Rabotai (my teachers), Baruch Hashem, we’re in siman (section) reish-ayin-dalet. We did the siman, Baruch Hashem. We need to do some external understanding in the sugya (Talmudic discussion) of lechem mishneh (double bread). We saw all the halachot (laws) of lechem mishneh. We didn’t see all of Chacham Ovadia (Rabbi Ovadia Yosef); we still have to go back to that. Today, we want to discuss a few questions.
The first question that came up, which I saw Tzitz Eliezer (responsa of Rabbi Waldenberg) actually discusses, was HaRav Eliezer Waldenberg (Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg). He has a she’elah (question): Are you allowed to use borrowed bread for lechem mishneh? This happens all the time. At a sheva berachot (seven wedding blessings), can I say, “Give me your bread over there. Let me use it for haMotzi lechem min ha’aretz (Who brings forth bread from the earth), and I’ll give it back to you. I need it for lechem mishneh”? I’m not eating it. I say, “That’s my bread. I’m zocheh (acquiring it). I’m at the sheva berachot, the bread is in front of me, and each guy gets one loaf, let’s say. That’s my bread.” So you say, “Before you eat it, let me make haMotzi lechem min ha’aretz on it.” The owner says, “Don’t eat it. I’m makpid (particular). This is my bread.” I say, “I’m not going to eat it. I’m not eating it.”
So the she’elah is really this: Since you can’t actually eat that bread, does it have to be edible? Or does it have to be yours, meaning you have to own it? Or is it enough to have a second loaf there? This is a very, very common she’elah. You don’t have to eat the bread, but it is edible and it is yours. So could you borrow lechem mishneh? You could borrow from the neighbors, too. You say, “Listen, do me a favor. We only have one big loaf for Shabbat. I need to borrow one loaf of Syrian bread. I’ll make haMotzi lechem min ha’aretz.” He says, “Please, we need it for seudah shelishit (third Shabbat meal).” You say, “No, no, I’m not going to use it. I’m just going to say haMotzi lechem min ha’aretz and give you the bread back.” Is that permissible or not?
I’m going to read from Shut Tzitz Eliezer (Tzitz Eliezer responsa). I have the copy here. Then I want to show you one of the proofs he almost brings from Shulchan Aruch (Set Table). Tzitz Eliezer is in chelek yud-alef (volume eleven), in siman kaf-gimel: al derech im efshar latzet yedei chovat lechem mishneh keshelechem echad sha’ul (borrowed), o shetzrichim sheshnei halechamim yiheyu mishelo (whether one can fulfill the obligation of lechem mishneh with one borrowed loaf, or whether both loaves must belong to him). Obviously, this assumes that you’re going to break only one of them, like our minhag (custom). We saw, you remember, that according to the Gaon miVilna (Vilna Gaon), his custom was to break from both of them, and the Chatam Sofer (Moses Sofer) and his community also had the custom of breaking from both. But we said that our minhag is really to break from one of them: the top one, the bottom one, or the one on the side. We had different opinions about which one you have to break.
According to Rabbeinu haAri (Rabbi Isaac Luria), we hold them side by side and break the right one. Chacham Ben Tzion (Rabbi Ben Tzion Abba Shaul) said it’s better to hold them on a slant so you can satisfy both shitot (opinions): Maran (the author of the Shulchan Aruch)’s up-and-down arrangement and haArizal (Rabbi Isaac Luria)’s side-by-side arrangement, and break the one on the right. Fine. So now the question is: can it be borrowed?
Before he brings any proofs, he says, vehachi mistabra debigemara biBerachot (Berakhot tractate) daf lamed-tet amud bet and uveshabbat daf kuf-yud-zayin lamdu ha-dina debeshabbat chayav adam livtzoa al shtei kikarot mipnei delechem mishneh ketiv (this is logical: the Gemara in Berachot daf lamed-tet amud bet and Shabbat daf kuf-yud-zayin teaches that on Shabbat a person must break bread over two loaves, because lechem mishneh is written in the Torah). Where did they learn it from? From the man (manna). What does it say about the man? Lechem mishneh. You need double bread. Uvehai kra lo nizkar leshon tzivui shetzrichim lilkot lechem mishneh (this verse is not phrased as a command to gather double bread). There is no commandment in the Torah saying they had to take lechem mishneh. It just says that they took lechem mishneh. It doesn’t say God commanded them to take it.
Sheyehe makom litlot velomar shetzrichim sheyilketu dumya desham sheyehe mishelachem (there is room to argue that they had to gather it as they did there, so that it would belong to them). You’re right: the man belonged to them. But nowhere does it say that they had to take it in a way that would teach us that they must take it exactly as they did. Ela katuv bileshon shel sipur (rather, it is written as part of a story). What does the Torah say? Vayehi bayom hashishi laktu lechem mishneh (on the sixth day they gathered double bread). They took lechem mishneh. Velachen hachiyuv la’asot rak zecher (remembrance) kefi shehayu az (therefore, the obligation is only to make a remembrance of what they did then). They had two, so we have to take two. But where does it say that the loaves have to belong to us? It doesn’t.
He says, vehayah livtzoa al lechem mishneh, aval ein korim “shelachem,” mipnei shesham hayah lema’aseh shelachem (the verse says to break over double bread, but it does not call it “yours,” because there it actually belonged to them). It’s true that the man belonged to each person, but the verse doesn’t say that in a way that makes it a requirement. If it said, “God commanded them that they must take it,” that would be another story. But here it just says that’s what they did. We’re obligated to model the fact that they took two, but not every single detail.
There is an amazing shitah (opinion) from a rabbi called Petach HaDvir (opening of the Dvir). He says a big chiddush (novel insight), quoting a rabbi: Since the whole law of lechem mishneh comes from the man, there is a hiddur (enhancement) that both challot (loaf) should be exactly the same, just like the man. You shouldn’t use one big loaf and one small one, or one round one and one long one. That’s a big chiddush. Tzitz Eliezer brings it down. Exactly: don’t use a challah and Syrian bread. It has to be like the man; just as the man was uniform, so should the loaves be. Tzitz Eliezer says, “Very nice, but you need a proof to say that they have to be identical to the man, or that they have to be two and two. How far do you want to go to make them identical?” Anyway, from sevarah (reasoning), he says right away that sha’ul (borrowed) should not be a problem at all.
But he brings a re’ayah (proof). What proof does he bring? He brings one from the Pri Megadim (Fruit of Precious Things). He writes, “Omnam matzati la-Pri Megadim, siman reish-ayin-dalet.” The Pri Megadim is at the bottom of the Shulchan Aruch, in Mishbetzot Zahav (Settings of Gold), on page shin-lamed. The Pri Megadim wrote a perush (commentary) on the Shulchan Aruch, and that commentary is called Mishbetzot Zahav. If you look at the Mishbetzot Zahav, the first line says yera’eh li. The word before it is lailah.
That’s what he says here: yera’eh li mi she’ein ochel pat kutim. A person doesn’t eat pat akum (bread baked by non-Jews). Some people don’t eat pat akum. What is pat akum? The bread of the goyim (non-Jews). Aladdin bakeries: it’s kasher (kosher)—flour and water, nothing else—but it was baked by goyim. Some people, God bless them, they’re correct, they’re careful not to eat pat akum, especially in our time, when pat Yisrael (Jewish-baked bread) is available. Right next to the Aladdin bread is the pita, whatever—the kasher pita, Yossi’s or Sababa. So why would someone stam, on purpose, get pat akum? Today, it’s easy to get something else. Maran said that even people who aren’t careful about pat akum all year should accept this chumrah (stringency) during Aseret Yemei Teshuvah (Ten Days of Repentance). Fine.
So let’s say a person is always careful and doesn’t eat pat akum. Yera’eh li mi she’ein ochel pat kutim ve’ein lo lechem mishneh, ki im (except) achat pat kasher ve’achat pat akum (it appears to me that someone who does not eat gentile bread and lacks two loaves has only one kosher loaf and one gentile loaf). He doesn’t have lechem mishneh, except for one kosher loaf and one pat akum. His she’elah is: can he use the pat akum for the second loaf, even though he isn’t going to eat it? Efshar yaniach hashniyah zecher laman (possibly, he may place the second loaf as a remembrance of the manna). He says it’s possible to use it for the second loaf; all you need is a zecher laman, a remembrance of the manna, and then you have two. Ufeshita, she’im ein lo pat Yisrael ki im pat akum beShabbat, sheyochal mimenu, afilu nizhar bo, ve’afilu mishum eivah, hitiru (it is obvious that if on Shabbat he has no bread except pat akum, he may eat it, even if he is normally careful about it, and even because of ill will, they permitted it).
So he says that if that’s all you have, you can use it. This happened to us a lot of times in Lawrence. For some reason, as you said, they found pat akum cheaper. In Deal in the summer, they gave us pat akum for Shabbat. “What the hell is going on over here?” It turned out they said, “This is all the bread we have in the shul.” So what, no seudah shelishit? Of course not! The Pri Megadim says that if that’s all you have, there are permissions for pat akum, even for people who are careful about it. So this is one of the heiterim (permissions): there’s nothing else to eat, it’s Shabbat, and so on. But what do you see from here? You see an interesting point in the Pri Megadim: he allowed pat akum to be used as a second loaf.
The Tzitz Eliezer wants to use this for something. He says, “Venitan lich’orah ledayek mizeh”—he wants to make a diyuk (inference) from the Pri Megadim—“desveira lei lehaPri Megadim dilechattechilah (ideally) tzarich lihyot gam halechem hametzoraf ra’ui la’achilah lemi shebotzei’a alav.” It is mashma (it implies) that this is bedi’avad (after the fact). Ideally, the bread should be edible. This is a bedi’avad case: you don’t have another loaf, so can you use pat akum? He says, “Okay, you have no choice.” It implies that ideally he wants you to use two loaves that are edible. So maybe that answers the question: ideally, don’t use borrowed bread, because you can’t eat it. You understand where he wants to go? Let’s see what he says.
He says no: “Aval achar ha’iyun zeh eino.” That’s not true. “Ve’aderabah,” he says, “adarabah, midehitir haPri Megadim letzaref lelechem mishneh pat akum keshein lo lechem acher, mashma desveira lei keda’atenu”—since the Pri Megadim permitted joining pat akum for lechem mishneh when a person has no other bread, it implies that he holds like us. “Dime’ikara dedina, maspik gam keshe’eino ra’ui la’achilah”—the law itself is satisfied even when the bread is not edible—“verak befat akum, mikeivan dehai gavra nahag bo isur, lo min hadin hu letzarfo lechattechilah lelechem mishneh, davar sheledideih ma’us (repulsive).” Pat akum is different because this person already treats it as forbidden. It may be that something halachically repulsive to a person shouldn’t be used for lechem mishneh. But sha’ul is not repulsive. On the contrary, it’s edible; he could eat it if it belonged to him. The issue is only that it doesn’t belong to him. So the Pri Megadim may be talking only about pat akum, and his chiddush is that even pat akum, which has a repulsive aspect for this person, can be used in a pinch. Borrowed bread has no such repulsive aspect, so perhaps even the Pri Megadim would say it’s fine ideally.
Do you hear the chiddush he makes here? He makes another chiddush. Listen to the she’elah. “She’elah nish’elet, rabotai, osif al zeh mah sherai’ti beShut Levushei Mordechai”—he brings something from the Levushei Mordechai—“shehayah mistapek be’Erev Pesach (Passover eve) shechal beShabbat.” The question was about Erev Pesach falling on Shabbat. That happens. Was it this year? Erev Pesach fell on Friday this year. Sometimes Erev Pesach falls on Shabbat, meaning the first night of Seder (Passover Seder) is Saturday night.
We always have the problem of what to do about bread, because you have to get rid of it. We have only the minimum amount of bread left in our homes, just enough for a Shacharit (morning prayer) meal before the time is over; then we flush it down the toilet and get rid of it. The rabbi’s she’elah was: on Erev Pesach that falls on Shabbat, if we have one loaf of bread, can I use matzah shemurah (guarded matzah) as the second loaf of lechem mishneh, even though you’re not allowed to eat matzah shemurah then, because it’s Erev Pesach? Maybe—I don’t know—maybe it has to be hamotzi, maybe it can be hamotzi. It can be hamotzi; besides, I’m not eating from it. Is it lechem mishneh? Is it a lechem shalem (whole loaf)? What Pesach? It’s lechem mishneh, right? Let’s say it has a din (status) of bread and a din (status) of shalem (whole). I’m not eating it; it’s just for the double loaf. That’s the question they bring down here.
He says, “Kevan de’eino ra’ui la’achilah.” In Shut Peri HaSadeh, he says that the head of the court in Paks answered this question: “Dekhevan de’al lechem mishneh hu mishum zecher la-man, peshita degam matzah yuchal lekach lishniyah, kevan de’ein tzarich livtzo’a, ela rak zecher la-man. Af al pi she’eino yachol le’echol mimenah bi-se’udah zot, shapir mikrei zecher la-man.” Since lechem mishneh is a remembrance of the manna, it’s obvious that matzah can be used for the second loaf, since you don’t need to break it; it is only a remembrance of the manna. Even though you can’t eat it at this meal, it is still a proper remembrance of the manna.
So what do you see? They were lenient even about something that is asur to eat, machmat (because of) an isur (prohibition)—not because it doesn’t belong to you. So these rabbis would certainly be lenient with sha’ul. Sha’ul is not asur be’etzem (intrinsically forbidden); it just isn’t yours, because you can’t eat it because it belongs to somebody else. That’s another proof he brings. Efshar lehosif (possibly, one can add). That’s that.
Now look at what he brings. That is basically what he wants to say. He wants to conclude lema’aseh (in practice): “Mikol ha-nitba’er nireh pashut, de’efshar shapir latzet yedei chovat lechem mishneh betziruf lechem sha’ul, shemachziro leva’alav bishleimuto le’achar haberachah uvetzi’ah shel kikar hasheini.” From everything explained, it seems clear that one can fulfill the obligation of lechem mishneh by including borrowed bread, returning it to its owner intact after the blessing and the breaking of the second loaf. So he wants to say it is completely permissible.
He brings another proof. Open up the Mishnah Berurah, shin-chaf-heh, halachah daled. Let’s read Maran on this case. It says, “Pat she’afah eino Yehudi le’atzmo beShabbat. Yesh oserim veyesh matirim.” A non-Jew baked bread for himself on Shabbat. You have a neighbor who baked fresh bread on Shabbat. He’s allowed; he’s a goy. You want to use that bread. He baked it for himself, not for you. If he baked it for you, for sure it’s asur (forbidden). A goy bakes for you, you can’t use it. But he baked it for himself. Now you smell the neighbor’s fresh bread, shi bijannen. You call him: “Hey, Antonio, send me some of that fresh bread lichvod Shabbat.” He says, “Enjoy it, enjoy it.” Some say yes, some say no. “Uvishe’at hadechak, letzorech mitzvah (commandment), kegon se’udat berit milah (circumcision ceremony), o letzorech birkat hamotzi, yesh lismokh al hamatirim.” In a pinch, for a mitzvah, such as a circumcision meal, or if you need it for birkat hamotzi, you can rely on those who permit it. Is it talking about eating it or using it for lechem mishneh? It says that if you need it for hamotzi, you can rely on those who permit it. It seems to be talking about everything. What is the prohibition? How could you…?
Now look at the Mishnah Berurah, yud-chet. What is the case of pressing circumstances? Why doesn’t he have his own bread? It says, “Kegon shedar bikfar yechidi, she’i efshar lish’ol pat mechavero.” For example, someone lives alone in a village and can’t borrow bread from his friend. So the Mishnah Berurah says the pressing-circumstances case is where he can’t even borrow bread. The only thing he can do is rely on the goy. That’s the case of this halachah.
The Tzitz Eliezer brings down what some of the rabbis say: “BeShulchan Aruch sham se’if dalet nifsak defat she’afah akum beShabbat yesh oserim veyesh matirin, besha’at hadechak o letzorech mitzvah kegon se’udat berit milah o letzorech birkat hamotzi, yesh lismoch al hamatirim.” The Magen Avraham (Shield of Abraham) writes, “Debesha’at hadechak”—what does pressing circumstances mean? “Kegon shedar bichfar yechidi,” he lives alone in a village, “she’i efshar lehash’il mechavero,” he can’t borrow from his friend. Therefore, he can’t even borrow. That’s the Magen Avraham, and that’s the Mishnah Berurah.
There is a rabbi called the Machatzit Hashekel (Half-Shekel), in the Shulchan Aruch near you. He says, “Uvesefer Olat Shabbat (Shabbat Burnt Offering) katav: omnam besha’at hadechak uletzorech lechem mishneh, yesh lehakeil.” This discussion was about bread that he needs to eat. But then he says that in pressing circumstances, if you need bread for lechem mishneh, one can be lenient. It implies that even if you have bread, and even if it’s whole, since you don’t have lechem mishneh, it’s permitted. That’s the Machatzit Hashekel’s wording. You have one loaf, but you don’t have two; that is also considered pressing circumstances, and therefore you can be lenient.
“Harei mevo’ar mizeh de’ein yotzei b’sha’ul.” He wants to prove from this that one does not fulfill the obligation with borrowed bread. If you tell me that you can use borrowed bread and then return it to the lender, then there’s no special leniency here at all. It would certainly be permitted even outside pressing circumstances: there’s no concern about pat akum, since you can’t eat it, and afterward you can return it to the non-Jew. Rather, it must be that the second loaf used to complete lechem mishneh has the same status as the first loaf: you must actually be able to eat it.
He wants to learn from the Machatzit Hashekel, who says that in pressing circumstances you can use the bread for lechem mishneh. Why would it be pressing circumstances? If I don’t have to eat from it, I can just take the bread from the goy, use it, and give it back. Before you get to muktzeh (set-aside on Shabbat), if the issue is whether sha’ul is muttar (permitted), why are we even talking about pressing circumstances? Take it from the goy, use it as lechem mishneh, and give it back. It would seem that the chiddush is that borrowed bread is no good. So when I take bread from the goy, it must be fit for me to eat if it is going to count as lechem mishneh. From the fact that the Machatzit Hashekel says that using it for lechem mishneh is also considered pressing circumstances, it must be that you need to be able to eat the bread. So he wants to prove that sha’ul is no good.
The Tzitz Eliezer says, “Mechilah (pardon),” whoever brought this proof didn’t understand what Olat Shabbat was discussing. You pointed that out just now, Joe. “Vehare’ayah hazot mafliah od beyoter, ki einena mimin hata’anah klal.” It isn’t a proof at all. The issue there is not pat akum. “Bediyuk, the issue is not a pat akum subject over here, ela mipenei sheha’akum afah beShabbat, umishum issur muktzeh, venolad (newly created).” The goy baked it on Shabbat, so it is muktzeh and newly created, as the rabbi said, and that’s what is explicitly written. Therefore, there is certainly a chiddush there: even though it is muktzeh, you can use it for lechem mishneh if you need it. But that is a different chiddush. The question is whether you can use pat akum that was baked on Shabbat. If it were ordinary borrowed bread from a Jew, of course it would be fine. There is no proof from there that sha’ul is asur.
On the contrary, the argument was, “You see, it’s only in pressing circumstances.” Why only in pressing circumstances? Why can’t you borrow it and use it, then give it back? The answer is that the chiddush is you’re allowed to take pat akum even though it was baked on Shabbat. If it wasn’t baked on Shabbat and you want to borrow it, it’s entirely permitted. So that is the first halachah (Jewish law), Rabotai. The Tzitz Eliezer’s conclusion from the different proofs is that there is no issue at all: it is permissible to borrow lechem mishneh.
Now we get to the second question we discussed before we left. Somebody asked the Tzitz Eliezer a question about Pesach, but it applies to lechem mishneh as well. I’m not an expert in this; I read it in the teshuvah. The way they make matzot (unleavened bread) in factories, it seems, is that they have a long piece of dough that comes out of the machine. They make, I guess, perforations for each slice, but it is all still one piece. Then, as it comes through the system, it bakes and breaks. After it’s baked, you have one long slice of matzah 20 feet long, and then the machine cracks it up.
The person asks the Tzitz Eliezer, “How do you look at that? Is it considered shalem (whole) or not? It started off baking as one whole piece.” After it was baked, they broke it up. This she’elah matters to us because we always ask about challot that the ladies bake together, so that 12 of them are all in one piece. Can they carefully cut each bun separately and then use them? That’s a question we’ll have to answer for our own way of eating. Let me read you the question.
It is in the next siman, in chaf-dalet. “La'asot retzoncha chafatzti lichtov lo da'ati,” okay, he gives a whole introduction over here. These are good to have on your files, these teshuvot, because the Kitzur doesn't talk about these cases over here; these are cases outside of the... He says, “Vesha’al mena’i odot matzot mechonah, shebechammah batei charoshet hen ne’efot mechubarot, keyeri’ah arukkah, verak le’achar afiyah im tzetan mehatanur, na’asah ma’aseh peridatan zeh mizeh, venafsho bishe’elato im nechshevet kisheleimot livtzo’a aleihem lelechem mishneh beShabbat veYom Tov, bihyot uma’aseh peridah ushevirah na’asah le’achar afiyah.” He asks about machine-made matzot baked while attached, like one long sheet. Only after baking, when they come out of the oven, are they separated from one another. Is the separation after baking considered a whole loaf for breaking over on Shabbat and Yom Tov? Is it a good question or not? That’s the very point, the question we’re asking.
Someone suggests, “Maybe it’s different from ours, because ours are tied individually, and then they just happen to become attached.” I’m not talking about them just happening to be attached. You actually put them together.
He says, “Venir’eh lefi aniyyut da’ati,” and he comes along to answer the question: “Lifshot sefeko kodem kol mimah shematzinu behilchot betzi’at hapat.” First, he wants to answer it from what we find in the laws of breaking bread. Open up kuf-samech-chet, se’if gimmel, in the Mishnah Berurah. It says, “Shene gluska’ot”—what are gluska’ot? Rolls. “Hadevukim yachad. Shene’efu, venechtach min ha’achat, vehasheniyah nish’arah shelemah.” Two rolls were attached and baked together; then one broke off, while the other remained whole.
What does Maran say to do? “Tov lehafrid hachatechah mehashelemah, kedei shetira’eh shelemah, mimah sheyaniachenah davuk bah,” rather than leaving the broken piece attached, even though that would make it look bigger. Maran gives interesting advice: two rolls were attached and baked together, and then one broke. If you leave them attached, it’s nice because the loaf is bigger, but it doesn’t look whole. So Maran says to remove the broken part, so at least the other piece will be considered whole.
This is a very important halachah, because it shows what is considered whole and what is not. The Tzitz Eliezer says, “Harei shehaMechaber koreh beshem shelemah lasheniyah shelo nechtach me’atzmutah verak nifredet mekom dibukah lasheniyah, ve’af al pi shena’asit zot le’achar afiyah.” The Mechaber calls the second roll whole even though it was separated from the first after baking. That seems like a perfect proof. When did you separate them? After they were baked. And it is still considered whole.
Someone asks whether it only looks whole. The Mishnah Berurah says, “Dema’alat shalem adif mima’alat gadol”: the advantage of being whole is preferable to the advantage of being large. The second roll broke off; a piece of it was missing. It was one and a half. So remove the half piece. Someone says, “But it’s bigger!” The Mishnah Berurah says the advantage of being whole is better than the advantage of being large. So it is considered whole.
The Tzitz Eliezer brings this as a proof: when two items were baked together and you separate them, as long as each one is a whole item, it should be okay. Look at the Rema (Rabbi Moses Isserles). You’re learning critically, and that’s how you get to the truth. Marcelo’s point was, “Hey, it only looks whole.” That’s how you have to learn. You can’t just accept everything. We’re trying to get to the emet (truth). If nobody challenges you and says, “Who says, Rabbi? Maybe it’s…,” you’ll never get to the truth.
From the Mishnah Berurah, it sounds as if this is about which is preferable, a whole loaf or a large one. So it seems to be a matter of being whole. What does the Rema say? “Hagahah (gloss), velo yivtza mimenah bimkom shehaytah devukah bachaveretah, shesham nir’et kifrusah. Ela yivtza mimakom hashalem shebah.” When you break from the loaf you just separated, don’t break from the place where it was attached, because there it looks like a broken piece; break from the whole part. The Rema adds that on the loaf you separated, you shouldn’t cut where the break was; cut from the other side.
The Tzitz Eliezer asks whether the Rema is arguing with Maran, since he calls the separated part broken. He says no: “Aval zeh eino.” The Rema’s reasoning is only that, for the inyan (matter) of breaking the bread, it’s preferable to break from the other side, because that side has greater importance. We’re going to learn this: you’re supposed to try to cut from the more baked part, even if the loaf is whole. The Rema isn’t saying it isn’t whole. It is whole. He is saying that when you have a whole loaf, it is better to cut from the part that wasn’t cut before. He doesn’t argue with Maran.
Then the Tzitz Eliezer says, “U-ve’iyuni,” as I analyzed it, “ra’iti she-be-sefer Tosefet Shabbat be-siman reish-ayin-dalet,” our siman, “ma’atik le-hach dina she-be-siman kuf-samech-chet.” A rabbi called Tosefet Shabbat (Addition to Shabbat), in the laws of lechem mishneh, refers to what was written in kuf-samech-chet. What does one have to do with the other? It must be clear that he wants to teach us that even in the case of lechem mishneh, if something like this happens, you remove the broken piece from the whole one, and the remaining piece counts as whole. The discussion in kuf-samech-chet is about making hamotzi on a whole loaf, not about lechem mishneh. But since Tosefet Shabbat refers to it in the laws of lechem mishneh, it must be considered the same in this case.
He says he also saw the Machatzit Hashekel explicitly make this inference about Tosefet Shabbat. Do we have the Machatzit Hashekel in that book? It’s right there in reish-ayin-dalet, se’if katan alef, two lines from the bottom. It says, “Od katav be-sefer Tosefet Shabbat, ve-zeh leshono muva be-siman kuf-samech-chet, de-im shenei lechamim ne’efim yachad, ve-nechtach me-echad mehem, tov lehafrish haprusah (broken piece) merishonah, shelo yiheyeh nireit keprusah, af al gav she’achshav hi nireit yoter gedolah.” Two loaves were baked together, and one of them was cut. It is better to remove the broken piece from the first, so it won’t look like a broken piece, even though now it looks larger.
It implies that in this kind of case, it is permitted to use it for lechem mishneh. Why did Tosefet Shabbat quote this? It must be that you can use the one that was cut, because it is considered whole.
But the Machatzit Hashekel says, “Ve’ani nistapek vesho’el de’efshar debachol adif tefei lehafrish haprusah, ve’al yedei zeh nireit keshlemah, aval sheyehe be’emet din shalem letzorech lechem mishneh, lo shama’nu.” He says he isn’t sure. It may be considered whole for hamotzi, but who says it is considered whole for lechem mishneh? Maybe there are two different standards. You understand his point? If it’s considered whole for the blessing, how could it not be considered whole for lechem mishneh? Maybe it’s whole for haMotzi lechem min ha’aretz, but lechem mishneh may require it to be perfect.
He continues, “Venireh de’afilu teima dehicha dekapdah Gemara im yesh lo prusah veshalem shalem adif afilu katan. Now, mikol makom ani mistapek.” Go down a few lines. He says, “Mikol makom ani mistapek in the same Machatzit Hashekel here, dedin zeh shebesiman kuf-samech-chet mekoro biTerumat HaDeshen, umashma la’aniyut da’ati demairi sheshenei halechamim nechamin nidbeku derech mikreh batanur.” This case in kuf-samech-chet comes from Terumat HaDeshen (Ashes of the Altar), and it seems to him that the two loaves happened to stick together in the oven. Remember we discussed this? He wants to say that the case happened by mistake. Someone put two challot on the same tray; in the oven, they expanded and stuck together.
That seems to be what the Shulchan Aruch says: “Shenei gluska’ot shenidbeku.” It sounds as if they were originally separate, and happened to stick together in the oven. But nowadays, when people make each loaf separately while kneading, then intentionally stick them together and bake them that way, perhaps if they separate them, neither one is considered a whole loaf. That’s a big chiddush from the Machatzit Hashekel. It’s like when they make them in the round tin. Exactly: they make them one by one, intentionally, and put them together in the tin. Now you want to separate them. Maybe that’s not good enough.
The Machatzit Hashekel has pulled the rug out from under us. We thought the Shulchan Aruch was a great proof that when you make these big challot, you can separate them and each one will be considered whole. But he wants to make an okimta (contextual limitation) in Maran’s ruling. He says Maran got it from the Terumat HaDeshen, and there it seems to have happened by mistake. That would undermine the matzah case, too. I don’t see the comparison. The other matzah is one big piece that you cut. Here, there are two pieces that stuck together. You’re right, but his point is: don’t bring a proof from a case where it happened by mistake. The matzot weren’t made that way by mistake. You made one long strip intentionally, and your intention was later to break it up. Who says that works? That is the Machatzit Hashekel’s claim. The Tzitz Eliezer is going to challenge it.
He says, “Beram lefi aniyut da’ati nireh de’im kol zot, yesh shapir lifsok denechshavim kishlemim.” Despite all that, it seems to him that they are still considered whole. He says, “Hineh reishit, lo avin divrei haMachatzit Hashekel.” First, he doesn’t understand the Machatzit Hashekel’s words. The Machatzit Hashekel says Maran’s ruling comes from the Terumat HaDeshen, and that it seems to be talking only about something that happened by mistake. The Tzitz Eliezer questions whether that is really the pshat in the Terumat HaDeshen.
Second, he says, “Mistaber lomar shebikhgon nidonenu, shenechshavim hamatzot behefradan zeh mizeh kishlemim, vehu de’ad kan lo mistapek haMachatzit.” In our case, even the Machatzit Hashekel would agree that the matzot are considered whole when separated. The Machatzit Hashekel was discussing bread that was made separately, and then intentionally stuck together so it would bake in that form. But with the matzot, each matzah isn’t made separately and then attached intentionally. It starts as one big piece of dough, and there is no later act of attaching them.
On the contrary, the act of making them is to put them together in one dough. From the beginning, the intention is that this one big dough will be separated after baking, so that each piece will be a whole matzah in its own shape. That is why, I guess, they make little ridges in the matzot from the beginning. The preparation shows that they were never meant to be connected. Maybe the Machatzit Hashekel is strict only where you make each one separately and then attach them together, showing your intention to make them one. But when they start as one, and you make preparations from the beginning to show that you don’t want them connected, perhaps even the Machatzit Hashekel would be modeh (agrees). There is a difference between taking separate pieces and actually putting them together, showing that your intention is for them to be one.
He says, “Zot gam zot.” That finishes that. “Vechisvarati hanal, dechesheda’ato merosh lehafridam, nechshavim hemah kishelemim.” When the intention from the beginning is to separate them, he holds they are considered whole.
He says he saw another rabbi discuss someone who bought two challot on Shabbat that were attached to each other. Sometimes at the bakery, two challot are attached. They’re biting each other; they’re kissing each other. The person baking them intended to separate them, since they were going to be separated and sold one by one. Did he intend to sell them together? The homeowner who bought them will obviously separate them, too. So it’s obvious they aren’t considered connected for lechem mishneh. He wants to make the big chiddush that you don’t even have to separate them: you can hold them attached, and they count as two because your intention is to separate them, they were made to be separated, and they were sold as two. That’s an even bigger chiddush. But there is also the matter of how they look.
He says, “Vehadvarim od bekal vachomer (all the more so).” If, based on this reasoning, they are considered separate even before you separate them because your intention was to separate them, then all the more so here, where you actually separated them. He doesn’t go as far as the other rabbi, who says you can rely on the fact that they will eventually be separated. He says you still have to break them.
He continues, “Vesamachti me’od she-Orchot Chayim (Ways of Life) sham mevi beshem ha-Minchat Pitim (Meal Offering of Fine Flour) shekatav lachlok al ha-Machatzit Hashekel vekatav devizeh mikrei shalem, vechen katav bishmo gam ken Minchat Shabbat (Shabbat Meal Offering).” He was glad to find that Orchot Chayim brings the Minchat Pitim, who disagrees with the Machatzit Hashekel and writes that this is considered whole. Minchat Shabbat says the same. He also saw in Machazeh Avraham (Vision of Abraham) a discussion of this question. Although the objections are written there, he agrees also with Oneg that this is not considered incomplete, because each loaf is separately its own size and is baked.
He found another sefer discussing exactly the question asked here about the matzot, and they wanted to be lenient. “Mikol halein nir’eh le’aniyut da’ati deshapir nechshevet hamatzot shenifradot zeh mizeh miyad achar ha’afiyah lisheleimot mamash.” From all this, it seems to him that matzot separated from one another immediately after baking are considered completely whole.
What would that mean for our challot? If a woman baked challot on a pan and intended them to be separate, but they stuck together in the oven, we can certainly be lenient and separate them; they would count as two. Perhaps, according to the Tzitz Eliezer, even if they were made together, they could be separated. It isn’t the Machatzit Hashekel’s view, of course. But according to the Tzitz Eliezer, perhaps even if they were baked together and then separated, as Maran seems to imply in siman kuf-samech-chet, as long as each has its own tzurah (form), it could work.
When could that happen? You run out of bread; you have the round one, and that’s all you have. You want to break it into multiple challot to get lechem mishneh. Perhaps you’d have something to rely on in the Tzitz Eliezer, based on siman kuf-samech-chet and what Maran seems to say.
Someone asks, “Would it be better to break that bread up and use it as two than to make the blessing on one?” In that case, you make it intentionally. No, can we even say that? Yeah, but so what? The Tzitz Eliezer doesn’t care. His conclusion is that although the Machatzit Hashekel reasoned that the case involved something that stuck together by mistake in the oven, the Tzitz Eliezer says it could be that someone did it intentionally. The point is that if the pieces separate properly and are distinct from one another, perhaps it’s okay. It goes back and forth. The matzah case is even better: they didn’t take two separate pieces and put them together. They were originally made as one, with perforations. Perhaps that means they were clearly intended to be separated from the beginning.
So we came out with two distinct halachot. Number one, borrowing is okay. Number two, there is room to be lenient when loaves stick together in the oven. Certainly if it happened by mistake, you can separate them properly and won’t have a problem. And perhaps even if they were baked together intentionally from the beginning, as long as you can separate them properly, they are considered lechem mishneh.
Now bring us Chacham Ovadia. Do we have Shabbat here? Chazon Ovadia, yes. “Rabbi, could we say Chazon Ovadia Bet, boys?” Who wants to bring it over here? We need Chazon Ovadia. Don’t throw it. We had it here before Shabbat. It’s right here.
These are the questions. Now we have to discuss another question. Listen to what Chacham Ovadia writes in kuf-ayin-vav: “Challot lechem shene’efu betanur venidbeku zo bezo”—by mistake—“vele’achar afiyah hifridan benachat, re’uyot kol echad mehem le’inyan lechem mishneh.” Challot baked in the oven stuck to one another, and after baking they were carefully separated; each one is fit for lechem mishneh. That sounds like the case we discussed.
Chacham Ovadia says that the Sho’el Umeishiv (Questioner and Responder) was lenient even when the loaves were still attached. Since you plan to separate them, they are considered separated. He says, “Ela shehechsirah laSho’el Umeishiv af keshe’odan debukot, kevan sheda’ato lehafrishan, eino chibur (joining).” That’s a bigger chiddush: there is a rabbi who says that even when the two loaves are still attached, you don’t need to separate them, because they are standing to be separated. Chacham Ovadia doesn’t go that far. He says that the rabbi concluded it is proper to separate them carefully.
Shut Ma’aseh Avraham (Ma’aseh Avraham responsa) says that loaves baked together and attached are acceptable even if they were made that way intentionally: “Afilu im asu chen bekavanah, kevan shenir’u achar peridatam shelemim, yesh lahem to’ar lechem shalem, kemo al lechamim shene’efu echad echad, yesh lehachshiram.” Once separated, they look whole and have the appearance of whole loaves, like loaves baked individually, so they can be permitted. Be’er Moshe (Well of Moses) says the same.
Of course, they won’t look the same. When something is baked individually, the whole outside is nicely baked. When it’s baked in a tray together and then separated, the sides are the inside of the bread. That was the Rema’s point: don’t cut from the side of the breakage. Cut from the other side.
He also brings the Tzur Yaakov (Rock of Jacob) on the question of matzot baked like a large sheet and separated after baking. It says that the Machatzit Hashekel thought it might not help if they were made intentionally that way. But since they made the preparations before baking, and after baking you don’t notice where the cut is, the matzot are considered whole. It also quotes different rabbis on the matzot, including Yerushat Hapeleitah (Inheritance of the Remnant).
Then he says clearly that the whole law of lechem mishneh is miderabbanan (rabbinically ordained), so why should we be so strict with all these chumrot? He also saw in Shut Tzitz Eliezer, chelek yud-alef, siman kaf-dalet, the question about whether the matzot count. It brings what the Shulchan Aruch says about two rolls attached together, and it is necessary to conclude that after they are separated, they are fit for lechem mishneh, as Tosefet Shabbat’s cross-reference implies. The Machatzit Hashekel understood the case differently and wanted to say that in kuf-samech-chet, it happened by mistake.
But in truth, when you look at these matzot, there is no way to tell whether they were cut before baking or separated afterward. They are considered suitable for lechem mishneh. He concludes that he agrees with what he found in a sefer called Minchat Pitim, who disagreed and came to permit them. Minchat Shabbat brings the same reasoning: since they began cutting before baking, it is like cutting them before baking. That is also the case with our matzot, which were prepared before baking. Other authorities wrote to be lenient, and the Tzitz Eliezer brings a responsum from the Gri”v Vales that is lenient. From all this, he says, one should be lenient in our case and permit challot separated after baking for lechem mishneh.
At the bottom, he says to permit challot separated after baking. But that was the case where they stuck together in the same tray. It sounds as if Chacham Ovadia is being lenient. At the top, he writes that the challot stuck together in the oven, which sounds like it happened accidentally. But at the bottom, he says to permit challot separated after baking. Why would it be different from what he said at the beginning? He isn’t changing his position. The Tzitz Eliezer argued with the Machatzit Hashekel. The Machatzit Hashekel’s proof was that the case in the Shulchan Aruch happened by mistake, but the Tzitz Eliezer rejected that whole argument.
So lema’aseh, I wonder what Chacham Ovadia would hold when they were made intentionally. On the bottom he clearly writes, “VeShut Machazeh Avraham lechamim elu shene’efu yachad afilu im asu chen bekavanah. Kevan shenir’u achar peridatan sheleimim veyesh lahem lechem shalem to’ar lechem shalem yesh lehachshiram.” He quotes the Machazeh Avraham, who says that even if they were baked together intentionally, after separation they look whole and have the appearance of whole bread, so they can be permitted. Why does he bring that? He brings it as part of his reasoning, and lechem mishneh is miderabbanan. How strict do you want to be? Do you want to follow the stricter rabbis?
Someone asks, “So one of those round ones would be okay bedi’avad? Because I had that whole two.” Exactly. No, that’s according to the other rabbi who says that since it is destined to be cut, you don’t even have to cut it. Although, you’re right, that’s the opinion of the—of the one that’s got four or five—That’s the Sho’el Umeishiv. Beauty! Take a 12-one, you got haArizal action in that. That’s it. Chacham Ovadia doesn’t go that far. The Tzitz Eliezer doesn’t go that far either: they don’t say that because it will eventually be cut, you can already consider it cut. Fine. But he will say that if you actually cut it, does it look whole? Can you cut it so it looks whole? That’s the problem: those don’t look whole.
Someone asks whether the outside pieces would count. When you make one roll, the whole outside gets baked nicely. When you have one with six or seven pieces together, after you break them apart, the side walls are the inside of the bread. The top and bottom will be baked, but the sides will look like bread. The pieces on the outside have the same issue. For sure, the cut side will look white, but how can I call it whole? Is it whole on three sides? Maybe it’s only one small spot, but what about the rov (majority) of it? The rov is rov. That’s what I was thinking. It’s different. Does the fact that it looks white mean it isn’t whole? That’s not the same as how well it’s baked. The Rema said, “Don’t cut from that side; cut from the other side.” But here both sides—only one side has the cut. They want it to come all the way around like this.
Halachah lema’aseh, Rabotai, it seems clear from Chacham Ovadia that if they stuck together in the oven by mistake, you can separate them and there’s no problem. If they got stuck, or you bought them in the supermarket and they were attached, break them apart and use them separately. Perhaps I’ll go as far as to say that even if they were baked together and you need them for lechem mishneh, you can carefully separate them and use them. And clearly, those matzot made in factories, where they were perforated from the beginning, and you can’t even tell whether they were made separately or detached from the beginning, would be considered separate. Everybody would agree that you can use them for lechem mishneh. So I wonder what would be better.