We begin our study of Gemara Nedarim, daf lamed dalet, starting on lamed gimmel amud bet. The discussion revolves around the principle of a person who has taken a vow forbidding another from benefiting from him, or vice versa.
The Mishna states that if Reuven vows to forbid Shimon from benefiting from him, Shimon is still permitted to return Reuven's lost object. This act of returning a lost object is not considered a benefit, as Shimon is merely returning what inherently belongs to Reuven. This is the understanding of the Ran.
A dispute arises between Rav Ami and Rav Assi regarding a specific scenario. One opinion holds that the Mishna's allowance for returning a lost object applies only when Reuven's property is forbidden to Shimon. In this case, Shimon is returning Reuven's own item, so it's not a benefit. However, if the vow is reversed, meaning Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven, then Shimon would not be permitted to return Reuven's lost object. The reasoning here is based on the concept of "Rav Yosef's coin." This refers to the idea that a person safeguarding a lost object is considered to be "paid" for their efforts, in that they are exempt from giving a coin to a poor person (charity) while engaged in the mitzvah of returning a lost object, as one occupied with a mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah. Thus, by returning Reuven's object, Shimon would be benefiting from Reuven by saving this potential charitable donation, which would be forbidden by the vow.
The other opinion states that even if Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven, he can still return the lost object. This view dismisses the concern about "Rav Yosef's coin" because the situation of being solicited for charity while returning a lost object is not prevalent enough to be considered a tangible benefit. Therefore, according to this opinion, it would be permissible for Shimon to return the lost object in either scenario.
To summarize the dispute: everyone agrees that if Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon, Shimon can return Reuven's lost object, as it's not a benefit. The disagreement lies in the reverse case: if Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven. One opinion says Shimon cannot return it due to the benefit of "Rav Yosef's coin," while the other says he can, as this benefit is not prevalent.
The Gemara then introduces a challenge from our Mishna: "In a place where one receives payment for it, the benefit falls to consecrated property." We previously understood this to mean that if Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon, and Shimon waives the compensation for returning Reuven's lost object, Reuven cannot benefit from this waiver. Instead, he must give the equivalent amount to charity (consecrated property). This is because accepting the waiver would constitute a forbidden benefit from Shimon.
The Gemara asks: According to the opinion that states Shimon cannot return the lost object when he is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven (due to "Rav Yosef's coin"), how can the Mishna's statement about compensation apply? If the object cannot be returned in the first place, there's no scenario for compensation to be waived or to fall to consecrated property. This implies that the Mishna's ruling about compensation must apply to both cases of returning a lost object, not just one. The Gemara answers that the Mishna's latter clause (about compensation) only refers to one of the cases – specifically, when Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon. In that case, if Shimon waives compensation, Reuven must give the money to charity.
The Ran offers a different interpretation of the Gemara's question. According to the Ran, when Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven, Shimon *can* receive compensation from Reuven for returning the lost object. This is because the compensation is not considered a "benefit" in the forbidden sense, as Shimon could have earned that money elsewhere (e.g., by working). It's merely a reimbursement for lost time or effort, akin to a "closeout sale" where the buyer isn't truly benefiting from the seller, but rather the seller is eager to unload goods. Therefore, the Ran argues that if the Mishna's statement about compensation falling to consecrated property were to apply to this case, it wouldn't make sense, as Shimon should be able to accept the payment directly. The Gemara's answer, "it refers to one case," then means that the Mishna's rule about compensation falling to consecrated property applies only when Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon, but not when Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven.
A different version of the dispute between Rav Ami and Rav Assi is then presented. In this version, everyone agrees that if Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven, Shimon can return the lost object, as the "Rav Yosef's coin" benefit is not prevalent. The dispute now centers on the case where Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon. One opinion holds that Shimon cannot return the object to Reuven, because Reuven *is* benefiting by receiving his lost object back, as there's no guarantee he would have recovered it otherwise. The other opinion maintains that Shimon can return it, as Reuven is merely receiving what is his own, and this is not a forbidden benefit.
The Gemara then poses the same challenge from the Mishna's statement about compensation. According to the opinion that allows the return of the lost object even when Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon, the Mishna's ruling about compensation makes sense: if Shimon waives the compensation, Reuven must give the money to consecrated property. However, according to the opinion that states Shimon cannot return the object at all when Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon, then the Mishna's clause about compensation cannot apply to that scenario. This leaves only the case where Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven as a possibility for the Mishna's compensation rule. But as per the Ran's understanding, in that case, Reuven *can* pay Shimon directly without it being a forbidden benefit. Thus, the Mishna's rule about compensation falling to consecrated property would have no applicable case. The Gemara concludes with a difficulty (a kashya).
Regarding the practical law (halacha) derived from this discussion, the Ran rules that regardless of who is forbidden from benefiting from whom, a lost object should always be returned. If Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon, Shimon can return the object because Reuven is simply getting his own property back. If Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven, Shimon can still return the object because the "Rav Yosef's coin" benefit is not prevalent. However, concerning compensation, the Ran rules according to the second version of the dispute. If Reuven is forbidden from benefiting from Shimon, and Shimon waives compensation, Reuven must give the money to consecrated property. But if Shimon is forbidden from benefiting from Reuven, Reuven *can* pay Shimon for his efforts, as this compensation is not considered a forbidden benefit, but merely payment for lost time that Shimon could have earned elsewhere.
Rava presents a new case: If a person finds an ownerless loaf of bread and declares it "consecrated," then picks it up with the intention of eating it, he is considered to have committed sacrilege (me'ilah) for its entire value. This means he must pay the full value of the bread plus an additional fifth to consecrated property. However, if he picks it up with the intention of giving it to his children as an inheritance, he commits sacrilege only for the value of the "goodwill benefit" (tovat hana'ah) that his children would feel towards him for his intention to bequeath it. The Ran clarifies why the case specifies an ownerless loaf of bread rather than one already owned by the person. If the bread was already in his possession and he declared it consecrated, merely picking it up would not constitute sacrilege, as he would be considered an administrator (gizbar) of the consecrated property, and sacrilege only occurs when an item is removed from the domain of consecrated property to a different domain. In the case of an ownerless loaf, even if it's within his four cubits (daled amot), which typically grants ownership, his declaration that it is consecrated indicates he does not intend to acquire it for himself, but rather for consecrated property. Therefore, when he picks it up with the intent to eat it, he is removing it from the domain of consecrated property into his own, thus committing sacrilege for its full value. If he picks it up to give it to his children, it doesn't leave the consecrated domain, but the "goodwill benefit" he receives from his children's appreciation for his intention is considered a sacrilege for which he must pay.
Rav Chiya bar Avin asks Rava: If Reuven tells Shimon, "This loaf of bread of mine is forbidden to you," and then Reuven gives the loaf to Shimon as a gift, is it permitted for Shimon to accept it? The question is whether the vow "my loaf of bread is forbidden to you" applies only while the loaf is in Reuven's possession, or if it applies to Shimon regardless of ownership. Rava initially states that it is certainly forbidden for Shimon to accept it, arguing that the phrase "to you" must mean that the loaf is forbidden to Shimon even if it is given as a gift. Otherwise, what purpose would the phrase "to you" serve? It couldn't refer to the loaf being stolen, as that's too far-fetched for a vow. Therefore, it must refer to a gift.
However, Rava retracts this, suggesting that the phrase "to you" could refer to a scenario where Reuven invites Shimon to eat at his table. In such a case, Shimon would normally be permitted to eat Reuven's food. By adding "to you," Reuven specifies that this particular loaf remains forbidden to Shimon even in a situation where other benefits would be permitted. Thus, the question of whether a gift is permitted remains unresolved, as the phrase "to you" does not definitively exclude the possibility of a gift being permitted. Therefore, we have no conclusive proof for the initial question.