Rabotai (my teachers), we’re continuing the Aruch HaShulchan. Today we begin a new siman (section), b'ezrat Hashem, with God’s help: resh-samech-vav. This is the famous case of somebody walking on erev Shabbat (Sabbath eve) who suddenly sees that Shabbat is coming and has money in his pocket. What does he do? If he puts it on the floor, it won’t be there motza'ei Shabbat (after Shabbat). Not just after Shabbat—five minutes later, it won’t be there. So it’s a hefsed, a loss. If you tell the guy, “There’s nothing you can do. You have to put the money on the floor,” he’s not going to listen to you. Adam bahul al mamono (a person is frantic over his money). What do we worry about? Shabbat will come, and he’ll walk daled amot (four cubits) in reshut harabim, or he’ll walk from the public domain to the private domain, where it would be issur d'Oraita (Torah-level prohibition). To make akirah (lifting), hanachah (placing down), it's issur d'Oraita (Torah-level prohibition). We don’t want him to come to a Torah-level prohibition, so we have to cut our losses. We have to say, “Listen, if we don’t let the guy do something m'drabbanan (rabbinic), we’ll have to waive the rabbinic prohibition so that he doesn’t come to do something prohibited by the Torah.” Why do we make these compromises? Because we know that when it comes to money, adam bahul al mamono. The guy doesn’t think rationally; he does things rashly to save his money.
So the halachah begins like this: Shanu chachamim b'mishnah (The sages taught in the Mishnah). The Mishnah is here, on kuf-nun-gimmel. We’ll have to see this Mishnah in a minute. I mean the Aruch HaShulchan. We’ll get to the Shulchan Aruch in a minute. Shanu chachamim b'mishnah, kuf-nun-gimmel: Mi shehechshich lo baderech (One who grew dark upon on the road), noten kiso l'akum—he gives his money to the goy. And even though, I mean, you're hiring the—you're not hiring, the goy's your shaliach (agent)! How could you make a shaliach (agent) to a goy to do something you can't do yourself? The rabbis had to permit it. The reason we say in the Gemara is that the rabbis understood that a person cannot control himself when it comes to his money. If you don’t permit it to him, he’ll end up carrying daled amot in reshut harabim.
Look at Rashi’s wording: noten kiso m'be'od yom (while it is still day)—he gives his purse while it is still day. Interesting! The way Rashi understands the case, the guy sees that Shabbat will begin in two minutes. It isn’t Shabbat yet. But we don’t want him to come to do melachah (forbidden labor) yet. There’s no prohibition yet. We know that when Shabbat comes in two minutes, the guy will panic. So we tell him on erev Shabbat, “Get yourself out of this mess now.” Technically, he isn’t doing anything prohibited yet. They haven’t permitted anything yet. Precisely at this point, on erev Shabbat, what have they permitted? Nothing yet. The guy is giving the money to him on erev Shabbat.
If we open up the Rambam, he is in perek (chapter) six, halachah twenty-two. I’m going to read you chapter six of Shabbat. Listen to the Rambam’s lashon (wording): Mi shehayah ba baderech v'kidesh alav hayom—ah, chalas, Shabbat!—v'hayu imo ma'ot, noten kiso l'nochri l'holicho lo. Now it comes out that we have a machloket (dispute) between Rashi and the Rambam. Rashi sounds as though the whole case is talking about while it is still day. The Rambam clearly says that Shabbat had begun.
The Aruch HaShulchan says that the Rambam, in chapter six, halachah twenty-two, wrote that this also applies after dark. The Rosh wrote the same thing, as did the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, which we’ll see in a moment. Maran (our master) holds that it applies even on Shabbat. It’s obvious that even though, after dark, there’s also the prohibition of muktzeh (set-aside object)—and, by the way, it can also be a problem on erev Shabbat, so don’t fool yourself; asking a non-Jew on erev Shabbat to do something for you on Shabbat is also prohibited—once Shabbat comes, there’s an additional prohibition. You have muktzeh. Besides telling the non-Jew, you have the prohibition of muktzeh because you’re holding it. That doesn’t matter. They permitted it so that he wouldn’t come to a Torah-level prohibition. They still permitted giving the money. Now you’re putting your hand in your pocket, holding the muktzeh, and giving it to the non-Jew. The chiddush (novel point) is that they still permitted muktzeh on Shabbat.
Rashi’s intention is the same too. He says that Rashi certainly prefers that you give it to the non-Jew while it is still day, so you can avoid the case of muktzeh and save yourself from that prohibition. But if you didn’t give it to him while it was still day, Rashi agrees that you can give it to him after dark. How do we know? He says so. When Rashi says “while it is still day,” he’s giving you the best scenario: do it while it is still day so you don’t have to touch the muktzeh. Save yourself.
And from the Rambam’s precise wording, it also seems that way. Why? From the Rambam’s wording. Let’s see Rashi’s wording and the Rambam’s wording: Mi shehayah ba baderech, shehayah ba baderech, vekidesh alav hayom, vehayu imo ma'ot, noten kiso lenochri, leholicho, lemotza'ei Shabbat lokcho mimenu. V'af al pi shelo natan lo sachar al zeh, v'af al pi shenatno lo mishechashechah, mutar. Obviously, if you gave it before dark, it’s much easier. But even if you gave it to him after dark, when there’s a problem of muktzeh, it’s permitted because a person is frantic over his money, and you can’t tell him, “Throw your money in the street.” So he wants to understand that there’s no dispute here: everyone holds that it’s preferable to give it on erev Shabbat, but if you can’t, you can even give it on Shabbat itself. “Even though he gave it to him after dark, it’s permitted” means that you give it while it is still day, but even if you gave it after dark, it’s permitted. That’s how he understands the Rambam.
Now, section two. This is the wording of the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch: Mi shehayah ba baderech vekidesh alav hayom, vehayu imo ma'ot, noten kiso le'akum leholicho, lemotza'ei Shabbat lokcho mimenu. Listen to the Rambam’s wording here: “Even though he didn’t pay him for this.” Look at that! Even though you didn’t pay him. You’re not paying him, obviously. It sounds as though it would be better to pay him or set a price, for the simple reason that if you set a price, at least the non-Jew is doing it for himself. Then you’ve already taken care of that issue. The novel point is that even if you didn’t set a price, it would be permitted. But of course, setting a price is much better. He says, “Even though he gave it to him after dark, it’s permitted, because a person is frantic over his money. If you don’t permit him this, which is prohibited only by rabbinic decree, he’ll bring it in his hand and violate a Torah prohibition.”
Now, regarding the Rambam’s wording, “to collect it after Shabbat”: he’s dealing with a side point. Why did he say “after Shabbat”? Why not let the non-Jew bring it to your house now? Put it in your house. Why wait until after Shabbat to pick it up? Let the non-Jew go to your house and put it in your dresser. He says this is when the man is far from his house, outside the techum (Sabbath travel boundary). He can’t go with the non-Jew because he can’t get to the techum. But if he were within the techum and could go to his house, he would tell the non-Jew, “Follow me.” We’re talking about a case where the Jew can’t get to his house because it’s outside the techum. So he’ll stay somewhere on Shabbat, wherever he has to stay, and after Shabbat he’ll pick it up from the non-Jew. The non-Jew could also bring the purse to his house and leave it there. It’s only if he has to stay on the road that the Rambam warns him that it’s prohibited to take it from the non-Jew all Shabbat, because it’s muktzeh.
Exactly. No, because it’s outside the boundary—how will he show the non-Jew where his house is? The non-Jew doesn’t know where it is. If it’s nearby, bring it to the house! Come with me, follow me. Precisely: follow me. That’s what he’s learning. The Rambam said you only have to wait until after Shabbat. It looks that way. He is doing work for you. We’re permitting it; we had to allow this. But now you drop it here or there, and the neighbors might say, “What is this guy doing? I had my money in my wallet.”
Now look at section three. Regarding what he wrote, “Even though he didn’t pay him for this,” we should examine it. If he pays him, would there be a heiter (permission) in the matter? It would be permitted, since the non-Jew is doing it for himself. If so, why didn’t the rabbis decree that he must pay him? The rabbis should have made a rule in this case: you can do it, but you have to give him money, so that he would not be like an agent of a Jew. So why didn’t they? Paying makes it better.
It seems to me that this is certainly the case. If he hands him the purse while it is still day, he has to promise him some payment. He says, “Wow.” If you gave it to him while it was still day, you have to tell the guy, “By the way, after Shabbat I’ll give you money.” But the Rambam is discussing a case after dark, when there’s a prohibition against hiring someone on Shabbat. We won’t gain anything by paying him. What are you going to gain? You’re still committing a prohibition. He said, “No, it’s better to pay the guy, but it’s prohibited to hire him on Shabbat, so either way, I’m stuck. Is the problem appointing an agent, or is it the prohibition of hiring someone on Shabbat?” I’ve taken care of the agency issue because he’s doing it for himself, but then there’s the prohibition of hiring him.
So once Shabbat comes, the greater novel point according to the Aruch HaShulchan is that before Shabbat you have to give the guy money. “Even though you didn’t pay him after dark” means that we permitted it without payment when you gave it to him after dark. That’s how he understands the Rambam. “So the best thing is to give it to him before Shabbat.” “That’s right. That’s the best case.” “Once it’s too late, give it to him without payment, whether you like it or not.” “Don’t worry, you won’t lose anything.” “Correct.” “What about a hint, like, ‘Don’t worry, I’ll take care of you very well’?” We have to learn what’s permitted and what isn’t. Yes, we have to learn what’s permitted and what isn’t.
Now, some say that since the main reason is to prevent him from violating a Torah prohibition by carrying four cubits in the public domain, or by transferring from the public domain to the private domain, let’s say that nowadays we have an eruv (Sabbath boundary arrangement), or they want to say that those streets did not have a Torah-level prohibition because they didn’t have 600,000 people going through them. So all the streets are only rabbinically prohibited. If so, nowadays, when we don’t have a public domain, we shouldn’t permit a shevut (rabbinic restriction), since even if he carries it himself, he would violate only a rabbinic restriction. Why should I let him do it himself? I’m not going to let him tell the non-Jew to do it—or maybe he should do it himself, because adam bahul al mamono, and the whole permission was to let a non-Jew do it so that he wouldn’t violate a Torah-level prohibition. But maybe we won’t permit amirah le'akum (asking a non-Jew to act) here, in a case where even if he does it himself, it won’t be a Torah-level prohibition. Do you hear what he’s saying? Maybe this was permitted only when the public domain was prohibited by the Torah. But maybe we won’t permit asking a non-Jew here, because it’s only a rabbinic restriction.
That’s like what the Tur later wrote: they didn’t permit moving muktzeh because of a small loss, for a similar reason. But really, the cases aren’t alike. There, either way, the rabbinic restrictions are equal. There are two rabbinic prohibitions, so we won’t permit one rabbinic prohibition if you’re going to do another one anyway. But here, either way, if this isn’t a public domain and the act itself is only rabbinically prohibited, giving it to a non-Jew would be a double rabbinic restriction, which is lighter than one rabbinic restriction. He says it is a double shevut, a double rabbinic restriction. Why would I permit the guy to carry it in a domain where the prohibition is only rabbinic? That’s one rabbinic restriction. But telling the non-Jew would be a double restriction, so it’s much better. Therefore, even nowadays, it’s better to tell the non-Jew to do it, because at least you’ll have two rabbinic restrictions. In many matters they permitted a double rabbinic restriction in a case of loss, even without concern that he might come to a greater prohibition.
So that’s a very important principle. Bottom line: even nowadays, you’ll say, “We don’t have a public domain, right?” Still tell the non-Jew. Why? Because you’re better off; it’s a double rabbinic restriction.
Now read the first halachah. Let’s read what Maran says in the Shulchan Aruch, in the first halachah. Which siman, boys? Resh-samech-vav? Yes, resh-samech-vav. Wow, we have a big one. It’s a kabiri. We’re still going to be part of it. Go ahead and read: Mi shehayah ba baderech vekidesh alav hayom vehayu imo ma'ot veyesh lo chamor. By the way, you see “vekidesh alav hayom”? That’s the Rambam’s wording. “Shabbat.” Yes, Shabbat—but he doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t do it on erev Shabbat too. Of course, he could be talking even about when Shabbat has begun.
“And he has a donkey.” His donkey is with him. “And he also has a non-Jew with him.” There’s also a non-Jew there. So now you might just leave it with a donkey. Good, he has his donkey, but remember: you aren’t allowed to have your donkey do forbidden labor for you on Shabbat. Otherwise, I would have said to put it on the donkey. Because it’s your donkey, you can’t have your donkey do forbidden labor for you on Shabbat, so the donkey isn’t an option. And the non-Jew: shevu lachem poh im hachamor, am hadomeh lachamor (Stay here with the donkey; a people like a donkey). Here, the non-Jew is better than the donkey.
“Is a car lock an option?” What’s a car lock? “You have a car; put it in the car.” Of course. If you have a bank, put it in the bank. “And he has a donkey and also a non-Jew with him.” Good. “He should not leave his purse on the donkey.” Don’t put it on the donkey, because it is commanded regarding its resting. Precisely: you’re commanded that it can’t do work for you. “But he gives his purse to the non-Jew to carry for him, and after Shabbat he’ll take it from him. Even if he didn’t pay him for this. And even if he gave it to him after dark, it’s permitted.” You understand? In other words, even if he didn’t pay him. If you paid him, there would be a problem, you know? No, payment is better. You can’t pay him after Shabbat, but normally it would be better to pay him, since he’s doing it for himself.
“But if he finds a lost object”—a lost object. Wait, wait, wait, before you go further. Continue the Aruch HaShulchan.
“This permission to hand the purse to the non-Jew applies even when he has a donkey or a horse on which he could put the purse.” What do you mean? Put it on your donkey. What’s the difference? If it’s Shabbat, put it on your donkey. What’s the problem? In any case, it’s better to give it to the non-Jew, because you’re commanded regarding the resting of your animal. That’s as if it were a Torah-level prohibition: “You, your son, your daughter, your male servant, your female servant, your animal.” But maybe the donkey already has a load on it. You have to take that off before Shabbat anyway. The saddle and all that aren’t the real things it’s carrying. So you can add another prohibition? You can’t add another prohibition. Therefore, it’s specifically when the animal is his. But if the animal belongs to a non-Jew—let’s say he rented the animal from a non-Jew—it’s better to put it on the animal, because you aren’t obligated regarding someone else’s animal. It’s permitted. So why give it to the non-Jew and have the problem of appointing an agent on Shabbat? I can just put it on the donkey that doesn’t belong to me.
Even if he rented the animal from him and the non-Jew is carrying it himself, he should still do that, since renting doesn’t make you the owner. Some say, in the name of someone else, that renting does make you the owner stringently, and that you become obligated regarding its resting. But it has already been explained there that the basic law is that renting does not make you the owner. However, there’s another problem: he shouldn’t walk after it while it’s carrying a load. You can’t lead it, because there’s another prohibition of leading an animal on Shabbat. It’s called mechamer, leading an animal, even if it isn’t your animal. So there are two prohibitions here. One is putting it on the animal, so the animal carries for you on Shabbat. If it’s your animal, just as you can’t carry on Shabbat, the animal isn’t allowed to carry. That’s why he says that if it’s the non-Jew’s animal, or you rented it, there’s no problem putting it on the animal. But if you lead it, there’s another prohibition. That’s mechamer. There’s no distinction between your animal and a non-Jew’s animal regarding mechamer, as we wrote there, and this will be explained further.
“Rabbi, is that one of the thirty-nine?” Mechamer is not one of the thirty-nine. “Hold on.” It’s not one of the thirty-nine. “It’s a toledah (derivative category) of carrying, or—”
“If there’s no non-Jew with him, he leaves it on the animal.” There’s no non-Jew; let’s say so. Even better. But what should he do now? What should he do so that he doesn’t violate mechamer? You’re leading the animal. What do you mean? There are two problems here. It’s your animal now. What are you going to do? There’s no non-Jew. Put it on your animal? What do you mean, put it on your animal? It’s carrying for you. Now we have big novel points here. He’ll take care of both problems: the problem of mechamer and the problem of carrying when it’s your animal.
If it’s not his animal, he doesn’t violate shevitat behemah (resting of one's animal). But does mechamer also apply if it isn’t his animal? Yes, it applies to both, whether it’s yours or not.
What should he do? The Tur writes: “He should put it on the donkey as it walks.” Watch this. Let the animal start walking. While it’s walking, put the money on its back. “He should be careful to take it off whenever it stops. When it starts walking again, he should put it back on,” and so on. We don’t know what that means yet. It’s also in the Gemara. Let’s explain the matter. All the liabilities for carrying on Shabbat involve lifting and placing down. When is a person liable? He lifted it, walked four cubits, and placed it down. He has to do both the lifting and the placing down.
But if his friend is carrying a load on his shoulder as he walks—for example, his friend was already walking and he put something on his shoulder—then he didn’t perform the lifting. He was walking; he stopped, so he performed only the placing down. He did only one part. Even if he stopped, he is exempt from Torah liability. It’s patur aval asur. His friend performed the lifting and he performed the placing down, and when two people do it, they are exempt. So here’s a big novel point: even though the Torah prohibits having an animal do the labor of carrying, the liability applies only when the animal performs both the lifting and the placing down. When you put it on the animal while it’s walking, it did not perform the lifting. But when it stopped, it performed the placing down. The question is whether it’s still prohibited. It should still be prohibited for the animal just as it would be for me to do one of the two acts. Even if it stopped, it performed the placing down without the lifting. It’s possible that you can’t make the animal more liable than yourself.
Here’s the novel point: even though when two people do this, they are exempt from Torah liability but prohibited rabbinically, with an animal, doing one of the two is permitted from the outset. Do you hear this? Trivia question: by a human being, if he does one of the two, it is exempt but prohibited. But with an animal, if it does one of the two, it’s permitted! An animal is more lenient than a human being. It’s in the Gemara.
The straightforward understanding of the Gemara and the Tur is explicit: he puts it on after the animal has begun moving with its whole body. Therefore, the Beit Yosef (the House of Joseph) must mean—read section two, Halfon. What does section two of the Shulchan Aruch say? “If there is no non-Jew with him, he places it on his donkey,” so that he won’t be liable for mechamer. If lifting and placing down are involved, he places it after it has lifted its foreleg and hind leg to walk. “Foreleg and hind leg”—front and back. Exactly. It sounds like two; it only has to move two. It doesn’t have to move all four.
The Aruch HaShulchan says that the Beit Yosef, who wrote in section two that he should place it after the animal has lifted its foreleg and hind leg, doesn’t mean one foreleg and one hind leg. Rather, perhaps that’s just a general expression. He means the forelegs and hind legs. His intention is that all four legs should move. The Levush (Levush commentary) wrote this too. By the way, let’s look at Rashi’s wording. You’re right; that’s interesting. “I don’t agree.” “You don’t agree? You can.” You hear? Listen! We live in a free country, Ike. I’m with you, honey. Look at Rashi’s wording. You tell me what Rashi says. Rashi on the Gemara says: belo mechamer notlo himena ule'achar sheta'atzor veta'akor regel yanichenu. Rashi’s wording also says, “After it stops and lifts its leg, he should place it.” It says “leg”; it doesn’t say “legs.” The Tur’s wording says “its whole body.”
What does the Rambam say? We have a new edition of the Rambam. He doesn’t even mention this here. He doesn’t even give me the option of the donkey here. Anyway, he wants to say that Maran’s “foreleg and hind leg” is how the Levush and Eliyahu Rabbah (Eliyahu Rabbah commentary) understand it too. What do you mean? “Leg” means the legs. Don’t be so literal. What do you do about four cubits in the public domain? The animal isn’t liable because there’s no lifting and placing down. The same issue applies to four cubits in the public domain: you need lifting and placing down, and with the animal, doing one is permitted.
This arrangement is only for when he has no non-Jew with him or doesn’t trust him. If he has a non-Jew and an animal, use the non-Jew, not the animal, because the animal option is controversial and can get you into trouble. You don’t trust the non-Jew; he might run away. He says, “I’ll take your money,” and then he won’t touch it. There goes your money. Otherwise, he shouldn’t do this. Why shouldn’t he? I would say this is better. With the non-Jew, you’re violating something because you’re appointing an agent. Here, you’ve figured out a way around the problem. Although you haven’t solved muktzeh—the guy is right; you haven’t solved muktzeh. Let’s say the money is light. But the problem here is that it could easily lead to a Torah-level prohibition. If you don’t do it exactly—put it down when the animal stops and pick it up when it moves—you have to be very careful. Precisely. The guy is already nervous on erev Shabbat, and now you tell him to put it on when the animal starts moving and take it off when it stops. If he makes one mistake, it’s a Torah-level prohibition. So he says there’s a concern that he won’t be careful, and the animal will perform the lifting and placing down. That’s what the Ran (Rabbi Nissim of Gerona) says. That’s why the Gemara didn’t give you this option to begin with: it could lead to a problem.
From the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, it seems that when he makes this arrangement, he has to exert himself to keep walking enough. The Rashba (Rabbi Shlomo ibn Aderet) wrote this too. But the Rambam added a condition. Let’s read it. That’s it; Maran said this is the way to do it. I’m going to read you the Rambam’s wording, rabotai. “No, that’s prohibited.” In chapter twenty? No problem; you just have to learn it precisely. You can’t whistle or hit it. Yes, chapter twenty, halachah six. Better. Rabbi, one question. You said this case above, there's no goy before Shabbat. So then, so then this is the only way to do it. What other case do you have? We just said before, don't do this He's stuck. He has a $20,000 No, but we're talking about if you have a goy. If you have a goy and the behemah, do the goy, don't do the behemah, he's telling you. Because the behemah is controvers-, you can get into trouble. But if there's no goy, then Of course. But this is though, even though animal it's worse, normally, than the goy. No, you follow, you walk with the animal, the animal follows you. The animal follows you, yes. You can't lead it, you can't hold it by a thing, you can't hit it, you can't whistle. It'll follow you, hopefully it'll follow you. Hopefully. Listen, it's your animal! It's your animal, Rabbi! It's your animal, usually the animal follows you.
Listen to the Rambam, rabotai. “One who grew dark on the road and had no non-Jew with him to whom he could give his purse, but had an animal with him, places his purse on it while it is walking. When it is about to stop, he takes it off so that it won’t stop with the purse on it, and so that there won’t be lifting or placing down.” Wait, wait, wait! The Rambam says that doing just one of the two isn’t good, even with an animal. The Rambam says you have to make sure to put it on while it’s moving and take it off before it stops. Before? You have to be a prophet! How do you know when the animal is going to stop? That’s a good question. You have to be a prophet. We’re talking about a prophet here.
But the bottom line is that the Rambam has just said a big novel point. Maran’s wording in section two says to put it on while it’s moving, and we understood “foreleg and hind leg” as its whole body—or let’s go with that. But the bottom line is, once you put it on while it’s moving, that’s it: let it go, let it stop, and then take it off. The Rambam says, “No, no, no. You have to do everything while it’s in transit.” The Rambam must have a different understanding of the liability for an animal on Shabbat.
Now open the Aruch HaShulchan. He’s going to explain. This is the Rambam’s wording: he places the purse on it while it is walking, and when it is about to stop, he takes it off so that it doesn’t stop with the purse on it, and so there won’t be lifting or placing down. Now here’s for you, Victor: “It is prohibited to guide it,” says the Rambam, “even by voice.” Exactly. “Come on, boy, follow me, boy.” As long as the purse is on it, so that he won’t be leading a loaded animal on Shabbat. We already knew that.
The Rambam added two things. First, before it stops, he should take the purse off it. In addition, it is prohibited for him to guide it, even by voice, even when it isn’t performing lifting or placing down. That’s a big novel point too. The animal didn’t perform lifting or placing down, but it’s still prohibited to lead it.
The Rashba disagrees with the Rambam. He holds that since there’s no lifting and placing down here, there’s no prohibition of mechamer, even if he guides it. The Rashba takes care of the second part. He holds that there’s no lifting and no placing down. If there’s no lifting and placing down, there’s no carrying. If there’s no carrying, there’s no mechamer. Do you understand? Mechamer is prohibited only when it’s carrying. But here it isn’t carrying. There’s no lifting and no placing down. In the Rambam’s case, is there lifting? No. Is there placing down? No. Only if it’s carrying. Right, only if it’s carrying. So the Rashba doesn’t understand why the Rambam said you can’t lead it. He says the carrying problem has been taken care of, so there’s no problem leading it.
However, the Beit Yosef didn’t mention the Rambam’s opinion that one has to take it off before it stops at all. It’s amazing. In the Beit Yosef, he brings all the views. This is a very important view, and he didn’t bring it. Really, he brings all the views, even those he doesn’t accept: the Rambam said this, and that one said that. But he didn’t mention this at all. As for the view that he shouldn’t guide it by voice, he wrote “some say.” Why did he write only “some say” in the Beit Yosef? Because he holds like the Rashba. Since he holds like the Rashba, the Rambam’s words are puzzling: where did he get this from? Now he’s going to bring a proof for the Rambam. Listen. Where does the Rambam get this law from? I would have thought it might be because the animal is like a human being: just as it’s prohibited for a human being to perform lifting or placing down, so too for an animal. But maybe that isn’t so. He’ll bring a proof that it is a problem.
The Aruch HaShulchan brings a proof from the Talmudic discussion. The Gemara says: “When it is walking, place it on it; when it is standing, take it off.” That’s what the Gemara originally said. When the animal is walking, put it on while it’s walking, so there’s no lifting; when it stops, take it off. Beautiful. Then the Gemara asks, “If so, even his friend could do that.” What do you need a donkey for? Even a person could do that. Your friend could do it: you stop walking, and he puts it on your back.
Wait, ask—doesn’t matter. Boys, watch the logic here. The Gemara says to put it on the donkey while it’s walking, and when it stops, take it off. The Gemara asks, “If that’s what you do with the donkey, you don’t need a donkey; you could do it with your friend.” So he asks: what do you mean, you could do it with your friend? With your friend, it’s prohibited rabbinically. With your friend, it is exempt but prohibited. How can the Gemara say you can do this with your friend? With a person, it would be prohibited.
So the discussion continues: If you thought that “when it is standing” meant when it was actually standing, how could the Gemara ask, “If so, even his friend could do it”? The first Mishnah in Shabbat, chapter one, page two, says that when the poor person and the homeowner each do one part, both are exempt, and it explains that they are exempt but prohibited. Lifting without placing down, or placing down without lifting, is prohibited rabbinically. If the animal is actually standing, it has performed the placing down. How could that be permitted with a friend? Therefore, we have to say that the intention is “before it stops.” The Gemara must mean that when it says, “When it is standing,” it means when it is about to stand. Rabotai, it doesn’t mean when it’s standing. If it means when it’s about to stand, the Gemara can ask, “Couldn’t you do that with your friend?”
He’s trying to bring a proof for the Rambam’s view. The Gemara said, “What should you do with the animal? When it’s walking, put it on, and when it’s about to stop”—we thought it meant when it had stopped. Then the Gemara asks, “If so, couldn’t his friend do the same?” If you did this with your friend, it would be prohibited rabbinically, because he would make the placing down when he stopped. How could the Gemara ask that? So we have to give a case that makes the Gemara’s question work: “When it’s about to stop” means it’s still walking. While the animal is moving, you put it on its back; as it’s about to stop, you take it off. The Gemara says that’s what you do with the animal. Couldn’t you do that with your friend? Yes, because there was no lifting and no placing down.
What else do you see from the Gemara? The only permission with an animal was in a case where there was no lifting and no placing down. The Rambam makes sense; he makes sense of the Gemara’s wording. The intention must be “before it stops.” That’s a proof from the Gemara. But how do you know? I told you, you’re a prophet. How do you know it’s about to stop? It slows down. Exactly. One can say that an animal carrying a load doesn’t stop suddenly. Rather, it slows itself down; it slows down as it’s about to stop and no longer walks as quickly as before. Therefore, when he sees that it’s about to stop, he takes the purse off.
It comes out that we have a fantastic dispute among the Rishonim (early rabbinic authorities). For some reason, the Beit Yosef didn’t bring down the Rambam’s opinion here. The question still stands: why don’t you do it with your friend? The Gemara answers something there. You’re right; the Gemara answers something, but it’s fine. It has to be that—maybe it has to be carrying; carrying is only picking up and putting down. You’re dropping it on him. It doesn’t matter; he has to drop it. Halfon, read section two again. It’s your friend; you throw it on his back. He didn’t pick it up. He didn’t pick it up either. Read section two again, rabotai. Oh. That’s what the Gemara said: if you’re doing it that way, why don’t you do it with your friend? We have to see what the Gemara says.
Not only that: you say you want to lead the animal, correct? Walk in front of it. Now you have to look behind you all the time, because if the animal stops, you have to run back and catch it before it stops. It’s ridiculous. Don’t make that my case. How are you going to do it? You have to be a prophet, like you said. For 12 hours a day, what you’re doing isn’t ridiculous, but this is the ridiculous part of the day? Everything else you’re doing isn’t ridiculous, but this is? Now continue section two. This is the ridiculous part.
“A person is frantic over his money.” No, rabotai, Halfon, section two inside the Shulchan Aruch: “If he has no non-Jew with him, he places it on his donkey so that he won’t be liable for mechamer. If lifting and placing down are involved, he places it after it has lifted its foreleg and hind leg to walk, since that is not lifting. When it is standing, he takes it from it.” When it stops, take it off. “When it resumes walking and lifts its leg, he places it on it.” So that’s it. Maran doesn’t accept the Rambam’s view—wait, let him continue. Anything else? “Some say one must be careful not to guide it by a loud voice as long as the purse is on it.” That’s the Rambam! “Some say”—they have the Rambam. Right, he saw the Rambam because he says “some say.” It says that they have a problem once you put it on the animal’s back: you shouldn’t guide it. But the Rashba says there’s no problem, since there’s no carrying and no problem of mechamer. He treats mechamer as a separate point. Maran holds that once you’ve taken care of the carrying, you’ve taken care of mechamer.
By the way, that “some say” in the Beit Yosef is the Rambam. Ah, that’s what it says? Yes. “Some say”—the Rambam. Very strange, huh? He included the Rambam’s second point, but not the first. He didn’t recognize it; he skipped right over it.
Okay, let’s continue, rabotai. You haven’t solved muktzeh. Take it out with your teeth! You haven’t solved muktzeh, because what are you going to tell the guy? He’s frantic. If you don’t let him do this, he’ll do something worse. He’ll carry it himself. So you’re right: we close our eyes to the muktzeh, because every second he’s picking it up and putting it down—up and down, up and down. 10 muktzehs until he gets home, by the way. That’s true, but the friend is rabbinic; muktzeh is rabbinic, no? Rabbinic against rabbinic. And if he doesn’t stop, go one way. No, this is better. At least, instead of two people dealing with muktzeh, only the animal does. There’s no muktzeh with an animal. If you do it with your friend, you had muktzeh and gave it to your friend; it’s muktzeh. Unless maybe it isn’t muktzeh for the second person, because if you put it on his back, you aren’t actually—Okay, so there’s no muktzeh for the second guy either. Let’s continue.
Now look at section ten in the Aruch HaShulchan. Regarding mechamer, he had another view when he examined the matter closely. Let’s go slowly, rabotai. This is a very important paragraph. You’re learning the principles of mechamer now. With an animal, we find two Shabbat prohibitions. First, shevitat behemah (resting of one's animal), the obligation to let your animal rest, which we derive from “so that your ox and your donkey may rest.” This applies when it carries a load, even without the owner. Exactly. I don’t care who put it on. An animal isn’t allowed to carry your things on Shabbat. The whole chapter in tractate Shabbat, “With what may an animal go out?” is based on what it’s permitted and prohibited to carry.
The second prohibition is mechamer. That means leading an animal. We derive it from “You shall not do any labor, you, or your animal.” What labor do the two of them do together? Guiding it. That is mechamer: it’s loaded, the animal is loaded, and he leads it. The Aruch HaShulchan asks: why do we need two different prohibitions? For the obligation to let the animal rest, we need mechamer, because the obligation to let it rest applies only to your own animal. But mechamer also applies to a non-Jew’s animal, as the Ran wrote. But why do we need the obligation to let the animal rest? If we had only mechamer, it would be prohibited whether it’s a non-Jew’s animal or mine. When is mechamer prohibited? Only when it’s carrying something. So the obligation to let the animal rest would be included in mechamer, since mechamer can be liable only when the animal is carrying. Therefore, just say mechamer, and you don’t need to tell me separately that the animal has to rest.
Rather, it must be that the obligation to let an animal rest involves only lifting and placing down, as we wrote. It has nothing to do with mechamer. Even if the animal walks by itself, carrying a load for you, or a load that belongs to you, it’s prohibited. These are two different prohibitions. The obligation to let your animal rest applies even if I do nothing. I’m sitting in my den, having the third Shabbat meal, singing pizmonim and bakashot. I look out in the field and see my animal walking back and forth, inside the stable or outside the stable, in the private or public domain, with things on its back. I say, “Thank God, I didn’t put it on its back. Thank God, I didn’t leave it there.” It doesn’t matter. It’s prohibited. Your animal is working on Shabbat. There’s another prohibition: I put something on its back before Shabbat began, and now I lead it. That’s the prohibition of mechamer. Mechamer is an additional prohibition. So whenever I’m leading my animal while it has a load, I violate two prohibitions: mechamer and the obligation to let the animal rest, even if it didn’t perform lifting and placing down.
What a novel point, rabotai! The obligation to let the animal rest applies only when there’s lifting and placing down, as with regular carrying. But mechamer is prohibited when he leads it, even if it doesn’t perform lifting and placing down. That’s a novel point. Even if the animal didn’t perform lifting and placing down, mechamer is prohibited. The obligation to let an animal rest is prohibited only when there’s lifting and placing down, like any labor that carries liability. Mechamer is a separate matter. You have to give me a case where you violate mechamer but not the obligation to let the animal rest. That was the Aruch HaShulchan’s question. Every case of mechamer would also violate the obligation to let the animal rest. Not so, because the obligation to let the animal rest applies only when the animal performs lifting and placing down. But mechamer applies even if the animal does not perform lifting and placing down. You just lead it, and that’s it.
That’s also explained in the Rambam, at the beginning of chapter twenty, halachah one: “It is prohibited to place a load on an animal on Shabbat,” as it says, “so that your ox and your donkey may rest”—an ox, a donkey, and every animal. “If he placed a load on the animal, even though he is commanded regarding its resting, he is not liable to lashes. Therefore, one who leads his animal on Shabbat while it has a load is exempt.” That’s why he had to say, “It is prohibited to guide it.” The Rambam understands that mechamer applies even without lifting and placing down. I don’t care how you put the load on the animal or when you took it off. According to the Rambam, even if the animal was moving when you put it on and moving when you took it off, mechamer is still prohibited, even without lifting and placing down. So when the animal starts moving, you can’t say, “Let’s go! Let’s go!” Even without lifting and placing down, the Rambam holds that mechamer is a separate prohibition. You can’t guide an animal with something on its back. That’s a big novel point, rabotai. Mechamer is a very strict matter.
What does the Rashba hold? The Rashba’s position requires us to explain that the Torah prohibited both when the animal alone is carrying a load that belongs to him, and when he leads it, even if the animal doesn’t belong to him. If the Torah had written only mechamer, I would have said that it’s prohibited specifically when the two of them are doing it together. The novel point of mechamer, according to the Rashba, is that you’re liable even when it’s someone else’s animal. But he also holds that there must be lifting and placing down for mechamer to be liable. The Rambam learned that the novel point of mechamer is that it applies even without lifting and placing down. That’s why he said it’s prohibited to guide it. That’s a big novel point in the Rambam.
You hit the animal as it’s going and say, “Come on, come on, faster!” Even though you’re going to take the load off and there won’t be lifting and placing down, that’s the obligation to let it rest. “Yes, but I’ve taken care of the obligation to let it rest.” Right, but I still can’t lead it. That’s the Rambam’s view, a major stringency. The Rambam has two stringencies here: first, I can’t have either lifting or placing down; and second, I’m not allowed to lead it in any way. The Rashba says, no. In this case there won’t be a prohibition of mechamer. Why not? Since there’s no lifting and placing down, there’s no mechamer. It’s a very important way of understanding the Rambam. According to the Rambam, it’s possible to violate mechamer without violating the obligation to let the animal rest. According to the Rashba, how can you violate mechamer without violating the obligation to let it rest? Only with somebody else’s animal. If I use a non-Jew’s animal, I don’t violate the obligation to let it rest, but I will violate mechamer.
“So you’re liable for only one?” The question is what the extent is. According to the Rambam, mechamer applies even when there’s no lifting and placing down. According to the Rambam, you could be liable for two. According to everyone else, you can be liable for only one. Precisely! Everyone agrees that mechamer involves something on the animal’s back. There’s no mechamer just from guiding an animal with nothing on its back. In the Rambam’s case, there was no lifting and no placing down, and he still said you can’t guide it. The Rashba says, “Why can’t you guide it? There was no lifting and no placing down.” And that’s what Maran says: “Some say” it’s prohibited to lead it. That is the Rambam’s view.
Now the last thing to look at: the Biur Halachah (Biur Halachah commentary). Do we have the Biur Halachah here, rabotai? The dibur hamatchil (opening words) are “u'kshehi.” Where is “u'kshehi”? “U'kshehi omedet.” It sounds from the straightforward wording as though it means after it has stopped. But this is difficult, since the Rambam ruled that one should take it off when it is about to stop, before it stops, so there won’t be lifting and placing down; the Levush quoted this too. But the Rashba wrote about the Rambam’s words that they don’t seem right. The Biur Halachah brought the Rambam’s ruling. Maran didn’t discuss the Rambam. The Biur Halachah points out that the Rambam is brought there and that the Rashba disagreed with him. The Rashba says you don’t need both acts; even one of the two is enough to avoid liability. Once you’ve avoided liability for lifting and placing down, you’ve avoided the problem of mechamer. Fantastic.
You see that you’re learning halachah through this study. You get a share in Olam Haba (World to Come) today? You got the World to Come because you finally learned. Now you’ve learned a dispute among the early authorities. Fantastic. When you learn the halachah like this, Maran becomes much more understandable. Every word you see makes you ask, “Where is his thought? Where is he getting it from?” Yafeh regel, non-Jew, this. Let’s see if Chacham Ovadiah mentions this here. He has to mention it, right? It’s a very important halachah. Take the bus, take the bus. Let’s see here.
Listen, whoever’s around tomorrow morning: tomorrow morning we’ll come to the main subjects. He’s going to discuss how we carry things in wagons. We have wagons today; we don’t have non-Jews and donkeys. We have caravans. We have to see whether you can put it in a taxi or in a wagon. Let’s see what he says here. “Between sunset and nightfall.” Amen. Amen, yehe shmeh rabba mevarach le'alam ule'almei almaya. Ve'imru amen. Amen. It comes out that there’s also a dispute among the early authorities about whether you can put it on the horse before Shabbat, right before Shabbat starts, if the guy gets stuck on erev Shabbat. Correct, it happens. If you get stuck on the Belt Parkway and can’t get home, he’s going to discuss different matters here. He isn’t discussing this specific case, where on erev Shabbat he forgot his money. He doesn’t discuss this case here. Chazon Ovadiah (Chazon Ovadiah) doesn’t discuss it. Okay, we’ll stop here. Baruch Hashem le'olam (Blessed is Hashem forever), amen ve'amen (amen and amen).