We begin today’s discussion of the Mishnah with the case of a person carrying food on Shabbat. We said that the measure of food that creates liability is a dried fig. If he carries food in a vessel, but the food is less than the required measure, he is exempt not only with regard to the food, which is below the measure, but even with regard to the vessel. Why? Because the vessel is subordinate to the food. Since the food itself is not significant enough to create liability, the vessel is being used only to contain the food and is therefore subordinate to it. Accordingly, he is not liable for carrying the vessel either.
We now come to the next case in the Mishnah: “If he carries a living person on a bed, he is exempt even for the bed.” What is he carrying? He is carrying a living person on a stretcher, which we will call a bed. He is exempt for the person because of the principle that a living person carries himself. Even though the person is lying down, a living person somehow assists in the carrying. He is not dead weight; he is living weight. Therefore, one is not liable for carrying someone who can carry himself.
But he is also carrying the bed. What about the stretcher? The answer is that the stretcher is subordinate to the living person, and therefore he is exempt for the stretcher as well.
However, if he carries a dead person on a bed, he is liable. Similarly, if he carries an olive-sized portion of a corpse, an olive-sized portion of an animal carcass, or a lentil-sized portion of a creeping creature, he is liable. All of these measures are significant because they convey ritual impurity. An olive-sized portion of a corpse conveys impurity from a corpse, an olive-sized portion of an animal carcass conveys impurity from a carcass, and a lentil-sized portion of a creeping creature conveys the impurity of a creeping creature. Since these are significant measures with regard to impurity, they are also considered significant measures with regard to carrying on Shabbat.
Rabbi Shimon exempts the person in all these cases, even if he carries an entire corpse. This is the famous position of Rabbi Shimon: a labor that is not needed for its own purpose. We will explain what that means as we study Rashi.
Rashi explains the phrase “a living person on a bed”: He is not liable for carrying the living person because the person lightens his own burden and carries himself. He is alive and breathing, and therefore he bears part of his own weight.
Regarding an olive-sized portion of a corpse, Rashi explains that one is liable because it conveys impurity. Removing it by carrying it away is considered significant, since the person wants to remove the impurity from himself. He does not want to become impure, so he gets rid of the object that conveys impurity. For that reason, it is a significant measure.
Rabbi Shimon, however, exempts even in the case of an entire corpse. This requires explanation. A person has died, the corpse is on a stretcher, and someone is carrying it out. One might think that he should certainly be liable, because a complete corpse is a significant object. Rabbi Shimon says that this is a labor not needed for its own purpose.
Rashi explains that this refers to any labor whose purpose is merely to remove something from oneself. The person carrying the corpse is interested only in getting rid of it. He does not want the corpse in front of him on Shabbat. It smells, it is unpleasant, and it is uncomfortable to have it there. He is not interested in the result of the carrying itself; he simply wants to remove the corpse. This is therefore a labor not needed for its own purpose.
Rashi continues that the situation did not arise from the person’s own intention. He did not seek out this object or plan to perform this act. The person died, and he found himself in a situation in which he is reacting to what happened. He wants to remove the corpse. For Shabbat, one needs a considered, constructive labor—an act in which the person is interested in the labor and its result. Here, however, he is not interested in the labor of carrying. He is performing an act of removal. This is how Rashi defines a labor not needed for its own purpose.
The Gemara asks: What is the measure of food that creates liability? The answer is a dried fig. We have said that for the food itself he is liable, while for the vessel he is exempt, because the vessel is subordinate to the food. But what if the person needs the vessel itself? When he reaches his destination, he needs the vessel for another use. In that case, he is liable for the vessel as well, because it can no longer be considered subordinate to the food. He is carrying the vessel for the purpose of using the vessel, and therefore he is liable for it independently.
What does the Gemara infer from this? It appears to establish that when a person eats two olive-sized portions of forbidden fat during one period of unawareness, he must bring two sin-offerings. He ate two olive-sized portions without realizing that he was eating forbidden fat. When he discovers what he has done, how many sin-offerings must he bring? According to this inference, he brings two. The case of carrying on Shabbat seems comparable: he carried the food and the vessel during one period of unawareness, and he is liable for each one. Although he performed the same category of labor twice, it appears that he is liable for each act separately. The Gemara seems to derive from here that two sin-offerings can be required for two acts committed during one period of unawareness.
Rashi explains that the vessel is exempt when it is subordinate to the food. But if the person needs the vessel in order to use it for another purpose when he reaches the place to which he is carrying it, he is liable for each item. It is like two acts of carrying performed in one public domain, or like eating two olive-sized portions of forbidden fat during one period of unawareness.
Rav Ashi says that the case must be understood differently. The person was unaware with regard to the food, but he intentionally carried the vessel. He did not realize that carrying the food from one domain to another was prohibited, and therefore he carried the food unintentionally. However, he knew that it was prohibited to carry the vessel. In that case, he brings a sin-offering for the food, while with regard to the vessel, if he needed it, he is liable for a death penalty because he carried it intentionally.
Accordingly, this case cannot prove that a person brings two sin-offerings for two acts committed during one period of unawareness. The word “liable” in the Mishnah means that he is liable in two different ways: one sin-offering for the food and a death penalty for the vessel. It does not mean two sin-offerings. Rashi explains that the person was unaware with regard to the food, while he knowingly carried the vessel. Therefore, the two liabilities are one sin-offering and one death penalty, and there is no proof from here regarding two sin-offerings during one period of unawareness.
This is the major question raised by Tosafot. The wording “even for the vessel” appears to imply that the liability for the vessel is the same as the liability for the food. It sounds as though the two liabilities are equal. If so, how can we say that the liability for the vessel is a death penalty while the liability for the food is a sin-offering? The language seems to indicate two equal liabilities.
Rav Ashi answers that the case is one in which the person was unaware with regard to both the food and the vessel, but he became aware of them at separate times. He learned that he had violated the prohibition with regard to one of them, but at that point he still did not know about the other. Later, he became aware of the second violation.
This leads to the well-known dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish: Do separate realizations divide the acts into separate obligations, or do they not? Normally, if a person commits a prohibition, then becomes aware of it, and afterward commits the prohibition again, the awareness separates the acts and he brings separate offerings. Here, however, he became aware of the food at one time and of the vessel at another time. Do these two realizations divide the liabilities?
Rashi explains that this is the dispute regarding whether realizations divide obligations. The discussion here cannot be used as a proof for the ordinary case in which a person has one realization and must bring two sin-offerings. Here, the two realizations occurred at separate times, and the matter is subject to the dispute between Rav Sheshet and Rav Ashi, as well as the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. Therefore, no proof can be brought from this case regarding the ordinary question of two sin-offerings during one period of unawareness.
The Gemara then returns to the case of carrying a living person on a bed. He is exempt even for the bed, because the living person carries himself and the bed is subordinate to him. The Gemara says that this appears to reflect the opinion of Rabbi Natan, not the opinion of the Sages.
We learned that if a person carries an animal or a bird into the public domain, he is liable whether the animal is alive or slaughtered. Rabbi Natan says that if he carries a slaughtered animal, he is liable, but if he carries a living animal, he is exempt, because a living creature carries itself. Clearly, Rabbi Natan is the authority who maintains that a living creature carries itself.
Rava answers that one can even say that the Mishnah follows the Sages. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Natan only regarding an animal. When a person carries an animal, the animal does not assist in the carrying. In fact, the animal resists: it pushes itself downward and tries to escape from the person carrying it. Therefore, with regard to an animal, the Sages do not say that a living creature carries itself.
With regard to a human being, however, even the Sages may agree that a living person carries himself. A person assists in the carrying by holding up part of his own weight. The dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Natan may therefore be limited to animals and birds. Rashi explains that animals push themselves downward and try to free themselves from the person carrying them. They do not lighten the burden; they make it heavier.
Rav Aḥa bar Ahava said to Rava that we find a related discussion elsewhere. It was prohibited to sell a large animal to a non-Jew, because of a rabbinic decree. The concern was that if a person sold an animal to a non-Jew, he might later lend or lease an animal to him, and the non-Jew might then use the Jewish-owned animal on Shabbat. The animal would perform labor on Shabbat, and this could lead to a violation of the prohibition that an animal belonging to a Jew may not perform labor on Shabbat.
However, Ben Beteira permits selling a horse. The reason is that a horse is generally used for riding, and riding does not involve a Torah prohibition of labor. At most, it involves a rabbinic prohibition. The Sages did not enact one decree on top of another: They did not prohibit selling the horse because one might lend it, when the feared use of the horse would itself involve only a rabbinic prohibition. This is why Ben Beteira permits selling a horse.
Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Natan are said to share one position: They both maintain that a living creature carries itself. If you say that the Sages do not disagree with Rabbi Natan regarding a human being, then the principle that a living person carries himself is accepted even according to the Sages. Why, then, does Rabbi Yohanan say that the Mishnah follows Rabbi Natan?
Rabbi Yohanan answers that the case involves a horse specially used for birds—live birds that are placed on the horse in order to trap other birds. In this case, Rabbi Natan is needed because he is the authority who says that even a bird carries itself. The Sages may agree with regard to a human being, but they do not necessarily agree with regard to birds.
One may ask: What kind of horse carries birds? The bird hunters place predatory or trained birds on the back of the horse and use them to trap other birds. The birds are not tied down and do not resist the carrying. They are simply sitting on the horse. Rashi describes people who place birds on a horse while hunting other birds. Since the birds are not actively pushing themselves downward, they may be considered to carry themselves.
Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Natan therefore said the same thing: A living creature carries itself, and for that reason carrying it does not constitute a Torah-level liability. The case cannot simply be attributed to the Sages, because perhaps the Sages say that a living creature carries itself only with regard to a human being. The case of the horse carrying birds requires the position of Rabbi Natan.
Rabbi Yohanan further says that Rabbi Natan agrees that if the animal is bound, the person carrying it is liable. Once the animal is tied up and cannot move, it can no longer carry itself. It becomes like dead weight. The principle that a living creature carries itself means that the creature has some ability to support or shift its own weight. If it is bound, it cannot do so, and even Rabbi Natan agrees that the person carrying it is liable. Rashi explains that this applies equally to a bound bird and a bound human being.
Rav Adda bar Mattana asked about the Persians, who wore large, heavy garments and therefore could not walk easily. How did they travel? They rode. The Gemara says that people who saw them in those garments might have considered them like bound creatures. Rashi explains that when they rode, they were wearing all the garments with which they were adorned. They were spoiled and did not want to place their feet on the ground. Their inability to walk was not a physical inability; it was a matter of their behavior and status.
The Gemara responds that this is not comparable to being bound. The Persians were not truly unable to walk. There was an incident involving a Persian officer whom the king became angry with and wished to punish. The officer ran three parasangs on foot. This proves that although the Persians normally rode and did not wish to place their feet on the ground, they were not genuinely bound. When necessary, they could run.
We already established that the discussion involves a horse carrying birds. The reason the Gemara introduced birds was to address the question of whether the Sages also agree that a living creature carries itself. The case of birds demonstrates the position of Rabbi Natan. If the case involved a bound creature, Rabbi Natan would agree that the person carrying it is liable. The question is therefore how Ben Beteira could permit selling a horse to the Persians if the Persians are considered bound. The answer is that they are not truly bound. Their clothing and conduct do not prevent them from walking; they simply do not wish to walk. They are not considered bound in the halachic sense.
The Gemara then discusses the case of removing a corpse. Rabbi Shimon exempts a person who carries out a corpse in order to bury it. One might have argued that since he is carrying it for a constructive and purposeful purpose, namely burial, he should be liable. The Gemara teaches that he is nevertheless exempt, because the labor is still not needed for its own purpose.
Rashi explains that when a person merely places the corpse outside, he does not need the corpse, nor does he need the act of carrying for its own sake. He is carrying only to remove the corpse. Even when the person has the constructive purpose of burying the corpse, Rabbi Shimon exempts him, because the carrying itself is still not the labor he needs.
How can one bury a person on Shabbat? The Gemara raises the following challenge: If carrying a corpse for burial is considered a labor not needed for its own purpose, then give us a case of a labor that is needed for its own purpose. One possible example would be a person carrying a Torah scroll in order to read from it. In that case, the person needs the object and needs the carrying in order to bring the Torah scroll to the place where it will be read. That should be a labor needed for its own purpose.
Another example would be carrying a shovel in order to dig. The person needs the shovel in order to perform the labor of digging, and the shovel itself is being carried for its intended use. If the shovel became dented, he might carry it out in order to repair it. In that case, the person needs the shovel for digging, and the shovel itself requires the repair. Similarly, one might carry a Torah scroll in order to read from it, while also needing to bring it to a place where a mistake in the scroll can be corrected. These would seem to be examples of labor needed both by the person and by the object.
However, if a person carries a shovel only in order to dig, or carries a Torah scroll only in order to read from it, the purpose benefits the person but does not benefit the object itself. One might have thought that such a case is still considered a labor not needed for its own purpose. The Mishnah therefore teaches us through the case of a corpse that even when the person has a purpose—removing the corpse in order to bury it—the person is exempt according to Rabbi Shimon.
Rav Naḥman once permitted removing a corpse that was lying in disgrace and placing it in a karmelit, a rabbinic domain. The corpse may have been in the sun, near a fire, or in another situation in which its condition would deteriorate. The Gemara asks: How could Rav Naḥman permit this? Even if one follows Rabbi Shimon and says that carrying a corpse is not a labor needed for its own purpose, Rabbi Shimon says only that the person is exempt from a sin-offering; he does not necessarily say that the act is permitted. The act should still be prohibited rabbinically.
Rav Naḥman answers that even Rabbi Judah would agree that this is permitted. The reason is the dignity of human beings, and especially the dignity of the dead. The Sages took the dignity of human beings so seriously that they permitted violating a rabbinic prohibition for that purpose. The Torah contains the prohibition of not straying from the words of the Sages. Nevertheless, this prohibition is flexible in a case involving human dignity. When a corpse is lying in the sun and deteriorating, the dignity of the dead overrides the rabbinic prohibition of carrying it into a karmelit.
This does not mean that one may carry the corpse into the public domain, where the prohibition would be from the Torah. The permission applies to a karmelit, where the prohibition is rabbinic. Even according to Rabbi Judah, who considers a labor not needed for its own purpose to create liability, the dignity of human beings permits violating the rabbinic prohibition in this situation.
We learned another matter in the Mishnah of Tractate Nega’im. A person who removes the signs of impurity from a skin affliction violates a prohibition. Two white hairs growing within the affliction are a sign of impurity. If he pulls them out, he has removed a sign of impurity. Similarly, if there is living flesh within the affected area, that living flesh is a sign of impurity. If he burns it and thereby removes the sign, he has also violated the prohibition, because the verse says that the affliction must be guarded.
The Mishnah states that if a person removes one of two hairs, he is liable. If he removes one of three hairs, however, the matter is disputed. Rav Naḥman says that he is liable, while another opinion says that he is exempt. What is the basis of the dispute? If there were only two hairs and he removed one, he accomplished something: He eliminated one of the two signs. But if there were three hairs and he removed one, he did not change the status of the affliction, because two hairs remain. He has not yet removed the impurity.
One might argue that he nevertheless accomplished something because, if another hair later falls out, the status will change. But we do not judge the act according to what may happen in the future. We consider what his action accomplished at the present moment. If he removed one hair from three, he did not change the present status, and therefore he should be exempt.
How do we know this? We can derive it from the case of carrying an olive-sized portion of a corpse or an animal carcass. The Mishnah says that carrying an olive-sized portion creates liability, while carrying half an olive-sized portion does not. Another teaching states that one is liable for carrying half an olive-sized portion. We must explain that the latter case involves removing half an olive-sized portion from an olive-sized portion of a corpse located in a house. By removing half, he reduces the remaining amount below the measure that conveys impurity. He has therefore accomplished something: He has removed the impurity from the house.
In the case where the person carries half an olive-sized portion without removing it from a complete olive-sized portion, he has not accomplished anything. The complete olive-sized portion remains, and the impurity remains. We do not say that he accomplished something because the object might later dry out and become smaller. We judge the result at the present moment. Since he has not changed the status, the half-measure he carried is not itself significant, and he is exempt.
This is the principle that is applied to the case of the hairs. If a person removes one significant hair from two, he has changed the status and is liable. If he removes one hair from three, he has not changed the status and is exempt. The same applies to the case of an olive-sized measure: If he removes a significant half from an olive-sized portion and thereby eliminates the impurity, he is liable. If he removes half from a larger amount and the impurity remains, he is exempt.
The parallel case to removing one hair from three would be removing one portion from a much larger amount. If a person removes one small portion from a large quantity, he has not accomplished anything significant. Everyone would agree that he is exempt, because the status of the remaining object has not changed.