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A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Torah Lecture

Siman 308o

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
April 10, 2024
Duration
72:07
Lecture code
REM-AR-669

This transcript was auto-generated and polished for readability. While we aim for accuracy, errors may occur. If you notice a mistake, please click to submit corrections.

Rabbotai (my masters), hilchot muktzeh (laws of muktzeh), mem-heh (forty-five), in Gemara Shabbat. I want to go through a little piece here today. Go to the source, exactly: Gemara Shabbat, mem-heh, a few lines down. This is one of my favorite perakim (chapters), Kira. A lot of material is in there.

The Gemara says, seven lines down: “Ba'u mineih deRav, mahu letaltulei sheraga dechanuketa (the Chanukah lamp) mikamei chabarei beshabata (because of the Chaveri on Shabbat)?” They asked Rav: May one move the Chanukah lamp because of the Chaveri on Shabbat? Sheraga dechanuketa (the Chanukah lamp) means the lights of the menorah. Mikamei chabarei (because of the Chaveri): Rashi says the Chabarei (the Chaveri) are these goyim (non-Jews). Obviously, the goyim had rules that they did not want you to put lights outside on their holidays, or whatever it was. The Persians, exactly. So the she'elah (question) is: Can you move the menorah on Shabbat?

Rashi says right away: “Sheraga dechanuketa achar shekavah” (the Chanukah lamp after it went out). Rashi understands that it is talking about after the lamp was extinguished. So what is the question once it has gone out? Presumably, it was a basis (base). Normally, if it was a basis going into Shabbat, then even if it went out, it is still muktzeh (set aside). So the question is whether we can be lenient here and move it because of the Chaveri.

Tosafot says: “Mikamei chabarei beshabata shebeyom chag shelahem lo hayu manichim ner ela beveit avodah zarah (idolatry)” (because of the Chaveri on Shabbat, since on their holiday they would place a lamp only in a house of idolatry). That explains who the Chabarei are. Rashi says, “Chabarei, shem umah shehayetah im Parsiyim.” They are with the Parsiyim (the Persians). Zoroastrians, exactly.

Rashi explains mikamei chabarei: “Shelo yir'uhu bechatzer ked'amrinan bepirkin dele'eil dehayu tov'im teva samuch lirshut harabbim veyad'u shehidlik bo ner.” They did not want them to see it in the courtyard, as we say in the previous chapter; they would know that a lamp had been lit there. They did not even want them to see the menorah, because they would know that a menorah must have been lit. This is after the fact. “Vehem gazru shelo lehadlik.” They decreed that one must not light it. Alternatively, it was on their holiday, as Tosafot said. So that is the she'elah: Is there room to be lenient here in order to get rid of this menorah?

It does not seem to be sakanat nefashot (danger to life), because if it were danger to life, you could blow it out or pick it up while it was lit, and so on. Obviously, this is not that kind of danger. Let’s see Rashi in a moment to understand what sort of danger this is. Anyway, the Gemara says, “Ve'amar lehu, ‘Shefir damei (it is fine).’” The rabbi answered, “Shefir damei”—mutar (permitted). The Gemara says, “Sha'at hadechak shani” (a time of pressing need is different).

The Gemara wanted to bring a re'ayah (proof) that there is no basis here: We allow you to move the menorah because of the Chaveri. The Gemara says, “No, no, no.” We hold like Rabbi Shimon, because Rabbi Shimon did not hold of this type of basis. Any basis that would go out on Shabbat, or would not remain for the whole Shabbat—like this kli (vessel), which would last only as long as it remained lit—is not a basis according to Rabbi Shimon. So you see that, and the Gemara says, “No, no, no, no. This is a sha'at hadechak. It is obviously not permitted lechatchilah (from the outset).”

The Gemara says: “Amar lehu, ‘Shefir damei. Sha'at hadechak shani.’ De'amar leih Rav Kahana veRav Asi leRav, ‘Hachi hachi hilcheta?’ Amar leih, ‘No, kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak’” (Rabbi Shimon is worthy to rely upon in a pressing situation). Rav Kahana and Rav Asi asked Rav, “Is that really the halachah?” He answered, “No, Rabbi Shimon is worthy to rely upon in a pressing situation.” That is the famous Gemara: “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.”

The basis is the menorah, because it had a shalhevet (flame) in it. Rashi says: “Hachi hilcheta? Bitmihah. Besha'at hadechak, sakanah. Almah shelo besha'at hadechak assur.” “Is that the halachah?”—as a question. In a pressing situation, danger; that shows that when there is no pressing situation, it is forbidden. So there was some sort of danger here. Obviously, it was not danger of death. They might beat him up, make him pay taxes, or something. If the danger was of that sort, they were lenient.

That is a very, very, very important halachah (Jewish law). Apart from danger of this kind, we have a basis. Once it becomes a basis, you cannot move it—not letzorech gufo (for its use), not letzorech mekomo (for its place), not mechamah letzel (from sun to shade), not for anything. A basis is locked in its place.

Let’s see the Shiltei Giborim on this passage. Boys, go to Rabbi Boaz in Shiltei Giborim, Perek Sheni (second chapter), on daf mem heh (page forty-five). In the dapei ha-Rif (pages of the Rif), it is on page chaf alef. Find mem heh, first side; it should be on daf chaf alef in the dapei ha-Rif. On the left side, find where he says, “Hinei zeh ot yud.” Continue. “Kechada,” okay, and “ve'im tomar,” muktzeh machamat isur. Go back just before that: “Yesh tnai.” The Shiltei Giborim is brought here just to explain what the danger is.

The Magen Avraham brings this. He says it does not have to be sakanah mamash (literally) that you are in danger. He says, “Afilu me'eimat nochrim” (even from fear of non-Jews). Fear of non-Jews is enough. It does not have to be an actual danger like Rashi said; you can simply be afraid. That is the view of the Shiltei Giborim.

Open the Mishnah Berurah at resh ayin tet (279), halachah alef (law one) and bet (two). We did this, but we have to review it; this will be a chazarah (review). In resh ayin tet it says: “Ner shehidliko bo be'otah Shabbat” (a lamp lit on that Shabbat). That is our case. A lamp that was lit before Shabbat, “af al pi shekavah,” even though it went out, “asur letaltelo,” it is forbidden to move it. Why is a lamp that went out forbidden to move? Because it is a basis.

It continues: “Vechein motar hashemen shebaner shehidliko bo be'otah Shabbat asur letaltelo ulehistapek mimenu be'otah Shabbat.” The remaining oil in a lamp that was lit on that Shabbat is forbidden to move or use that Shabbat. The Mishnah Berurah explains in Mishnah Berurah alef, “Af al pi shekavah,” meaning even if no oil at all remained. The reason is that, since it was forbidden to move at twilight because the lamp, oil, and wick had become a basis for the shalhevet, which is forbidden to move, “migo de'itkatzai levin hashemashot itkatzai lechulei yoma” (once set aside at twilight, it is set aside for the whole day). This is what the Gemara calls muktzeh machamat isur. We hold that in this prohibition. Beautiful. Muktzeh machamat isur: it became a basis, and once it becomes a basis, it is forbidden for the whole Shabbat.

Keep your place in the Mishnah Berurah. Law two: “Ner zeh she'amarnu she'asur letaltelo, afilu letzorech gufo uletzorech mekomo asur.” This lamp, which we said is forbidden to move, is forbidden to move even for its use or for its place. Why? The Mishnah Berurah says in Mishnah Berurah dalet, “Velo dami lish'ar keli shemelachto le'isur.” It is not like other vessels whose use is for something prohibited. Even if you call the menorah a keli shemelachto le'isur, such a vessel would appear to be permitted to move for its use or its place, as it says in section shin-chet, paragraph three. Here, since it was forbidden to move at twilight—even for its use or its place—because it was a basis for the shalhevet, the rule is different.

So it is worse because it was lit. Once it was lit, it was a basis. Even if you want to call a menorah a keli shemelachto le'isur, it loses its movability once it has become a basis.

In the Mishnah Berurah, fourth line, third line: “Im yesh eimat eino Yehudi alav al yedei haner”—if he is afraid of a non-Jew because of the lamp. “Eimat” means fear, as it was in the time of the Amora'im, when there was a nation that was particular on its holiday “shelo yir'uhu shemadlikim ner be'oto hayom vechol ki hai gavna.” They did not want to see people lighting a lamp that day, as we just read in the Gemara about the Chavrei. “Mutar letaltelo le'achar shekavah”—it is permitted to move it after it goes out. No problem. This is the Shiltei Giborim we were looking for.

The Mishnah Berurah continues: “Vechen hiskim besefer Torat Shabbat,” and in Pri Megadim it implies that if he fears they will strike him, or there will be some other monetary loss, everyone agrees it is permitted. “Lechulei alma sharei”—everyone agrees it is permitted. Aha. This is where we get to the sugya (discussion). First, the Mishnah Berurah says fear of non-Jews. Rashi said danger; the Mishnah Berurah says fear of non-Jews is also enough. Fear that they may strike him is also enough. And then he adds “o she'ar hefsed mamon”—or some other monetary loss.

That sounds possible: if you leave your menorah outside, especially in the old days in a courtyard, they could steal it. They do not only steal menorot in Brooklyn today; they have always stolen them. Put out a silver menorah, and someone takes it. In those days they lit it outside, so there was a concern. This is an unbelievable heter (permission). The Mishnah Berurah began with danger, then broadened it: it is not only danger; fear is enough. Fear of what? That they might strike him. That is also enough. Then at the end he adds monetary loss. We have a general principle here, Rabbotai. Realize that we are being lenient like Rabbi Shimon. “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.” The Mishnah Berurah is treating monetary loss as a sha'at hadechak, and therefore we can rely on Rabbi Shimon that this lamp did not become a basis.

If it is not a basis, it goes back to being a keli shemelachto le'isur. I need to move it—but this is not letzorech gufo or letzorech mekomo; this is mechamah letzel, where Rabbi Shimon agrees. That does not help. Hold on: where did this start? It started with a basis. According to Rabbi Yehudah, you cannot move the menorah at all if it is a basis. We have lost the thread.

According to Rabbi Yehudah, you cannot move the menorah at all. The halachah in the Gemara should be: You lit the menorah on the holiday of the goyim? Sorry, it is a basis. They are going to beat you up? Nobody is going to die here. What should we do? “Tisbol”—you should bear it. You should have lit it on your kitchen table that year. Why are you acting like such a chasid? It is your fault. But the answer is no: “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.”

Rabbi Shimon holds that this menorah is not a basis because it is destined to go out. We do not hold that way. We hold that even though you knew it would go out, that does not matter. Since you lit it and it was off-limits at twilight, it is set aside—unless you made a condition. But this Gemara is discussing a case where you made no condition; you simply lit it without specifying anything. So we rely on Rabbi Shimon. What are we saying about Rabbi Shimon? That it is not a basis.

If it is not a basis, what is it? It is a keli shemelachto le'isur. According to Rabbi Shimon? Yes, Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is a keli shemelachto le'isur. When we say “ein muktzeh,” it does not mean there is no muktzeh at all. He does not hold of all Rabbi Yehudah’s categories of muktzeh, but he does hold of muktzeh. Tosafot says that every muktzeh is shemelachto le'isur, right? So it is a keli shemelachto le'isur. Let’s spell it out.

What is Rabbi Shimon allowing here? It is obviously not letzorech gufo. I will tell you what it is: as Chacham Ben Tzion told us, this can be considered letzorech mekomo. Letzorech mekomo does not mean only that I need a place to put something; it can mean that I need the place to be empty. Why do I need the place to be empty? Otherwise, the goyim are going to beat me up. Or they are going to steal it. Before you get to the reasoning about saving it, ask whether you have a heter for letzorech gufo or letzorech mekomo. In this case, according to Rabbi Yehudah, do you have a heter? No. According to Rabbi Yehudah, it is a basis; you are stuck. It cannot be moved for anything. So the Gemara says, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak”—we rely on Rabbi Shimon not to call it a basis.

But I say it is not called a keli shemelachto leheiter; it is called a keli shemelachto le'isur. Therefore, we are back to the regular rules of letzorech gufo and mekomo. What is letzorech mekomo in this case? The place does not only mean that I need to put something there. I need the place itself; I need it to be empty and vacant.

Go back to what we learned with Chacham Ben Tzion when he had the pot on the table. The pot was a keli shemelachto le'isur. You emptied it; there is no more food in it. Chacham Ben Tzion said that if you are sitting at the table on Shabbat, it is not a geraf shel re'i (chamber pot). You want to get rid of the pot and take it off the table because your oneg Shabbat (Shabbat delight) is not having empty pots on the table. That is also considered letzorech mekomo: you want the space vacated. That is Chacham Ben Tzion’s view. Fine, that is not the point of the shiur, but that is letzorech mekomo.

Now the Mishnah Berurah says something hard to understand. If you are worried they are going to beat you up, no problem: you need the place vacant so they will not beat you up. But the Mishnah Berurah says, “O she'ar hefsed mamon”—some other monetary loss. Monetary loss means they are going to take the menorah. That is normally mechamah letzel. So now you are telling me a major chiddush (novel insight): is there room to be lenient for a keli shemelachto le'isur, mechamah letzel, because of monetary loss? Is that the halachah? We know that normally a keli shemelachto le'isur cannot be moved mechamah letzel. Maybe the Shulchan Aruch says there is a halachah if there is a loss, perhaps a large loss, because this is a monetary loss from sun to shade. Maybe a large loss is different.

Open shin-lamed-dalet (334), boys, just to remind ourselves of the halachot. Maran says: “Naflah deleikah beShabbat, Rachamana litzlan.” If a fire breaks out on Shabbat, may God save us. If it is Friday night before the meal, a person may save enough food for three se'udot (meals), what is fit for a person for a person, and what is fit for an animal for an animal. The person can bring it outside because he needs three meals for Shabbat. In the morning, two meals, because he has already missed the night meal. In the afternoon, food for one meal, presumably because of se'udah shelishit (third meal).

“Vedavka bnei habayit shehadeleikah bo lo yatzilu yoter, mishum de'ika lemeichash shemitoch sheterudim behatzalah yishkechu Shabbat veyichbu.” Specifically, the people whose house is on fire may not save more, because we are concerned that, while they are busy rescuing things, they will forget it is Shabbat and extinguish the fire. The people whose house is burning have to be very strict and take out only the minimum. If you let them take out more, they're going to get bahul—they're going to get panicked—and that panic could lead to kibui—put out the fire. They might start putting out the fire. If they know they can save their things, they may come to extinguish the fire. So far, so good?

The Mishnah Berurah, in Mishnah Berurah gimmel, explains: “Rotzeh lomar ve'al korchach, vadai bahul, ve'i sharit lei atei lechibuye.” The person is certainly panicked, and if you permit him, he may come to extinguish the fire. It continues: “Kan azlinan lehatzil kedei shelo yichbeh.” Here we are rescuing things so that he will not extinguish the fire. In truth, we said that they permit rescuing things so that he will not extinguish it, as written in this section shin-nun-dalet. Tosafot wrote that a person is indeed panicked over his loss, and therefore they had to permit it so that he would not extinguish the fire deliberately. In truth, they were more lenient.

The Mishnah Berurah, kaf-vav, then discusses fires that are close to one another and cites a sefer called Atzei Shittim, a commentary on the Shulchan Aruch. It says that if all the houses belong to non-Jews and we Jews live among them, and there is danger to life, it is permitted to extinguish the fire. That is the famous heter: we live next door to goyim, and the houses are close together, so it is permitted.

Now read the Mishnah Berurah’s “vehu hadin,” the next two words: “Devarim hamuktzim”—the same law applies to muktzeh items. It continues that we cannot decree that a person will become panicked and extinguish the fire, since nowadays it is permitted to extinguish it. But that is not certain: perhaps in his panic he will do other labors, such as carrying in the public domain. In any event, one should not protest. See the Bi'ur Halachah, which says that even in rescuing money it is permitted, according to Ba'al HaTerumot, if he does not transgress a Torah prohibition. The same is true according to Issur veHeter, although people question this. Chayei Adam and others wrote about it as well. Continue: “Ve'afilu ma'ot de'ein bo ela issur muktzeh”—even money, where the only prohibition is muktzeh.

He is discussing what it is permissible to take out and what is not. Maran says in paragraph bet: “Veyesh matirin letaltel ma'ot ushe'ar devarim hamuktzim kedei lehatzilam mipnei hadeleikah o me'onsim habaim legozlam.” Some permit moving money and other muktzeh items to save them from a fire or from coercers (mobsters) who come to take them. Beautiful. That is the worst kind of muktzeh: money. And other muktzeh items, to save them from a fire or from coercers who come to steal them. “Deve makom hefsed ein lachush le'issur muktzeh”—in a case of loss, there is no need to worry about the prohibition of muktzeh. Yishtabach Shemo! What a general principle!

Then he says, “Veyesh oserim”—and some prohibit it. There is a dispute. What do you do when there are conflicting views? The Mishnah Berurah says that “yesh matirin” means specifically in another house, where people are not panicked, and not in the house where the fire is. Their reason is that this is no more than what they permitted a person overtaken by nightfall on the road: he can carry his wallet in increments of less than four cubits, so he will not commit the more severe prohibition of carrying it openly. The same is true here: they permitted the prohibition of moving muktzeh so he would not come to extinguish the fire. They also permitted it in a case involving coercers so that he would not carry the items openly in the public domain.

The reason of those who prohibit it is that they hold that this permission applies specifically to someone overtaken by nightfall on the road, so that he will not commit a greater prohibition. But in a case involving coercers, “yiklu vehishlimu yadi.” That is, in a case involving coercers, you lose money. In the case of the person overtaken by nightfall, they let him walk in increments of less than four cubits because otherwise he might walk normally and commit a Torah prohibition. Here, what is going to happen? They will take the money. Let them take the money, the opinion says. He will not commit a prohibition. There is nothing else he can do. Whether he puts it in his pocket or not, they will take it. No Torah prohibition will happen here, so they were not lenient.

What is Maran’s opinion in paragraph bet? If we follow our rules, the later view has the final word. This is a “yesh veyesh,” and the later view prohibits it. So we do not have a heter to move muktzeh in a case of loss. In a case of loss, we do not have permission to move even money—unless we distinguish between other kinds of muktzeh and money, as if we are discussing different levels of muktzeh. Fine, but he does say “ma'ot veshe'ar muktzim”—money and other muktzeh items. Perhaps he means even money, where a person may be panicked.

But Maran’s “stam” follows the first opinion. No, that is not our rule here. What does he say? “Stam shel Maran halachah kede'ah rishonah”—Maran’s unqualified first opinion is the halachah. But here it says “yesh veyesh.” This is a “yesh veyesh”; there is no dispute about that. Maran prohibits it. So apparently, we have a problem.

Look at the Mishnah Berurah too. Can you say, as Benny did, that it is different kinds of muktzeh? You can say that, but the Mishnah Berurah does not make that distinction. The Mishnah Berurah seems to mean all muktzeh. That is the problem. Is it permitted to tell a goy? Leave the goy out; we are not talking about telling a goy. Here is the question, Rabbotai: apparently we have a problem, because Maran says here in the “yesh veyesh” that in a case of loss we do not waive the rules of muktzeh. Whatever the rules are, they remain the rules. A loss does not give you any additional permission.

I am reading Maran again: “Yesh matirim letaltel ma'ot udevarim hamuktzim kedei lehatzilam mipenei hadeleikah o me'onsim haba'im legozlam.” Some permit moving money and muktzeh items to save them from a fire or from coercers who come to take them. “Uvimkom peseida ein lachush le'issur muktzeh.” And some prohibit it, and even prohibit telling a non-Jew to move merchandise that is being damaged by rain. “Va'afilu lomar le'eino yehudi letaltel sechorah hanifsedet machamat hageshamim.” Some prohibit even telling a non-Jew to move merchandise being damaged by rain.

So the million-dollar question we have to answer today is this: the Mishnah Berurah just told me that I could move the menorah in a case of loss. In resh ayin tet, he told me that you can move the menorah because of monetary loss. What does it mean to move the menorah because of monetary loss? You want to call the menorah a keli shemelachto le'isur because we are not following Rabbi Shimon? Fine. Where did we see in the Gemara, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak,” that you can move a keli shemelachto le'isur mechamah letzel, when even Rabbi Shimon did not say that? Even Rabbi Shimon does not say that.

Apparently, there is a problem with the Mishnah Berurah, which added those words in resh ayin tet. Go back there for a moment. Look how far the halachah moved. It began with danger. The two Shtei Yadot added fear. The Mishnah Berurah said “sheyakehu”—that they might strike him. Look at the sha'ar hatziyun, letter gimel. What is it discussing? “Umipi Pri Megadim mashma she'im yareh sheyakehu”—the Pri Megadim implies that if he is afraid they will strike him. The Chaveri might beat him up, or there may be a monetary loss. The sha'ar hatziyun says, “Vesiyem haPri Megadim al zeh, ve'adayin tzarich iyun.” That is the Pri Megadim’s leshon (wording): “Tzarich iyun”—it requires further study.

The sha'ar hatziyun is trying to explain what the Pri Megadim’s question is. When the Pri Megadim wrote this halachah, he said, “Venir'eh gam keshe... sheyakehu o sheyehei hefsed”—it appears that if they might strike him, or there may be a loss, it is permitted to move the menorah. Then the Pri Megadim writes, “Aval tzarich iyun.” What was his question? The sha'ar hatziyun explains: “Venir'eh shekavanato de'afilu be'ofen zeh, gam ken eino metoratz kol kach bemeimra deRav de'amar kedai hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav, demashma deRabbi Yehudah de'it lei muktzeh machmat isur, asur.” Even in this case, it is not fully resolved by Rav’s statement that Rabbi Shimon is worthy to rely upon, because it implies that according to Rabbi Yehudah, who holds of muktzeh machamat isur, it is forbidden. According to Rabbi Yehudah, it is forbidden because, as we said, it is a basis. The whole permission we are giving is according to Rabbi Shimon.

“Ah, vehalo lekamman besiman shin-nun-dalet, se'if bet, sevira leih lede'ah rishonah sham, vechen hiskimu acharonim sham demuktzeh bimkom peseda ein isur letaltel.” But later, in section shin-nun-dalet, paragraph bet, the first opinion holds that there is no prohibition against moving muktzeh in a case of loss, and later authorities agreed. You are right: that is the first view. However, according to what the Magen Avraham wrote there, it is specifically in a case where the person is panicked, because we are concerned that he will commit a Torah prohibition if we do not permit him to move it.

The Magen Avraham later says that this permission to move something that is muktzeh, such as money, in a case of loss applies only when there is panic, when not allowing it might lead to something more severe. So in this case, apparently, what is going to happen? They are going to steal your menorah? In the other case there was a fire or carrying in the public domain, so the Magen Avraham understood that the permission was given because it might lead to a Torah prohibition. That is a problem. That is how the Magen Avraham understood the permission.

But here, the Pri Megadim says “tzarich iyun,” because it sounds as though we are being lenient. What will happen? The person left his menorah at the front of the house, as he is supposed to, and fears someone will come and steal it. The menorah cost him $1,000. If we do not permit him to move it, what will happen? Nothing. It will cause distress and financial loss, but nothing more. In the fire case, he may extinguish the fire; in the other case, he may carry. Here, there is nothing more he can do.

So the Pri Megadim says “tzarich iyun” about whether we can give such a permission here. We have a big puzzle: why did the Mishnah Berurah and the Pri Megadim say this, when they knew shin-mem-daled? We really rule like the second opinion; and even if you want to rule like the first opinion, it is under circumstances that do not exist in this case.

I saw that Chacham Ner Tziyon discusses this. He has a nice piece on it. He brings the suggestion that the distinction is that, in the other case, it was money, which is muktzeh because of the item itself, whereas here it is a keli shemelachto le'isur. He writes: “Veyesh sheratzu lomar dela ne'emru divrei ha-Magen Avraham veha-Mishnah Berurah lekaman le'esor le-Yisrael lehatzil sechorah min hageshamim, ela bemuktzeh machmat gufo o bemuktzeh machmat chesron kis dumya dema'ot, devezeh gam Rabbi Shimon modeh dahavei muktzeh.” Some wanted to say that the Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah’s words forbidding a Jew to save merchandise from the rain apply only to muktzeh because of the item itself, or muktzeh because of financial loss, like money, since Rabbi Shimon agrees that those items are muktzeh. “Ve'im ken leika lemeimar desamchinan a-Rabbi Shimon bishe'at hadechak.” In that case, we cannot say that we rely on Rabbi Shimon in a pressing situation. The whole permission for the menorah is that we rely on Rabbi Shimon in a pressing situation. We cannot say that in the other case, because Rabbi Shimon agrees that those items are forbidden.

But for other muktzeh items, such as a menorah, Rabbi Shimon would call it a keli shemelachto le'isur. Although we do not rule like him in this respect, because it should be a basis, nevertheless, in this case we can rely on Rabbi Shimon in a pressing situation, and even in a case of financial loss where the person is not panicked. That is the conclusion. You have to be discussing monetary loss where there is no panic and no extinguishing of the fire. One answer is that you are right: the other case was about muktzeh because of the item itself, and nobody permits that. Even Rabbi Shimon is stringent about muktzeh machmat gufo and muktzeh machmat chesron kis. Here, we rely on Rabbi Shimon because it is an issue of basis. He does not hold that it is a basis in this case, so it goes back to being a keli shemelachto le'isur. Therefore, you have to say that Rabbi Shimon permits moving a keli shemelachto le'isur.

In other words, there is no panic in the menorah case. Now hold on: we have to establish that Rabbi Shimon agrees to that. We always understood that, for a keli shemelachto le'isur, everyone agrees that it can be moved for letzorech gufo or letzorech mekomo, but even Rabbi Shimon does not permit moving it mechamah letzel. Always remember, Rabbotai: whenever you get to the permission to move a menorah, you are relying on a leniency you would not normally use: “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.” That is the permission. But you have to make sure Rabbi Shimon agrees to it.

Why did Maran make that the second opinion? The other case was muktzeh because of the item itself. That is a serious kind of muktzeh, and even Rabbi Shimon is stringent about it. But here, with a keli shemelachto le'isur, it must be that Rabbi Shimon permits moving it mechamah letzel. What do you mean it is a basis? “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav.”

The problem is that, as the rabbi is going to prove, we clearly find that Rabbi Shimon holds that a keli shemelachto le'isur is forbidden mechamah letzel. Finished! Then you cannot say, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav,” even when you are worried about losing it. Exactly—even when you are worried about the loss. What is the proof? “Achein zeh eino.”

The Gemara says in Beitzah, daf lamed-vav or lamed-heh, lamed-heh amud bet: “Bei reichya de-Abaye.” What is bei reichya? The millstone, the grinder. “Reichya” means millstone. “Daluf”—it was wet and getting moldy or something like that. They wanted to move it out of the room, perhaps because they wanted to eat there, or to get it out of the wet place. They could not move it. A millstone is a keli shemelachto le'isur, and they did not need it for its use or its place. They could not use it, and they wanted to save it from the damp.

What did the Gemara say? “Vehoreh Rava sheyachnis lesham mitato”—Rava instructed him to bring his bed into the room. “De'al yedei zeh ya'asu kegraf shel re'i.” Because of that, it would become like a chamber pot, and it would be permitted to remove the millstone from there. “Umeshum debimkom pseida”—because of a loss, you may create a geraf shel re'i lechatchilah. Remember the whole issue of whether you can create a geraf shel re'i lechatchilah? The Gemara’s rule there is that in a case of loss, the millstone is going to be ruined. So in a case of loss, we let you create the situation. You did not need it; you were fine in the other room. No, put your bed in that room, pretend you want to sleep there, and then you can move the geraf shel re'i out of the way. Chazak!

The Magen Avraham says that the millstone is, if anything, a keli shemelachto le'isur. “Dechashiv rak kli shemelachto le'isur, umochach mizeh demah shekatav haMagen Avraham le'essor yesod heiter muktzeh machmat shenifsad bigshamim, hu afilu bemuktzeh dekli shemelachto le'isur.” It is considered only a keli shemelachto le'isur. This proves that what the Magen Avraham wrote about forbidding the basis of permitting muktzeh items damaged by rain applies even to a keli shemelachto le'isur. Exactly. Why did the Gemara need to say, “Make a geraf shel re'i”? Just say: It is a keli shemelachto le'isur; there is a loss; Rabbi Shimon is worthy to rely upon in a pressing situation; move it!

“De'af al gav demutar letaltel letzorech gufo umekomo, mikol makom letzorech mechamah letzel assur, afilu bimkom pseida digshamim.” Even though it is permitted to move it for its use or its place, it is forbidden to move it from sun to shade, even in a case of loss from rain. So you see that they prohibited it in this case because there is no panic. The only time they permitted it in the other case was because panic might lead to extinguishing the fire and the like. They permitted moving it then. But even for a keli shemelachto le'isur, you did not get that permission outside of that situation. They made him create a geraf shel re'i. Why did they not make it simple?

The Magen Avraham establishes this halachah. Why did they not say: It is a keli shemelachto le'isur, there is a tremendous loss, it is raining everywhere, and in a case of loss, take it out? They did not. So this leniency does not distinguish between levels of muktzeh. The restriction concerning merchandise, which you cannot move because of financial loss, applies to every level of muktzeh: whether it is muktzeh because of the item itself, because of financial loss, or a keli shemelachto le'isur, like the millstone. Why did the Gemara have to find a way to move the millstone? It could simply have said, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak”—move it.

There is no such Rabbi Shimon. Where do you see Rabbi Shimon permitting a keli shemelachto le'isur mechamah letzel? Later we saw they were lenient? No, that was a situation of panic. When there is panic that might lead to a Torah prohibition, we are lenient. But when there is no panic, you can make it a geraf shel re'i; there are other ways. You cannot move it without creating a geraf shel re'i, so use that route. Let’s go back to our question.

The Mishnah Berurah says simply: If the Chaveri are going to beat you up, or there is some other danger, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.” I understand that. That is a keli shemelachto le'isur where you need its place. What does “need its place” mean? I need the place to be empty, because if it is not empty, the goyim will kill me or beat me up. That is no problem; I need to vacate the area.

But in this case, you are vacating the area to save the menorah. You do not need the place empty. You want to save the menorah and the thousand dollars. That is not letzorech gufo or letzorech mekomo. Letzorech gufo clearly does not apply: you are not using the menorah. Letzorech mekomo? Do I need the place empty? No. If it is because of the goyim walking by and seeing that I lit a menorah there, then they may beat me up. But when you are doing it to avoid a financial loss, what is the permission? Even Rabbi Shimon permits that?

They might tell me, “Take your bed and put it on the porch.” That would not be a geraf shel re'i. So putting your bed on the porch will not help. That is why I am saying perhaps this is not a proof. Maybe when there is an opportunity to do it in a more permitted way, by making it a geraf shel re'i, we will not let you move it. I will let you move it—meaning, no, I will not. Rav Chaim, you are right: it is a loss, and you can move it, but I do not want to give you that permission. Make it a geraf shel re'i and use the regular rules. Fine, but what if you do not have the geraf shel re'i permission? Then move it. And on whom are you relying? Rabbi Shimon. But we have not found Rabbi Shimon permitting a keli shemelachto le'isur that way. With a keli shemelachto le'isur, Rabbi Shimon agrees to the regular rules. That is the problem. You always have to go back to the general rule: “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav.” Find me a case where Rabbi Shimon permits a keli shemelachto le'isur because of a loss. The Gemara says it was permitted there? No, there was panic there. The Gemara says it was a situation of panic. Here, by contrast, Chacham Ben Tzion gives a nice answer.

He says: “Ume'atah, keshenavo ladun be'inyan menorah, hinei omnam peligi bah Rabbi Yehudah veRabbi Shimon.” When we discuss the menorah, Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether it is considered a basis. Rabbi Yehudah says it is a basis; that is the end of it. Rabbi Shimon says it is not a basis, because it is going to go out. Rabbi Shimon is lenient about that kind of basis. “Ivra”—nevertheless, he does not hold that way in every case of basis.

“Im ken tzarich bi'ur mahu she'amru baGemara decheivan desamchinan aRabbi Shimon sharei letaltelah lemenorah, halo gam Rabbi Shimon modeh be'isur tiltul kli shemelachto le'isur mechamah letzel?” If so, we need to explain what the Gemara means when it says that, relying on Rabbi Shimon, one may move the menorah. Does Rabbi Shimon not also agree that it is forbidden to move a keli shemelachto le'isur mechamah letzel?

“Ivra de'al divrei haGemara lo kashya midi, sheharei lo amru lehatir letaltel hamenorah mechamah letzel.” There is no difficulty with the Gemara, because it never said that it is permitted to move the menorah mechamah letzel. It did not say that you can move it because of a financial loss. “Rak kitzuro shel davar mipenei kepidat hanochrim”—the point of the Gemara is that the non-Jews are particular about it.

“Uvi'ur hadavar: de'ahar dekayma lan keRabbi Shimon delo chashiva basis, mimeila lo nish'ar bah ela isur mitzad dahavei kli shemelachto le'isur. Vecheivan dekli kazeh sharei letaltelo letzorech gufo umekomo, verak mechamah letzel asur.” Since we rule like Rabbi Shimon that it is not considered a basis, what remains is only the prohibition that it is a keli shemelachto le'isur. Such a vessel may be moved for its use or its place; it is only forbidden mechamah letzel. “Im ken, ka'asher yarei mikpidat hanochri, sheyir'eh shehidlik menorah befit'om, harei tiltul hamenorah chashiv ketzorech mekomah mamash, sheharei hu ken nitzrach sheyihyeh mekom hamenorah panui.” When he fears the non-Jew’s disapproval—when the non-Jew might see that he lit a menorah—the moving is genuinely for the place, because he needs the place where the menorah is to be vacant. That is the reasoning we discussed: he needs the menorah’s place vacated so the non-Jews will not see it.

So the Gemara works out. This is a nice way to understand the Gemara. Do not take that line as saying that “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon” permits everything; you have to go through the steps. We follow Rabbi Shimon, so it is not a basis. What is it? Is it a keli shemelachto leheiter? No, it is a keli shemelachto le'isur. A keli shemelachto le'isur may be moved only letzorech gufo or letzorech mekomo. Here it is mekomo. The chiddush is that it counts as mekomo. Why? I am not putting anything in that spot. No: I need the place vacant so that when the Persians walk by, they will not see a menorah there.

But if you want to argue that way, is that just playing with the rules? Anytime it is mechamah letzel, could you say, “I want the space vacant”? No. You have to be honest. You do not need the place vacant; you want the item. In mechamah letzel, you want the item. What do you care whether the place is vacant? Here you need the place vacant. The Arabs—or the non-Jews—will come by, see a menorah, and kill you. You need the place empty. That is clear. In mechamah letzel, the place has no bearing on it. You need the menorah safe in your house. That is a big difference.

So I am saying this is a nice way to understand the Gemara, because otherwise you always have to ask: “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon?” Rabbi Shimon is not a credit card that permits muktzeh. There are rules. He comes along and says: “Ve'atah techezeh, de'im nefaresh kedivrei ha-Pri Megadim veha-Mishnah Berurah, she-hitiru tiltul ha-menorah gam mipnei hefsed mamon, dehaynu mipnei hefsed ha-menorah, shetiganev”—if we explain the Pri Megadim and Mishnah Berurah to mean that they permitted moving the menorah because of financial loss, meaning fear that the menorah itself will be stolen—

Now we have a problem. You are saying that we permit moving a keli shemelachto le'isur mechamah letzel, but there is no Rabbi Shimon to rely on in a pressing situation. Maran later prohibited it, and those who permit it do so only when there is panic, as the Magen Avraham said. So why did the Mishnah Berurah add “vehu hadin, hefsed mamon” in this one line? It is a very strong question.

He answers: “Vehashenir'eh, muchrach mikol zeh detrey inyaney hefsed mamon ninhu.” It is necessary to conclude from all this that there are two kinds of monetary loss. “Dema shekatav ha-Mishnah Berurah kan lehatir tiltul muktzeh mishum hefsed mamon, haynu beyareh min ha-nochri sheyafsidenu mamon harbeh.” What the Mishnah Berurah wrote here to permit moving muktzeh because of monetary loss means that he fears the non-Jew will cause him a great financial loss. The loss there is not the $1,000 menorah. The non-Jew is going to put a fine on you for $10,000 if he sees your menorah outside.

The chiddush of the Mishnah Berurah is that the monetary loss is part of the fear: “O haka'ot, o sheyafsi... o hefsed mamon.” It is not the menorah itself. If they see a menorah outside that you lit, they're going to come the next day and repossess your piano. They're going to repossess your house! The text says, “Velo rak sheyafsid ha-menorah, ela dumya deyakenhu ha-nochri, sheyichnesenu mamon harbeh, o yitol kol asher lo,” or they may take everything he owns, “vehu karov legeder sakanah,” and it is close to a danger, since he is dealing with a non-Jew who is angry with him. Once you are dealing with a non-Jew who may come to your house after Shabbat or Chanukah and repossess your things, you are dealing with a non-Jew.

That is the monetary loss here. “Vedumya dechavreh”—there are two ways to understand the Chaveri. They may come and beat you up, in which case we clearly say, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav,” and we say it is letzorech mekomo: remove it because you need the place vacated. The Mishnah Berurah is saying that it is not only physical harm; they may also harm you financially. “She'ar hefsed” means other monetary losses, such as a fine. It is not only beatings; it is also other kinds of losses caused by the Chaveri.

“Ve'afilu lo yahargenu ha-nochri”—the non-Jew does not have to kill him. If it were a situation where they were going to kill him, as Joe said at the beginning, you would move the menorah while it was lit; you would not have to wait for it to go out. “Ela yuchrach lenatzlo bemamon.” Nevertheless, it is a situation that can be included in the language of the Gemara, “sha'at hasakanah” (a time of danger). Fine.

“Vehashta nicha hakol.” Now everything makes sense. It is a nice explanation of the Mishnah Berurah. When you read it, you have to figure out how to understand that wording. The monetary loss seems to come out of nowhere. In fact, it is the opposite of what we usually permit: they do not ordinarily allow that.

He says, “Vehashta nicha hakol, dele'olam hefsed hamuktzeh atzmo, gam keshehu hefsed merubah, ein od ta'am klal lehatir letaltelo.” The loss of the muktzeh item itself, even when it is a large loss, gives no reason to permit moving it. There is no heter. That is muktzeh machmat chesron kis. “Vezeh ikar mah she'asru: kli shemelachto le'isur mechamat chesron kis.” That is the famous rule. “Vedavka hefsed sheyesh bo gam pachad vesakanah mesuyemet min hanochri”—it is specifically a loss that also involves fear and a certain danger from the non-Jew. When a non-Jew is involved, that is the Gemara’s permission here. Whatever the danger means—fear of being struck, fear that he will enter your home and take your things, or fear that he will see the menorah where it is, contrary to his laws—that is specifically when they permitted it, because in that situation moving the muktzeh is considered moving it for its place. It goes back to letzorech mekomo. And in a pressing situation, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.” That fits the criteria. It is a beautiful resolution.

Now, Rabbi, did we not see Chacham Ovadia say that candlesticks are a keli shemelachto leheiter? That is a basis—no, did he say it was a keli shemelachto leheiter because it is just holding something, not being used for something? We saw that reasoning. According to the Mishnah Berurah, this is a keli shemelachto le'isur, but according to Chacham Ovadia, perhaps the question does not even begin. That might have been about decorative ones. Yes, the silver ones that you leave there as decoration, not the ones you use every week. You can call those a keli shemelachto leheiter because they are decorative. But the ones you use—no, that was the chiddush: he called them muktzeh because of financial loss, since you do not use them. No, it is different, like a vase. So it is like a vase, a keli shemelachto leheiter. What does keli shemelachto leheiter mean? You cannot have muktzeh because of financial loss with it. But this is a menorah you use. You could say that, but if you had the same cheap one—why cheap? Because you want to call it muktzeh because of financial loss. He calls it a keli shemelachto le'isur, a vessel because you use it.

That is the first chiddush. The second chiddush I want to tell you today is—are we rushing, or can I give one more? Is anybody doing anything today? That is already two lines of reasoning. Is this Tircha detzibura (burdening the congregation)? No, it is not. Let’s see how you answer Chacham Ovadia’s interesting question in Chazon Ovadia.

A man rented a hall for Shabbat. On Friday, the workers setting up the hall took a muktzeh item that was on the floor and, not knowing where else to put it, placed it on one of the chairs just before Shabbat. Leave it there; put it on the chair. At twilight the muktzeh was on that chair. So far, so good? That Shabbat, another non-Jew came and moved the muktzeh somewhere else. The chair then got mixed up among a thousand chairs. It had been a basis. Does that chair now become muktzeh? If it does, I cannot sit on it, because I cannot move the chair. Does it become nullified among the thousand chairs? What is the nullification of a basis? Is it nullified in sixty, in a hundred, in two hundred? “Batel berov”—nullified in a majority. Batel berov. That is a general principle. I have heard that there is nullification in sixty, in a hundred, and that after the fact it is nullified in a thousand, while even in a thousand it may not be nullified. Are you giving me a new rule, that a basis is nullified in a majority?

Can you clarify the case? Whose chair is it? That is part of the question. It belongs to the hall. Who put the basis there? The owner, the non-Jew, told the workers to set up the chairs and they put it there. Everything was done al da'at (with the intention of) the hall’s owner. So the owner made it a basis, and the owner of the chairs made it a basis? The owner of the hall and the owner of the chairs, yes. And he is a non-Jew? Can a non-Jew make a basis? That is another question. He was acting with the intention of the Jew. Fine, we said it was with that intention.

One way out is to say that since you rented the place, the chair is yours, and someone else cannot prohibit something that belongs to you. If sechirut (rental) makes you the owner, then nobody can prohibit your item. I like that; that is a good heter. Chacham Ovadia brings it at the end: “Ve'od yesh lomar she'im sacharta makom ein adam yachol le'esor davar she... she'eino shelo.” It can also be said that if you rented a place, no one can prohibit something that is not his.

But let’s assume it was not a rental. Suppose you went to someone’s house for lunch and he says, “I do not know if we can sit on any of these chairs. There was a basis before Shabbat, and all these dining-room chairs look the same. We do not know which chair it was, so we will stand.” Are you going to stand? He says, “I definitely made a basis. I wanted to leave the item there; I did not know I would have company. Now we have company, but it turned out they took the item off before Shabbat.”

Rabbotai, here is the problem. We have a general rule. What is the law, boys? Answer based on other cases. You have an egg that was laid on Yom Tov (festival), “beitzah shenoladah beYom Tov” (an egg laid on Yom Tov). It is forbidden because it is nolad (newly created). Beautiful. Now the egg gets mixed up with 10,000 eggs. Chazak u'varuch. Why did you not say that from the beginning? That is called davar sheyesh lo matirim (an item that will become permitted): wait until after Yom Tov, at least until the next day, and then it will be permitted.

When do we say bitul (nullification)? If milk falls into meat, I can wait until Mashiach (Messiah), and it will still be forbidden. So then it is subject to bitul. But if the prohibition is only a matter of time, and after a certain amount of time it expires, wait it out. The Gemara says, why eat it while it is forbidden when you can eat it while it is permitted? Why rely on bitul? Wait until it becomes permitted.

That is the problem with the chairs. Maybe one chair was mixed in with a thousand chairs. Wait until after Shabbat, and that chair becomes permitted. But the eggs are also a loss. I want to eat the eggs now. Yom Tov will be over, and I want to eat the eggs then—but I want to eat them today. I have 10,000 people at my house now, Rabbotai. No eggs today; come tomorrow. Why are you coming over tomorrow? Tomorrow they're going back to—No, Rabbi, after Shabbat the chairs will no longer be mine; they belong to the non-Jew again. They are in the house? Yes, they are in the house. I gave the rental case to address the rental issue. Now we are back to the case of an ordinary person’s house, where there are other chairs.

Maybe you tell the person that it is like the eggs. Why is it not like the eggs? I need the eggs now too. You are right that I need a chair now. If all I had for lunch was eggs, I would need the eggs too. “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.” Can we not use the chair? What does Rabbi Shimon hold? That there is no basis? No, nolad is a different issue. The egg is one thing, but the chair is a basis. “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav besha'at hadechak”—what does that mean? Does the chair become a keli shemelachto leheiter? What do you call the chair? A keli shemelachto leheiter? Yes, it is a keli shemelachto leheiter. It takes on the status of whatever was on it. Wait: once the muktzeh comes off, what is the status of the chair? If it was a basis—but it is no longer a basis. Right.

The problem is that, to answer your question, the only case we saw was “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismoch alav” in a danger involving non-Jews. We did not see that permission in a pressing situation or in a safek (doubt). Again, think about how far we took “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon.” We applied it to non-Jews who might beat you up, or non-Jewish police whom you fear. The Mishnah Berurah’s chiddush was that they might fine you. It is still an issue involving non-Jews. Here, it is about the gas. It is a pressing situation, but not the specific pressing situation in the Gemara, which is clearly about the Chaveri, the Zoroastrians, if that is what we call them. This is a pressing situation, but not the Gemara’s particular case. They did not give you carte blanche to say, “Ah, Rabbi Shimon!”

And by the way, slow down. I am not sure Rabbi Shimon does not agree that this is a basis. Rabbi Shimon holds of basis. He does not hold that a menorah is a basis because it is going to go out. But that is not this case. Here the muktzeh is on a chair. Where is it going? Rabbi Shimon agrees with the principle of basis. He is lenient in one particular case: a menorah that you know will go out does not become a basis. But when muktzeh is sitting on a chair, even Rabbi Shimon may hold that it does. So you cannot use that route, “Kedei hu.”

Chacham Ovadia brings an amazing reasoning from Noda BiYehudah, Rabbi Yechezkel Landau, the Gaon from Prague, in his sefer Tzelach, Tziyun L'Nefesh Chayah. That is what it stands for? Tziyun L'Nefesh Chayah. He says an amazing chiddush. The reasoning of davar sheyesh lo matirim, which is a chumra (stringency), applies only to food. Why? Because food is a one-time item. It is consumed. The Gemara’s language is: instead of eating it while forbidden, wait and eat it while permitted. You can eat the item only once. So instead of relying on bitul, wait and eat it later; you only get one use.

But a chair can be used a hundred times. If you tell me to wait until later, I lose all the uses of that chair until the end of Shabbat. The reasoning that says, “Instead of using it while forbidden, wait and use it while permitted,” does not work the same way. You will eat an egg only once, whether now or later. “Mah nafshach” (whichever way you look at it), you cannot eat it more than once. Wait it out: davar sheyesh lo matirim. But a chair does not have only one use. So with an item that has many uses, we do not say davar sheyesh lo matirim. We can say batel berov; at the Torah level it is nullified in a majority, and we can be lenient here and not worry about the basis. The reasoning of davar sheyesh lo matirim applies specifically to food.

Does everyone agree? The Noda BiYehudah agrees. There are those who argue, you are right, but muktzeh is derabbanan (rabbinic). “Kedei hu haNoda BiYehudah bemuktzeh derabbanan, basis derabbanan; kedei hu haNoda BiYehudah lismoch alav besha'at hadechak.” We can rely on the Noda BiYehudah for rabbinic muktzeh, a rabbinic basis, in a pressing situation.

We can use that permission in another case that happens all the time: one of the knives that you did not immerse in the mikveh (ritual bath) gets mixed up with all the other knives. It happens. You put the knife aside because it has to be immersed, and suddenly it gets mixed up. Where is it? The maid put it back in the drawer; they are all the same knives. The Shulchan Aruch discusses that. What did he say? I forget. I think it is batel berov.

If he discusses it, I would expect it in Yoreh De'ah, not Choshen Mishpat. We know that trick. Saying Yoreh De'ah does not prove you are a great talmid chacham. If you gave me the section number, I might be impressed, but Yoreh De'ah does not impress me; that is automatic. It will be in Yoreh De'ah, Hilchot Tevilat Kelim (laws of immersing utensils). It is not only Yoreh De'ah—chazak u'varuch. That is a tactic wise guys use to show they know something. The people who really know are not impressed. The others are impressed: “How did he know? Yoreh De'ah!” Where is it going to be, Choshen Mishpat, Hilchot Tevilat Kelim? What are you telling me? Take a shot; you could also say the section. Among those who know, among those who know.

Anyway, the same issue will come up there: davar sheyesh lo matirim. What is the davar sheyesh lo matirim? Go take all the knives and immerse them. I can fix this. I cannot fix a pot that milk fell into by extracting the milk; the only way to permit it is bitul. Here I have a way out: take all 50 knives and immerse them. It is not bitul. Why rely on bitul?

There is another set of issues. First, there is no bitul except with food. Second, I have to do a ma'aseh (action). When do we say davar sheyesh lo matirim? Maybe when you can simply wait it out. Wait it out. But here you are telling me I have to take it to the mikveh. Maybe that stringency does not apply in such a case, especially when there is a loss now. I have to go and get water. So they are lenient in that case too, and one of the snifim (additional grounds) for leniency is the Noda BiYehudah.

Again, your starting point is that this applies only to food. A knife can be used. “No, wait until you immerse it”—but I could use it 52 times. And, as Benny said, maybe davar sheyesh lo matirim means something that becomes permitted on its own. Wait until after Yom Tov and the eggs become permitted. By contrast, I can wait until Mashiach comes, but until somebody immerses the knives in a mikveh, they will not become permitted.

That is another way to answer. But after Shabbat, you have to immerse them? Why? What does Shabbat have to do with it? On Tuesday—also bishul akum (food cooked by a non-Jew)—I have 50 knives and one was not immersed. It got mixed up. Use it now and immerse it later. Why do I have to immerse it now? If it is prohibited, are they going to use it on Shabbat? Why do I have to immerse it? It is permitted; you can fix it. What is the prohibition against fixing this? It is nullified. What happened to bitul? Now you want to eat, so he is bringing it back to davar sheyesh lo matirim.

And basar bechalav (meat and milk)—you eat it, then throw the rest out? I asked a simple question. With basar bechalav, I said bitul beshishim; eat it once and you are done. Throw the rest out? You eat it once; a knife can be used many times. Bitul gives you a heter. I am trying to tell you that there is no davar sheyesh lo matirim in this case. Right. Davar sheyesh lo matirim applies when it will become permitted on its own, not when you have to do an action. Here you have to take it to a mikveh. You are not waiting for Yom Tov or Shabbat to end. So perhaps in that case you can rely on bitul. The egg case is not a loss; here there is a loss. The egg case involves food; this does not. There are many reasons to be more lenient in the knife case than in the egg case.

The question is whether the knife issue is lechatchilah. Why, if a non-Jew uses a pot, do you not have to—Listen. Are you talking about any prohibition? Any prohibition. It is a common case. The maid made—Everything is common, Dave. Once it is nullified, it is—It is still, I know he did not—So I do not know how to open it. You can put the knife in there. Whatever. What would you do in general bedi'avad? bedi'avad? Save it as a—I see Joe's, I don't know why. There's his coat. If I take off my coat, I lose all that Apple Wallet stuff. Oh yeah? Okay. Not that I use Apple. I happened to remember your coat, like I'm not—I'm not usually that good at remembering your coats like that, but—

Well, if it—It has to be very bad because after 84 is the repetition, right? That that the star in that needs high school. They're not—So it's gotta be good. It's gotta be good. All right, people. Hi, guys. No, so that I can do it my own way. So that's 10:15. 10:15 already? Wow, yesterday I went up till I had like a great sleep. I woke up in the morning like dripping in sweat. And the wind went down. I think the wind went down, which is good. All right, should be well for should be very, very fine. God bless you. I'm going to turn it on. Good head on him. Good head on him. God bless you. I'm so happy. Yesterday, I was even in a little had burn off in three days, and then I—I understand, I understand how you're weighing yourself every day, you feel like you got to. Honestly? No, you have to. It reminds you every day. Correct. You don't fuck with it so you could see. Very proud of you. Relax. Yeah, almost there, halfway. Okay, good. Halfway there, three weeks, four weeks, whatever it is. Five weeks. No, it's not five weeks. February. February 5th, I started. February 5th to what do you call it? To 28 days, right, till March 5th, and then you have to—You have a week. Yeah, you're right, five weeks then. Right? There you go. You feel any better? I'm bored of what I'm eating. Right, right, right, right. Okay. Step to the plate, Sam, you're a big boy. Not as big as you were, but you're a big...