Today’s folio is being studied. Amen. We begin on folio 106b, at the bottom of the Mishnah. The subject is the labor of trapping.
The Mishnah discusses a deer that is inside a house. As long as the door is open, the deer is not considered trapped, because it can still escape. A person then comes and sits in front of the doorway, but he does not fill the entire opening. The deer is still not trapped, because there remains a space through which it can escape. A second person comes, sits beside the first, and fills the remaining gap. At that point, the deer is trapped. The second person is liable, because he performed the actual act of trapping; the first person is not.
The Mishnah then says that if the first person stood up and walked away, the first person is liable and the second person is exempt. Although the second person completed the trapping when the first person left, he is not liable, because when he originally sat down, he had not performed an act of trapping.
The Mishnah provides an analogy: this is comparable to a person who was already inside a house and then came and locked the door. The animal was already protected within the house, and the person merely added an additional level of protection by locking the door. The same is true in our case. The first person was sitting in the doorway, and the second person merely added to the existing trapping. One might have thought that the second person should be liable because he increased the trapping; the Mishnah teaches us that adding additional protection to an existing act of trapping is not considered a new act of trapping.
This is one way of understanding the passage, and it is the approach of the Ramban and the Rashba, in his second explanation. According to this approach, the person who locked the door need not even have known that a deer was inside. He was simply coming home and locking the door. He did not intend to protect the deer, and he did not know that he was doing so. Nevertheless, locking the door does not constitute a new act of trapping, because the deer was already protected.
One might have thought that a person must open the door again once he realizes that a deer is inside. The Mishnah teaches that he does not have to undo the trapping. In the case of the person who sat in the doorway, as well, the fact that his presence later contributed to the trapping does not make him liable, because at the time he sat down, he had not performed an act of trapping.
A question may be raised about the use of an analogy here. The case of the second person sitting in the doorway is itself the case whose law is not yet known. If so, how can the Mishnah bring an analogy from locking a door? Who told us that the law in the analogy is correct? It seems that the analogy itself requires a source.
The answer is that the case of locking the door is more obvious. A person returns home, closes and locks the door, and does not know that there is a deer inside. No one would say that he must reopen the door merely because he unknowingly added protection to the deer. That straightforward case serves as the analogy for the first case. Just as locking the door is permitted when the person is unaware of the deer, so too, adding protection by sitting beside another person is not considered a new act of trapping.
We now turn to the Gemara. Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: If a bird entered beneath a person’s coat and can no longer leave, the person may remain in that position throughout the entire Sabbath.
What is the novelty of this ruling? The person did not trap the bird. It entered on its own. Nevertheless, one might have thought that he must release it immediately, because sitting with a bird beneath one’s coat appears as though he trapped it. The Gemara teaches that we do not impose such a concern of misleading appearances in this case. If he wishes to remain in that position for the rest of the Sabbath, he may do so. He is not required to release the bird, because he acted passively and did not trap it.
Rabbi Nachman bar Yitzhak challenged this from our Mishnah. The first person sat in the doorway, and the second person sat beside him. After the first person left, the Mishnah says that the first person is liable and the second person is exempt. At first glance, the second person should at least be exempt but prohibited, because although he did not perform the trapping when he sat down, his presence eventually caused it. If so, why does the Gemara say that a person may remain with the bird beneath his coat?
The Gemara answers that this is an exceptional case. Ordinarily, when the Mishnah says that a person is exempt, it means exempt from a Torah prohibition but still prohibited rabbinically. In this case, however, “exempt” means fully permitted. The Gemara says that this conclusion is logical because of the analogy in the Mishnah. The person who locked the door was also described as exempt, and that case is clearly permitted. Therefore, the second person in the Mishnah is likewise exempt and permitted.
There is another version of Rabbi Nachman bar Yitzhak’s statement. The question is asked from the Mishnah itself: perhaps when the Mishnah says that the second person is exempt, it means exempt but prohibited. Rav Shmuel said that whenever the term “exempt” appears with regard to the Sabbath, it generally means exempt but prohibited, except in three cases where it means exempt and permitted.
The first case is the second person in our Mishnah, who remained seated after the first person left. Since he did not perform an act of trapping when he sat down, he is exempt and permitted.
The second case is a person who opens a boil on the Sabbath. If he opens it in order to create an opening, so that the pus can leave and air can enter, he is liable because he is creating an opening. But if he opens it only to release the pus that has accumulated, and he does not care whether the opening remains open or closes afterward, he is exempt and permitted. He is not creating an opening for its own sake; he merely wants to relieve the pressure.
We know this from the later discussion of a hand needle. A hand needle is ordinarily considered a prohibited object to handle on the Sabbath, but it may be used for its permitted function when a person has a splinter. He may use the needle to make an opening and remove the splinter. He does not need the opening to remain open. The purpose is only to remove the splinter. Since the Mishnah permits this use of the needle, we see that an act performed merely to remove something painful, and not to create a lasting opening, is permitted.
The third case is trapping a snake on the Sabbath when the person’s intention is to prevent it from biting him. This is a labor not required for its usual constructive purpose. Although such an act is generally exempt but prohibited, in this case it is exempt and permitted because the snake presents a danger or genuine distress.
We find a similar ruling regarding a scorpion in a sukkah. If a person is sitting in a sukkah and a scorpion is moving around, he may place a vessel over it to prevent himself from being stung. Ordinarily, one may not take a permitted object for the purpose of covering something that may not be handled. Nevertheless, in this case he may cover the scorpion because he is protecting himself from harm.
This permission does not apply to every insect or minor nuisance. The discussion concerns creatures that sting, bite, or cause genuine pain. It applies only in a situation of actual distress, not to every annoyance.
One might ask whether this is the source for a general principle that any danger permits the desecration of the Sabbath. We cannot automatically transfer the ruling from one case to another. This is a specific case in which the Sages permitted an act that would ordinarily be exempt but prohibited because of danger or significant pain. The same principle appears in all three cases: the boil, the snake, and the scorpion.
In the case of the boil, the pus causes pain, so the person may release it, provided that he is not creating an opening for its own sake. In the case of the Mishnah, the second person did not perform any act of trapping when he sat down. The first person had already been trapping, or the person who closed the door was unaware that a deer was inside. That is a separate principle from the rule of exempt and permitted.
We now begin the next chapter, which discusses the eight creeping creatures. If one of these creatures dies, its carcass conveys ritual impurity, as the Torah states. We will not identify all eight creatures here, but anyone wishing to study the subject can examine the various explanations of what each creature was.
The Mishnah says that if a person traps one of the eight creeping creatures, or wounds one of them, he is liable.
Why is he liable for trapping them? The novelty is that these are creatures that people ordinarily trap. The general rule is that a person is liable for trapping only something that is normally trapped. Since these eight creatures are ordinarily trapped, even if a person traps one without specifying his purpose, we assume that he is trapping it for a useful purpose, and he is liable.
Why is he liable for wounding them? A wound is considered significant when blood leaves the flesh and becomes caught between the flesh and the skin. In a human being, if a person is struck, the area may become red temporarily, and the blood eventually returns to the body. That is not considered a wound for the purposes of the Sabbath. With these creatures, however, the blood that leaves the flesh does not return to the body. It remains between the flesh and the skin, and that is considered a wound.
This assumes that these creatures have skin. The question is which labor is involved when a person wounds them. There is a three-way disagreement.
One opinion is that the person is liable because of slaughter. When he removes some of the blood, he has taken part of the creature’s life. He does not need to remove all its blood; removing part of it can be considered taking its life in that place.
Another opinion is that he is liable because of dyeing. The blood that leaves the flesh reddens the skin, and causing that redness falls under the labor of dyeing.
A third opinion is that he is liable because of detaching. Just as one removes grain from its husk, here one removes blood from the creature. According to this view, one need not determine the matter simply by asking whether the wound is visibly red; the question is which of the thirty-nine labors the action resembles.
Other creeping creatures that are not among the eight do not have this same law. If a person wounds them, he is exempt, because the blood eventually returns to the body. Even if one were to explain the prohibition as dyeing, the creature is already red when it lacks this type of skin, so the person is not creating a new color.
The Mishnah then returns to trapping other creatures, such as worms, snakes, and scorpions. If a person traps them for a useful purpose, he is liable. This is a labor performed for its constructive purpose. If he traps them for no useful purpose, he is exempt, because he does not need the creature itself. He is trapping the snake merely to prevent it from harming him, which is a labor not required for its usual constructive purpose.
A question arises from the structure of the Mishnah. At the beginning, the Mishnah stated that a person is liable for trapping the eight creatures because they are creatures that people ordinarily trap. This seems to imply that everything else should be exempt, even if he traps it for a useful purpose. Why, then, does the Mishnah later distinguish between trapping another creature for a useful purpose and trapping it for no useful purpose?
The answer is that the first part of the Mishnah discusses a person who traps the creature without specifying his intention. With the eight creatures, since they are normally trapped, we assume that his act was performed for a useful purpose, and he is liable. With other creatures, which are not normally trapped, the ruling depends on the person’s intention. If he needs the creature for a remedy or another purpose, he is liable. If he is trapping it merely to protect himself, he is exempt.
The Mishnah then adds: if a person wounds a creature that is in his possession, he is liable; if he traps it, he is exempt. The reason is that a creature in his possession is already trapped. Wounding it can still constitute a prohibited act, but trapping it again does not.
The Gemara asks about the statement that wounding the eight creatures is liable. Earlier, we said that the eight creatures must have skin, because a wound is significant only where blood becomes caught beneath the skin. Who is the author of this Mishnah?
Rav Shmuel said that it follows the view of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri. We find a dispute in which Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says that all eight of the creatures mentioned by the Torah have skin. The Sages, however, say that only four of them have skin.
The Gemara initially reasons that our Mishnah must follow Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, because it says that wounding the eight creatures is liable. If the Mishnah followed the Sages, only four of them would have skin, and the other four could not be wounded in the same way.
Rav Huna said in the name of Rav that the Mishnah can even follow the Sages. The fact that the Sages say that four of the creatures do not have skin applies only to ritual impurity, not to the laws of the Sabbath. These are separate areas of law.
In the discussion of ritual impurity, the Torah states the word “impure” immediately after listing four of the creatures. The Sages derive from this that the skin of those four is treated like flesh. Therefore, their skin conveys impurity along with their flesh. This does not mean that they literally have no skin. Rather, their skin is so thin that, for the laws of ritual impurity, it is treated like flesh.
Regarding the Sabbath, however, the Sages agree that all eight have skin, and wounding any of them can be liable. The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Sages concerns ritual impurity, not the Sabbath.
The Gemara then examines the wording of the earlier teaching. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says that all eight creatures have skin. The Sages appear to say that only four have skin. However, the wording is somewhat awkward, because the four listed by the Sages are precisely those whose skin is treated like flesh. If their skin is like flesh, it sounds as though they do not have ordinary skin.
Abaye adjusts the wording. The point is not that only the four mentioned by the Sages have skin. Rather, the skin is considered separate from the flesh only in the other four. With the four mentioned by the Sages, the skin is treated like flesh. Thus, there is skin in all eight creatures, but in four of them the skin has the legal status of flesh for purposes of ritual impurity.
Rava objects that the wording cannot be changed so drastically. When correcting the text of a teaching, one should make a subtle correction, not change “the creatures mentioned by the Sages” into “the creatures not mentioned by the Sages.”
Rava therefore explains the teaching differently. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri is discussing both the Sabbath and ritual impurity. Regarding the Sabbath, all eight creatures have skin. Regarding ritual impurity, their skin does not convey impurity, because impurity is conveyed by flesh. The Sages respond that there is a special scriptural derivation concerning four of the creatures: their skin is treated like flesh for purposes of ritual impurity.
According to this explanation, Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri maintains that all eight creatures have skin, but the skin itself does not convey impurity. The Sages agree regarding the Sabbath that all eight have skin, but they hold that, for ritual impurity, the skin of four of them is treated as flesh and therefore conveys impurity.
The reason the word “but” creates a problem is that it makes the Sages appear to be limiting Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri’s statement directly. If that word is removed, the teaching can be understood as discussing two separate issues. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri is speaking about the Sabbath, while the Sages are explaining the law of ritual impurity. This permits the two statements to be reconciled.
Thus, with respect to the Sabbath, there is no dispute between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Sages: all eight creatures have skin, and wounding them can be liable. The dispute concerns ritual impurity. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri treats the skin of all eight as distinct from the flesh, whereas the Sages say that the skin of four is treated like flesh because of the scriptural derivation.
The Gemara brings another opinion, that of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Yehudah does not determine the law solely from the scriptural list. He examines the physical nature of the creature’s skin. If the skin is thick, it is considered skin; if it is extremely thin, it is treated like flesh.
Rabbi Yehudah states that the lizard has skin as thick as that of a weasel, and therefore its skin does not convey ritual impurity. According to him, the relevant measure is the physical thickness and texture of the skin, rather than simply whether the creature appears in the verses before the phrase that introduces impurity.
This approach also creates a difference regarding the Sabbath. According to the Sages, all eight creatures have skin for purposes of the Sabbath, even though the skin of four is treated like flesh for purposes of ritual impurity. According to Rabbi Yehudah, the question is determined by the creature’s physical characteristics. A creature with thick skin has skin in the full sense; one with very thin skin does not.
The Gemara then asks why the teaching presents the dispute as one between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and Rabbi Yehudah, without mentioning the Sages. Since the Sages also agree with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri regarding the Sabbath, they should have been included on his side.
The answer is that regarding the Sabbath, Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Sages are indeed in agreement. The one who disputes them is Rabbi Yehudah, who follows the physical thickness of the skin. The Sages were therefore not mentioned separately because, with respect to the Sabbath, they share Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri’s position.
The Gemara next asks how we know that the wound discussed by the Torah is a wound in which the blood does not return to the body. The verse says, “Will a Cushite change his skin?” and then asks, “Will a leopard change its spots?” The term used for the leopard’s markings is understood as referring to a permanent change, not a temporary redness.
The Gemara explains that just as the skin of a Cushite does not change, so too, the wound under discussion is one whose appearance does not return to its original state. A temporary redness, such as when a person is struck and the blood later returns to the body, is not the type of wound for which one is liable. The relevant wound leaves a lasting mark, like a scar.
We return to the statement that, with other creeping creatures, wounding is exempt but killing is liable. The louse is not one of the eight creatures, yet the Mishnah indicates that killing it is liable. This demonstrates that the law of killing does not depend on the size of the creature. Killing a tiny louse and killing a large animal are both included in the labor of taking life.
Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua dispute whether trapping a flea on the Sabbath is liable. If a person traps a flea from the ground, Rabbi Eliezer says that he is liable, while Rabbi Yehoshua says that he is exempt. At first glance, since the two labors of trapping and killing are related, one might infer that Rabbi Yehoshua would also hold that killing such a creature is exempt.
The Gemara rejects that inference. The dispute regarding trapping concerns the definition of trapping. Rabbi Eliezer holds that even a creature that is not normally trapped is included, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua holds that a person is liable for trapping only something that is normally trapped. Regarding killing, however, Rabbi Yehoshua agrees that killing a creature that reproduces in the ordinary manner is liable.
The central dispute concerning a louse is whether the Torah’s labor of killing applies to a creature that does not reproduce in the ordinary manner. Rabbi Eliezer says that it does. The fact that the creature may arise through spontaneous generation does not change the fact that it is alive, and killing it is taking its life. The Sages disagree and maintain that the Torah’s liability for killing applies to creatures that reproduce in the ordinary manner, not to lice.
Everyone agrees that the issue is not a dispute about the scientific reality of whether lice reproduce. The dispute is how the Torah’s category of killing applies to a creature whose origin is understood differently.
The Gemara challenges the assumption that lice do not reproduce in the ordinary manner. It quotes the teaching that the Holy One sustains the world from the great wild ox down to the eggs of the lice. The reference to eggs would seem to indicate that lice reproduce through eggs.
The Gemara answers that the phrase “eggs of the lice” is the name of a species, not a reference to eggs laid by lice. It is a type of louse that is called by that name. Therefore, the teaching does not establish that ordinary lice reproduce through eggs.
This passage led to a major discussion in later generations. Modern science maintains that lice reproduce in a natural biological manner and do not arise through spontaneous generation. Some authorities therefore questioned the ruling that one may kill lice on the Sabbath. Maran rules that it is permitted to kill them, and some later authorities considered whether modern scientific knowledge should affect that ruling.
This raises a broader question: may one change a Talmudic ruling based on later scientific knowledge? One possible approach is to say that the Sages were correct in the halachic ruling even if their description of the biological process was not the basis of the law. The ruling remains valid because it was transmitted as halachah, while the explanation given for it was based on the scientific understanding of that time.
Another possible approach is to say that the Sages were discussing a different type of creature, or that there is another way to understand the passage. The issue is not simple, and it has been discussed at length by Rabbi Dessler in Michtav MeEliyahu, by the Pachad Yitzchak in his correspondence with Rabbi Bason, and by Rabbi Moshe Halevi in Menuchat Ahavah. The latter issued a controversial ruling, and there was opposition to him in Bnei Brak until Hacham Ovadiah defended his position.
We now return to the end of the Mishnah. If a person traps one of the other creeping creatures for a useful purpose, he is liable. If he traps it for no useful purpose, he is exempt. The Gemara asks who holds that trapping for a useful purpose is liable.
Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rav that this is the view of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon holds that a labor not required for its usual constructive purpose is exempt. In the case of opening a boil merely to release pus, the person does not need the opening itself, so the act is exempt. Similarly, if he traps a snake merely to prevent it from biting him, he does not need the snake, so the act is exempt. If he needs the snake, however, the act is a labor performed for its constructive purpose and he is liable.
The Gemara also discusses fishing. If a fish is taken from the water and the area between its fins dries to the extent of a sela, a coin, the fish is considered to have died, even if it is still moving. Once that area has dried, it will not survive. Taking it from the water and allowing it to reach that condition is therefore considered taking its life.
It was asked whether a person who immediately throws the fish back into the water is liable. The discussion may be referring to a fish already caught before the Sabbath, such as one in a bucket or container placed in the sea, so that the person is not performing the labor of trapping. If he removes the fish and immediately returns it before it reaches the critical degree of dryness, the question of killing may still arise, depending on the circumstances.
The Gemara then discusses a person who inserts his hand into an animal and moves the fetus. He is liable. The Gemara compares this to a person who pulls hops away from the thorn bush on which they grow. Removing the hops from their source of nourishment is considered detaching.
At first, this comparison appears difficult. Detaching is normally associated with things that grow from the ground. How can the act of removing a fetus from its mother be compared to detaching a plant?
The novelty is that the hops do not grow directly from the ground; they grow from the thorn bush. Nevertheless, removing them from the place that provides their nourishment is considered detaching. Similarly, the fetus is receiving its life from its mother. When a person removes it from its source of life, he has not necessarily killed the mother or directly killed the fetus, but he has severed the fetus from the source that sustains it. That is considered an act of detaching.
One might have thought that because the fetus has no independent life and receives everything from its mother, removing it would not be considered taking its life. The comparison to the hops teaches that removing something from the source that sustains it can itself constitute the relevant labor.
The Gemara then discusses fungus or growth that is attached to a vessel or wall. If a person detaches it from the place where it grows, he is liable, because he has removed it from its source of nourishment. This applies even though it is not growing directly from the ground.
Rabbi Oshaya challenges this from the law of a perforated flowerpot. If a person detaches a plant from a perforated pot, he is liable because the pot is connected to the ground through the hole. If the pot is not perforated, he is exempt because the plant is not considered attached to the ground.
The answer is that the law depends on the normal manner of growth. Vegetables normally grow from the ground, so if they grow in a flowerpot that is not connected to the ground, removing them is not the ordinary act of detaching and the person is exempt. Fungus, however, normally grows on a wall or another surface. Removing it from that surface is its normal form of detaching, and the person is liable.
Modern agriculture can grow vegetables through hydroponics, in water rather than soil. That does not necessarily change the blessing recited over them, because the halachic classification depends on the relevant rules of growth and the circumstances in which the plant is cultivated.
We have completed this section.