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A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Shevuot 2A - 2B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
June 7, 2007
Duration
60:59

This transcript was auto-generated and polished for readability. While we aim for accuracy, errors may occur. If you notice a mistake, please click to submit corrections.

This is the Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli. Hashem, Hashem, Naaseh Ben Asliah. We are beginning today’s Massechet Shevuot. Today’s study is לעילוי נשמת Avraham ben Ester; may his soul rest in the Garden of Eden. It is also לעילוי נשמת Eliyahu ben Alegra.

We are beginning on Daf Bet. The beginning of today’s page is the Mishnah. In fact, the entire page consists of one long Mishnah; there is no Gemara on today’s page.

The Mishnah begins: “Oaths: two that are four.” The Mishnah begins by defining oaths. There is a type of oath called an oath expressed with one’s lips. It does not necessarily involve betting or monetary matters. A person may swear, “I will do this,” or, “I will do that.” This is called an oath of verbal expression.

There are two primary oaths mentioned in the Torah, and these two have another two derivative cases. The Mishnah explains: there are two oaths regarding the future. One is an oath for something positive, and the other is an oath for something negative. For example, “I swear that I am going to eat”—that is a positive oath, an oath for the good. “I swear that I am not going to eat”—that is an oath for the bad, because he is causing himself discomfort.

These are the two oaths written in the Torah: “I swear that I am going to eat,” and, “I swear that I am not going to eat.” They apply to anything positive or negative, and they apply to a future matter. The Torah’s oaths refer to a future action: “I swear that I will eat,” or, “I swear that I will not eat.”

From the Torah, therefore, there are only two explicit oaths: an oath to do something positive in the future and an oath not to do something negative in the future. “They are four” means that these two become four because the verses add two further cases: oaths concerning the past, one concerning an action and the other concerning its opposite. For example, “I swear that I ate,” when in fact he did not eat; or, “I swear that I did not eat,” when in fact he did eat.

Thus, the two oaths explicitly stated in the Torah concern the future, while the two additional oaths, derived from the verses, concern the past. That is how the Mishnah concludes: “Oaths: two that are four.”

We now move to the next case: knowledge concerning ritual impurity. The Gemara will explain what this means. Again, there are two explicit cases, and from those two cases we derive an additional two.

What is knowledge concerning ritual impurity? It refers to a person who is liable to bring an Oleh ve-Yored, a variable offering, because of impurity involving the Temple or sacred food. The case is that a person entered the Temple while impure, or ate sacred food while impure.

The verse states that his impurity was hidden from him and he was impure. This implies that at one point he knew that he was impure, and afterward he forgot that he was impure. He had knowledge of his impurity, then that knowledge was forgotten, and while he was in that state he either entered the Temple or ate sacred food. Later, he realized, “I was impure when I entered the Temple,” or, “I was impure when I ate the sacred food.”

These are the two cases in the Torah: he ate sacred food while impure, or he entered the Temple while impure. In both cases, there is no liability unless he had first known that he was impure, then forgot his impurity, and subsequently performed the act. This is why the subject is called knowledge concerning impurity: the offering is required only when he had knowledge at the beginning, forgot it, and then entered the Temple or ate sacred food.

From the verses, two additional cases are derived: he forgot the Temple, or he forgot the sacred food, while remembering his impurity. In other words, in the first two cases, the person forgot that he was impure. In the additional two cases, he remembered that he was impure but did not realize that he was entering the Temple or eating sacred food. These are the four cases of knowledge concerning impurity.

We now continue with the next case, which we already know from the second chapter of Massechet Shabbat: the carrying of objects on Shabbat, “two that are four.” Regarding carrying on Shabbat, there are two primary cases that become four.

Look at Rashi. The Torah derives the prohibition of carrying from the verse, “A person shall not take anything out of his place on the seventh day.” The Torah teaches two things: taking an object out and bringing an object in.

The two primary cases are both forms of taking an object out. In one case, a person standing in the private domain extends his hand into the public domain, takes an object, and brings it out. In the other case, a person standing in the public domain reaches into the private domain, takes an object, and brings it out. In both cases, the object ends up in the public domain. This is considered taking out.

The two additional cases are the reverse: bringing an object in. A person standing in the public domain picks up an object and places it in the private domain, or he stands in the private domain, extends his hand into the public domain, takes an object, and brings it into the private domain. Just as the Torah is concerned with taking an object from one domain to another, it is also concerned with bringing an object in.

These, then, are the two cases of carrying on Shabbat that become four.

The Mishnah continues: “The appearances of skin disease: two that are four.” These refer to the forms of skin disease for which a person may become afflicted and then bring an offering upon his purification.

According to Rashi, there are two explicit forms in the Torah: the white appearance called a swelling and the white appearance called a bright spot. They are not distinguished on the basis of their appearance, since one appearance can be confused with the other. Each of the two has one derivative form, and together they become four.

Our Mishnah has therefore discussed four subjects described as “two that are four”: verbal oaths, knowledge concerning impurity, carrying on Shabbat, and the appearances of skin disease.

For some reason, the Mishnah now skips the laws of oaths, even though this is the tractate of oaths, and moves to knowledge concerning impurity. This becomes the subject of the Mishnah. What is the classical case of knowledge concerning impurity? A person knew that he was impure, forgot that he was impure, entered the Temple or ate sacred food, and later remembered that he had been impure. He had knowledge at the beginning, a period of forgetfulness in the middle, and knowledge at the end. In that case, when he remembers what happened, he must bring a variable offering.

Rashi explains that every one of these cases contains knowledge concerning impurity. We do not need to discuss the laws of carrying here, because they were already discussed in Massechet Shabbat, and the laws of skin disease were discussed in their own tractate. Why, then, does the Mishnah explain knowledge concerning impurity here? It is included because it is similar to the first subject, oaths, in that both are cases of “two that are four.”

Still, the question remains: why did the Mishnah skip oaths and begin with knowledge concerning impurity? In the Torah, the section dealing with impurity involving the Temple and sacred food appears before the section dealing with verbal oaths. Why did the Mishnah not follow that order?

The answer is that the primary subject of this tractate is oaths. Although the tractate also discusses impurity involving the Temple and sacred food, its central subject is the oath: a person claims, “You owe me money,” or, “You damaged me,” and the other person takes an oath. The main subject belongs to the order of monetary law. Impurity involving the Temple and sacred food, by contrast, belongs to the laws of offerings and is not the central subject here.

Therefore, even though the Mishnah discusses impurity involving the Temple and sacred food, it places the tractate among the sections dealing with monetary law in order to indicate that oaths are its primary subject. The Mishnah also discusses knowledge concerning impurity because the laws of verbal oaths and impurity involving the Temple and sacred food appear next to one another in the verses. Since they are written together, they are discussed together here.

There is also a grammatical point in the wording of the Mishnah. It says, “Oaths: two that are four.” The word for oaths is feminine, and therefore the number is expressed in the feminine form. “Knowledge” is also feminine, as is “carryings.” The first three subjects therefore use the feminine form of “two” and “four.”

When the Mishnah reaches the appearances of skin disease, however, it says, “two that are four” in the masculine form. The reason is that the word for “appearance” is grammatically masculine, even though the plural form is feminine. This is why the Mishnah uses the masculine wording there. It is a technical point of grammar.

We now return to the detailed cases of knowledge concerning impurity. The Mishnah presents the case of a person who knew at the beginning that he was impure, forgot his impurity, entered the Temple or ate sacred food, and then remembered. Because he had knowledge at the beginning and at the end, he brings a variable offering.

The variable offering changes according to the person’s financial status. A wealthy person brings a female animal as a sin offering. A poor person brings a bird. A person who is extremely impoverished brings the offering of the poorest person, which consists of a measure of flour. This is called the offering of the sinner. It is called a variable offering because for a wealthy person the offering rises, while for a poor person it decreases.

Let us read another case in the Mishnah. Suppose a person did not remember his impurity when he entered the Temple. He entered without knowledge that he was impure, and afterward he remembered that he had been impure. In this case, he does not bring a variable offering, because that offering is brought only when there was knowledge at the beginning. Here there was no knowledge at the beginning; there was knowledge only at the end.

What provides atonement in such a case? The goat brought inside on Yom Kippur and Yom Kippur itself provide protection until he becomes aware of what he did. The goat brought inside, whose blood is sprinkled in the inner part of the Temple, is called the inner goat. On Yom Kippur, three goats are brought: one whose blood is sprinkled inside, one that is sent away from the mountain, and one that is brought as part of the additional offering.

The Gemara teaches that when a person had knowledge at the beginning but never acquired knowledge at the end, the goat sent away on Yom Kippur protects him from punishment until he realizes what he did. Once he becomes aware, he can bring his offering.

There is an important principle here. All inadvertent sins require atonement when the person becomes aware of them. If he requires atonement when he discovers the sin, that indicates that before he discovers it, he is subject to punishment because of the sin he committed inadvertently. The novelty is that Yom Kippur delays the punishment until he gains knowledge of what he did.

So far, we have discussed the ordinary case of knowledge concerning impurity, in which there was knowledge at the beginning, forgetfulness, and knowledge at the end. We have also discussed a case in which there was knowledge at the beginning but no knowledge at the end. In that case, the inner goat is not a complete atonement; it merely suspends the suffering until the person becomes aware. The goat sent outside is what provides atonement when there was no knowledge at the beginning but there is knowledge at the end.

Now the Mishnah continues with another case. Suppose the person had no knowledge at the beginning, entered the Temple, and afterward realized that he had been impure. In this case, the goat sent outside, which is part of the additional offering of Yom Kippur, provides atonement, together with Yom Kippur itself.

The Mishnah states that Yom Kippur itself provides atonement, as it says, “For on this day he shall make atonement for you.” It also derives this from the verse concerning the goat sent outside, which says that it is offered in addition to the sin offering of Yom Kippur. The phrase “in addition to the sin offering of Yom Kippur” creates a comparison between the goat sent outside and the inner goat. Just as the inner goat provides atonement in a case where there was knowledge at the beginning, the goat sent outside provides atonement in a case where there is knowledge at the end.

The distinction must be stated carefully. The inner goat does not provide full atonement in a case where there is knowledge at the beginning but no knowledge at the end. It merely suspends the punishment until the person has knowledge at the end. The goat sent outside provides atonement in a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning and there is knowledge at the end, because in that case the person cannot bring a variable offering at all. A variable offering is brought only when there was knowledge at the beginning.

The Mishnah then asks: what is the difference between a person who had knowledge and a person who did not have knowledge at the end? The case we have not yet seen is a person who never had knowledge at all. He did not know that he was impure when he entered the Temple or ate sacred food, and he never subsequently discovered it.

Such a person cannot bring an offering, because he never becomes aware of the sin. Nevertheless, he requires atonement, since he did enter the Temple or eat sacred food while impure. Rabbi Yehuda teaches that the goats brought on the pilgrimage festivals and the goats brought on the beginnings of the months provide atonement for such cases.

There are therefore two other categories of goats we have not yet discussed: the goats brought on the three pilgrimage festivals and the goat brought on Rosh Chodesh. These provide atonement for a person who never had knowledge at the beginning and never had knowledge at the end.

Rabbi Shimon disagrees. According to Rabbi Shimon, the goats of the pilgrimage festivals provide atonement, but the goats of Rosh Chodesh do not provide atonement for this case.

Rabbi Shimon teaches a further case. A person who was pure but ate sacred food that was impure requires atonement, but he does not bring an offering. Which offering during the year provides atonement for him? According to Rabbi Shimon, it is the goat of Rosh Chodesh.

Rabbi Meir says that all the goats have equal powers of atonement regarding impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. This includes the goat sent outside on Yom Kippur, the goat of the additional offering, the goats of the pilgrimage festivals, and the goats of Rosh Chodesh. They all provide atonement for all the cases.

According to Rabbi Meir, the three goats—the goat of Rosh Chodesh, the goat of the pilgrimage festivals, and the goat sent outside on Yom Kippur—provide atonement for every one of these situations. They provide atonement for a case in which there was knowledge at the beginning but not at the end, for a case in which there was no knowledge at the beginning and no knowledge at the end, and for a case in which a pure person ate sacred food that was impure.

Accordingly, if an interval of impurity occurred between one offering and the next, the next offering provides atonement. If the impurity occurred between the pilgrimage festivals and Rosh Chodesh, the goat of Rosh Chodesh provides atonement. If it occurred between Rosh Chodesh and Yom Kippur, the goat of Yom Kippur provides atonement. Any one of these offerings can provide atonement for the sins committed during the intervening period.

There is one function that is not included in this general equality. The inner goat has a specific function: it suspends the punishment in a case where the person had knowledge at the beginning but has not yet acquired knowledge at the end. Once he realizes what he did, he must bring an offering. The inner goat does not provide the final atonement in that case.

According to Rabbi Meir, all the other situations can be compared with any of the other goats: the goat sent outside on Yom Kippur, the goats of Rosh Chodesh, or the goats of the three pilgrimage festivals. The inner goat, however, is specifically associated with a case in which there was knowledge at the beginning but no knowledge at the end.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, in the name of Rabbi Shimon, gives another version of Rabbi Shimon’s view. According to this version, the goat of Rosh Chodesh provides atonement not only for a pure person who ate impure sacred food, but also for a person who had no knowledge at the beginning and no knowledge at the end. The goats of the pilgrimage festivals provide atonement for a person who had no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end. Yom Kippur provides atonement in a case in which there was knowledge at the beginning but knowledge has not yet occurred at the end.

According to this version, each offering has a specific function. The goat of Rosh Chodesh provides atonement for a pure person who ate impure sacred food. The goats of the pilgrimage festivals provide atonement when there was no knowledge at the beginning and no knowledge at the end. The inner goat of Yom Kippur suspends punishment when there was knowledge at the beginning but no knowledge at the end. The goat sent outside is associated with a different case, until the person realizes what he did.

A question is then raised regarding the practical use of these offerings. Suppose that on Yom Kippur a goat was designated for the Yom Kippur offering, but it was lost. Another goat was brought in its place. Later, the original goat was found, but by then it was Rosh Chodesh. May the goat originally designated for Yom Kippur be brought as the goat of Rosh Chodesh?

At first glance, one might argue that it should not be permitted. The Yom Kippur goat provides atonement for a particular case, whereas the goat of Rosh Chodesh provides atonement for a different case. When the goat was designated for Yom Kippur, it was designated with the intention of providing the atonement associated with Yom Kippur. Now one wishes to use it for Rosh Chodesh, whose atonement is associated with a different situation. According to Rabbi Shimon, who assigns each goat its own specific function, perhaps the Yom Kippur goat cannot be used for Rosh Chodesh.

According to Rabbi Meir, however, there is no difficulty. Since all the goats provide atonement for the same general category, it does not matter whether the goat was originally designated for Yom Kippur or for Rosh Chodesh. Whatever Rosh Chodesh provides atonement for, Yom Kippur also provides atonement for. Therefore, if the goat was lost on Yom Kippur and found later, it may be brought on Rosh Chodesh.

The Mishnah answers that it may be brought. Rabbi Shimon’s students objected: how can this be allowed? The Yom Kippur goat was designated for a case involving knowledge at the beginning, whereas the goat of Rosh Chodesh is designated for a case involving a pure person who ate impure sacred food. These are different forms of atonement.

The answer is that there is a general commonality among all these offerings. They all provide atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. Although their specific functions may differ, their general subject is the same. Therefore, one may transfer the offering from one occasion to another when necessary.

Rashi explains the question: if the goat designated for Yom Kippur was lost and another goat was used, and the original was later found on a pilgrimage festival or on Rosh Chodesh, may it be brought for that day? The objection is that when it was designated for Yom Kippur, it was designated for the cases for which Yom Kippur provides atonement. How can it now be used for cases for which the other offering provides atonement?

The answer is that the offerings share the same general principle. Although the specific atonement of each goat is different, they all address impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. Therefore, if one offering was not brought for its original occasion, it may be brought on another occasion and serve as the appropriate atonement there.

The Gemara then brings another version in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, who heard it from Rabbi Shimon, meaning Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai. According to this version, the goats of the pilgrimage festivals provide atonement for two situations: not only for a pure person who ate impure sacred food, but also for a person who had no knowledge at the beginning and no knowledge at the end.

Yom Kippur provides even more extensive atonement. It provides atonement for the case of a pure person who ate impure sacred food, for a case in which there was no knowledge at the beginning or at the end, and for a case in which there was knowledge at the beginning but knowledge at the end has not yet occurred. Thus, according to this version of Rabbi Shimon, Rosh Chodesh covers one category, the pilgrimage festivals cover two, and Yom Kippur covers three.

The same question is asked: may one offering be brought in place of another? The answer is that the Yom Kippur goat may be brought on one of the other days because Yom Kippur is comprehensive and provides all three types of atonement. If the Yom Kippur goat was lost and later found, there is no problem bringing it on a pilgrimage festival or on Rosh Chodesh.

But what if the Rosh Chodesh goat was lost and found six months later, on Yom Kippur? Rosh Chodesh provides atonement for only one category, whereas Yom Kippur provides atonement for three. When the goat was designated for Rosh Chodesh, it was designated only for that one category. How can it now be used for Yom Kippur?

The answer is again that, in general, all these offerings provide atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. Therefore, one may transfer an offering from one occasion to another. We have, then, two approaches within Rabbi Shimon’s view. They differ regarding the specific categories for which the three offerings provide atonement, but both maintain the principle that the offerings may be interchanged because of their shared general purpose.

The Mishnah now discusses a new case: deliberate impurity involving the Temple or sacred food. This refers to a person who intentionally entered the Temple while impure or intentionally ate sacred food while impure.

How does he obtain atonement for a deliberate transgression? The goat brought inside the Temple on Yom Kippur, together with Yom Kippur itself, provides atonement.

Until this point, the Mishnah has been discussing the relatively narrow category of impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. The Mishnah now expands the discussion to all the other transgressions in the Torah, whether minor or severe, whether committed deliberately or inadvertently, whether the person knew what he had done or did not know, and whether the transgression involved a positive commandment or a negative commandment, a punishment of excision, or a punishment imposed by the court.

For all of these other transgressions, the goat sent away on Yom Kippur provides atonement. The goat sent away, called the Se’ir HaMishtale’ach, provides atonement for all the transgressions of Israel.

The Mishnah then asks about the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest. One goat provides atonement for Israelites, one provides atonement for the priests, and one provides atonement for the anointed high priest. What is the distinction between them?

The question is surprising. If we have just been told that everyone receives atonement through the goat sent away, why ask what the difference is between Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest? The answer is that the general atonement is the same, but there is one specific distinction: the priests receive atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food through the bull that the high priest brings.

On Yom Kippur, the high priest brings a bull for himself. He confesses over the bull, and its blood is sprinkled in the inner part of the Temple. For what does he confess over the bull? If all the other sins are atoned for through the goat sent away, why must he confess over the bull?

The answer is that the bull provides atonement for the priests’ impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. Until now, we learned that when an Israelite entered the Temple while impure or ate sacred food while impure, the relevant atonement came through the appropriate goat. If a priest commits the same transgression, however, his atonement comes through the bull that the high priest brings on Yom Kippur and over which he confesses.

Thus, although the goat sent away provides atonement for the other sins of everyone—Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest—the priest has a separate offering for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. The bull is the priest’s special offering for that category.

Rabbi Shimon now makes an important point. The Mishnah has said that Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest are equal with regard to the atonement provided by the goat sent away, and that the only distinction is that the priests receive atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food through the bull. Rabbi Shimon argues as follows.

Just as everyone agrees that the blood of the inner goat provides atonement for Israelites without requiring a confession over the goat, so too the blood of the bull should provide atonement for the priests without requiring a confession over the bull. If the blood of the inner goat alone provides atonement for the Israelites, then the blood of the bull alone should provide atonement for the priests.

According to the first view, the confession over the bull is what provides atonement for the priests’ impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. Rabbi Shimon says that this cannot be correct. Just as the inner goat provides atonement for the Israelites merely through the sprinkling of its blood, the bull should provide atonement for the priests merely through the sprinkling of its blood. What, then, is the confession over the bull for?

Rabbi Shimon answers that the priests do not receive atonement through the goat sent away for all the other transgressions in the same way as Israelites do. The other sins of the priests are atoned for through the confession over the bull. It emerges as follows: according to the first view, the goat sent away provides atonement for Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest for all the other transgressions, while the bull and its confession provide the priests’ atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food.

Rabbi Shimon agrees that the bull provides atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food, but he says that the sprinkling of the bull’s blood alone is sufficient. Just as the Israelites do not require a confession over the goat sent away for their atonement, the priests do not require a confession over the bull for this particular sin. The confession over the bull is for the other sins that the goat sent away would otherwise atone for.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, the goat sent away provides atonement for the other transgressions of Israelites, while the confession over the bull provides the priests’ atonement for those transgressions. The blood of the bull provides the priests’ atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food. The first view, by contrast, maintains that the goat sent away provides the general atonement for everyone, while the confession over the bull provides the priests’ special atonement for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food.

This concludes the Mishnah and its various cases. The Gemara now returns to explain each point. It begins with the opening words of the tractate: “Oaths: two that are four.” Why did the Mishnah not begin, as the tractates of vows and Nazirites do, by saying that all expressions and nicknames of oaths are considered oaths?

The reason is that the Mishnah is continuing from the end of Massechet Makkot. At the end of that tractate, there was a discussion involving oaths, and our Mishnah continues with that subject. Since it is a continuation of what was learned at the end of Makkot, it begins with oaths.

If the Mishnah were beginning the subject independently, it could have started with the various expressions of oaths, as the tractates of vows and Nazirites do. But because it is continuing a discussion from the end of Makkot, it begins with “Oaths: two that are four.”

The Gemara then asks why the Mishnah did not begin with knowledge concerning impurity, since that subject appears earlier in the Torah than verbal oaths. The answer is that the primary subject of the tractate is oaths. The laws of impurity involving the Temple and sacred food are included because they appear next to the laws of oaths in the verses, but the main subject of the tractate remains oaths.

That is also why the tractate belongs in the section dealing with monetary law. The principal cases involve a person who claims that another person owes him money or caused him damage, and the other person takes an oath. The subject of offerings for impurity involving the Temple and sacred food does not belong to monetary law. It is included here because of the connection between the verses and because it shares the structure of “two that are four.”

Finally, we return to the grammatical detail in the wording of the Mishnah. “Oaths,” “knowledge,” and “carryings” are feminine nouns, and therefore the Mishnah uses the feminine forms for “two” and “four.” “Appearances,” however, is grammatically masculine in this context. That is why the Mishnah says “two that are four” in the masculine form for the appearances of skin disease.

The word “four” itself has a different form depending on whether it is masculine or feminine. This is one of the peculiarities of Hebrew grammar. Since the noun referring to an appearance is masculine, the Mishnah uses the masculine form of the number. That is the technical grammatical point in the Mishnah.

Baruch Hashem le’olam va’ed. Amen.