I’m trying to remember what halachah (Jewish law) negi'ah bemuktzeh (touching muktzeh) is. We held that touching is mutar (permitted), while tiltul (moving) is asur (forbidden). So the question was negi'ah letzorech davar hamuktzeh (touching for the sake of the muktzeh).
The case was that Maran (the Master) writes that if something falls into a keli (vessel) on Shabbat, it is mevatel keli meheichano—rendering a vessel unusable for its intended purpose. A muktzeh item falls into a vessel, and it is mevatel keli meheichano. However, he says you can take that vessel and cover the muktzeh. But when you cover it, make sure you don’t touch it.
So the Mishnah Berurah said that this is talking about an egg, because when you touch the egg with the vessel, you are going to move it. But if it is another type of muktzeh that does not move, it should be permitted. That is how Rav HaMaggid (the Maggid) understood the Rambam (Maimonides), as well. Terumat haDeshen (The Ashes of the Altar) had a different way of understanding it. He held, no: touching muktzeh is permitted, but if you touch it for the sake of the muktzeh, it is forbidden. Now, when you cover it, why are you covering it? For the sake of the muktzeh. So covering it is already a problem, because you touch it with the covering.
And therefore, nu, chiddush (novel idea). That is how it came out in Menuchat Ahavah (Rest of Love): touching it for its sake—and they brought a proof from Maran. When Maran discussed covering the muktzeh, he said, “uvilvad shelo yiga bo” (provided that he does not touch it). He didn’t say it was an egg. It sounds like he was talking about any muktzeh. So that was the proof we brought last night.
Chacham Ovadiah (Rabbi Ovadia Yosef), alav hashalom (may he rest in peace), came along in his Chazon Ovadiah (Vision of Ovadiah) and said a novel idea. He said, no, you can touch muktzeh no matter what: “Kol davar shehu muktzeh mutar lingoa bo, negi'ah bilvad. Ve'eino asur ela behazazato” (Anything that is muktzeh may be touched; only moving it is forbidden). Only moving it. But, “moda'ah zot, nireh od zot rabbotai, she'isur muktzeh noheg lo rak behagba'at vetiltul hamuktzeh kulo, ela gam behagba'ah vetiltul miktzato” (notice also, my rabbis, that the prohibition of muktzeh applies not only to lifting and moving the whole item, but also to lifting and moving part of it).
Okay, not only if you lifted the whole thing, but even if you picked up part of it: moving part of it. “Ela gam bene'anu'o vehazazato shel hamuktzeh kemosheshaninu beShabbat” (but also moving and shifting the muktzeh, as we learned in Shabbat). “Osim kol tzorchei hamet, sachin, medichin oto, uvilvad shelo yaziz bo ever” (they attend to all the needs of the deceased person, anoint him, wash him, provided they do not move a limb). Now, “maziz bo ever”—you know, you didn’t move the whole met (deceased person); you’re just moving a part. Moving part of the muktzeh is also forbidden. That is the first kelal (principle).
“Vechatav haRamban (Nahmanides)” (and the Ramban wrote)—from that case of the deceased—“shema minah shetiltul muktzeh shemei tiltul” (we learn from this that moving muktzeh is considered moving). “Shelo tomar she'eino asur ela ad sheyagbihenu” (you should not say it is forbidden only once he lifts it), or “ad sheyigror et kulo” (until he drags the whole thing). “Ela keivan shemaziz chelek min davar she'eino nital, asur” (rather, once he moves part of something that may not be moved, it is forbidden). And so wrote haRan (the Ran).
Beautiful. “Aval lingoa bo mutar” (but it is permitted to touch it). And so it was written in Shut Maharam (Responsa of Maharam): it is permitted to touch the amud (pillar) in front of the aron kodesh (Holy Ark) that the candles are on, provided you don’t move it. As long as you don’t move the chandelier, touching it—leaning against it—is okay. It seems the pillar had nerot (candles) on it, so you’re leaning against the pillar. As long as you don’t move the nerot, it’s okay; it’s negi'ah. Same thing: you can lean on a car that doesn’t have an alarm, let’s say, or sit on the car. Why? The car moves a little? That doesn’t—you didn’t move any part of it. “She'afilu hamuktzeh atzmo eino asur liga ki im betiltul” (even the muktzeh item itself is forbidden only when moved).
Okay, that’s beautiful, beautiful, beautiful. So that’s that. Now we get to the point of Chacham zeh. Ah, over here, rabbis: “VehaRambam katav, ein notnin keli tachat hatarnegolet lekabel beitzatah” (the Rambam wrote: one may not place a vessel beneath a hen to catch its egg). Why? Because “shezeh mevatel keli meheichano” (this renders a vessel unusable for its intended purpose). “Aval kofeh hu et hakeli aleha” (but he may turn the vessel over upon it)—you can cover it. “Vechen kofeh hakeli al kol davar she'asur letaltelo” (and likewise, he may cover any item that is forbidden to move).
What’s the novel idea in that, by the way? Even though you’re using this vessel for the sake of muktzeh, it’s okay. Since the vessel is permitted, even though my purpose in using it is for the sake of muktzeh, it is okay to move it for that purpose. “Sheharei lo bitlo, she'im yachpotz yitlenu” (for he has not rendered it unusable; if he wishes, he can remove it). And by the way, I didn’t render it unusable, because it’s on top. If I want to take it off, I can take it off. If you put it underneath, you render the vessel unusable for its intended purpose. I put it on top; I didn’t render it unusable. Take it off.
“Vechatav al zeh haRa'avad (Rabbi Abraham ben David), uvilvad shelo yiga babeitzah, ad kan leshono” (the Ra’avad wrote about this: provided that he does not touch the egg; thus far his words). Beautiful. The Ra'avad comes in with this: “uvilvad shelo yiga babeitzah.” “Vezeh leshon haRav haMaggid al da'at haRa'avad” (and this is the wording of Rav HaMaggid according to the Ra’avad). We saw that in Rav HaMaggid: “Velo yadati ta'am lazeh” (I do not know the reason for this). What’s the problem? “Vechi hamuktzeh min hanolad asur liga bahem” (is it forbidden to touch muktzeh that is newly created)? That was the Maggid’s question: why should it be forbidden to touch the egg? “Havu delo nosif, shema yena'anea habeitzah al yedei keli” (let us not add to the prohibition, lest he move the egg with the vessel).
“Vera'iti lehaRadbaz (Rabbi David ibn Zimra) shechatav al zeh, va'ani omer yafeh dikdek haRa'avad al pi haYerushalmi (Jerusalem Talmud), vehi shekol davar agol, bish'ah she'adam nogea bo, benekel hu mitnone'a” (I saw that the Radbaz wrote about this. I say that the Ra’avad reasoned well based on the Jerusalem Talmud: any round object moves easily when a person touches it). Beautiful. According to these shitot (opinions), it’s only an egg. Why? Because davar agol (a round object) rolls. “Lefi shehadavar agol, nekudah hi moshavo” (because a round object rests on a point). It sits on a point. Once you touch it, you move it.
“Uvenegi'ah kalah hu nad kol shehu, vecheivan shehabeitzah agulah hi, hadavar nir'eh la'ayin shebenegi'ah bilvad hi mitnona'at” (with a light touch, it moves a little; since the egg is round, it is apparent that it moves from the touch alone). And it says there, “katav Rabenu Ovadyah miBartenura” (our teacher Ovadiah of Bartenura wrote). Maran Beit Yosef (House of Joseph) wrote: “umah shekatav Rabenu de'asur liga bah nir'eh delav davka, she'ein davar muktzeh asur benegi'ah” (what our teacher wrote, that it is forbidden to touch it, appears not to be exact, for no muktzeh item is forbidden to touch). That is what the Beit Yosef wrote.
He’s saying, “I wrote in siman shin chet, beshem haMordechai (the Mordechai), ulefi mah shekatavti besiman shin yud, beshem haRav haMaggid, sha'ani sha'ani beitzah shehi davar hamitgalgel, chayshinan shema yena'anena” (I wrote in the name of the Mordechai, and according to what I wrote in siman shin yud in the name of Rav HaMaggid, an egg is different, since it is something that rolls, and we are concerned lest he move it).
Okay, who’s the other side, rabbis? Terumat haDeshen. Very good. “Vilefi mah shekatavti sham beshem Terumat haDeshen”—that’s the Beit Yosef speaking—“ein heiter liga beshum muktzeh ela im ken hahanachah shemani'ach alav vehatashmish shemishtamesh bo eino ela letzorech davar she'eino muktzeh, ad kan” (it is not permitted to touch any muktzeh unless the placement upon it and the use made of it are only for the sake of something that is not muktzeh). Now, if it is for the sake of the muktzeh, even if you aren’t moving it and are only touching it, it is forbidden. So the Beit Yosef brings down both opinions, Rav HaMaggid and Terumat haDeshen.
“UMaran beShulchan Aruch pasak shemedadin kol behemah (domesticated animal) chayah (wild animal) va'of (bird) bachatzer (courtyard)” (Maran ruled that one may lead any domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird in the courtyard). Remember, we said you can push the animal in the courtyard? “She'ochez betzavaram” (holding it by the neck)—you hold its neck and help it walk, if needed, because of tza'ar ba'alei chayim (the suffering of animals). Because of animal suffering, we allowed moving part of it. Remember, that was the principle we established there. If the animal is in pain, we allow you to hold it by the neck and move it like that.
“Vechatav od sham, davar shehu muktzeh mutar liga bo, uvilvad shelo yena'anea afilu et miktzato” (he further wrote there: it is permitted to touch an item that is muktzeh, provided that one does not move even part of it). “Davar shehu muktzeh, mutar lena'anea”—but you can’t move part of it. And the permission we just gave for the animal is because of animal suffering. By the way, I saw poskim (halachic authorities) discuss the animal’s hair, so we’ll bring that up when we need to.
I was looking for the—remember we discussed petting, moving? Okay, we’ll see that be'ezrat Hashem (with God's help), when we get to the review. “Umashma she'afilu negi'ah bemuktzeh atzmo, afilu shelo letzorech davar hamutar, muteret” (it implies that even touching the muktzeh itself, even when not for the sake of a permitted item, is permitted). That’s right. Here it says, “davar shehu muktzeh mutar liga bo, uvilvad shelo yena'anea afilu miktzato.” As long as you don’t move part of it. Now Maran doesn’t stipulate whether it is for the sake of something forbidden or not. It is permitted. “Mutar liga bo.” Period.
“Vechen nir'eh da'at haRema (Rabbi Moses Isserles), shekatav, kol muktzeh eino asur beShabbat ela betiltul, aval benegi'ah be'alma, she'eino mitnadned, mutar” (it likewise appears to be the opinion of the Rema, who wrote that muktzeh is forbidden on Shabbat only when moved, but mere touching, if it does not move, is permitted). So from these statements, it sounds like Maran permits touching.
However, “hineh emet sheMaran beShulchan Aruch siman shin yud se'if vav”—our halachah: “kol davar she'asur letaltelo mutar lichpot alav keli, uvilvad shelo yiga bo” (anything that is forbidden to move may be covered with a vessel, provided that the vessel does not touch it). “Vechatav Magen Avraham (Shield of Abraham), ve'af al gav demuktzeh mutar benegi'ah, kemo shekatav bemakom acher beShulchan Aruch, hainu keshehanegi'ah letzorech davar hamutar, kegon sheheni'ach chefetz al muktzeh verotzeh letolo, mah she'ein ken hacha shehanegi'ah letzorech hamuktzeh” (the Magen Avraham wrote: although touching muktzeh is permitted, as written elsewhere in the Shulchan Aruch, that is when the touching is for the sake of something permitted, such as when he placed an object on muktzeh and wants to take it; not so here, where the touching is for the sake of the muktzeh). Like Terumat haDeshen.
Oh, so that’s the whole problem the group has to deal with in shin yud. The halachah is that in shin yud, Maran writes that you’re not allowed to touch the muktzeh. “Vehineh beVi'ur haGra (the Gra's commentary) katav, veshamat mida'ateih mah shekatav beShulchan Aruch siman shin yud alef se'if zayin” (and behold, in the Gra’s commentary he wrote that they overlooked what Maran wrote in Shulchan Aruch, siman shin yud alef, se’if zayin). The Gaon miVilna (the Vilna Gaon) says that anyone who thinks Maran meant here that you can’t touch muktzeh because it is for the sake of something forbidden has forgotten what Maran wrote in shin yud alef, which we’re going to get to now.
“Mutar lasuch et hamet” (it is permitted to anoint the deceased person). You’re allowed to put oil on the deceased person. “Velishmot hakar mitachtav” (and to pull the pillow out from beneath him), “uvilvad shelo yaziz bo ever” (provided that he does not move a limb). Now, there you are touching him. You’re not moving him, but you’re touching him for the sake of the muktzeh, and Maran says it is permitted. He doesn’t want to say, “ela letzorech met hitiru” (they permitted it only for the sake of the deceased person). I would have answered, “For the sake of the deceased person.” No: he says that’s because it follows the principle, “velo hekelu bemet ela letaltelo al yedei kikar o tinok” (they were lenient regarding the deceased person only to move him by means of bread or a child). The leniency regarding the deceased person is that if you want to move him, you can put a piece of bread on him and move him. Without the piece of bread, he is like everybody else, and we are allowing you to touch him. Ah, you’re touching him for the sake of something forbidden! So the Gaon miVilna learns from there that Maran must hold...
Now, where is that Rema, by the way? Is that the Gra? Do you have a Shulchan Aruch, the big ones? Bring the Shulchan Aruch. We’ll learn it inside; it’s nice to learn it inside. You’ll see it inside. Bring the big Shulchan Aruchs, rabbis. Not that one, the big ones, Beit Yosef. Open up, rabbis. Open the original version of Shulchan Aruch, shin yud alef—or shin yud, I should say. In the second section, right? This book has two sections? No, it doesn’t go that far, Rabbi. Oh, it doesn’t go—it stops there? Shin yud heh. Oh, so we actually need the next volume. Okay, we stopped at shin yud heh.
Anyway, the Gaon miVilna makes this point in his glosses when you look at the case of the deceased person. That’s fine; I just wanted everybody to see it inside, “vetihyu machkimot” (so that you will become wise). The Gaon miVilna makes this point. Okay? So he says, “vechen katav haMeiri (the Meiri), shemuttar lishev al gabei avanim beShabbat, she'ein zeh tiltul ela rak negi'ah, vechol muktzeh shene'esar betiltul mutar benegi'ah, she'ein hanegi'ah kelum” (the Meiri wrote that it is permitted to sit on stones on Shabbat; this is not moving but only touching, and anything forbidden to move may be touched, for touching is nothing), “ela shebidevarim she'efshar shehanegi'ah tavi lidei tiltul” (except in cases where touching may lead to moving), said the Meiri. But if touching will lead to moving, as with an egg, “ra'ui lehafrish” (it is fitting to separate oneself from it).
Ah, so clearly the Meiri only learned that touching is a problem with an egg or something like that. They allowed you to move a chicken partially, to hold it by the neck. Why? Specifically a chicken—but with any other animals, it’s permitted. That’s moving muktzeh. Right, you’re holding muktzeh. Here, clearly, you’re moving part of the muktzeh. So animal suffering makes them lenient. The Meiri says touching is permitted, touching is permitted, except with an egg!
“Ve'od ayein baMeiri shekatav, hadas bimchubar mutar lari'ach bo” (further see the Meiri, who wrote that it is permitted to smell a myrtle branch while it is attached). We learned that with an attached myrtle branch, you can smell it. “Yesh omrim shelo hutar ela keshelo benegi'at yad” (some say it was permitted only when not touching it with one’s hand). Some say you just smell it like that without touching it. “Veli nir'eh she'afilu benegi'ah hayah mutar, ve'eino asur ela bekeshechofef et anafav” (it seems to me that even touching it would be permitted; it is forbidden only when he bends its branches). The Bach (the Bach) also wrote that the main opinion is like Rav HaMaggid. Look what it says over here in Terumat haDeshen. So who’s this here? The Bach. The Bach clearly says Rav HaMaggid is the main opinion, not Terumat haDeshen.
“Vechen katav haRav Be'er HaGolah (Well of the Exile)” (and so wrote the Rav Be’er HaGolah), siman shin yud, letter yud. Open the Mishnah Berurahs, boys. Shin yud, our siman shin yud, Be’er HaGolah, yud. Ah, you see? Beautiful! You see Be’er HaGolah, yud? Open up, I have it over here, boys: shin yud, Be’er HaGolah, yud. “Af Tur, af al gav demutar liga bemuktzeh, hacha habeitzah ka'esh. Vechen hu biYerushalmi, uvilvad shelo yiga babeitzah. Uve'ur haRa'avad biteshuvot behasagot perek kaf-heh, halachah kaf-gimmel, vehaRosh beperek kama deVeitzah, ayein Beit Yosef mah shekatav bazeh, haRav haMaggid, veTerumat haDeshen chelek alef siman samech-zayin.”
So he learns that Maran is talking about an egg. That’s the point of the Be’er HaGolah. Again, there are two sides here. So far, the Mishnah Berurah learned that Maran means specifically an egg; the term is beitzah dafka. The Be’er HaGolah clearly sounds like he is learning that it means specifically an egg. The Gaon miVilna sounds like he is learning that it means specifically an egg. “Ve'od ayein lehaGaon Ya'avetz (the Ya'avetz), Mor uKetzi'ah (Mortar and Corner), shekatav gam ken she'ikar kedivrei haRav haMaggid vesheken da'at Maran” (further see the Gaon Ya’avetz, Mor uKetzi’ah, who also wrote that the main view is like Rav HaMaggid and that this is Maran’s opinion). Finish. “Ve'ein tzarich lidchot kmo sheratzu ha'acharonim lefaresh al pi shitat Terumat haDeshen” (and there is no need to force an explanation, as the later authorities wished to do, according to the view of Terumat haDeshen). What? They’re saying that, according to Maran, it’s a strained interpretation to explain it according to Terumat haDeshen.
“Vechach katav beShulchan Atzei Shitim (Table of Acacia Wood), ud'lo keTerumat haDeshen, kmo haMa'amar Mordechai (Discourse of Mordechai), demah shekatav Magen Avraham lefaresh divrei Maran al pi divrei Terumat haDeshen eino muchrach” (and so it was written in Shulchan Atzei Shitim, not like Terumat haDeshen; as the Ma’amar Mordechai says, the Magen Avraham’s explanation of Maran according to Terumat haDeshen is not necessary).
Now, Maran—this was Marcelo’s problem—in shin chet mem bet, says, “she'davar shehu muktzeh mutar liga bo, uvilvad shelo yena'anea afilu miktzato” (an item that is muktzeh may be touched, provided that one does not move even part of it). Finish. “Mutar liga bo.” Now he should have said, “It is permitted when it is not for the sake of the muktzeh, but for the sake of the muktzeh it is permitted.” Maran didn’t give any explanation. “Mutar liga bo,” period. “Umashma dehainu shemutar bechol inyan, afilu shelo letzorech davar hamutar” (it implies that it is permitted in every situation, even when not for the sake of a permitted item). And so it was written in Torat Shabbat (Teaching of Shabbat): what Maran wrote there, “uvilvad shelo yiga bo,” means that there is concern it might move when touched. Again, all of that is tied up with the deceased person. Then he brings a proof from the case of the deceased person. His main proof is from that case. “Vechen pasak haRav beMishnah Berurah kedivrei haGra” (and so the Rav ruled in the Mishnah Berurah, according to the Gra). Of course, the Mishnah Berurah clearly learned that Maran was talking about the egg. “Vechen pasak beDerech haChayim” (and so it was ruled in Derech haChayim (Path of Life)). The only one who learned the other way is the Magen Avraham.
So that’s it. I mean, rabbis, he brings in everybody. So what did Chacham Ovadiah say in practice? He says two against one, right? That’s it. And so it was written in Aruch HaShulchan. Ben Tzion—that’s Chacham Lichtman, and we’re printing that book, with God’s help. That’s a big thing. Chacham Ben Tzion Lichtman says, “she'elah shel negi'ah beyadayim bemuktzeh af letzorech muktzeh shari” (a question about touching muktzeh with one’s hands, even for the sake of the muktzeh, is permitted). All of that is in Olat Shabbat (Burnt Offering of Shabbat). So what do you want? All right, that’s what we’ll have to come out with. Petach haDvir (Entrance of the Word): “Rebbi omer...” So that’s the practical conclusion. In practice, he permits it. He permits it. Touching is permitted in every situation, except for a rolling object. Chacham Ovadiah made his point very, very, very, very clear.
Okay. Now we go, rabbis, to shin yud alef. By the way, we also learned in the other class that gerama (indirect causation) in bitul keli meheichano is permitted. A case of indirect causation would be, as we said, if you’re sitting at the table on Shabbat and you have bones on the plate that aren’t suitable as food for a behemah (domesticated animal), and you take the food off the plate. Now, how have you rendered the vessel unusable for its intended purpose? There is a dispute about whether indirect causation is permitted, but the way we concluded, according to the law, it is permitted.
Let’s say it’s not a geraf shel re'i (a vessel containing something repulsive); there’s one bone on the plate. There’s one bone, and it’s not a vessel containing something repulsive. So I took my food off, and now I’m left with a bone, right? I rendered the vessel unusable for its intended purpose through indirect causation. That would be permitted, although you don’t need to rely on it. But on Shabbat, I take my tallit, my prayer shawl, out of my kuracha, and now I’m left with the tefillin, the phylacteries, inside. Now I’ve rendered the vessel unusable for its intended purpose. Ah, very good. I said you didn’t need it. That’s why I said you didn’t need it. But that would be—if those who hold that tefillin are considered muktzeh machmat gufo (muktzeh by virtue of the item’s nature) are right, there would be no problem with rendering the vessel unusable by taking out the prayer shawl, because it’s indirect causation.
Anyway, tefillin are a keli shemelachto le'isur (a utensil whose primary use is forbidden), so I did not render the vessel unusable for its intended purpose. It had been movable going into Shabbat; it is still movable going into Shabbat. I could use the tefillin to teach; I could use it to—oh, could, could, could, could—or maybe not! Or maybe not! It could be not, according to what we learned: any kind of basis, supporting object, for shells that I can throw away right away, that don’t need the plate and aren’t there for the whole Shabbat—we were lenient with those types of items. A pistuk (pistachio), we concluded in practice, you can eat it and put it on the plate without putting anything underneath it, unlike the Ben Ish Chai (Son of a Living Man). The Ben Ish Chai says you have to put something on the plate first. Chacham Ovadiah and all the other rabbis said no: since the pistachio—you can lena'er (to shake off) right away, the plate doesn’t need it. It’s not there like oil that you can wipe away right away; it isn’t there for the whole Shabbat. Clearly, they don’t want it there for the whole Shabbat. So we gave a law for that, whatever the relevant laws are.
Okay, rabbis, shin yud alef. Open up the Aruch HaShulchan. I said, rabbis, we’re going through these two sections and then doing a comprehensive review of products, of items. “Hamet af al pi shehu hamuktzeh hayoter gadol” (the deceased person, although he is the most severe muktzeh). Okay. A deceased person is like a rock. He has no function. “Mikol makom hekelu vo chachamim kulot harbeh betiltulo” (nevertheless, the Sages were lenient in many ways regarding moving him). Okay, these are laws for the community; they have to know them. These laws, for sure—but that happens, bar minan (may it not happen to us), on Shabbat, and we have to know how to deal with a met (deceased person).
“Hen mita'am muktzeh hen mita'am masa kmo shekatvu raboteinu zichronam livrachah” (both because of muktzeh and because of carrying, as our Sages of blessed memory wrote). We’re going to have leniencies regarding moving him, and leniencies regarding hotza'ah (carrying), carrying him from place to place, as in a karmelit (an area of intermediate public-domain status).
“Veyeshibazeh shenit.” Why were they lenient? Why were they lenient? “Echad hu mishum kevod habriyot” (one reason is human dignity). Certainly. “Shelo yitbazei al hachayim” (so that the living are not disgraced). We don’t want the deceased person to become disgraced. Be'inyan not to be mevazeh the met. “Vehachayim lo yitbazu vo” (and the living should not be disgraced by it). Both ways: we don’t want the deceased person to be disgraced, or the people to be disgraced because the deceased person is there.
“Vehashenit dekima lan derabbanan demitoch she'adam bahul al meto yoter me'al mamono” (and the second reason is that the Sages established that a person is more distraught over his deceased than over his money). May His name be praised! Fortunate is the people of Israel. “Adam bahul al meto yoter al mamono” (a person is more distraught over his deceased than over his money). Therefore, they’re going to do things. “I lo niftach lo eizeh petach beheter, ya'aseh be'issur” (if we do not open some permitted avenue for him, he will act in a forbidden manner). Wow. So they had to be lenient regarding a deceased person because they know people are going to do it anyway. The man is bahul (panicked). So they have to give him some ways to do it.
“Ve'ikar hata'am hu mishum kevod habriyot, de'ilu mita'am behilot lo shayach lehatir ela bimkom sheyachol lavo lidei issur hayoter gadol mimah shenatir lo” (the primary reason is human dignity, since panic would justify leniency only where he might otherwise commit a greater prohibition than the one we permit). Right? If the whole reason is behalah (panic)—the second reason—then it should only be permitted when there’s a bigger prohibition: we’ll let him do the smaller prohibition, because if we don’t let him do the smaller one, he might commit the bigger one. That’s the logic of a panicked person. The man is going to do something major, so we let him do something minor.
“Vezeh eino ela bedleikah” (this applies only in a fire). “De'i lo sharit leh, ati lechabuyei” (if you do not permit it to him, he will come to extinguish the fire). But in other cases, such as when the deceased person is lying in disgrace or lying in the sun, this reason does not apply. “Demah yachol la'asot yoter mitiltul hamet?” (what more can he do than move the deceased person?) What else could you do besides move him? He’s in the sun; they let you carry him inside. That’s only because of disgrace. What else could you do? The only thing is to carry him inside. There’s no bigger prohibition and smaller prohibition; there’s one option here: carry him inside. So clearly, the overriding reason has to be the disgrace of the deceased person.
“Uvazeh avid hatam mishum dekavod, vekayma lan gadol kevod habriyot shedocheh issur derabbanan” (in this case they acted because of dignity, and we hold that human dignity overrides a rabbinic prohibition). That’s the kelal (principle), okay? Kevod habriyot (human dignity) pushes away a derabbanan (rabbinic prohibition). “Sheharei gam bishvil kinu'ach hitiru” (for they also permitted it for wiping), as we wrote in siman shin yud bet. We’ll learn shin yud bet, regarding someone who’s dirty and has to go to the bathroom; they’ll let him take rocks. Rocks are muktzeh? Human dignity.
“Vezehu kelal hadevarim” (and this is the general principle). That’s the principle. “Vegam kelal gadol yesh bazeh, de'im biycholet la'asot beheter, lo natir la'asot be'issur” (there is also a major principle here: if it is possible to act permissibly, we do not permit acting in a forbidden manner). All right, another principle: don’t think that just because we have a deceased person here, it’s carte blanche. Whatever you can do permissibly, you have to do permissibly. If you can’t do it permissibly, then we would let him do it in a forbidden manner.
Okay, Benny, you’re up. “Velachen...” You came late; I would have had you—Okay, I figured that out. Dignity, let—
“Velachen met shemutal bemakom sheyareh alav mipnei hadeleikah.” A fire. Ah, so, may it not happen to us, there’s a fire, and the deceased person is there, God forbid, where the fire might reach. You have to get him out. So what do you do? “Im yesh kikar o tinok, metalteilo al yedei shemani'ach alav hakikar o hatinok umetalteilo” (if there is bread or a child, he moves him by placing the bread or child upon him and moving him). Permission number one: take a piece of bread, put it on the deceased person, and now you have—he’s a base for a permitted item, and carry—put the kid—Okay, so let him burn to death, then. Huh? Then let him burn to death. What do you mean? Let him get cremated. Yeah, let him get cremated. They’re not going to—Again, this is talking about what you could do. So fire is sakanah (danger). That’s so. Again, if you’re talking about an inferno, forget about the bread, forget about anything. It could become an inferno. When it starts, come back. Okay, we’re talking here about a little fire in the kitchen, and the deceased person is over there on the floor.
“Vezeh yoter kal mipnei she'eino metalteil hamet levado” (this is more lenient, because he is not moving the deceased person by himself). Why are you jumping to danger? There’s no danger here. Bottom line, there’s a deceased person here, and there’s a—yes, there’s a fire. It doesn’t say danger. “Sheyareh alav.” Okay, you don’t want to use this permission; you don’t have to. You don’t want to move the deceased person without doing anything. Fine. You don’t want to use this permission. You want a bigger permission. If you don’t want to use this permission, don’t use it.
“Ve'im ein lo kikar vetinok vehamet mutal bemitah, veyesh lo od mitah, metalteilo...” If the deceased person was on a bed, and he has another bed, he moves him by turning him from one bed to another. “Ad sheyevi'enu bamakom betoch mipnei hadeleikah” (until he brings him to a place inside, away from the fire). Now, what are you doing here? How are you moving him? You’re not touching him directly, so it’s a little better. I’m moving him by means of the stretcher. Ultimately, you’re moving the deceased person; there’s no bread there. “Aval mikol makom ein zeh tiltul lehedya, ela tiltul min hatzad, ve'ein na'aseit hamitah basis” (nevertheless, this is not direct moving, but moving from the side, and the bed does not become a base).
Good. Now, let’s say the deceased person was put on the other stretcher at twilight, so now the stretcher becomes a base. If the deceased person was there at twilight, the stretcher is forbidden to move, even if the deceased person is no longer there. Once it becomes a base at twilight, the stretcher is muktzeh for the whole Shabbat. “Migu de'itkatzai levein hashemashot, itkatzai lechulei yoma” (since it was set aside at twilight, it remains set aside for the entire day). “Ve'im lo hayah bah bein hashemashot”—but let’s say the deceased person wasn’t there at twilight—“muteret achar kach betiltul” (it is permitted to move it afterward), so you can go ahead and do that.
“Veyesh omrim dele'olam lo na'aseit hamitah basis lamet” (and some say the bed never becomes a base for the deceased person). Why doesn’t it become a base? “De'ein hamitah tzrichah lamet, vechol atzmo shel met hu lehatilo ad hakarka” (because the bed is not needed by the deceased person, and the deceased person’s place is on the ground). Oh, the ground—which means, normally, what is a base? You put something on it because it has to be there. A deceased person shouldn’t be on the bed; he should be on the floor, because it’s cooler. So some say that doesn’t make it a base. When I put something on a base, I want it to be on that item. When I put the candlesticks on this item, I want them to be there. I want—I put down a base because I want to catch the egg in it. I want it to be there. Here, I don’t want the deceased person on the bed. On the contrary, the bed isn’t good for him, so it doesn’t make it a base. It’s better—if there’s a better place to put him, especially in the case of the deceased person, being on the bed is detrimental because it gets hot. Even if I put him there at twilight, they want to say that since he belongs on the floor, it doesn’t make it a base. “Vezeh da'at Ba'al Hama'or, aval haRosh cholek alav” (this is the opinion of Ba’al Hama’or, but the Rosh disagrees with him). And the other halachic authorities disagree with this, too.
If the deceased person is lying on the ground, let’s say, and he has no two beds, and he also has no bread or child, he moves him “kedarko” (in the usual manner). Okay, that’s what I’m wondering: “metalteilo kedarko”—we’re not going to let the man cremate him. So there are levels: bread or child is one way, or moving him from one bed to another. No bread or child, no moving him from one bed to another: the dignity of the deceased person is going to win. But the point of this law is to minimize the prohibition as much as possible. Don’t think, “It’s a deceased person; come on, do whatever you want.” Carrying.
“Uvechol zeh ein chiluk bein shemotzi'o le'oto chatzer shemutar betiltul, uvecheder acher... bein shemotzi'o lechatzer acheret shelo irvu beyachad” (in all this, there is no distinction between taking him into the same courtyard, where moving is permitted, and taking him into another courtyard with which they did not join by an eruv). Whether you’re taking him into the backyard where there’s an eruv, let’s say, a courtyard, a private domain, or taking him to another courtyard without an eruv (Sabbath boundary arrangement) with the neighbor. Okay, no problem; it’s a rabbinic prohibition. So now you’re learning a new idea: it is permitted to move the deceased person through rabbinically prohibited carrying. Technically, by the way, if you hold that our streets do not have a public domain in our time, and you want to carry the deceased person from one house to the next-door house, it’s reshut hayachid (private domain) to reshut hayachid (private domain), through—I don’t know what—maybe that’s permitted, too. Obviously, there has to be a need: a fire or whatever. I want to get him out of the house because it’s—Huh? Yes, on Shabbat they’re not going to clean the body, but let’s say for whatever reason there’s a reason to get him out of this house. I don’t know. Normally, you put him on the ground, but let’s say the air conditioning broke in this house, it’s 90 degrees in the summer, and the deceased person is going to become smelly. Even if you put him on the floor, now we have to get him out of there. So we’ll bring him next door through the backyard. We’ll go through the backyard so nobody sees him in the front. We’ll go through the backyard, even if there’s no eruv between the two houses. It’s permitted.
“Vegam hahotza'ah lecharmelit mutar kemo sheyitba'er bemet shehu karov lehasri'ach, ve'im mipnei hasirchon hitiru, kol sheken mipnei hadeleikah” (carrying to an intermediate public-domain area is also permitted, as will be explained regarding a deceased person close to becoming malodorous; if they permitted it because of the odor, all the more so because of a fire). Good. Sure, it’s not only for a fire; they permitted this even for odor, all the more so for a fire.
“Vegam bikhei hai gavna tzarich lehader achar hakal hakal” (in such a case one must seek the more lenient option). The more lenient option, yes, same thing: try to do it in the easiest permitted way.
“Veyesh omrim debhehai gavna lo yisa oto al yedei kikar vetinok kedei shelo leharbot behotza'ah” (and some say that in this case he should not carry him with bread or a child, so as not to increase the carrying). Yes, that’s a good question. Some say that in this case, if you use the bread or child, now you’re carrying the bread or child. So when carrying is necessary, forget about the bread or child; just do it directly, so you minimize the carrying.
“Veyitba'er lekaman bedin sirchon” (and this will be explained later regarding the law of odor). But our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in se’if alef that all this is in the same domain. Meaning, regarding a fire, carrying to an intermediate public-domain area was not permitted. He holds that in the case of odor there is more disgrace than in the case of a fire. Oh, so the Shulchan Aruch is going to say here that in the case of a fire, they didn’t let you move him to an intermediate public-domain area, only in the case of odor. Wow, because there’s more disgrace in the case of odor than in the case of a fire. I don’t know if the body is going to burn.
“Vediyek lah mileshon haRambam, beferik kaf-vav, shekatav: venaflah delikah bachatzer sheyesh bo met, rabbim o gedolim yotzi'uhu” (and he inferred from the Rambam’s wording, in perek kaf-vav, where he wrote: if a fire breaks out in a courtyard containing a deceased person, the many or the adults should take him out). Ah, “venaflah delikah bachatzer sheyesh bo met”—that implies that regarding a fire, it’s only in the courtyard, only in the same courtyard, not moving him to a different courtyard. He says this about odor. Certainly, a fire is more of a disgrace than odor. Yes, logically. A fire is burning a deceased person.
“Uvazeh shekatav haRambam venaflah delikah bachatzer sheyesh bo met, kavanah acheret hi: delo hutrah rak keshenaflah delikah bachatzer shel hamet, she'az hamehumah vehabehalah rabah; uvazeh amru Chazal adam bahul al meto, ve'i lo sharit leh, ati lechabuyei. Umutar lo lehotzi'o gam lechatzer acheret, karmelit, aval...” (and what the Rambam wrote, that a fire broke out in a courtyard containing a deceased person, has a different meaning: it was permitted only when the fire broke out in the deceased person’s courtyard, when there is great commotion and panic; this is the case in which the Sages said that a person is distraught over his deceased, and if you do not permit it, he will come to extinguish the fire. It is also permitted to take him to another courtyard, an intermediate public-domain area, but...). Ah, maybe when the Rambam wrote “courtyard,” he didn’t mean that you can move him only within a courtyard. Really, you can move the deceased person to an intermediate public-domain area. It’s saying where the fire is. If the fire is in the courtyard where the deceased person is, then we say the person is panicked. He’s going to get nervous that the fire will reach the deceased person, so we permit it. But if the fire is next door, somewhere else, we’re not going to give you permission to move the deceased person yet. That’s all the Rambam is saying: how close the fire has to be to the deceased person. But not where you can carry him; once you’re carrying him, you can carry him into an intermediate public-domain area.
“Aval im hamet eino bachatzer shedelikah bo, eino bahul kol kach, velo hutrah lo rak...” (but if the deceased person is not in the courtyard where the fire broke out, he is not so panicked, and it was permitted to him only...). That’s a nice way of answering the Rambam. So we’ll have to see what Maran holds. Maran sounds stringent. But only—what’s the logic? Only odor. Maran—oh, that’s more! But a fire isn’t as bad as odor. He’s saying the opposite. Yes, he says the opposite. On the contrary, if you permit it for odor, kal vachomer (a fortiori) for a fire. Because they’re going to burn him—is that a disgrace? Okay, Marcelo, you’re up.
“Vehinei chefi mah shenitba'er, lo hitiru bedleikah keshehamet bachatzer acheret, vehaposkim lo dibru mizeh” (and behold, according to what has been explained, they did not permit it in the case of a fire when the deceased person is in another courtyard, and the halachic authorities did not discuss this). Okay, well, that comes out according to the novel idea of the rabbi here. According to the Aruch HaShulchan, based on how he understood the Rambam, it is permitted to move the deceased person only when the deceased person and the fire are in the same courtyard. If they are in different courtyards, they won’t let you, and the halachic authorities didn’t mention that.
“Veleshon haShas (the Talmud), gam kein stama: hem matzilin et hamet mipenei hadleikah” (and the wording of the Talmud is also general: they rescue the deceased person from a fire). There it is: “matzilin et hamet mipenei hadleikah.” It doesn’t say same courtyard or different courtyard; it says, “They rescue him.” Finish. “Vegam hasar haTur shekatav: met shemutar bimkom sheyeira'eh alav mipnei hadeleikah vechulei” (and likewise, the Tur wrote: a deceased person who is in a place where the fire may reach him, and so on). “Velo bi'er devarav, ela shebileshon haRambam dikdak kein” (he did not explain his words; he only inferred this from the wording of the Rambam). Right, he says, “I made a diyuk (inference) in the Rambam.” So this is one of the Aruch HaShulchan’s novel ideas: from his inference in the Rambam, he concludes that it is only when the deceased person and the fire are in the same courtyard.
“Vegam hasevara kein hu” (and the reasoning is also so). It makes sense. “Dikeshe'ein hadleikah bachatzer shehamet bo, eino bahul” (when the fire is not in the courtyard where the deceased person is, he is not panicked). “Umechuyav la'asot rak al yedei kikar o tinok, ulehotzi'o lemakom shemutar lehotzi” (he is required to act only by means of bread or a child, and to take him to a place where carrying is permitted). “Mihu, zehu vadai de'im achar kach hegi'ah hadleikah lachatzer shehamet bo, chazar dino liheyot kemo shenitba'er” (but certainly, if afterward the fire reaches the courtyard where the deceased person is, his law returns to what was explained). Right, right, it’s logical. Just because the fire started somewhere else—good. But once the fire reaches the deceased person’s courtyard, all bets are off. I don’t care, “Oh, the fire started in the other courtyard.” Okay, wherever it started, the bottom line is that now it’s in the deceased person’s courtyard. Once it’s there, dignity—get him out!
“Hu omer shebechol hamutar lechol... bechol hadevarim shenitba'aru. Aval ad shetagi'a hadleikah lesham, lo hutrah rak al yedei kikar o tinok, velachatzer hame'urevet vechayozei bazeh, kedina” (he says that in all the matters explained, the permission applies once the fire has reached there; before the fire reaches there, it was permitted only by means of bread or a child, and to a joined courtyard and the like, according to the law). Okay, so that’s that.
One more, Marcelo: “met hamutal bachamah, o ule'et atah eino mitkalkel” (a deceased person lying in the sun, when at this time he is not decomposing). Okay, he’s in the sun, but at this point he’s not decomposing yet. “Af debemeshech hasha'ot yuchal lehitkalkel, lo hitiru lo chachamim kol hakulot ha'elu, rak hitiru lo letaltelo mechamah letzel al yedei kikar o tinok, uve'oto chatzer. Yoter mizeh lo hitiru” (although over the course of the hours he may decompose, the Sages did not permit all these leniencies; they only permitted moving him from the sun to the shade by means of bread or a child, and within the same courtyard; they did not permit more than this).
That’s it. If he’s in the sun, and at this point he isn’t decomposing, and he’s only going to decompose later, put bread or a child on him. They’re not going to let you just move the man normally; you have to use bread or a child. “Velachen im ein lo kikar o tinok, lo yetaltelenu kelal” (therefore, if he has no bread or child, he should not move him at all). Wow, because here there’s no odor yet, and there’s no fire; it’s in the future. Let him lie there. Ah, what will happen? Yes, use bread or a child. Marcel’s rules. Again, the lesson here is that a deceased person is not carte blanche. That’s where the moreh heter (one who finds a dispensation) comes in right away: “Ah, the dignity of the deceased, the dignity of the deceased; don’t worry about anything.” Not everything! This shows you again how serious muktzeh is.
But it’s a rabbinic prohibition; muktzeh is rabbinic, whatever. And the deceased person—the deceased person, that’s it. Even moving him from one bed to another, they won’t let you do that in this case. “Detiltul min hatzad letzorech davar ha'asur, shemo tiltul” (moving from the side for the sake of a forbidden item is considered moving). Yes, right: normally, when you take the stretcher and turn the deceased person from one stretcher to another, that’s called moving from the side for the sake of the muktzeh, which would normally be forbidden. So we’ll only permit it for a fire or actual odor, when he is malodorous, but not merely because he may become malodorous.
“Uchevar nitba'er besiman shin chet se'if kaf-zayin, delo hitiru kikar o tinok ela al hamet bilvad” (it has already been explained in siman shin chet, se’if kaf-zayin, that they permitted bread or a child only for the deceased person himself). Right, that’s another question we have to look at. Okay, bread or a child: I want to put bread or a child on anything muktzeh now. I might have a hundred-dollar bill; I want to carry it into my room, and it’s on the floor. I want to put a pretzel on it, exactly, and lift it up, and—no. But, by the way, when it says “bread,” does it mean specifically bread, or does a pretzel also count? But a bigger pretzel. Well, it has to be—if it’s bread, it has to be a kezayit (an olive-sized amount).
Why bread and a child? Why did they put those two things together? Baby, it has to be a baby. That’s significant. Just because it’s small? Because it fits well on the deceased person. You can’t put an adult on the man. Right, what about a book? Exactly. Exactly. Why bread and a child? Not necessarily, or specifically bread and a child? A fixed rule: bread and a child. I’ll get bigger pretzels, easy. Why did they just say, “Put, put a permitted item” on it? Right. Ah, it has to be a piece of bread, a mezonot (grain-based food blessing) roll. Now that’s another halachah: I have to know whether this is a mezonot bagel or din hamotzi (the law of the blessing hamotzi). Put a pizza. Ashkenazim (Ashkenazi Jews) could put a pizza; Sephardim (Sephardi Jews) have to put two slices according to Rav Moshe, and then it actually has the law of the hamotzi blessing there? No, so what? There it has the law of the hamotzi blessing. So I put eight ounces of pretzels. But spaghetti, no. Spaghetti, no. Spaghetti, no, because spaghetti is not—We have to see; this is a she'elah (question): what counts as bread or a child?
The rabbis could easily have waived these laws in a second. Why wouldn’t they? Muktzeh. They could say, by the way, guess what? The Sages could have done away with all the laws of muktzeh. Okay, we see there are good reasons for that, but in this situation involving a deceased person, there are good reasons for that, too. I guess they don’t want to. Muktzeh is serious stuff. They don’t want to lighten up. They don’t want to lighten up. That was my point, by the way, Syal. That was my point. I just made that point. Yeah, and I know, that’s what I’m thinking. I made this point that the rabbis obviously held muktzeh in higher regard. It implies something. Muktzeh! They held muktzeh in high regard.
“Mutal mutal lefanav, va'afilu hasovrim shegam keli shemelachto le'isur mutar al yedei kikar o tinok” (even according to those who hold that a utensil whose primary use is forbidden may be moved by means of bread or a child). Ah, there are some opinions that say that a utensil whose primary use is forbidden may be moved by means of bread or a child. “Mikol makom, aval bemuktzeh dumya demet lo hitiru rak bemet” (nevertheless, for muktzeh like the deceased person, they permitted it only for the deceased person). Ah, but in muktzeh machmat gufo, only the deceased person—they permitted that. That means it could be that they allow the people who say a utensil whose primary use is forbidden may be moved by means of bread and a child. But in the category of the deceased person, which is muktzeh by its inherent nature, only the deceased person.
No, but it’s on the porch. It’s on the porch, and it’s raining. From the sun to the shade. So, for a utensil whose primary use is forbidden, from the sun to the shade: put the child on it and carry the utensil inside. It’s a—“veyoter mizeh lo hitiru. Veshama tomar, im ken mah na'aseh keshe'ein kan kikar o tinok? Kvar amarnu bazeh natnu Chachamim takanah acheret kemo sheyitba'er” (they did not permit more than this. If you ask what we do when there is no bread or child, we have already said that the Sages gave another remedy, as will be explained).
Okay, so let’s say you don’t have bread or a child in this case. The man is lying there, and he doesn’t smell yet, but if you leave him there long enough, he will—what? No bread or child. Let him lie there the whole Shabbat? So there is another remedy. Open up Shulchan Aruch alef; that’s what we have to see today, alef. And that’s what we did—well, just to make sure there isn’t another alef here. Yes, alef in Shulchan Aruch. We have a Mishnah Berurah here. Here, okay, beautiful. All right, okay, beautiful. Todah rabah (thank you very much).
Shin yud alef, Marcel, do you want to read it? Shin yud alef, alef. “Met shemutar...” This guy is recording. Dignity. “Met shemutar bemakom sheyareh alav mipnei hadeleikah.” Okay, may His name be praised. “Met shemutar bemakom sheyareh mipnei hadeleikah.” “Yareh”—not that the fire is on him and all that, but that it may reach him; it’s in his courtyard, let’s say.
“Im yesh kikar o tinok, metalteilo al yedeihem” (if there is bread or a child, he moves him by means of them). Beautiful. “Ve'im ein lo kikar o tinok, im yesh shum shtei mitot, metalteilo al yedei shehofcho”—no, from one bed to another. From one bed to another, and that is moving from the side. Ah, normally, moving from the side for the sake of something forbidden is forbidden. In the case of the deceased person, they permitted it. But bread is better. With bread, you made him a base for something permitted; that’s a better leniency. If you don’t have that leniency, we’ll be lenient with the next option.
“Ve'im ein lo lo zeh velo zeh, metalteilo tiltul gamur. Uvechol zeh davka be'oto reshut” (if he has neither this nor that, he moves him directly; all this is specifically within the same domain). All this is when we allow him to carry the deceased person; we’re only allowing it within the same domain. What does “within the same domain” mean? From a private domain to a public domain? “Mashma bizeh delereshut acher asur” (it implies that taking him to another domain is forbidden). Ah, meaning it could be a different domain. “Aval harbeh acharonim hiskimu de'afilu reshut acheret shelo erbu bazeh, o karmelit, sharu lehotzi mipnei bizayon hamet” (but many later authorities agreed that even to another domain with which they did not join by an eruv, or to an intermediate public-domain area, it is permitted to take him out because of the disgrace of the deceased person). So perhaps Maran only forbids it outside the same domain. Continue.
“Met hamutal bachamah, metalteilo mechamah letzel, be'oto reshut, al yedei kikar o tinok” (a deceased person lying in the sun may be moved from the sun to the shade, within the same domain, by means of bread or a child). Okay, clearly, a deceased person lying in the sun—you can move him from the sun to the shade by means of bread or a child. Fine. “Ve'im ein lo kikar o tinok, lo yetaltelenu kelal” (if he has no bread or child, he should not move him at all). Ah, finish! Again, this is a deceased person lying in the sun. So this is more stringent than the case of odor. You have the same permissions. Start with bread or a child; if you don’t have bread or a child, use the stretcher option. If you don’t have that, they didn’t permit it at all—except to turn him from one bed to another? “Umitzad shemetaltel, lo hitiru kelal, afilu lahafokh memi...” Ah, even that! He is stringent. That’s why he doesn’t give you that option. Here he didn’t smell yet. He is lying in the sun, as we learned, but not yet. They give you bread or a child, but they don’t give you moving him from the side.
Look at the Mishnah Berurah. “Hamutal bachamah, mairi she'adain lo hisri'ach. Ela shechoshesh pen yasri'ach. Velachen hechemir hamechaber dedavka be'oto reshut mutar lehotzi, ve'azil leta'ameih le'el bese'if bet, shesham hatiltul, umita'am zeh asur ledachoto al yedei kaneh” (when he is lying in the sun, this is speaking of a case where he has not yet become malodorous, but there is concern that he may; therefore, the author was stringent that taking him out is permitted only within the same domain. This follows his reasoning above in se’if bet, and for this reason it is forbidden to push him with a pole).
Okay, let’s go over this again, rabbis, to clarify the principles. If the deceased person is lying in a place where a fire may reach him, why are we calling it a fire? Is it because, as he said, it’s like a fire, or does it sound like it’s a very small fire? Right, a small fire. “Fire” means—is there a case of a bigger fire? Then that’s it. Yes, a bigger fire is the regular law: all bets are off. So here, the deceased person is lying in a place where the fire may reach him. It’s not imminent, but it may reach him. Again, the permissions are bread or a child, and after that, moving him from one bed to another. But then he says only within that domain. That’s something we have to look at, by the way. Wait, somebody is probably taking the bread out into the public domain.
Yes, look at Gary’s book here: “delereshut acher asur lehotzi bechol gavna” (to another domain, it is forbidden to take him out in any situation). That’s the Mishnah Berurah quote, right? The Mishnah Berurah quotes it; it sounds like Maran says that taking him to another domain is forbidden in any situation. The Mishnah Berurah, in se’if katan daled, says: “mashma mizeh delereshut acher asur lehotzi'o bechol gavna” (it implies from this that taking him to another domain is forbidden in any situation). Gary’s book says here, “ken hu da'at haMagen Avraham” (this is the opinion of the Magen Avraham). “Vechatav Magen Avraham sham she'ein bizayon keshenisraf hamet” (and the Magen Avraham wrote there that there is no disgrace when the deceased person is burned). Wow! There is no disgrace when the deceased person is burned! Unbelievable. “Uchevar hisigu alav ha'acharonim” (the later authorities have already challenged him). They all jumped on him. What do you mean there’s no disgrace to the deceased person?
“Vegam mah shekatav Ma'aseh Roke'ach leyashev da'at haMagen Avraham al pi mah shekatav haRema, shemuttar liten sid alav” (and regarding what Ma’aseh Roke’ach wrote to explain the Magen Avraham according to what the Rema wrote, that it is permitted to place lime on him). They sometimes put limestone on him, which causes the body to decay. “Uchevar hisig alav bePetach haDvir, deshani hatam dedavka le'akel habasar, aval kan bedeleikah yisaref hakol, ve'ein lecha bizayon gadol mizeh, uvifrat divrei haAri (the Ari) zal vehaZohar HaKadosh (the Holy Zohar)” (he has already been challenged in Petach haDvir: that case is different, because it is specifically to consume the flesh, whereas here, in a fire, everything is burned, and there is no greater disgrace than this, especially in light of the words of the Ari, of blessed memory, and the Holy Zohar). Okay, fine.
Okay, what is Maran’s opinion going to be? Is Maran going to say only within the same domain? So the Mishnah Berurah writes here: “aval harbeh acharonim hiskimu, afilu reshut acheret shelo erbu, im zeh oleh karmelit, shari lehotzi'o mipenei bizayon hamet” (but many later authorities agreed that even to another domain with which they did not join by an eruv, if it is an intermediate public-domain area, it is permitted to take him out because of the disgrace of the deceased person). Can we rely on that? It says in Kaf HaChaim that Maran would be lenient about going to a—or perhaps Kaf HaChaim says you can go to an intermediate public-domain area—“beshem kamah acharonim, ve'al ken hamakel lo hifsid” (in the name of several later authorities, and therefore one who is lenient has not lost). Aha! Maybe it’s not Maran’s opinion, but there are other opinions that are lenient about going to an intermediate public-domain area.
You wouldn’t learn it when he says reshut is reshut de'oraita (a Torah-level domain). You wouldn’t say that’s what Maran means; that’s hard to say. Right, they don’t say that. And in the next section he says you can take him if he’s malodorous. That’s if you go according to the malodor case. That’s Maran. Maran is making a distinction between being malodorous and a fire. I mean, logically, a fire—That’s right. They hold that with a fire, it isn’t such a disgrace. They—this is, again, we would think otherwise, right? All the more so for a fire. There’s a way to say that a fire is not as bad as odor because the body is going to decompose anyway. Maybe odor is worse than a fire because it disgraces the living person and the deceased person, while a fire is only a disgrace to the deceased person. It’s only to the deceased person. Okay, okay, okay, I hear you. Nobody wants to see their relative burn. Disgusting, the other one is just burning. I mean, what if the relative sees the burning?
Rabbis, rabbis, you can philosophize about all this, but he says here: “met hamutal bachamah, o bimkom tzar shelo yuchal lashevet etzlo” (a deceased person lying in the sun, or in a narrow place where one cannot sit beside him). What if he’s in a narrow place and you can’t sit there, so you want to move him to make room to sit next to him and be shomer (watching over him)? “Kevurat met mitzvah (unattended deceased person) eino docheh Shabbat” (the burial of an unattended deceased person does not override Shabbat). Okay.
“Umah shenohagim she'ein metaltelin et hamet ki im al yedei kikar o tinok shehayah sham mibe'od yom” (and the custom is not to move the deceased person except by means of bread or a child that was there from before the day began). What does it mean, “shehayah sham mibe'od yom”? It means you can’t bring it there, bring it into a domain; you can’t carry the item there to make it easier to move the deceased person, I guess. I don’t know why you’re getting all bent out of shape about it. It’s not a burning kind of house; it’s still a question, though. You’re saying to take the deceased person out and leave the house alone. That’s always—Here there’s a fire; the house is going to burn down.
Just a question: forget about the deceased person. What happens on Shabbat if there’s a fire on an island, in a house, where there’s no pikuach nefesh (saving of life) involved? You know that law. You know that law. If you’re on an island in the middle of nowhere and there’s one mansion and the fire goes on on Shabbat, and you can get out safely, and you have a bucket of water in front of you and you just throw the bucket on it and it'll—So? You have to walk out. You have to walk out. That’s—hope that nobody did a nisayon (test). Nobody should ever be tested. Brooklyn? Brooklyn, chas veshalom (God forbid). Brooklyn tzafuf (crowded). Of course you call the fire department. That’s a danger to everybody; there are babies all over the place, all that. But I’m talking about a rare case where you’re alone in the middle of—Right.
Okay, rabbis, we’ll stop here. We’ll continue tomorrow morning. How—that’s how they wanted to bring proof from the deceased person about whether you can touch muktzeh: you’re allowed to make sichah (anointing) on the deceased person. Right, that’s the proof. You see, you see, you see, it’s all, “hikilu bemet, lo hikilu kol kach” (they were lenient regarding the deceased person, but not so very lenient). Right. Right. Right, right, right. You see, they didn’t give you every leniency. They didn’t give you every leniency. Although the Perishah did say that, you can say it the other way, too. Yeah.