatry was permitted. For example, a convert who grew up among non-Jews may not have known that a particular object was an idol. Even though he did not know that such a prohibition existed, he can still be liable for idolatry. This is more stringent than Shabbat, where a comparable lack of knowledge can result in exemption.
The discussion distinguishes between a regular inadvertent act and a person who never knew that the prohibition existed. In an ordinary inadvertent act, the person once knew the law and forgot it. Here, the person never knew that the prohibition existed at all. Nevertheless, with regard to idolatry, he can be liable.
The Gemara challenges this comparison. Perhaps the case is not speaking about a person who never knew that idolatry was prohibited. Perhaps it is speaking about someone who knew the prohibition but thought that the particular action was permitted. In that case, the comparison to Shabbat must be examined carefully.
We previously learned about a person who did not know either that it was Shabbat or that certain labors were prohibited. There was a dispute whether he brings one offering or more, but no one said that he is liable without limitation. Therefore, the proposed distinction cannot be based simply on a person’s complete lack of knowledge. The Gemara continues by searching for the precise difference between the case of Shabbat and the case of idolatry.
The discussion then returns to the laws of Shabbat and the thirty-nine primary labors. The Mishnah lists thirty-nine primary categories of labor. If a person performs all thirty-nine, he is liable for each one. The first categories are sowing, plowing, harvesting, gathering, threshing, winnowing, selecting, grinding, sifting, kneading, and baking.
Sowing includes planting or otherwise causing growth. Harvesting is cutting the grain or other growing material. Gathering refers to collecting the cut stalks and bringing them together. Threshing is separating the usable grain from the stalk or husk. Winnowing is throwing the material into the air so that the wind carries away the chaff while the grain falls back down. Selecting is separating the unwanted material from the useful material. Grinding reduces the grain to flour, sifting separates the flour through a sieve, kneading combines the flour with liquid, and baking completes the preparation of the food.
The next categories involve preparing wool and fabric. Shearing is removing the wool from an animal. Washing or whitening is cleaning the wool, often by placing it in water. Combing is removing knots and arranging the fibers. Dyeing gives the material a color. Spinning turns the fibers into thread.
There is then the work of preparing the loom. One category involves setting up the threads of the loom, and another involves placing the threads through the openings in the frames. The long threads are called the warp, and the threads that pass across them are called the weft. The warp is stretched through the wooden frames, and the weft is passed over and under it in order to create the fabric.
The frame itself is called the loom frame, and the openings through which the threads pass are made in that framework. Two sets of threads are placed through the openings, one in front of the other, so that the threads can be separated and the cross-thread can pass between them. Setting up the loom, placing the threads in the openings, weaving two threads, and separating two threads are all distinct stages of the process.
Making two stitches is also a primary labor. Tearing is prohibited when it is done in order to create a place where one can sew two stitches. In the work of preparing animal skins, one traps the animal, slaughters it, skins it, and prepares the hide for tanning. Salting or tanning processes the skin, smoothing it removes roughness, and cutting it prepares it for a particular use, such as making shoes.
Writing two letters is a primary labor, as is erasing in order to write two letters. Building and demolishing are also included. One who builds a structure is liable, and one who demolishes in order to rebuild is likewise liable. Extinguishing and kindling a fire are separate categories.
The final category is striking the final blow. When a craftsman completes an object, he may strike the hammer on the anvil as the final act of the work. That finishing action is included as a primary labor. Carrying an object from one domain to another is another primary category.
The Gemara asks why the Mishnah needs to list all thirty-nine categories. If a person performs all of them, it is obvious that he is liable for each one. The list teaches that each category is an independent labor. The discussion then turns to the apparently unusual order of the first categories. The Mishnah mentions sowing before plowing, even though ordinarily a person plows before planting.
The answer is that the Mishnah follows the order used in a particular type of field. In hard soil, one may plow first merely to soften the ground, plant the seeds, and then plow again in order to cover them. Therefore, even plowing after sowing can be a genuine act of plowing, because it serves the purpose of preparing the soil and covering the seeds.
The category of sowing includes several related acts. Planting seeds, planting a tree, grafting, bending a branch into the ground so that it takes root, and pruning in order to encourage growth are all forms of causing growth. Even though the acts have different names, they share the same underlying purpose.
If a person performs several of these acts in one period of unawareness, he may be liable for only one offering because they are all included under the same general category of causing growth. The terminology differs depending on whether the person is dealing with seeds or trees, but the underlying labor is the same.
Pruning is ordinarily included under planting because its purpose is to encourage the tree to grow. If a person also intends to keep the branches that he cuts, however, he may be liable for harvesting as well. Cutting and preserving the branches resembles cutting grain and keeping it. Thus, the same act may involve both the labor of causing growth and the labor of harvesting.
The same principle applies when a person cuts grass or a plant from the ground in order to feed it to an animal. He may be liable for harvesting because he removed the plant, and for causing growth because cutting it encourages further growth. Similarly, if he cuts a piece from a root vegetable that remains attached to the ground and eats it, he may be liable for two categories.
Plowing includes more than using a plow. Making furrows in the soil with an instrument, softening the ground, and smoothing the ground for planting can also be included. If a person removes a mound of dirt from his house in order to level the floor, that may fall under building or repairing the structure rather than plowing, because he is improving the house rather than preparing the ground for planting.
If a person fills a hole in the floor with dirt, he is repairing the floor. If he digs a hole but needs only the dirt for another purpose, such as covering waste, he may not be liable for building, because he has not intended to construct anything; in fact, he has damaged the floor. Nor is he necessarily liable for plowing, because the act was not performed to prepare soil for planting.
This also relates to the principle of a labor whose intended result is not needed. According to the usual position, a person can be liable even when he does not need the ordinary result of the labor. In a case where the person is damaging rather than repairing, however, even that position may agree that he is exempt.
Harvesting includes cutting grapes, dates, olives, figs, and other produce from the place where they grow. The common denominator is that the person removes something that is growing and preserves it for use. It does not apply in exactly the same way to objects that do not grow from the ground.
For example, gathering salt into piles in a quarry is not necessarily the same as gathering grain in a field. Grain grows from the ground, while salt does not. Likewise, gathering toys from a room and placing them into a container is not the labor of gathering produce, because toys do not grow from the ground.
Threshing is the separation of the usable material from the stalk, husk, or surrounding matter. It can include beating flax or cotton in order to release the fibers or seeds. In one case, the person is extracting the good material from the unwanted material; in another, he is separating the useful material from its covering. The details differ, but the fundamental process is separation through force or beating.
The lesson is that the thirty-nine categories are not limited to the exact historical form in which the work was performed. Each category is defined by the essential function of the act: causing growth, cutting and preserving, separating, preparing, building, completing, or transferring. The later examples are analyzed according to that underlying function.