The Eri B. Sit edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli. Today’s page has been dedicated by Mr. Uri Nidam in honor of all the members of the minyan, all the members of the Daf Yomi, and in honor of the rabbi, may he continue to succeed.
We are beginning today’s page. May the Holy Spirit of Abraham be with us. May the Holy Spirit of Abraham be with us again. Amen.
Today’s page is also being begun in the merit of Hema Shlomo ben Miriam and in the merit of Sarah and Sarah of Bethlehem. May He heal them; may He heal them; may He heal them—with healing of the soul and healing of the body, with a complete and speedy recovery. Amen.
We begin today’s page on 12b, starting five lines from the bottom. We are discussing one specific case that the Gemara has not yet resolved. A person has a peace offering in front of him, after the blood has been sprinkled, which means that technically the offering is now permitted to be eaten. Next to it, he has a piece of food, such as a piece of bread, and he says, “This is like that.”
The Gemara’s question was: What does he mean by saying, “This is like that”? Does he mean that just as the offering is now permitted, the bread is also permitted? For whatever reason, he made the statement in that way. Or does he mean that just as the offering was initially prohibited—because he made it prohibited by declaring it an offering—so too, this food is prohibited? Before the blood was sprinkled, the offering was prohibited, and he is saying that this food should likewise become prohibited.
The Gemara went back and forth, trying to determine whether we follow the current status, the present state of the item, or whether we follow its original status. At this point, the Gemara will try to resolve the question by saying that it is actually a dispute among the Tannaim.
The Gemara attempts to prove this from the case of a firstborn animal. A firstborn is the first animal born to its mother from a kosher species. It possesses sanctity and is given to a priest. It is then slaughtered, and after the blood is sprinkled, it becomes permitted to eat. The Gemara says: Let us say that the issue in our case is indeed a dispute between the Tannaim. One person says, “This food is like a firstborn animal,” while Rabbi Yaakov says that Rabbi Yehuda permits it. This would be a dispute between them.
The Gemara asks: What is the case? If we are speaking about a firstborn animal before the blood is sprinkled, what is the reason for the one who says that the food is permitted? How could anyone say that it is permitted? Just as the firstborn animal is prohibited before the blood is sprinkled, so too, if he says that this food is like a firstborn before the blood is sprinkled, the food should be prohibited. No one could say that it is permitted.
And if we are speaking about a firstborn animal after the blood has been sprinkled, what is the dispute? Once the blood has been sprinkled and the animal has been slaughtered, everyone agrees that the meat is permitted. So what is the case that produces a dispute?
The Gemara therefore says that the case must involve a person who has a piece of firstborn meat in front of him and another piece of ordinary food in front of him, and he says, “This is like that.” This is precisely like the case of the peace offering. We can therefore say that there is indeed a dispute between the Tannaim. One rabbi says that we follow the item’s current status: Since it is currently permitted, the food is permitted as well. The other rabbi says that we follow its initial status: Since it was initially prohibited, before the blood was sprinkled, this food is also prohibited.
The Gemara then says: No, this is not proof. I can argue that everyone agrees that we follow the item’s initial status, and therefore the food should really be prohibited. Why, then, does one rabbi say that it is permitted?
The verse says, “When a person makes a vow to the Lord.” We learned an important point from the language of this verse. Why does it use this particular formulation? The Rabbis derive that when a person makes a vow and wishes to associate one item with another, the item to which he compares it must itself have become prohibited because of a vow. The verse is understood as referring to an item that has been made sacred through a vow, excluding a firstborn animal, which is prohibited independently.
A firstborn animal becomes sacred as soon as it emerges from its mother’s womb. A person does not have to do anything to make it holy. It is not prohibited because of a vow; it is prohibited by its inherent sanctity. Therefore, I can argue that we should not involve the case of the firstborn in this dispute. The dispute concerning a firstborn may really be whether one can associate another item with a firstborn at all. Everyone may agree that, in our case, we follow the initial status and that the food should be prohibited. The reason the other rabbi says that it is permitted is that one cannot create a vow by comparing an item to a firstborn. A firstborn is not an item that has become prohibited through a vow.
What, then, does he do with the word “to the Lord” in the verse? The Gemara answers that the verse says “to the Lord” in order to include an item that is prohibited in itself. The verse teaches that even an item that possesses inherent sanctity can serve as the object of such an association. Therefore, although a firstborn animal becomes sacred automatically, one can still associate another item with it.
Accordingly, there is no dispute here about whether we follow the item’s original status or its current status. Everyone may agree that we follow the original status. The dispute is whether a person can associate another item with a firstborn at all. One rabbi says that one cannot make such an association with a firstborn. The other rabbi says that one can, because although the firstborn is intrinsically sacred from the moment it emerges from the womb, there is still a mitzvah to sanctify it.
What does the rabbi who says that it is prohibited do with the other verse? He says that he can derive from it the case of a sin offering or a guilt offering. If a person says, “This food is prohibited to me like a sin offering or a guilt offering,” the statement is effective. Although a person is obligated to bring such an offering in certain circumstances, he designates the particular animal and says, “This is the offering I am bringing.” In that respect, it is similar to something that has been sanctified through a vow.
The sanctity of a firstborn, by contrast, is automatic. It emerges from the womb already sacred. That is why he distinguishes between a sin offering or guilt offering and a firstborn animal. The verse teaches that the former can serve as the object of the association, while the latter cannot.
What is the reasoning of the one who says that the food is prohibited? Seemingly, a firstborn emerges from the womb already sacred and automatically prohibited. How, then, can a person say that the vow is effective and that the food becomes prohibited by association with it? He answers that a person is still required to sanctify the firstborn. How do we know that if an animal is born in a person’s house, there is a mitzvah for him to sanctify it? The verse says, “You shall surely sanctify.” Therefore, although the firstborn is sacred from the womb, there is still a mitzvah to sanctify it. Since there is a mitzvah to sanctify it, it is similar to an item that a person sanctifies through a vow.
And what does the rabbi who says that the food is permitted hold? He says that the mitzvah to sanctify the firstborn is merely an appropriate mitzvah to perform. It is not what creates the sanctity. Even if a person does not sanctify it, the animal remains sacred. Therefore, it is not comparable to an item that has become prohibited through a vow.
In summary, the case of the firstborn does not prove anything about our original question. I can say that the dispute concerning a firstborn is whether one may associate another item with it at all. One rabbi says that a person cannot associate another item with a firstborn, even though the firstborn is intrinsically sacred from the moment it emerges from the womb, because there is nevertheless a mitzvah to sanctify it. That makes it comparable to an item prohibited through a vow. The other rabbi says that a firstborn is sacred automatically, from the womb, and therefore a person cannot say, “This food is prohibited like that,” because the firstborn is intrinsically prohibited.
We therefore leave the firstborn out of the picture and return to the original question. A person has a piece of food and a peace offering in front of him and says, “This is like that.” We agree that one can associate an item with an offering, because an offering is made sacred through a person’s designation. The question remains whether we follow its initial status or its current status—its present state or its original state. The Gemara does not resolve the question.
What does one do in such a case? Look at the Ran, near the top of the page. Since the Gemara did not resolve whether we follow the initial state or the current state, the Ran concludes that we follow the lenient position. Therefore, we follow the item’s current status. When the person says, “This is like that,” the food follows the current status of the offering and remains permitted.
Remember that today’s Mishnah follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda teaches that whenever a person prohibits an item by comparing it to something else, he must use the prefix meaning “like.” For example, he must say, “Like Jerusalem,” meaning that he is declaring the item to be like the offerings brought in Jerusalem. He might say, “Like the animals that are in the pen,” or, “Like the animal on the altar.” In all the cases in the Mishnah, the comparison is introduced by that prefix.
A baraita teaches: If a person says, “This should be like a sheep,” the statement is effective. Which sheep is he referring to? A sheep brought on the altar, such as a burnt offering or another offering. The baraita then lists various forms of expression: “A sheep,” “to a sheep,” or “like a sheep”; “a pen,” “to a pen,” or “like a pen”; “wood,” “to wood,” or “like wood”; “fire,” “to fire,” or “like fire.” In the case of fire, he is comparing the item to the fire of the altar, which is sacred. It also lists “sanctuary,” “to the sanctuary,” or “like the sanctuary”; “Jerusalem,” “to Jerusalem,” or “like Jerusalem.” Any of these expressions renders the item prohibited.
Stop here. This baraita cannot follow Rabbi Yehuda, because Rabbi Yehuda requires the prefix “like.” The baraita, however, says that the other formulations are also effective. We therefore know that this baraita does not follow Rabbi Yehuda.
Let us continue with the baraita. If a person says, “What I will not eat from you is like this,” then the item he will not eat is prohibited, while the food he will eat is not a problem. Whose opinion does this reflect? It reflects the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who does not require the prefix “like.” Therefore, the baraita is following Rabbi Meir and not Rabbi Yehuda.
There is a problem, however, with the final clause. The baraita says that in all these cases, what he will not eat from the other person is prohibited. Seemingly, this should make sense according to Rabbi Yehuda as well. If he says, “What I will not eat from you is like a sacrifice,” then what he will eat is not included in the prohibition. He will not eat the prohibited item, and when he eats, he will eat permitted food. Why, then, would the presence or absence of the prefix matter?
Earlier, however, Rabbi Abba offered an interpretation according to Rabbi Meir. When a person says, “Like an offering, what I will not eat from you,” we interpret his words as follows: “Your food is like an offering to me; therefore, I will not eat from you.” According to that interpretation, the food is prohibited. If so, the baraita should also say that when he says, “Jerusalem,” meaning that the food is like Jerusalem, the food is prohibited. The Gemara says that this baraita is not consistent with Rabbi Abba’s interpretation.
The Gemara answers that there is no difficulty. One case involves a person who says the word with a certain vocalization, and the other involves a different vocalization. The distinction is between a sheva and a patah.
When he says, “A sheep—what I will not eat from you,” he means, “This will be like a sheep.” Since he is saying that the food is like a sheep or like an offering, what he is saying is a straightforward statement: “What I will eat from you will be like an offering; therefore, I will not eat it.” In that case, it is prohibited.
But if he says, “To an offering, what I will not eat from you,” he does not mean that the food is like an offering. Rather, he is saying, “What I will not eat from you is not an offering,” implying that what he will eat from the other person is an offering. Rabbi Meir does not follow implications. He does not say, “Since he said one thing, we infer the opposite.” Therefore, the food remains permitted.
Let us review the distinction. If he uses the vocalization that means “like a sheep,” then he is saying, “This food will be like an offering.” Therefore, he will not eat it, and the food is prohibited. But if he says, “To an offering, what I will not eat from you,” he is saying that what he will not eat is not an offering. The implication that what he will eat is an offering is not enough for Rabbi Meir, because Rabbi Meir does not follow implications. In that case, the food is permitted.
The Gemara continues with the Mishnah: If a person says, “What I will eat from you is like a burnt offering, a meal offering, a sin offering, a thanksgiving offering, or a peace offering,” the food is prohibited. This is a straightforward statement and not an implication. He is saying that what he will eat from the other person is like one of these offerings, and therefore it is prohibited.
The Mishnah needs to teach this because one might have thought that the case is different from the other cases, perhaps because it resembles an item that is already prohibited in itself, such as an offering that has become invalid through improper intention or an offering that remains after its permitted time. Rabbi Yehuda might not require the prefix “like” when a person compares an item to something that is intrinsically prohibited. The Mishnah therefore teaches that these words are merely terminology; they do not themselves imply prohibition in the necessary way. Even according to Rabbi Yehuda, the person must say, “Like that,” using the appropriate formulation.
Rabbi Yehuda says that until the person uses the prefix “like,” the vow is not effective. But if he says, “The offering,” “like the offering,” or simply, “Offering—what I will eat from you,” the food is prohibited. Rabbi Meir likewise says that the formulations “the offering,” “like the offering,” and “what I will eat from you is an offering” are effective.
What is the reasoning behind Rabbi Meir’s ruling? As Rabbi Abba explained, when a person says, “To an offering, what I will not eat from you,” he is really saying, “What I will eat from you will be an offering.” Therefore, he will not eat from the other person. This is not an application of an implication; it is one continuous statement.
The Gemara now reads the wording of the Mishnah more precisely. Obviously, the Mishnah follows Rabbi Meir. How do we know this? Rabbi Yehuda requires the prefix “like,” whereas the Mishnah says that the various formulations are effective without that prefix. This is similar to the baraita we saw earlier.
There is another question, however, concerning the final formulation of the Mishnah: “The offering that I will eat from you.” We had taken this to mean that what he eats from the other person will be an offering. The Gemara asks why this should be prohibited. The Gemara suggests that everyone should agree that this formulation does not create a vow.
Even the Rabbis who do not require the prefix “like” agree with Rabbi Yehuda that when a person says, “The offering,” he does not mean, “This food will be like an offering.” Rather, “An offering” means that the food is prohibited only during the lifetime of the offering. That is not the language required to associate one item with another. To create such an association, he must say that the food is prohibited like the offering, not that it is prohibited during the offering’s lifetime. How, then, can the Mishnah say that it is prohibited?
The Gemara answers that there is no difficulty. One case involves a person who says, “The offering,” and the other involves a person who says, “The offering,” with a different formulation. When he says the word as one unit, the expression means, “Let this be like an offering,” as in the language of the Mishnah. But when he says it in the other way, he means, “Let it be an offering during the lifetime of the offering.” That statement does not prohibit the food.
The Gemara then asks: Why, when the expression means “during the lifetime of the offering,” is it ineffective? The answer is that he is saying only, “Let it be during the lifetime of an offering.” That formulation does not create the necessary association.
We now reach the final case of the Mishnah: “To an offering, what I will not eat from you.” Rabbi Meir says that the food is prohibited. Why does Rabbi Meir say that it is prohibited if he does not follow implications? What is he really saying? He is saying, “What I will not eat from you will be an offering.” What he will eat would then be permitted. Why, therefore, is the food prohibited?
Rabbi Abba gives the same answer that we have already mentioned several times. The person is understood to be saying, “Your food is an offering to me; therefore, I will not eat from you.” This is not an implication. It is a direct statement.
The Mishnah later teaches: “My mouth is forbidden from speaking with you.” The word used there is a substitute expression for a vow. He is saying, “It is prohibited for me to speak with you.” It also says, “My hands are prohibited from working with you,” or, “My feet are prohibited from walking with you.” In each case, he places the prohibition on himself, verbally, through his hands, or through his feet.
The Gemara will explain precisely what these statements mean. He is essentially saying: “When I speak with you, my mouth should be like an offering.” When I work for you with my hands, my hands should be like an offering. When I walk with you, my feet should be like an offering. These are the three things he prohibits.
The Gemara now analyzes the distinction between a vow and an oath. They operate through different mechanisms. Each has a stringency that the other does not have. The Gemara does not yet explain the details of these stringencies.
One stringency of vows is that vows can take effect with respect to commandments, whereas oaths cannot. For example, a person can say, “The sukkah is prohibited to me,” or, “It is like an offering for me,” and the vow takes effect even though he is commanded to sit in a sukkah. But he cannot say, “I swear that I will not sit in a sukkah.” That is one stringency that a vow has and an oath does not have.
Now let us go in the other direction. As we learned earlier, a vow can take effect only upon an object. What does a vow mean? The person is prohibiting an object. He cannot prohibit an abstract concept; it must be something tangible upon which he places the vow. Therefore, he cannot say, “A vow makes sleep prohibited to me,” because sleep is not a tangible object. He cannot impose a vow on such a thing.
An oath, by contrast, can apply to something tangible or intangible, because an oath is imposed upon the person. If a person says, “I swear that I will not sleep,” the oath rests on him. He can say, “I swear that I will not eat this item,” or, “I swear that I will not sleep.” It makes no difference; an oath can apply to a tangible or intangible matter because it always rests upon the person. A vow, however, must rest upon an object.
This creates a question on the Mishnah, because the Mishnah is discussing the laws of vows. What does it say? “My mouth is prohibited from speaking with you.” Speaking is not a tangible object. Speech itself is not an object. How can a person impose a vow on speech?
Rabbi Yehuda answers that he is saying, “My mouth is prohibited from speaking.” He is imposing the prohibition on his mouth, the physical organ through which he speaks. Similarly, he is saying, “My hands are prohibited for work,” and, “My feet are prohibited for walking.” The prohibition is placed on the physical object—the mouth, the hands, or the feet.
The wording of the Mishnah supports this interpretation. It does not say merely, “What I speak with you.” It says, “My mouth that speaks with you.” The Ran points out that the wording is still somewhat vague. It is not automatic that the person intended to prohibit his mouth rather than his speech.
Nevertheless, we have a general principle that vows are interpreted stringently. Therefore, we assume that he intended to place the vow on the object, his mouth, and the vow is effective. It remains a matter of uncertainty, because we do not know precisely what he intended, but because vows are treated stringently, we rule that he must act stringently.
We now begin the second chapter of Tractate Nedarim, starting with the first Mishnah. The following expressions do not constitute effective vows. If a person uses these formulations, nothing has happened; he does not need to annul the vow or go to a rabbi to find a way out of it. These expressions are permitted.
If he says, “What I will eat from you is ordinary food,” that is an easy case. Ordinary food is permitted to eat, so he has not prohibited anything.
The Mishnah then gives several cases. If a person says, “This food is like pork,” what is the reasoning? Pork is always prohibited. We learned the rule today: a person can associate an item only with something that became prohibited because of a vow. Pork is prohibited in itself, not because of a vow, so the statement is ineffective.
If he says, “This food is like idol worship,” that is also an item prohibited for benefit. A person may not derive benefit from an idol or from an object of idolatrous worship. The Mishnah then mentions the hearts that were removed from living animals and used in idolatrous worship. These hearts were not themselves objects of worship, but they were used in the service of idolatry.
The non-Jews would make a puncture in the flesh of an animal near its heart, remove the heart while the animal was still alive, and bring it as an offering for idolatry. This is the practice referred to by the Mishnah.
There is a distinction between an idol itself and an object used in the service of idolatry. An idol can be nullified. A person can declare that it is nothing, and after it has been nullified, it may become permitted for benefit. An object used as an offering for idolatry, however, can never be nullified. Once it has been designated for such an offering, it remains prohibited.
This is why the Mishnah gives both cases. One case is where a person says, “This food will be prohibited to me like an idol.” The second case is where he says, “This food will be prohibited to me like an object used in the service of idolatry,” such as the hearts removed from living animals. In either case, the comparison is ineffective because these items are prohibited in themselves.
Look at the Ran. He explains that these hearts were taken from the animals while the animals were still alive and were used in the service of idolatry. The Ran points out that the prohibition of an object used in idolatry is more severe and cannot be nullified.
Let us continue to the next cases in the Mishnah. If a person says that this food is like an animal that was torn or like an animal that died without proper slaughter, he has said nothing. An animal that was torn, meaning that it has a defect such as a damaged lung, is intrinsically prohibited. An animal that died without proper slaughter is even more severe, because it also conveys ritual impurity.
The Ran explains that the Mishnah is teaching that the prohibition of the torn animal applies to eating, while the carcass also has the additional matter of ritual impurity. The measure of ritual impurity from a carcass is an olive-sized portion.
The Mishnah next mentions creeping creatures. If a person says that this food is prohibited like a creeping creature or a crawling creature, the statement is also ineffective. These creatures are even more severe in one respect, because their ritual impurity applies to the smallest measure, the size of a lentil. The Ran explains that the Mishnah is presenting a series of cases, each with a distinct feature: the impurity of a carcass applies at the measure of an olive, while the impurity of a creeping creature applies at the measure of a lentil. The common denominator is that all these items are prohibited in themselves.
The Mishnah then says that if a person compares the food to the portion of dough separated for Aaron or to a priestly portion, the food remains permitted. The portion of dough and the priestly portion are intrinsically prohibited to non-priests.
One might ask: Why are they considered intrinsically prohibited? A person has to designate the portion verbally and say, “This is the priestly portion.” The answer is that they are nevertheless prohibited in themselves. If the verbal designation were the element that created the prohibition, then the portion would be prohibited to everyone, including priests. The fact that it is permitted to priests and prohibited only to non-priests demonstrates that its prohibition is inherent in its status.
The Ran explains that the person still has to designate the priestly portion, but the designation itself is not what creates the basic prohibition. The prohibition applies to non-priests because the Torah prohibits them from eating it. Therefore, it is not an item that became prohibited through a vow.
That is the common denominator of all the cases we have just mentioned. A person cannot create a vow by comparing an item to something prohibited in itself. To create such an association, he must compare the item to something that became prohibited through a vow.
Seemingly, the Mishnah is somewhat redundant. It begins by saying that these expressions are permitted, and at the end of the list it again says that the food is permitted. Why does the Mishnah need this repeated formulation?
Let us turn to the final case, and we may understand why the Mishnah seems to surround all the previous cases with the statement that they are permitted. The Mishnah says that if a man says to his wife, “You are prohibited to me like my mother,” he must be released from the vow through an opening found by the court.
What does he mean by saying to his wife, “You are like my mother”? Just as his mother is prohibited to him, so too, he is saying that his wife is prohibited to him. Based on what we know, this should seemingly be nothing. A mother is prohibited to her son independently, not because of a vow, so a person should not be able to prohibit his wife by comparing her to his mother. Nevertheless, the Mishnah says that he must go to court and be given an opening through which the vow can be annulled.
Technically, one might say that nothing happened and that he can remain at home. He said that his wife is like his mother—so what? But the Rabbis were concerned about this particular case because it is common for people to become angry with their wives and make vows against them. The concern was that if a person were not required to go to court in this case, where the vow is technically ineffective, he might conclude that he also does not need to go to court in a case where the comparison is effective. He might say, “They did not make me go to court the last time, so I probably do not have to go this time either,” and he could place himself in a serious situation.
Therefore, the Rabbis said that in matters involving a wife, a person must go to court even when the vow is technically ineffective. This prevents him from becoming lenient in cases where he is actually required to be stringent.
Let us read this in the Ran. The Ran explains that the Mishnah could have chosen other examples. A person might say to his wife, “You are like pork,” or, “You are like my sister.” Why did the Mishnah choose the example of a mother? Because it is natural for a person to become angry and prohibit his wife through a comparison to his mother, his sister, or another close relative. Since this is a common situation, the Rabbis required him to go to court.
The Ran explains that the first point being taught is that even when a person associates an item with something prohibited in itself, the Rabbis still require him to go to court. The second point is that the opening used to release him from the vow must come from a different consideration.
What does that mean? The court cannot simply tell him, “If you had known that speaking this way about your mother was disrespectful, would you have made the vow?” He cannot be released on the basis that he should have realized it was disrespectful to compare his wife to his mother. That is not the appropriate opening.
The opening has to come from another angle. The court cannot simply tell him that it is disrespectful to speak that way about his mother and then ask whether he would have made the vow had he known that. The Mishnah is teaching that when a vow of this type is annulled, it cannot be annulled through the factor of honoring the mother.
One might have thought that because this entire requirement is only rabbinic, perhaps the court could use the matter of honor as the basis for releasing him. The Mishnah teaches that even in this case, the opening must come from a different consideration. That is the second point of the Mishnah: first, the vow is treated as requiring release; and second, its release must come from a separate opening.
The Ran continues that the Rabbis were concerned because a person commonly becomes angry with his wife and makes vows. If they allowed him to remain without seeking release in this case, he might later make an effective vow by associating his wife with an item that became prohibited through a vow. He would then say, “The last time they did not require me to go to court,” and he would come to treat all such vows lightly.
Other vows, however, are not as common. If a person comes to court and says, “This piece of food is prohibited to me like pork,” there is no need to impose this additional requirement, because such cases are not as common. The first section of the Mishnah therefore remains entirely permitted, without the need for release. The final case involving a wife is different, because of the concern that the person will become accustomed to making vows in marital situations.
Now we understand why the Mishnah needs to repeat the word “permitted.” The Mishnah is divided into two sections. In the first section, all the cases are permitted entirely, even for an unlearned person, and no release is required. In the final case involving a wife, however, the Rabbis are stringent and require him to go to court, even though the comparison is technically to an item prohibited in itself and would not ordinarily create an effective vow.
One might have thought that if the Mishnah did not repeat the word “permitted” at the end, perhaps some of the cases in the first section would also require release. Therefore, the Mishnah concludes by stating again that all the cases mentioned above are permitted. They are entirely permitted, even without a release. Only the final case involving the wife requires him to go to a rabbi or court for release.
May the learning be successful and may it bring healing and blessing. Amen.