The study of Gemorah Shabbos continues on page seventy-five, side b, in the twelfth chapter of Masechet Shabbat. This study is dedicated for a complete recovery for all the ill of Israel and for the elevation of the soul of Shimon ben Julia; may his spirit find rest in the Garden of Eden. Our exploration begins with a ruling from the Mishnah regarding the prohibited labor of sewing. The Mishnah states that one who sews two stitches on the Sabbath is liable for a transgression. However, the Gemara immediately questions this: two stitches typically do not hold and will eventually come apart. Since a prohibited labor must result in something permanent to incur liability, how can two simple stitches be considered a violation? Rabbah bar bar Chana, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, clarifies that this ruling applies specifically when the individual knots the threads, thereby ensuring the stitches remain in place and the work is permanent.
The Mishnah also discusses tearing, noting that one is liable if they tear a fabric with the intent to re-sew it. To understand the gravity of this act, we must look to the Tabernacle, as all prohibited Sabbath labors are derived from the activities performed during its construction. The Gemara asks where tearing occurred in the Tabernacle. Rabbah and Rabbi Zera explain that if a worm damaged one of the curtains made of skins, the workers would enlarge the tear in a clean manner so that it could be properly repaired and sewn back together. This demonstrates that tearing for the purpose of sewing was a necessary part of the sacred service.
Furthering the discussion on sewing, Rav Zutra bar Tuvia, in the name of Rav, teaches that a person who tightens the threads of a loose seam on a garment is liable for a sin offering. Even though no new stitches are added, the act of pulling the threads to re-attach or tighten the fabric is considered a derivative of the prohibited labor of sewing. Transitioning from physical labors to spiritual boundaries, Rav also warns that one who learns even a single matter of Torah from a magosh—a term referring to a sorcerer or one who seduces others toward idolatry—is liable for death at the hands of Heaven. The Gemara debates whether this magosh is one who practices black magic or a blasphemer who actively incites others to worship false gods. It concludes that the warning refers to a blasphemer, as the Torah actually permits learning about magic for the sake of understanding and judging it, but strictly forbids any association with those who lead people away from the Creator.
The Gemara then emphasizes the importance of observing the natural world. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, quoting Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Kappara, teaches that anyone who possesses the knowledge to calculate the cycles of the seasons and the movements of the constellations but fails to do so is criticized by the verses. Such a person ignores the wonders of the Holy One, Blessed be He. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, in the name of Rabbi Yonatan, adds that studying these celestial movements is a positive commandment. This wisdom is what the nations of the world recognize and respect in the Jewish people. While they may not appreciate the intricacies of Mishnah or Talmud, they are impressed by the Jewish mastery of astronomy, mathematics, and the complex calculations of the calendar, such as leap years and lunar cycles.
Returning to the laws of the Sabbath, the Gemara analyzes the act of trapping. If one traps a snail, specifically the kind used to produce the sacred blue dye, and pierces it to extract its blood, Rabbi Yehuda rules that the person is liable for two violations: trapping and threshing. He views the act of piercing the snail to remove its blood as analogous to threshing grain to remove the kernel. However, the other Sages disagree, arguing that the labor of threshing applies only to items that grow from the ground. Furthermore, the Gemara questions why this act isn't considered the prohibited labor of taking a life. Rabbi Yochanan explains that the ruling refers to a case where the snail was already dead. Rava offers a different perspective, suggesting that even if the snail were alive, the person’s intent is not to kill it but merely to extract the blood. While killing the snail is an inevitable consequence of the piercing, this specific case is unique because the person actually prefers the snail to stay alive as long as possible; blood extracted while the creature is alive produces a superior, clearer color. Because the person has a "negative intent"—actively wanting to avoid the death for the sake of the dye's quality—he is not liable for taking a life.
The discussion then turns to the act of slaughtering an animal. Rava suggests that the primary violation here is dyeing, as the blood reddens the area of the neck. He explains that a slaughterer is interested in this color because it serves as a sign of freshness to potential customers. Shmuel, however, maintains that the primary violation is taking a life, which was a necessary act in the Tabernacle to obtain animal skins. Regarding the preparation of these skins, the Gemara notes that salting and tanning are often part of the same process. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish suggest that because they are so similar, they should be counted as one labor, and the labor of marking lines on leather should be included in the list of thirty-nine instead. Rabbah bar Rav Huna notes that salting meat can sometimes be considered tanning, but Rav Ashi clarifies that this only applies when one uses excessive salt to preserve meat for long-distance travel. For domestic use, salting is not considered tanning because a person does not intend to turn their food into a hard, wood-like substance.
The Gemara continues to define various "final touches" that complete an object, a category of labor known as striking with a hammer. Rav Acha bar Chanina explains that smoothing the ground between pillars is a form of smoothing. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, quoting Rav Assi in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, lists three other examples: sanding the tops of poles to make them smooth or sharp, smearing ointment on a bandage, and smoothing a stone after it is quarried. Other examples of this final touch include drawing a decorative figure on a finished vessel or a glassblower blowing into glass to give it its final shape. Even a simple act like removing fuzzballs or small imperfections from a new sweater can be a violation, provided the person is fastidious and would refuse to wear the garment with those imperfections present.
Regarding the labor of writing, the Mishnah teaches that writing two letters creates liability, as this was done to mark the beams of the Tabernacle so they could be reassembled in the correct order. The Gemara clarifies that writing one very large letter in the space where two could fit does not incur liability, as the requirement is for two distinct characters. Conversely, Rabbi Menachem b'Rabbi Yosi points out a stringency regarding erasing: if one erases a single large letter with the intent to write two letters in that newly cleared space, they are liable. This highlights that the essence of the labor of erasing is the preparation of a surface for new writing.
Finally, the Gemara introduces a general rule regarding the prohibited labor of carrying. To be liable for carrying an object into a public domain, the item must be significant enough that people typically store it. This significance is determined by both the nature of the item and its quantity. If an item is generally considered junk, such as waste or certain forbidden objects, carrying it does not result in liability. However, a complex three-way debate arises regarding subjective importance. The Mishnah holds that we follow the majority; if the majority of people value an item, everyone is liable for carrying it. If only one specific individual values a piece of "junk" and stores it, only he is liable for carrying it because of his personal intent. Rabbi Shimon takes a more lenient view, arguing that a wealthy person is not liable for carrying a small amount that he personally considers insignificant, even if the average person would value it. Furthermore, he believes that if the majority of people do not value an item, even the individual who stores it is not liable. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar presents a more stringent view: if one person deems an item significant and stores it, his intent elevates the status of that specific item, making anyone else who carries it liable as well.