Okay, rabotai (my teachers), we’re in Reish-Mem-Daled (section 244). Maran (the author of the Shulchan Aruch) has a very interesting halachah (Jewish law). It’s straightforward; it’s one line: Im banu leYisrael goyim bayit beShabbat be'issur, nachon lehachmir shelo yikanesu bo (If non-Jews built a house for a Jew unlawfully on Shabbat, it is proper to be stringent and not enter it). Maran says that if the goys built a house for the Jew be'issur (unlawfully), he doesn’t say it’s assur (forbidden) to live in the house. He says nachon lehachmir and not to enter it.
We have to see where this comes from. We know there’s an existing rule that if a goy (non-Jew) does something for a Jew on Shabbat, you cannot be nehaneh (benefit) from it until the time it would take you to do it. For example, Motza'ei Shabbat (after Shabbat), you’d have to wait a certain amount of time so you don’t benefit from the melachah (forbidden labor) he did on Shabbat. That’s called bikhdei sheye'asu (the time that it would take you to do it). That’s a normal rule.
Here, the Shulchan Aruch doesn’t say that if he built the house on Shabbat, you have to wait the amount of time it would have taken to build it beheiter (permissibly). It says the whole house is assur, or off-limits. But it doesn’t say it’s assur min hadin (forbidden by law); it says nachon lehachmir. So Chacham David, yishmerehu HaEl (may God protect him), has a few pages on this, to go through it and clarify where this halachah comes from. Then we’ll have to give a bottom-line halachah benidon zeh (in this case): if somebody builds a house on Shabbat with contractors and things like that, is it nachon lehachmir? Do we tell the guy not to live in such a house?
We also have to ask: can you sell it? Is that considered hana'ah (benefit) too? The Mishnah Berurah yesterday told you that you could sell it to a goy. That’s not considered hana'ah. You can also sell it to a Jew, and he has to wait the time; we saw that too.
Mo'ed Katan amru (Behold, in Mo'ed Katan they said). This comes from the Gemara, Mo'ed Katan, daf yod-bet: shepo'alim hagoyim banu apadna leMar Zutra bereih deRav Nachman bekibolet bechutz latechum (Non-Jewish workers built a palace for Mar Zutra, son of Rav Nachman, under contract beyond the boundary). They built a palace for Mar Zutra outside the techum (Shabbat boundary), which is permitted, but velo ratzu chachamim lehikanes letocho (The Sages did not wish to enter it).
The Gemara asks, Ve'akshu baGemara, veha chutz latechum mutar (They asked in the Gemara: Is it not permitted beyond the boundary?). The answer is adam chashuv shani (an important person is different). An important person shouldn’t do it, even though it’s permitted. “Cool, though,” even if he was an important person. Another version says, Ve'ika de'amri, siyueie sai'a betivna bahadayhu (And some say: he assisted them with straw). What do you mean, he helped them? Rashi says, shehaya noten lahem teven limlachah (he gave them straw for the work). Since he assisted them, it was forbidden. Rashi holds that way: he helped them. Rabbenu Chananel there has a different text: his servants helped build it, which is closer to the case.
The Tur, in Hilchot Chol Hamo'ed (intermediate festival days), writes: Ve'afilu nivneh habayit be'issur al yedei goy, nachon lehachmir shelo yikanesu bo (Even if the house was built unlawfully by a non-Jew, it is proper to be stringent and not enter it). That’s the Tur’s wording: nachon. Beit Yosef writes that he holds the halachah follows the lishna batra (later formulation). According to the first formulation, the house was really built beheiter; it’s just that an important person is different. But according to the second, it was built be'issur (unlawfully), either because he supplied the materials or because his servants helped. That’s why they didn’t want to enter the house.
It sounds, though, like he holds that the halachah follows the later formulation, where it was also built unlawfully, but the Gemara doesn’t say it was forbidden to enter. It just says the Rabbis didn’t enter. That was a chumra (stringency). So you see how they arrive at this halachah: they say Mar Zutra’s house was built unlawfully, and still the Rabbis, it sounds like, didn’t forbid entering; they were just stringent. It seems that this wasn’t forbidden min hadin, but was midat chasidut (a pious practice), and that’s what the Tur means by “proper to be stringent”—even though it’s permitted by law, it’s proper to be stringent.
Beit Yosef writes in section 244 that although the Tur didn’t bring this ruling there, he holds that the same law applies to Shabbat. This was all said about Chol Hamo'ed: Mo'ed Katan was discussing something built during Chol Hamo'ed, and the Tur writes about it in Hilchot Chol Hamo'ed. But the same law applies to Shabbat; all the more so. See the Bach, who goes deeply into rejecting Beit Yosef’s interpretation of the Tur’s view, and the Taz, who goes even deeper in explaining the sugya and supports Beit Yosef’s understanding.
In the Shulchan Aruch here, Maran copied only the Tur’s words from Hilchot Chol Hamo'ed. So this halachah is a Chol Hamo'ed halachah, and Beit Yosef extended it to Shabbat. If you have a goy build a house beShabbat, it is nachon lehachmir.
Several of our later authorities express surprise at Maran’s words, because, in their view, these Rambam passages were brought only as a chumra. Open up the Rambam, rabotai. Perek vav, halachah bet (Maimonides). Let’s see what they want from this Rambam. Goy she'asah melachah me'atzmo beShabbat (A non-Jew who performed labor on his own on Shabbat). He worked for himself. Im bishvil Yisrael asah (If he did it for a Jew), then it is forbidden to benefit from that labor on Motza'ei Shabbat, and one waits bikhdei sheye'asu. He adds that the allowance of bikhdei sheye'asu applies only when the matter was done batzin'ah (in private). If it was done befarhesya (publicly) and many people know it was done for a particular Jew on Shabbat, it is a problem; if it was done only for the non-Jew himself, it is permitted to benefit from it on Shabbat.
What is the Rambam saying with the words, “provided that the matter was not done publicly”? The allowance of bikhdei sheye'asu applies only when it was done in private. It sounds like if it was done publicly, it’s worse. What could be worse than bikhdei sheye'asu? Forever! Maran didn’t say the Rambam’s ruling here is “proper to be stringent,” so this is what he brings out: the Rambam sounds like there is a problem.
It emerges from the Rambam that if something is done publicly, such as building a house, it is forbidden to live in it after Shabbat, even after enough time has passed for it to have been done. He doesn’t tell you for how long, but it sounds like it’s forbidden for a longer time. The source of the Rambam’s words is a Mishnah in Masechet Shabbat, daf kuf nun alef: Asu lo aron vechafru lo kever (They made him a coffin and dug him a grave). They made a coffin and a grave for a non-Jew on Shabbat. The ruling says it can be used for burying a Jew. If the non-Jew made them for a Jew, however, the Jew may never be buried in them. So we have a case where the non-Jew made the coffin for a Jew, and then it may never be used for him.
The Maggid Mishneh writes that the Rambam learned this from the law of a grave. The sugya in perek Ein Tzadin also proves it. The Maggid says the Rambam’s source is the law of the grave. All the more so: if this applies to a grave that isn’t attached to the ground, and it extends forever, it applies to a house, which is publicly known. The Rambam’s ruling about the grave is in halachah heh. It says that if non-Jews made a coffin and dug a grave for a dead person on Shabbat, or brought flutes to lament with, then if it was done privately, one waits the time it takes to do it after Shabbat and may bury him in it. If the grave was beside a public road, and everyone passing by knew that it was being made for a particular righteous person as his burial place, that Jew may never be buried in it, because it was done publicly.
So the Rambam holds that anything done for a Jew publicly is a problem. Maran himself later copied the Rambam’s wording to be stringent in the law of a grave. Open up the Shulchan Aruch, first the six-packs. Section Shin Kaf-Heh, Yud-Daled. We’re getting into a whole subject here. The ruling says that if an akum (idolater) made a coffin or grave for himself on Shabbat, a Jew may bury someone in it. If he made it for a Jew, the Jew may never be buried in it, specifically when the grave is publicly known.
Here Maran says that in the case of a grave, it is forbidden by law forever. But with the house, he says only that it is proper to be stringent. That’s a bit strange. So perhaps there is a setirah (contradiction) in Maran. That’s what Chacham David is pointing out. He copied the Rambam’s wording. Some later authorities wanted to reconcile Maran’s statements. They say the house case is one where it was built bekablanut (contract work), and the only prohibition is mar'it ayin (appearance of wrongdoing). Contract work is permitted by law, so that’s why Maran says it is proper to be stringent. The grave case, by contrast, is where it was actually built unlawfully, for example by sechirei yom (day laborers), and is forbidden by law.
That’s one way to resolve it: the house was built under contract, which is permitted by law, and is only prohibited because of mar'it ayin; the grave was built unlawfully by day laborers. But Maran’s wording in the Shulchan Aruch is general. He says, “If non-Jews built a house for a Jew on Shabbat unlawfully,” without specifying what kind of issur (prohibition). He didn’t write in parentheses that it was contract work. “Unlawfully” sounds like it could mean either contract work or day laborers, and still Maran only says it is proper to be stringent. We’re back to the question.
If we read Maran straightforwardly, all he said was, “If a house was built unlawfully.” Do we know that “unlawfully” means only contract work? No; a prohibition is a prohibition, any prohibition. In every case, he says it is proper to be stringent. Several later authorities write this. After examining the harishonim (early authorities), it seems reasonable to explain Maran as holding that in every case it is only proper to be stringent, even if the house was built by non-Jewish day laborers.
Regarding a grave made for a Jew, which the Mishnah says may never be used, the early authorities disagree about whether that is a special law about graves, or whether it also applies to other things done publicly. There is a machloket (dispute). The Rambam writes generally in halachah bet about anything done publicly, and in halachah heh he gives the law of the grave. That suggests he doesn’t distinguish between them. The Rambam doesn’t make a distinction: anything done publicly is forbidden by law forever.
Tosfot Rid writes that what they said about a grave—that it may never be used—is because it was done publicly. The Rabbis imposed an extra knas (penalty) on something done publicly: you can never benefit from it, because of the penalty. If it was public knowledge, for example, if they built his house on Shabbat, it should be forbidden to him forever. The Piskei Rid says that since the labor was public and related to a Jew, it is forbidden to benefit from it forever, and he learned this from the law of a grave.
Shibolei HaLeket, in the name of Rabbeinu Yeshayah, likewise writes that if the labor was public, such as building a house, one should forbid it to him forever, like a grave. The Piskei Ri'az writes that it is forbidden whether it is that Jew or another Jew. The view also emerges from the responsum of HaRif: anything comparable to a grave is forbidden forever. Sefer HaMichtam writes that regarding a house, they should not enter it even on a weekday, since it stands forever; it’s get befarhesya, and people remember that they saw it built on Shabbat. People will say, “That was the house that was built on Shabbat,” and talk about it for a long time—even after a very long time. Basically, they’re lenient about something cooked on Shabbat because people forget about it, but something permanent that was done publicly is forbidden forever. The HaRan and HaMe'iri write similarly.
On the other side, there are authorities who praise the lenient view. Rabbeinu Tam, in a responsum in Sefer HaManhig, writes that even a vessel made for public use is permitted. Why are a coffin and grave strict? The reason is that people might say, “This grave was made unlawfully for him on Shabbat.” But something else would have been permitted. The question is the palace of Mar Zutra: that wasn’t a grave, and the Rabbis didn’t want to enter the house. The answer is that the building could have been done unlawfully. The reason they didn’t enter wasn’t that his servants were building it on Shabbat; it was that it had been built unlawfully. I found a text that says his servants helped them. That wasn’t contract work; his workers were actually there on the site building on Shabbat.
We’ve already established that it may be a special law about a grave, so people won’t say that this grave was made for him in violation of Shabbat. Sefer HaHashlamah also writes that if a grave was made publicly, it is forbidden forever to that person because of kevod hamet (respect for the dead). That applies specifically to a dead person; in other cases, when something was done for a Jew, one waits bikhdei sheye'asu, the regular rule. The Ba'al HaMa'or and Or Zaru'a likewise explain that they were more stringent in the case of a dead person than in other prohibitions because of respect for the dead. Maharam miRothenburg writes similarly. What a real machloket! Big guns on both sides, with different ways to understand this sugya.
Let’s go back to Maran and the Shulchan Aruch. We can say that after seeing several early authorities who distinguish between the law of a grave and other things—and whose view is the Tur’s position in Hilchot Chol Hamo'ed, where he ruled stringently—Maran established the halachah according to them. That’s why Maran said that a grave is forbidden forever by law, while for a house it is proper to be stringent. Even though some say that with a house it is permitted after bikhdei sheye'asu, Maran saw other opinions that were stringent by law, and others that were entirely lenient. He took a middle position.
In any case, amirah le'akum (asking a non-Jew to do something) is rabbinic, and this whole law is rabbinic, even though the Rambam is stringent in this respect. Although the Rambam holds that anything done publicly is forbidden by law, forever, we already pointed out that position. Maran moved away from the Rambam’s approach and took the Tur’s. That’s a beautiful way to learn it, and that’s the main way he’ll learn it.
I also saw that Eliyahu Rabbah writes that this explains Maran’s view: the law of a grave is different because of respect for the dead. A dead person is a matter of respect for the dead; a house is a house. The Rambam was stringent, but Maran didn’t follow this Rambam. The Rambam is a problem; according to him, it’s forbidden. But Maran—
Open the Mishnah Berurah, section ayin-gimmel, by the law of a dead person. What does it say? “Forever.” Even though in other forbidden labors done for a Jew the prohibition lasts only until bikhdei sheye'asu, here, since the grave is public, the Sages were more stringent. The same law applies to anything done publicly. The Mishnah Berurah says that anything done publicly for a Jew is forbidden forever, in the name of the Rambam. But from the words of the Ran, it sounds like they were stringent here specifically because it would be degrading to a Jew to be buried in a publicly known grave where Shabbat was desecrated. With other labors, it is forbidden only until bikhdei sheye'asu. That gives us the dispute here.
See the end of section tar-samech-dalet. That is also the Ran’s view, and I found it in several other early authorities. Therefore, there is no need to be stringent when there is a need. That gives us a way to be lenient with other items, even though it goes against the Rambam, bimkom tzorech (in a case of need). I guess there’s always a need: somebody builds a house on Shabbat; what’s the need? He wants to live in the house. Maybe that’s a need.
We’re equating a coffin with a grave here. Maybe it doesn’t work out that way. A coffin could be governed by the regular rule; it doesn’t have to be in his house. If they made the coffin publicly, it was public, in the street. If the guy made the coffin, it should all be bikhdei sheye'asu. Maybe not. Maybe that’s the distinction between a grave and a coffin. Maran says it is the grave that was publicly known. The coffin was known to have been made for a particular Jew. So this is incredible: we have a way to understand Maran, but the question is what the ruling is nowadays, when everybody does contract work. Is it still proper to be stringent and not live in such a house?
If the guy puts up a sign saying “contract work,” and the whole world uses contract work, nobody is concerned about mar'it ayin anymore today. The ruling at the end says that where most people in the place build their houses by contract, many authorities hold that one may be lenient, even initially, and have a house built by non-Jews; one may be lenient and move into that house, even initially. There’s no concern about it.
In our case, where it’s a matter of what was already done, it seems simple that one can initially move into the house. Even with other contract work that is forbidden, some say it is permitted to enter. Rabbeinu Tam permitted building a house by contract on Shabbat. However, in the responsum Knaf Renanah—Knafeh? Knafeh? Knaf Renanah—he writes stringently nowadays, even if most people in the city build by contract. He is stringent even if most people use contract work. Although the Taz and others were lenient in the case of Rabbeinu Tam, that was specifically in their time, when people seeing the work might assume it was being done permissibly. Nowadays, even after the fact, it is forbidden because of chillul Hashem (desecration of God’s name), and people will suspect that the non-Jew is a day laborer.
Our master, Rav Chacham Ovadiah Yosef, wrote at length, with good reasoning, to reject his words. In any case, some say there is a prohibition against entering a house that was built unlawfully—
The whole thing is a chumra. That’s it: according to Maran, the whole thing is a chumra. Especially today, when everybody uses contract work, leit denitztarech bazeh. Nobody has to worry about any of this.
Now let’s go to halachah heh. Open up the Aruch haShulchan. We need daled, heh, and vav. Reish-Mem-Daled, and we’re in daled. It’s one paragraph in the Aruch haShulchan: Ve'ein ikar hahefresh bein talush lemechubar, de'ikar hefresh hu bein tzin'ah lefarhesya (The main distinction is not between detached and attached; the main distinction is between private and public). That’s a very important point, because the grave also wasn’t attached. It’s public, and even that is going to be forbidden. The point is private versus public. A house happens to be attached, but the reason it is forbidden is that it is public.
Is a grave not attached? They’re making it. It’s public! They’re building it in the grave, the grave factory, and then they use it and bring it to the cemetery. When you’re building it, it’s movable property; that’s how you bring a grave to the cemetery. You carry the coffin. But since it’s public, it’s forbidden. The Aruch haShulchan says not to get caught up in whether it is detached or attached; the main distinction is between private and public, because, in most cases, detached things are made privately and attached things publicly. That’s why they made a distinction between detached and attached.
In truth, a detached thing made publicly—for example, making a sefinah, a boat—is different. A boat is detached, but it’s a huge item. The Shibolei HaLeket treats its law like that of attached work. Section daled, daled: attached work is forbidden in all cases, and making a boat is prohibited when it is done in a public place where many people can see. If it isn’t done in a public place, it is permitted. Even attached work in a place where people can’t see, such as beyond the Shabbat boundary, is permitted. So certainly if you build a boat somewhere, it is permitted.
Melechet parhesya (public labor) is very important. Public labor, even involving movable items such as a boat known to belong to a Jew, has the same law as attached labor. Don’t get caught up in attached versus detached. Maran tells you that it has nothing to do with that. Even a detached item that is publicly known is forbidden. If you build a boat publicly, you have the same problem.
Now section heh. Go to yod-dalet. It’s a big one. We have the Rambam; let’s read it inside. Perek vav, halachah yod-bet: Posek adam im hagoy al hamelachah vekotzet damim. A person may make an agreement with a non-Jew about the work and set a price. If the non-Jew is working for himself, then even if he does it on Shabbat, it is permitted. Likewise, if you hire a non-Jew for many days, it is permitted even if he works on Shabbat. For example, you hire him for a year or two to write for you or weave for you. He writes and weaves on Shabbat, and it is permitted, as if you had made a set-price agreement with him to write a book or weave a garment, which he does whenever he wants. It is provided that you don’t calculate with him day by day.
It’s interesting: this isn’t regular contract work. You’re not paying him for the job; you give him a two-year contract and pay him for two years. You don’t pay him by the day and tell him, “Write me the book.” The Rambam says that’s also permitted. It’s like a long contract you make with a person: I didn’t tell you when to write the book; I hired you for two years, and you give me the book after two years. That’s like contract work. I’m not paying you for the book; I didn’t set a price for the book. I gave you a period of time.
But don’t tell him, “I’m paying you $50 a day,” because then, if he works on Shabbat, he’s getting the $50 for Shabbat. It’s all muvla, it’s all in there. That’s the Rambam. It’s a different form of contract work. Normally, contract work means I’m paying you to write the book; here’s a check for $50,000 to write it. Here, I’m not telling him that. I’m paying you $50,000 this year and $50,000 next year. I’m hiring you for two years, $50,000 a year, and I want you to write the book. It has the same flavor as contract work.
The Aruch haShulchan starts again: “The Rambam writes in chapter six, law twelve: a person may make an agreement with an idolater about the work and set a price. Likewise, if he hires an idolater for many days, it is permitted even if he works on Shabbat. How? For example, he hired the idolater for a year or two to write for him or weave for him. He writes and weaves on Shabbat as if they had agreed on a price for him to write a book or weave a garment, which he does whenever he wants. Provided that he doesn’t calculate with him day by day.”
The Aruch haShulchan explains: just as it’s permitted to make a contract for a particular task, with a set price for that work, so too, even if you don’t hire him for a particular task but do hire him for a particular kind of work, and hire him for a year, whenever this particular work is needed, he does it for you. That’s also permitted. He’s hired for the time, and you tell him, “Whenever you want to do this job, you can get it done.” Since he’s working on contract, receiving a set amount for that year’s work, and he can do it whenever he wants, it doesn’t matter when he does it.
It has to be a particular kind of work, such as writing or weaving, because he will surely have a lot of free time when he can sit idle. When the employer needs him to write, he is obligated to write; when the employer does not need him, he is not obligated to write. You gave him one job, so he’ll have time to do it without having to work on Shabbat; if he chooses to work on Shabbat, that’s his prerogative. The Jew doesn’t benefit from the fact that he writes or weaves on Shabbat. If he doesn’t do it on Shabbat, he’ll do it during the week.
But if you hire him for all the work he’ll need to do, that’s different. You hired the guy as your butler to do everything. He has to do it on Shabbat so that he can be free at other times to do the other things you hired him for. It’s forbidden to have him do it on Shabbat, because he benefits: when he does it on Shabbat, he has time during the week, and the Jew benefits that way. On the contrary, he’s happy that he did the writing on Shabbat and is free on Tuesday to do all the other work he has to do.
The Ra'avad disagrees with the Rambam. He holds that even for separate, particular jobs, it is forbidden for this reason: if the worker does one on Shabbat and tomorrow you need that kind of work again, he’ll do it then, and the Jew benefits from what he did on Shabbat.
Hold on; go slowly. We have the Ra'avad. Open up the Ra'avad in your Rambams, chapter six, halachah yod-bet. Do you see the Ra'avad? It says, “How? For example, if he hired him for a year.” Amar Avraham (Avraham said). Who is Avraham? Avraham Avinu? No, that’s the Ra'avad, Joe. The Ra'avad’s name is Rabbi Avraham ben David. When he writes, he’s saying, “I’m—” He wrote comments on the side of the Rambam, so nobody should wonder who wrote them; he signed them with alef-alef.
The Ra'avad writes, davar zeh lo savir velo nahir (This matter is neither reasonable nor clear). So I don’t like it. Even if he doesn’t calculate with him while he’s idle, nevertheless that work mishtarshela. He gets hana'ah. The Ra'avad says this isn’t contract work. Let’s make contract work clear again: I’m paying the guy to make this cup for me, and I pay him $50. One job, one cup. The non-Jew decides to do it on Shabbat because he wants to finish and get another job. No problem: I didn’t give him a time frame, just “Finish it.” He had enough time to do it during the week, on Shabbat, or whenever he wants. I didn’t limit him to doing it on Shabbat.
In this case, no. I hire a non-Jew for a year or two, pay a salary for the year, and tell him, “By the way, I want you to get this book done.” The Rambam says that’s like contract work because he has a lot of free time and can do what he wants. If he decides to do it on Shabbat, what difference does it make? I don’t benefit from his doing it on Shabbat; I’m paying him for the year anyway.
The Ra'avad says no, that’s worse than contract work. Why? Because you benefit: he’ll be available on the other days because you hired him for the year. “But I only hired him for the book, not for anything else. He’s not my employee.” The Ra'avad says that even when he’s idle, that work keeps accruing. The Aruch haShulchan explains the Ra'avad’s view: even with a particular job like this, it’s forbidden, because if he does it on Shabbat and tomorrow you need that same work again, he’ll do it then, and the Jew benefits from what he did on Shabbat. If you have another book for him to write, he’ll be free to write it because he did the first one on Shabbat.
“But is he an employee? With contract work, the job is the book.” Yes, but here it’s like I hired you for a year. I bought the time; I didn’t buy the book. If he works on Shabbat, now he has time to write another book. That’s what the Ra'avad doesn’t like about buying his time.
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch agree with the Rambam, which is fortunate for us. The Ra'avad’s view seems far-fetched, because he would have to need the same work repeatedly. Beit Yosef therefore brings the Ra'avad’s view only as “some say,” not as the ruling. The reason the Rambam says not to calculate with him day by day is simple: it shouldn’t look as if you’re paying him Shabbat wages. It’s also obvious that if you hire him to write or weave continuously, it’s forbidden to have him do it on Shabbat. If you’re hiring a daily writer, he can’t work on Shabbat, because then you need him.
The permitted case is when you give him a particular writing job that he can do in his free time. But if you give him constant work, Shabbat itself becomes beneficial to him. So the Aruch haShulchan writes that a Jew who owns a factory and has non-Jewish workers hired for a year to do a particular kind of work, such as weaving, spinning, or similar work, may not have them do it on Shabbat. Even if they were hired for a particular kind of work, the factory’s work goes on all day, and the Jew benefits from what they do on Shabbat. A single kind of work that is not constant would be permitted; but when the work is constant, the Jew benefits from what is done on Shabbat. They were hired for all the work. The Rambam agrees that this is forbidden.
There’s no solution for that except selling, as will be explained in paragraph chaf-dalet. Now we get to our story: maids. We have goyot (non-Jewish woman) working in the house, and they have constant jobs. Some of those jobs are forbidden: laundry, ironing, vacuuming, and things like that.
The hashfachot (maids) in a Jewish home are forbidden to do any labor on Shabbat for the Jew, even if they aren’t doing it in the Jewish home. That’s when they’re hired for all kinds of work. Exactly: she does the ironing on Shabbat, and now she’s free to do other things you hired her to do. You hired her for everything. You benefit: she got the laundry out of the way on Shabbat, so now she can do the windows Sunday morning. It’s not just that one job; I need her for everything.
But she may do things for herself, even in a Jewish home. She’s knitting a sweater for her own granddaughter in Honduras; go ahead, I don’t care. It has nothing to do with me. There are those who forbid her from doing her own work in a Jewish home, because people may suspect that she’s doing it for the Jew. But that isn’t the main view. The glosses of the Mordechai at the end of perek deShabbat say it is permitted. Why would people suspect that it’s for the Jew? Everybody knows she also has things to do for herself. She’s doing her own laundry; she took her own sweater and is cleaning it on Shabbat. That’s her sweater.
So paragraph heh is the paragraph about maids. We finally found the Shulchan Aruch’s discussion of where maids come into the issue. Look at the Taz. The case is: if you hire a non-Jew for a year or two to write for you or weave a garment, he may write and weave on Shabbat, as if you had agreed on a price for a book or garment, which he does whenever he wants. Provided that you don’t calculate with him day by day and that he doesn’t do the work in the Jewish home.
Some say it is forbidden when you hire a non-Jew for a period of time. We’ve reached the point: you’re buying his time. Who says that? The Ra'avad. Maran brings “anonymous view and a second view”: the anonymous view is the Rambam, and the second view is the Ra'avad.
The Magen Avraham explains that the Rambam’s case is like having a particular writer or chayyat on retainer. He has this person working for him, and whenever he needs a suit, he says, “Make me a suit.” He keeps the worker available; whenever he needs something, he asks him to make it. He has the worker on retainer for two years, so the work can be done today or tomorrow. The Jew has to make sure that the worker has time available to write, and that he isn’t obligated to write when there’s no work. Sometimes he may do nothing for six months. Therefore, he may write or weave on Shabbat whenever he wants.
He isn’t telling him to produce suits every day, so that he has to work on Shabbat and can be free on Sunday to make more suits. He gives him jobs once in a while. He pays him so he’ll be available whenever the king calls him. Is he paid by the suit, or is he on salary? He’s on salary for the years. But he still wouldn’t be able to tell him Friday afternoon, “Make me a suit; I need it tomorrow night.” That’s always the point: you’re not telling him to do it on Shabbat. If he wants, he does it; he can do it tomorrow. The Jew doesn’t gain by its being done on Shabbat. I don’t need another suit anyway. Do it Tuesday; what difference does it make to me?
But if he hires him to weave garments or write books constantly, it’s forbidden to have him do it on Shabbat, even if the Jew doesn’t insist that he work on a particular day. Nevertheless, the Jew benefits from his work. The Taz sounds like he wants to be lenient even in that case, because the Jew doesn’t mind if the worker takes a day off. If the worker says, “I didn’t work on Shabbat yesterday,” it doesn’t bother the Jew; he’ll just make fewer sweaters.
The Taz wants to say that according to the Rambam, that case is also like contract work, since the Jew isn’t particular if the worker takes a day off. You can hear the other side: when he works on Shabbat, I get more goods, and I need those goods. If he is particular that the worker not sit idle for any day, then it is certainly forbidden, as if he commanded him to work on Shabbat.
Look at the next phrase, “Some say it is forbidden.” That is the Ra'avad’s view. According to the Taz, it’s straightforward to understand the Ra'avad’s reason: even if the Jew doesn’t mind that the worker takes a day off, the Jew still benefits from what he does on Shabbat. According to the Magen Avraham, the Ra'avad’s view also makes sense: the Jew benefits because he may need him again tomorrow. Maybe tomorrow he’ll need him to write something else. He can say, “I did that on Shabbat already,” and be available for Sunday’s work. You never know; the Jew might give him another job on Sunday. The Jew doesn’t give him jobs every day, but maybe he’ll have another job right away. If the worker says, “I’m backed up; I still didn’t finish the other suit,” the Jew benefits retroactively. The Ra'avad says you have to be concerned about that. But Maran says he isn’t concerned about it. According to Maran, there’s no problem with that. When Sunday comes, it’s all right to give him another job, even though you benefited. “I didn’t tell him to do it on Shabbat; he did it for himself.”
Now go back to the Rama’s gloss. It is specifically when you hire him for a particular job, such as weaving a garment or writing a book. But if you hire him for all the work that will be needed during the period of employment, everybody agrees that it’s forbidden. That’s like the end of section Reish-Mem-Zayin: if you hire him for everything, you need him available for the next job. Since the work is constant, you benefit from what he did on Shabbat because he’s available for the next job.
The Mishnah Berurah explains: with a particular job, it’s possible the Jew won’t gain from the work being done on Shabbat, for example if he won’t need another weaving or writing job of that kind. But if he hires him for all kinds of work, it is almost certain that he’ll need another job tomorrow. Then he benefits from the worker having done something on Shabbat. For that reason, even if he doesn’t work with him today, it’s forbidden.
And here we are, rabotai. In the Mishnah Berurah, the second wide line says that for this reason one should protest when maidservants do their employers’ work on Shabbat, even if they do it outside the Jewish home and without being told to do it. They are hired for all kinds of work. All the more so if they do it in the Jewish home. The Mishnah Berurah says that some forbid even when the worker is hired for a particular kind of work, as we just saw.
That means all of this, including the case of the man writing a book: where was he writing the book? In his house. All of what we said is permitted when the non-Jew is writing there, but for the non-Jew to write it in your house is plainly forbidden. Betokh is always forbidden. Remember the rules? Everything we were lenient about—contract work and all that—is when the non-Jew does it in his own place, not in your house. The only thing we were lenient about was the non-Jew doing his own thing in your house, not your thing in your house.
So even if you hired the maid for one job—laundry—and don’t need her for anything else, and pay her by the job, she can do the laundry whenever she wants. You pay $10 for the job, whether there’s a lot or a little laundry; you don’t care when she does it. She decides to do it on Shabbat. “It’s one job, like contract work.” But it’s in your house. Go slowly. Once it’s in your house, you don’t have a way out. You’ll say, “It’s contract work; she’s doing it so she can go early or late.” But it’s in your house. “No, it’s in the basement, in her domain.” Whatever it is.
Also, let’s think about how you pay the maid. By the day? Weekly? If she misses a day, do you still pay her weekly? If she misses two days, do you deduct? Suppose she makes $300 a week and is supposed to come Mondays. You calculate that she worked 11 days: 11 times $53, and that’s her pay. How did you get the $300? Six days a week, $50 a day. Exactly. If she comes an extra day, you pay $350.
I’m not talking about paying her for holidays when she takes time off because you want to be nice, or paying her when she’s sick and comes back three days later. “Joey is an arcade.” You’re unbelievable, Joey; you’re a tzaddik (righteous person)! “I’m not paying you to get sick. Go back to Mexico!” You’re lucky. Joey Haber for president! That’s another story. You’re not necessarily paying her a set price, but the going rate is based on a daily rate, right? My wife has a list and counts: “You worked 11 days; 11 times $53, here’s your money.” Then she says, “Joey Haber gives his maid—” “Go work for Joey Haber; don’t bother me!” You killed the market. Ashreicha, Joey, you’re a tzaddik.
By the hour? Maybe. That could be worse, because then you’re paying her for each hour on Shabbat. I’m just saying, I don’t even think it’s contract work; it’s probably day labor, which is already very bad. But even if you want to say it’s like Joey’s arrangement, where it’s contract work, it’s still in your house. What are you going to do about it being in your house?
We already did this when we got into the shul. Remember we stopped the non-Jews from doing everything here? We said, “Hold it, it’s in a Jewish home. The air conditioners are turning on and off; they’re doing melachah b'yadayim (labor done directly).” Calm down. They’re still doing what? Talk, talk. What about the air conditioning? There are cases of excruciating pain. Don’t throw out a bomb and then go back to your Pac-Man. We’re learning now.
We stopped all the air conditioning, but we learned in the halachah that if it’s painful for the community, one may be lenient. This year was an odd year. In December it was 70 degrees, and the heat was going on because it was switched on; the systems weren’t expecting that. When we came on December 27th and it was 75 degrees outside and 95 degrees in the shul, we told the non-Jew to tell the non-Jew to turn on the air conditioning. Last year, before we learned the halachah, people were telling him, “Up one degree, down one degree, one degree more,” all day long. We got rid of that. No more going from 72 to 71, and then another guy saying, “No, I want to go to 62.” We stopped fooling around with degrees.
But in situations where the community was unexpectedly hot, and the heat was going on properly in the winter without our realizing it, we were lenient completely. We had grounds to rely on, because it was for the community. We said heat and air conditioning are different. Everyone is considered ill in these circumstances, and we saw that there is even a special leniency for air conditioning. In a house, by the way, we have the same leniency for air conditioning and heat. Air conditioning and heat are in a different category. If it’s cold in the winter, people get sick; some say there is distress even in the summer. Leave that aside. But ovens, laundry, and the other things—you see, we don’t have a way out.
Someone asks: Could there be a havla'ah (bundled payment) in our cases with day labor, since we’re not paying them for Shabbat but for Friday and Saturday, and parts of Friday and Saturday are weekdays? That’s a good question. Saturday after Shabbat? So you want to make it like that. When are we saying the day starts, when you pay these maids? Are you paying her at 8:00 in the morning? Does she punch in at 8:00? I don’t really know what the 24-hour period is or what the law is. “When she wakes up.” No matter how you learn it, you’ll have Friday to Saturday as one day; Friday and Saturday are weekdays and Shabbat together. So on Saturday it’s a problem if she works then. “But part of the payment is for Shabbat and part for Friday.” If Friday is from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., let’s say—if she worked during the day on Friday, that doesn’t help you. It doesn’t help you do labor. Even contract work won’t help. If she does it for free, that probably won’t help either. There’s no way out.
That’s all we have to know: maids are a major problem on Shabbat. Don’t tell me, “But they’re washing the dishes.” You can wash the dishes. Whatever you can do, she can do. Someone asks about a catering company that comes before Shabbat and does work so they can do it. That’s a separate question about how to pay them. A Jew has issues paying, so we let them come early to set up so we’re not paying them for—. That’s the paying aspect of it. We’re talking about doing the work for you now. There are two issues: how can you pay a worker on Shabbat, even if the work is permitted? That’s the question with the chazan (cantor), chazanim, rabbis, and so on. We say you’re not paying the rabbi for Shabbat; you’re paying him for preparation during the week, and it’s all muvla, it’s all in there. That’s how we resolve the payment issue.
But do we have a way to allow a maid to do laundry or vacuum on Shabbat? Maybe she vacuums because it makes her life easier; perhaps. Some have that leniency with a dishwasher. Let’s say it doesn’t make much noise—or even if it does, since we don’t go by noise—but you don’t want to ruin your whole Shabbat atmosphere. She decides to put the dishes in the dishwasher. She could have cleaned them by hand. What if they’re plates from the seudah shelishit (third Shabbat meal)? She could have cleaned them then, but you can’t do it in advance. Would you go so far as to say that’s also hachanah (preparation)? We have to see how far we’ll take this chidush (novel interpretation). A she'elah (question): can she set the dishwasher after the seudah shelishit? What do you care anymore? If she puts the dishes in the dishwasher instead of washing them by hand, she has more time to do something else. But that’s for herself. You could say she gets to go off after she washes the dishes. If she washes them, she doesn’t want to wait. That’s for herself.
We’re going to read all these halachot, rabotai; the laws of maids are coming up. Someone asks about havla'ah for a factory worker outside the house. Could be, because the payment covers both weekdays and Shabbat. What if the factory worker doesn’t finish? His boss tells him he needs to do 100 bags; on Friday he only does 90, but says he’ll do 100, so he does the other 10 on Shabbat. “This is taxes.” We need five here. Here it is: dalet, heh. Socher.
Someone asks if it is definitely forbidden to hire a maid just for Shabbat. Why would it be forbidden? She’s coming to help clean or set the table. Why not? Anything you can do, she can do. “Anything I can do, you can do better.” What is this, Shirley Temple? Hire waiters, hire everybody. “What is the problem?” She’s doing something you could have done. “It means you’re paying on Shabbat.” Now you’re going into payment, which is a different halachah.
“Only Shabbat—what’s the problem?” You keep repeating “only Shabbat.” Did you hear a bat kol (heavenly voice) here? You’re talking about two different halachot. We’re discussing a non-Jew doing melachah for you on Shabbat, in this section. We’re not talking about payment. Payment is a separate question. “I’m not asking about paying. I’m asking if it’s permitted to have her.” That’s a different question. Whether you hire her just for Shabbat or for the week, she can only do the same things. Nothing changes. Whether you hire her for a day, a week, a year, or a month, her obligations to the house—what she is and isn’t allowed to do—never change. She can’t do anything that I can’t do.
The question is whether I have to stop her. I probably have to stop her too if she’s in my house. The separate question is whether I’m allowed to hire a non-Jewish woman for the day, for Saturday, to do permitted things, and at the end of the day pay her $52. That’s called day labor. Am I allowed to hire her? That’s a separate halachah. It could be permissible for non-Jews; it could be more lenient. For Jews there is a prohibition. Maybe for non-Jews it’s more lenient. We’ll discuss that separately.
“Why would it be forbidden?” What is the prohibition? Bring me the Halachah Berurah, section bet. I want to see what he says about maids. The blue book? I want to see all his material about maids. Maybe he discusses maidservants under hiring workers. What else do you call them? “Ozeret (female domestic helper).” Sometimes the most practical term isn’t in the index. They grouped it with all the other workers. Maybe eved (servant), maybe maidservants. Let’s look. I don’t see it. The laws of hiring workers on Shabbat—we’ll see that in Shin-Zayin. That’s a good question. Perhaps it’s under benefit from a non-Jew’s work, hiring, contract work, partnership. We’ll have to see.
Then someone says, “Invoke shalom bayit (domestic harmony).” I don’t know what you think he’s going to say. You think he’s going to give you a leniency? We’re desperate for that. “It has to be shalom bayit.” Whatever, you can desecrate Shabbat and go to the beach for shalom bayit. The question is about a non-Jew doing public labor. Then can you use the item they made? What about the sprinkler system? We’ll see. We’re going to see section vav now.
But you see clearly what the Mishnah Berurah says. Read it again so we’re clear: “For this reason, one should protest against maidservants when they do their employers’ work on Shabbat, even if they do it outside the Jewish home and without being instructed by their employers.” They’re hired for all kinds of work. All the more so if they do it in a Jewish home. He says it is forbidden even when they’re hired for a particular kind of work, as mentioned earlier. The Taz cites Rabbeinu Simchah, who forbids a maidservant even to do her own work. We saw that, but that’s too much; the Aruch haShulchan already said that’s too much. We can let her do her own work.
So basically, it comes down to this simple rule: whatever you’re allowed to do, she’s allowed to do. The only thing about which we may be a little more lenient is when there’s a permitted way to do something, and she chooses to do it in a forbidden way to make her life easier—for example, using a dishwasher, or perhaps vacuuming, when she could do it manually or pick things up by hand.
There’s also the principle that when a non-Jew does work for his own needs, even in a Jewish home, one doesn’t have to protest. That’s where Chacham Ovadia is lenient. Does it say anything else about maids? No, it’s forbidden. “You can’t wash dishes by hand?” No, there’s no way. Washing clothes? You’ll never have a leniency. Dishes, yes; not washing clothes. Washing clothes is certainly forbidden. Ironing is certainly forbidden. There’s no way to do that.
“I’m done. Give him the gavel!” I got the gavel! “You didn’t say to go slowly.” Who said go slowly? “I didn’t say go slowly. I thought there was a leniency; I didn’t find anything.” What do you have to know? I told you that. He’s sinking.
For things that could have been done permissibly, and she chooses to do them—okay. But that won’t get you out of doing laundry, or turning lights on and off for you. “So what? It’s rabbinic; what’s the difference?” I’m just saying, unless she’s doing it for herself so she can see. We have to clarify which kinds of labor she does in the house. You have to be aware of these things.
Raking leaves is a problem on Shabbat. I don’t think there’s a permitted way to rake leaves. I don’t know what it is—maybe me'amer (gathering produce). Maybe she is tolesh (uprooting), I don’t know. Muktzeh (set-aside items) for sure, but maybe we don’t say muktzeh by a goy. Maybe she’s smoothing the field as she rakes, but we don’t say pesik reisheih (inevitable consequence) applies to a non-Jew. That may not be the biggest problem.
Someone asks about bringing the newspaper from outside to inside. What paper? The newspaper? Then you’ll say we have eruv (Shabbat boundary enclosure). Don’t make an issue out of the newspaper or a book. I wasn’t talking about the paper; I wasn’t talking about the image. Okay, that’s that. Let’s say one thing over here for the...