Hilchot Muktzeh (Laws of Muktzeh; set-aside object), mem heh in Gemara, Shabbat: I want to go through a little piece here today. We’ll go to the source. Gemara Shabbat, mem heh, a few lines down. This is one of my favorite perakim (chapters): Kirah (stove). There’s a lot of material in there.
The Gemara says, seven lines down: Be'u minei deRav (They asked Rav): Mahu letaltulei sheraga dechanuketa mikamei chabarei beShabeta? (May one move the Chanukah lamp before the Chabarei (Persian religious group) on Shabbat?) The question is: Can you move the menorah (lamp), the lights of the menorah, before the chabarei? Rashi says that the chabarei are these goyim (non-Jews). Obviously, the goyim had rules that they didn’t want you to put lights outside during their holidays, or whatever it was. How about the Persians? The Persians—exactly. So the she'eilah (question) is: Can you move the menorah on Shabbat?
Rashi says right away, “Sheraga dechanuketa, achar shekavah”—the Chanukah lamp after it was extinguished. Rashi understands that the question is about after the lamp went out. What is the question after it gets extinguished? It was a basis (base). Normally, if it was a basis going into Shabbat, then even if it went out, it is still Muktzeh. So the question is whether we can be lenient and remove it because of the chabarei.
Tosafot says, “Mikamei chabarei beShabeta, shebeyom chag shelahem lo hayu manichim ner ela beveit avodah zarah.” That shows who the chabarei are. Rashi says, “Chabarei, shem umah shehayetah im Parsiyim”—they were a people associated with the Persians. These are Zoroastrians. Exactly. Rashi also says, “Shelo yir'uhu bechatzer ked'amrinan bepirkin dele'eil, hennicho befettach hasamuch lirshut harabbim veyad'u shehidlik bo ner.” They didn’t even want them to see the menorah, because they would know that if there was a menorah, it must have been lit. It is after the fact. “Vehem gazru shelo lehadlik”—they decreed that they should not light. Or, as Tosafot says, it was on their holiday.
So that is the she'eilah: Is there room to be lenient and get rid of this menorah? Is there sakanah (danger)? It doesn’t seem to be sakanat nefashot (danger to life), because if it were sakanat nefashot, you could extinguish it or pick it up while it was lit. Obviously, this is not a sakanah. We’ll see in a moment what type of sakanah Rashi means.
The Gemara says, “Va'amar lehu: Shapir dami.” Were the first ones saying that they should not light Chanukah lights? Yes. Period? The other ones, because of their holiday? Right, a fire holiday. The Rav answered them, “Shapir dami”—it is fine; it is muttar (permitted). The Gemara says, “She'at hadechak shani” (pressing circumstances). The Gemara wanted to bring a proof to what? You see that there is no basis, because we let you move the menorah before the chabarei. The Gemara says, “No.” We hold like Rabbi Shimon, because Rabbi Shimon does not accept this type of basis. A basis that will go out on Shabbat, that will not remain for the whole Shabbat—like this lamp, which will last only as long as it is burning—is not a basis according to Rabbi Shimon.
The Gemara says, “No, no. This is pressing circumstances. It is obviously not permitted to do this initially.” The Gemara continues: “Va'amar lehu: Shapir dami, she'at hadechak shani, de'amar lei Rav Kahana veRav Asi leRav: Hachi hilcheta?” Rav Kahana and Rav Asi asked Rav, “Is this the halachah?” He answered, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak”—Rabbi Shimon is worthy of relying on in pressing circumstances. That is the famous Gemara. The menorah was the basis because it had a flame.
Rashi says, “Hachi hilcheta, uvitmiha, bishe'at hadechak, sakanah, alma shelo bishe'at hadechak assur.” Is that really the halachah? In pressing circumstances? Danger? It follows that when there are no pressing circumstances, it is forbidden. So there was some kind of sakanah here. Obviously, if it is a sakanah not of death, sakanah—they are going to beat him up, or make him pay taxes, or something. Therefore, they were lenient in such a case.
That is a very important halachah (Jewish law). Outside of sakanah like this, we have a basis. Once it becomes a basis, you cannot move it, not for tzorech gufo (use of the object), not for tzorech mekomo (use of its place), and not for mechamah letzel (from sun to shade)—not for anything. Once a basis becomes locked in its place, that is it.
Let’s look at the Shiltei Giborim on this passage. The reference is in the back of the Gemara, Rabbi Boaz, Shiltei Giborim, perek shelishi, daf mem heh amud rishon, and in the Rif pages, page chaf alef. The Shiltei is on the left side. The Shiltei Giborim is brought here to explain what the danger is. The Magen Avraham brings it. He says it does not have to be actual sakanah: “Afilu me-eimat nochrim”—even fear of non-Jews is enough. It does not have to be actual sakanah, as Rashi said; it is enough that you are afraid. That is the position of the Shiltei Giborim.
Open the Mishnah Berurah at reish ayin tet, halachah alef and bet. We have learned this, but we need to review it. It says, “Ner shehidliku vo be'otah Shabbat”—a lamp that was lit on that Shabbat. Obviously, the reference is to before Shabbat. “Af al pi shekavah, asur letaltelo”—even though it went out, it is forbidden to move it. Why is a lamp that went out forbidden to move? Because it is a basis.
It also says that the remaining oil in a lamp that was lit before Shabbat is forbidden to move or use on Shabbat. The Mishnah Berurah explains: “Af al pi shekavah”—even if no oil remained in it at all. The reason is that since, during twilight, the lamp, oil, and wick were forbidden to move, the lamp, oil, and wick became a basis for the flame, which is forbidden to move. Since it became Muktzeh during twilight, it became Muktzeh for the whole day. This is called muktzeh machamat isur (Muktzeh due to prohibition), as we hold.
Hold your place in the Mishnah Berurah. It says that this lamp is forbidden to move even for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo. It is entirely forbidden. The Mishnah Berurah explains that this is unlike other keli shemelachto le'issur (vessel used for prohibited work). A keli shemelachto le'issur is seemingly muttar for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo, as we learn in siman shin-chet, se'if gimmel. But here, since it was forbidden to move during twilight, it is forbidden even for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo, because it was a basis for the flame.
It is worse because it was lit. Once it was lit, it was a basis. So even if you want to call a menorah a keli shemelachto le'issur, you lose its movability once it becomes a basis.
Now look at the next part of the Mishnah Berurah. “Im yesh emat eino Yehudi alav al yedei haner”—if he fears a non-Jew because of the lamp; fear, as it was in the time of the Amoraim, when there was a nation that was particular on its holiday that they light a lamp that day. The Mishnah Berurah says that, like the Gemara’s case of the chabarei, it is permitted to move it after it went out, quoting “ad sheyisa shemadlikim ner be'oto hayom vechu'.” The Shiltei Giborim is quoted there.
It also says, “Uvelo'a ke-Magen Avraham uve-Peri Megadim mashma she'im yareh sheyakehu”—and from the Magen Avraham and Peri Megadim, it seems that if he fears they will beat him, that is also enough. Or there could be a monetary loss, and everyone permits it. Here is the issue: the Mishnah Berurah first says that fear of non-Jews is enough. Rashi said sakanah; the Mishnah Berurah says fear they will beat you is enough. Then he adds monetary loss. You might leave your menorah outside in the courtyard, and in the old days they could steal it. They steal menorot in Brooklyn today, too. Put out a silver menorah. It's a Jewish menorah. Leave it on the porch. In those days, they lit it outside. So there is a concern it will be stolen.
This is an incredible leniency. The Mishnah Berurah began with danger. They lightened it: it does not have to be danger; fear that they might beat you is enough. Then he adds monetary loss. So we have a general principle here. We are being lenient like Rabbi Shimon: “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak.” The Mishnah Berurah is calling monetary loss a she'at hadechak, and therefore we can rely on Rabbi Shimon that this lamp did not become a basis.
If it is not a basis, it goes back to being a keli shemelachto le'issur. A keli shemelachto le'issur can be moved for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo. But this case is neither tzorech gufo nor tzorech mekomo; it is mechamah letzel, where Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is forbidden. That does not help.
Wait. Where did this start? The reasoning says that a basis cannot be moved at all. According to Rabbi Yehudah, you cannot move the menorah at all. The halachah in the Gemara should be: “Sorry, you lit the menorah on the holiday of the non-Jews; it is a basis. Are they going to beat you up? Nobody is going to die. You should have lit it on your kitchen table that year. Why are you being such a pious person?”
The Gemara says no; you do not have to be so strict. “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak.” Rabbi Shimon holds that this menorah is not a basis because it is destined to go out. We do not hold that way generally. We hold that even though you knew it was going to go out, it does not matter: since you lit it and it was forbidden during twilight, it is forbidden—unless you made a condition. The Gemara assumes that we made no condition. You just lit it without specifying. So we can rely on Rabbi Shimon.
What are we saying about Rabbi Shimon? That it is not a basis. Then what is it? It is a keli shemelachto le'issur. Rabbi Shimon agrees that there is such a category. When we say Rabbi Shimon does not hold of Muktzeh, it does not mean he holds that there is no Muktzeh at all. He does not accept all of Rabbi Yehudah’s Muktzeh, but he does accept Muktzeh. So it is a keli shemelachto le'issur.
What is Rabbi Shimon allowing here? Tzorech gufo? Obviously, this is not tzorech gufo. I’ll tell you what it is: as Chacham Bentzion told us, this can be considered tzorech mekomo. Tzorech mekomo does not mean only that I need the place to put something there; I need the place to be empty. Why do I need the place to be empty? Because otherwise the goyim are going to beat me up.
What is the reasoning for mechamah letzel? Let it stay. You want to save it from being stolen, but before we get to saving it from being stolen, we have to ask whether you have permission to move it for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo. In this case, according to Rabbi Yehudah, do you have permission? No. According to Rabbi Yehudah, it is a basis, and you are stuck. The Gemara says, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak”: do not call it a basis. But it is not a keli shemelachto le'heter; it is a keli shemelachto le'issur. So you are back to the regular rules of tzorech gufo and tzorech mekomo.
What is tzorech mekomo in this case? The place does not only mean that I need to put something there. I need the place to be empty and vacant. Go back to what we learned from Chacham Bentzion about the pot on the table. We said it was a keli shemelachto le'issur. You emptied the pot; there is no more food in it. Chacham Bentzion said that if you are sitting at the table on Shabbat, it is not a graf shel re'i (chamber pot), but you want to take it off the table because your oneg Shabbat is not having empty pots on the table. That is also considered tzorech mekomo: you want the place vacated. That is Chacham Bentzion’s reasoning. Fine, that is not the point of the class, but that is tzorech mekomo.
Now the Mishnah Berurah says something that is hard to understand. Even if you are worried they will beat you, you need the place to be vacant so they will not beat you. Then the Mishnah Berurah says, “O she'ar hefsed mamon”—or some other monetary loss. That means they are going to take the menorah. That is normally mechamah letzel. So now you are telling me a great novelty: there is room to be lenient about moving a keli shemelachto le'issur mechamah letzel?
Is that a general halachah? We know that normally you cannot move a keli shemelachto le'issur mechamah letzel. Maybe the Shulchan Aruch says there is a halachah for a major loss. Open siman shin-chaf-dalet for a moment, to remind ourselves of the laws.
Maran says, “Naflah deleikah beShabbat, Rachamana litzlan”—if a fire breaks out on Shabbat, God forbid. If it is at night, before the meal, a person may save enough food for three Shabbat meals, the amount appropriate for a person and for an animal. In the morning, two meals, because he has already missed the evening meal; at Minchah, one meal, I guess because of the third meal. The people of the house where the fire broke out may not save more, because we are concerned that, in their distraction while saving things, they will forget it is Shabbat and extinguish the fire.
Look at the Mishnah Berurah. It means that they will certainly be panicked, and if you allow them to save more, they will come to extinguish the fire. Here, we forbid them to save more so that they will not extinguish it. But regarding a dead body, we permitted saving it so that they would not extinguish the fire, as Tosafot writes in siman shin-yod-aleph. A person is more panicked about a dead body, so they needed to permit it to prevent him from intentionally extinguishing the fire. See there for more on this.
Now look at the Mishnah Berurah’s se'if vav. Relatives are not so panicked; see siman shin-resh-dalet, se'if zayin, and Sha'ar Hatziyun, samech vav. It is better to extinguish the fire, and therefore it is muttar to extinguish it. That is the famous permission to extinguish a fire because we live near the goyim and the houses are close together, so that is fine.
Now read the first wide line: “Vehu hadin devarim hamuktze'im, ukhemo shehadin beveit hashecheinim, keivan de'ein ligzor shemitoch sheyihyeh bahul yavo lechabot, sheharei bazman hazeh mutar lechabot, ve'ein zeh mukrach de'efshar shemitoch behalato yavo lidei she'ar melachot dehotza'ah bereshut hayachid vechulei.” The same applies to Muktzeh items, as in the case of the neighbors. Since we do not decree that the person will become panicked and extinguish the fire—because nowadays it is permitted to extinguish it—it is not inevitable that his panic will lead him to other labors, such as carrying in a private domain.
Continue: “Umikol makom ein limchot... ma'ot mutar leda'at Ba'al HaTerumot im ein over al zeh issur de'oraita, vechen be'issur veheiter, af dibnei adam mefakpek bezeh hadavar, vechatav haChayei Adam gam ha'acherim.” In any case, there is no need to object. It is permitted to take money, according to Ba'al HaTerumot, if no Torah prohibition is involved; the same applies to prohibited and permitted items, even if people are uncertain about the matter. The Chayei Adam writes similarly about other cases. Continue: “Ve'afillu ma'ot de'ein bo ella issur muktzeh.” Even money, where the only prohibition is Muktzeh.
He is discussing what may and may not be taken out. Look at se'if bet. Maran says, “Veyeish matirin letaltel ma'ot ushe'ar devarim hamuktze'im kedei lehatzilam mipenei hadeleikah o me'onssim haba'im legozlam.” Some permit moving money and other Muktzeh items to save them from a fire or from assailants who come to rob them. “Devemakom hefsed ein lachush le'issur muktzeh”—where there is a loss, there is no need to be concerned about the prohibition of Muktzeh.
Then he says, “Veyeish oserim”—and some prohibit it. It is a yeish veyeish. What do you do? There are those who prohibit it. Look at the Mishnah Berurah: those who permit it are speaking specifically about one house where the people are not panicked, and not the house where the fire is. The reason for permitting it is similar to the permission for someone who forgot his wallet to walk less than four cubits at a time, so he will not commit a more serious prohibition by carrying it openly. Likewise, they permitted moving Muktzeh so that a person will not come to extinguish the fire.
They also permitted it in the case of assailants so he will not carry the items openly into the public domain. The reason those who prohibit it give is that the earlier case is specifically someone who forgot something on the road; they permitted him to move it so that he would not commit a serious prohibition. But in the case of assailants, even though he will lose his money, he will not commit a Torah prohibition. If he puts it in his pocket, or if he does not put it in his pocket, the assailants will take it. There will be no Torah prohibition. So they were not lenient.
What is Maran’s opinion? “Veyeish” comes after “yeish matirin,” so it is a yeish veyeish, and seemingly Maran prohibits it. We do not have permission to move Muktzeh in a case of monetary loss—not even money. Fine. He is telling you that some permit even money, perhaps because the person is panicked or something, but that is not our ruling.
What does Maran say? The first opinion is the halachah? No, you are looking at the wrong thing. Since it is a yeish veyeish and there is no one disputing the yeish veyeish, Maran prohibits it. The Mishnah Berurah also seems to include all types of Muktzeh. That is the problem here.
Someone asked whether it is different types of Muktzeh. You could say that, but he does not distinguish between them. The Mishnah Berurah seems to include all Muktzeh. That is the problem. He says it is muttar to tell a goy—no, leave the goy; we are not talking about telling a goy.
So here is the question of the day. Seemingly, we have a problem. You just told me that Maran’s yeish veyeish says that in a case of monetary loss, we do not waive the rules of Muktzeh. Whatever the rules are, the rules are. Monetary loss does not give you any additional permission. I am reading Maran again: some permit moving money and other Muktzeh items to save them from a fire or assailants who come to rob them. Where there is a loss, there is no need to be concerned about the prohibition of Muktzeh. And some prohibit it. Even telling a non-Jew to move merchandise that is being damaged by rain, there are those who prohibit.
So the million-dollar question we have to answer today is this: You just told me in the Mishnah Berurah that I could move the menorah because of monetary loss. What is a menorah in a case of monetary loss? You want to call the menorah a keli shemelachto le'issur, since we are relying on Rabbi Shimon? No problem. But where did we see in the Gemara, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak,” that you can move a keli shemelachto le'issur mechamah letzel? Even Rabbi Shimon does not say that.
Seemingly, the Mishnah Berurah added those words. Go back to reish ayin tet. Look how far the halachah moved. It started with Ashi, danger. The Shiltei Giborim added fear. The Mishnah Berurah said fear that they will beat you. Look at the Sha'ar Hatziyun, se'if katan gimel. What is it discussing? It is discussing the Peri Megadim’s statement that if you fear they will beat you, or there will be a loss, it is permitted. The Sha'ar Hatziyun says, “Vesiyem haPeri Megadim al zeh, ve'adayin tzarich iyun”—the Peri Megadim concluded this point by saying, “It still requires further study.”
The Sha'ar Hatziyun is trying to explain what the Peri Megadim meant by “tzarich iyun.” When the Peri Megadim wrote that if one fears they will beat him, or there will be a loss, it is permitted to move the menorah, he then wrote, “Aval tzarich iyun.” What was his question? The Sha'ar Hatziyun says, “Venir'eh shekavanato de'afillu be'ofen zeh gam ken eino metoratz kol kach mibaraita deRav de'amar kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav, demashma deRabbi Yehudah de'it leih muktzeh machamat isur, assur.” His intention seems to be that even this case is not fully resolved by Rav’s teaching, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav,” because it implies that according to Rabbi Yehudah, who holds of Muktzeh due to prohibition, it is forbidden.
The whole permission we are giving is according to Rabbi Shimon. The Sha'ar Hatziyun continues: “Ah vehalo lekaman besiman shin-lamed-dalet, se'if bet, sevira leih lede'ah rishonah sham, vechen hiskimu acharonim sham devemuktzeh bimkom pesida ein issur letaltel.” You are right that later, in siman shin-lamed-dalet, se'if bet, the first opinion holds that there is no prohibition against moving Muktzeh in a case of loss, and later authorities agreed with it.
“Ach lefi mah she-katav Magen Avraham, sham, de-davka bi-mkom she-ha-davar bahul, de-chashinan she-yavo lidei isur de-orayta, im lo natiru be-tiltul.” But according to what the Magen Avraham wrote there, that it is specifically in a case where the person is panicked, because we are concerned that if we do not permit moving it, he will come to commit a Torah prohibition.
That means that if he is not panicked, perhaps the permission does not apply. In this situation, seemingly, what is going to happen? They are going to take your menorah? There, you were dealing with a fire or carrying, a Torah prohibition. The Magen Avraham understood that the permission to move something Muktzeh in a case of monetary loss applies only when it prevents a Torah prohibition. No problem. But here, the Peri Megadim says it requires further study, because it sounds as though we are being lenient. What is going to happen? The person left his menorah outside the house as he was supposed to. He is worried someone will steal it. The menorah cost him $1,000. What will happen if we do not permit him to move it? Nothing. It will not lead to a Torah prohibition. It will lead to distress and financial loss. So the Peri Megadim says it requires further study whether we can give such permission.
We have a big puzzle to solve. The Mishnah Berurah and Peri Megadim knew siman shin-lamed-dalet. We actually rule like the second opinion; even if you want to rule like the first opinion, it applies under circumstances that do not exist in this case.
I saw that Chacham Ner Tzion discusses this. He brings up an answer someone wanted to suggest: In the other case, it was money, which is Muktzeh because of the object itself. Here, in contrast, it is a keli shemelachto le'issur. That would explain why the other case has those who prohibit, while here there is room to rely on Rabbi Shimon. He writes, “Ve-yesh she-ratzu lomar de-lo ne'emru divrei ha-Magen Avraham ve-ha-Mishnah Berurah le-kaman le-esor le-yisrael le-hatzil sechora min ha-geshamim, ela be-muktzeh machamat gufo o be-muktzeh machamat chesron kis dumya de-ma'ot, de-va-zeh gam Rabbi Shimon modeh de-havei muktzeh.” Some wanted to say that the Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah’s words prohibiting a Jew from saving merchandise from the rain refer only to Muktzeh due to the object itself or due to its monetary value, like money, where Rabbi Shimon also agrees that it is Muktzeh.
“Ve-im ken, leika le-meimar de-samchinan a-Rabbi Shimon bi-sh'at ha-dachak.” If so, we cannot say that we rely on Rabbi Shimon in pressing circumstances in those cases, because Rabbi Shimon agrees that they are forbidden. But with other Muktzeh, such as a menorah, which Rabbi Shimon would call a keli shemelachto le'issur—even though we do not rule according to him in this case, because it should be a basis—nevertheless, we can rely on Rabbi Shimon in pressing circumstances. We can rely on him even in a case of monetary loss where the person is not panicked and there is no fire involved.
That is one answer: the other case was Muktzeh because of the object itself, and no one permits that. Even Rabbi Shimon is strict about Muktzeh because of the object itself and Muktzeh due to monetary value. Here, we rely on Rabbi Shimon because it is a basis issue and he does not hold that it is a basis in this case. So it goes back to being a keli shemelachto le'issur, and you have to say that Rabbi Shimon permits moving a keli shemelachto le'issur.
There is no panic in the menorah case of monetary loss. Now we have to establish whether Rabbi Shimon agrees to that. We always understood that when it comes to a keli shemelachto le'issur, everyone agrees that it can be moved for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo. Even Rabbi Shimon would not permit it mechamah letzel. I always understood that whenever you get to the permission to move a menorah, you are relying on a leniency you do not normally use: “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak.” That is the permission. But you have to make sure Rabbi Shimon agrees to it.
Why did Maran take that as the second opinion? In the other case, it was Muktzeh because of the object itself, a serious kind of Muktzeh. Even Rabbi Shimon is strict about serious Muktzeh. Here, it is a keli shemelachto le'issur, so Rabbi Shimon must permit mechamah letzel. But what do you mean? It is a basis. “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav.” The problem is, as the Rav will prove, we find clearly that Rabbi Shimon holds that a keli shemelachto le'issur is forbidden mechamah letzel. That is it. So you cannot rely on Rabbi Shimon. Even when you are worried about losing it? Exactly. Even when you are worried about the loss of it.
What is the proof? “Achen zeh eino.” The Gemara in Beitzah, daf lamed-vav—perhaps lamed-vav—says, “Bei recheya de'Abaye.” What is a recheya (millstone)? A grinder, a millstone. “Daluf”—it was wet, getting moldy, whatever it was. They wanted to move it out of the room, or they wanted to use the room, or move it away from the dampness. They could not move it. A millstone is a keli shemelachto le'issur. They did not need its place for something else, and they could not use it. They wanted to save it from the dampness.
What did the Gemara say? “Vehorahu Rava sheyachnis lesham mitato”—Rava instructed him to bring his bed into that room. “Ve'al yedei zeh ya'aseh lo kegraf shel re'i.” Then it would become like a chamber pot. The water falling on the object meant you could not sleep there. Now you have a permission to make it a graf shel re'i, and it would be permitted to take the millstone out of there. The reason is that in a case of loss, you can initially create a graf shel re'i. Remember, we had a whole discussion: Can you initially create a graf shel re'i? The Gemara’s rule there is that in a case of loss, the millstone will be ruined. In a case of loss, we let you create a graf shel re'i. You did not need it before; you were in the other room. Put your bed in that room, act as if you want to sleep there, and then you can move the graf shel re'i out of the way.
The Magen Avraham says that a millstone is, if anything, a keli shemelachto le'issur. It is considered only a keli shemelachto le'issur. This proves that what the Magen Avraham wrote, prohibiting the movement of Muktzeh items damaged by rain, applies even to a keli shemelachto le'issur. Although it is permitted to move it for tzorech gufo and tzorech mekomo, moving it mechamah letzel is forbidden, even in a case of considerable loss due to rain.
So you see that in this case they prohibited it because there was no panic. The only time they permitted it there was when there was panic, because you might put out a fire and do other things. But outside of that, even for a keli shemelachto le'issur, you did not get this permission. They had you create a graf shel re'i. Why didn’t they simply say, “This is a keli shemelachto le'issur, there is a tremendous loss, it is raining everywhere; in a case of loss, take it out”? They did not. So the prohibition against moving something because of loss applies to every level of Muktzeh: Muktzeh due to the object itself, due to monetary value, and a keli shemelachto le'issur, like the millstone.
Why did the Gemara have to find a way to move the millstone? Why not simply say, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak,” and move it? There is no such Rabbi Shimon. Where do you see Rabbi Shimon permitting a keli shemelachto le'issur mechamah letzel? “Later we saw that they were lenient”—no. Later, the case involved panic, which can lead to a Torah prohibition. There, we are lenient. But this was not that kind of panic. Besides, you have another way: make it a graf shel re'i.
That is precisely the point. You have another way, but you do not have a way to move it without creating a graf shel re'i. So go back to our problem. The Mishnah Berurah says that if the chabarei are going to beat you, it is permitted. If they are going to beat you, that is clearly danger, and we say, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak.” I understand the permission: it is a keli shemelachto le'issur for tzorech mekomo. What does tzorech mekomo mean? I need the place empty because if it is not empty, the goyim will beat me up. I understand that.
But in this case, you are clearing the place in order to save the menorah. You do not need the place to be empty. You want to save the menorah, worth $1,000. That is not called tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo. It is clearly not tzorech gufo; you are not using the menorah. Tzorech mekomo? Do you need the place empty? No. If you are doing it because of the non-Jews, yes: when they walk by, the place has to be empty so they do not see the lit menorah, or they will beat you up. But when you are doing it to prevent monetary loss, what is the permission? Even Rabbi Shimon is—
Now you might say, “Take your bed and put it on the porch.” That is like a graf shel re'i, so that is not going to help. Perhaps that is why this is not a proof. Maybe when you have the opportunity to do it in a more permitted way, by making a graf shel re'i, they do not let you move it directly. They make you use the regular rules. But if you do not have the graf shel re'i option, then move it? And who are you relying on? Rabbi Shimon. But we have not found Rabbi Shimon permitting a keli shemelachto le'issur. That is the problem. In a keli shemelachto le'issur, Rabbi Shimon agrees to the regular rules.
Chacham Tzion gives a nice answer. Watch what he says. When we discuss the menorah, Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether it is a basis. Rabbi Yehudah says it is a basis; we have established that. Rabbi Shimon says it is not a basis, because it is going to go out. Once you know something is going to go out on Shabbat, Rabbi Shimon is lenient. He does not hold of that other type of basis.
But we need an explanation of what the Gemara means when it says that, because we rely on Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted to move the menorah. Rabbi Shimon also agrees that moving a keli shemelachto le'issur mechamah letzel is forbidden. Here, it is mechamah letzel. What are you moving the menorah for? The Gemara presents no difficulty. It did not permit moving the menorah mechamah letzel because of monetary loss. It permitted moving it because of the non-Jews’ anger. The Gemara was concerned about the non-Jews.
Here is the explanation. Since we hold like Rabbi Shimon that it is not a basis, what remains is only the prohibition that it is a keli shemelachto le'issur. Since this type of keli can be moved for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo, and only mechamah letzel is forbidden, when the person fears the non-Jew’s anger because the non-Jew may suddenly see that he lit a menorah, moving the menorah is truly considered tzorech mekomo. He needs the menorah’s place to be empty. That is the reasoning we discussed: he needs the place where the menorah was to be empty so the non-Jew will not see it.
It is a nice approach to the Gemara. “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon” requires you to go through the steps. We are relying on Rabbi Shimon, so it is not a basis. What is it, then? It is not a keli shemelachto le'heter; it is a keli shemelachto le'issur. A keli shemelachto le'issur can be moved only for tzorech gufo or tzorech mekomo. So he brings in that famous novelty: this is mekomo. Why is it mekomo? I am not putting anything in that spot. No, I need the place vacated so that when the Persians walk by, they will not see a menorah there.
But if you start using that reasoning, couldn’t you say that in any case of mechamah letzel, “I want this space to be empty”? No. You do not really want the place empty; you want the object. With mechamah letzel, what do you care about the place being empty? The place has no bearing on it. You need the menorah in your house because it is safe. That is a big difference. Here, you need the place empty because the Arabs might come by, see the menorah, and kill you. There, I need nothing to be in the place. That is clear. With mechamah letzel, you want to save the item; you do not care whether the place is empty. You do not need the place empty. You want the item safe in your house.
So it is a nice approach to the Gemara, because otherwise you always have to ask about “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon.” Rabbi Shimon is not a credit card that permits Muktzeh. He has rules, too.
Now he says, “Ve'ata techezeh,” and continues: If we explain the words of the Peri Megadim and Mishnah Berurah as permitting movement of the menorah because of monetary loss—that is, because you are worried the menorah will be stolen—we now have a problem. You are telling me we permit a keli shemelachto le'issur mechamah letzel, but we have no Rabbi Shimon to rely on in pressing circumstances. Maran later prohibited that, and those who permit it only permit it when there is panic, as the Magen Avraham said. So where did the Mishnah Berurah add, in this one line, “the same applies to monetary loss”? That is a very strong question.
He answers: “Ve-hanir'eh”—this is his novelty—“muchrach mikol zeh detrei inyenei hefsed mamon ninhu.” No, there are two kinds of monetary loss. What the Mishnah Berurah wrote here, permitting movement of Muktzeh because of monetary loss, means that you fear a non-Jew will cause you a great monetary loss. It is not that you are worried about losing the $1,000 menorah. The monetary loss there is that the non-Jew will impose a $10,000 fine if he sees your menorah outside.
The Mishnah Berurah’s novelty is that monetary loss is part of “yareh o haka'ot”—fear or blows—not the loss of the menorah itself. If they see the menorah outside after you lit it, they may come the next day and repossess your piano or your house. He says, “Velo rak sheyafsid hamenorah, ela dumya deyakehu hanochri, sheyekhannesennu mamon harbeh, o yitol kol asher lo.” It is not only that he will lose the menorah; it is comparable to the non-Jew beating him, imposing a large fine, or taking everything he owns. “Vehu karov legeder sakanah, lefi shehu mit'asek im hanochri hamakpid al kach.” It is close to the category of danger, because he will have to deal with a non-Jew who is angry about this.
That is the monetary loss here. The chabarei may beat you up; that is one way. Another way is that they impose a fine. The Mishnah Berurah is saying that it is not only physical beating but financial punishment as well. “She'ar hefsed mamon” means other types of losses at the hands of the chabarei. Even if the non-Jew is not going to kill him—as wise Joe said at the beginning, if someone is going to kill you, move the menorah while it is lit; you do not have to wait until it goes out—he may still be saved financially. In any case, it is a situation where the language of danger may include a threat to one’s property.
Now everything is clear. This is a nice explanation of the Mishnah Berurah. When you read the Mishnah Berurah in reish ayin tet, you have to understand that language. The monetary loss is not the loss of the Muktzeh item itself. Even if the loss is great, that is not a reason to permit moving it. That is the point of the prohibition: a keli shemelachto le'issur cannot be moved simply to save it. The permission applies specifically when the loss also involves fear and a defined danger from a non-Jew. The non-Jew’s involvement is what creates the Gemara’s permission. The non-Jew will see the menorah in a place where it is not permitted according to their laws, and this is considered moving the Muktzeh for tzorech mekomo. In pressing circumstances, we rely on Rabbi Shimon.
Someone asked: Didn’t we see Chacham Ovadiah say that candlesticks are a keli shemelachto le'heter? No, didn’t he say it is chesron kis? No, no, didn't he say it was a keli shemelachto leheiter? You cannot say this reasoning in the Mishnah Berurah, because he calls this a keli shemelachto le'issur. But according to Chacham Ovadiah, perhaps this discussion does not even begin. Those may have been ones that are not used, only decorative. He was talking about ones that are left as decoration. There, he called them a keli shemelachto le'heter, because they are decorative. But the ones you use every week—no, that was the novelty. He did not call them chesron kis. Since you do not use them, they are like a vase or something, so they are a keli shemelachto le'heter.
How big are the candlesticks? This is a menorah you are using. He is saying he does not think it is the same. This is the cheap one. The cheap ones. If you want to call it chesron kis, he calls it a keli shemelachto le'issur, because it is a utensil you use.
The second novelty I want to tell you today is—are we rushing, or can I give you one more? Anybody leaving today? That is two lines of reasoning. What do you call this? Tircha detzibura (burdening the congregation)? We know that one. Try me again. What is the majority?
Chacham Ovadiah has a very interesting question in Chazon Ovadiah. Let’s see how you answer it. A person rented a hall for Shabbat. On Friday, the workers were setting up the hall, and they took a Muktzeh item that was on the floor. They did not know where to put it, so they placed it on one of the chairs right before Shabbat. Leave it there; put it on the chair. During twilight, the Muktzeh item was on this chair.
On Shabbat, another non-Jew came, took the Muktzeh item away, and put it somewhere else. Then this chair got mixed in among all the chairs—there were a thousand chairs. Did that chair become a basis? Why would it become a basis? Before you get nervous: that chair is now mixed among a thousand chairs. If it is a basis, I cannot sit on it because I cannot move it; the chair becomes Muktzeh. So does that chair become batel among the thousand chairs? What is the bitul (nullification) of a basis? Is it batel beshishim? Is it batel beme'ah? Is it batel bemata'yim? It is batel berov (nullified by a majority).
That is a new rule? It is always a rule. I heard there is nullification in sixty, in a hundred, after the fact in a thousand, and some things are not nullified even in a thousand. So you are giving me a new rule that a basis is nullified by a majority. Say that again. Whose chair is it? That is part of the question. The chair belongs to the hall. But why is it a basis? Who put the Muktzeh item there? The non-Jew. The owner, the non-Jew, the workers. The non-Jew thought they were setting up the chairs and put it there. Everything is according to the owner of the hall. Did the owner of the hall make it a basis, and the owner of the chairs make it a basis? Yes, they made it a basis; it was placed with the owner’s intent. But wait, when a non-Jew sets it up, does that work? Are you saying it was al da'at Yisraeli?
One way out is to say that since you rented it, it is your chair, and therefore someone else cannot prohibit your item. If you hold that renting makes you the owner, that is a good permission. Chacham Ovadiah brings this at the end: “Ve'od yesh lomar she'im sacharta et hamakom, ein adam yachol le'esor davar she'eino shelo”—one can also say that if you rented the place, a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him.
But let’s assume it was not rented and set that aside. What would you say if you went to someone’s house for lunch and he said, “I don’t know if you can sit on any of these chairs. One was a basis before Shabbat, and they are all the same dining-room chairs. We don’t know which chair it was, so we are going to stand.” You say, “But he put it on—” He says, “I made it a basis. I definitely wanted to leave it there. I did not know we would have company. I put it there. Now we have company, but luckily they took it off after Shabbat.” It is a basis now. Is it nullified?
The problem is whether there is a rule of bitul. We have a general rule. What is the law? Answer it based on other cases. You have an egg born on Yom Tov (holiday): beitzah shenoldah beYom Tov (an egg laid on Yom Tov). It is forbidden because it is newly created. Now the egg gets mixed up with 10,000 eggs. It is still forbidden. Why? Because you can wait until after Yom Tov.
That is called davar sheyesh lo matirim (an item that becomes permitted). In other words, wait until after Yom Tov, at least until the next day, and then it will be permitted. When do we say bitul? If milk falls into meat, I could wait until Mashiach and it will still be forbidden. So there we use bitul. But if the prohibition will expire after a certain amount of time, the Gemara says to wait it out and then eat it. Why eat it while forbidden when you can eat it when permitted? Why rely on nullification? Wait until it becomes entirely permitted.
So now, perhaps this chair got mixed in with a thousand chairs. Wait until after Shabbat; then the chair becomes permitted. Everything is a loss. The eggs are also a loss. What loss? I want to eat the eggs. What do you mean, I do not need eggs? I have company today; I want to eat the eggs today. No, you cannot eat the eggs. I have 10,000 people at my house now. They will tell you, “No eggs today; come tomorrow.” We are not coming tomorrow; tomorrow I am going back to Israel.
Someone objects, “No, Rabbi, after Shabbat the chairs are no longer yours; they belong to the non-Jew again.” It is in the house. Yes, it is in the house. I gave the rented-hall case, which could be answered by renting; now we are back to the case of someone’s house. A regular person has the chairs after Shabbat.
Maybe you will tell him that it is like the eggs. Why is it not like the eggs? Because you need the chair now. I do not need the eggs now? I want the eggs now, too. You are right; I need a chair now, absolutely, because I need to sit. If my lunch was eggs, I needed the eggs, too.
Can we say, “Kedei hu Rabbi Shimon lismokh alav bishe'at hadechak,” and use it? What does Rabbi Shimon hold? That it is not a basis? We do not hold of newly created things? The egg is fine; the question is the chairs. The chair is a basis. You can rely on Rabbi Shimon? Why? Then does it become a keli shemelachto le'heter? Are the chairs a keli shemelachto le'heter? No, if it becomes a basis, it takes on the status of whatever was on it.
Wait. Once the Muktzeh is removed, what is the status of this chair? If it is a basis, it is a basis. But it is not a basis? We have not established that. The only case we saw of relying on Rabbi Shimon in pressing circumstances was danger from non-Jews. We did not see a permission to rely on Rabbi Shimon in pressing circumstances for a doubt. We relied on him in the case of the non-Jews: they might beat you up, shema yikberum; you are afraid of them; the Mishnah Berurah’s novelty is that they might fine you. It is an issue involving non-Jews. Here, there is no loss of money. Here it is a party. Yes, it is a she'at hadechak, but it is not the Gemara’s she'at hadechak. The Gemara is clearly specific about the chabarei, the Zoroastrians.
Someone suggests, “Safek sefeika.” No, wait. And slow down: I am not sure Rabbi Shimon would not agree that this is a basis. Rabbi Shimon did not hold that the menorah was a basis because it was going to go out. But if Muktzeh is sitting on a chair, where is it going? It is sitting there. Rabbi Shimon does hold of basis; he is lenient in a particular case. He holds that a menorah that you know will go out is not a basis. What is not the same here is that you have Muktzeh sitting on a chair. Even Rabbi Shimon may hold that it is a basis. So you cannot take that route.
Chacham Ovadiah brings an amazing explanation from the Noda BiYehudah, Rabbi Yechezkel Landau, the gaon from Prague, in his sefer Tzelach, which stands for Tziyun LeNefesh Chayah. He says something amazing: You say davar sheyesh lo matirim, a stringency, only with food. That is the difference. Why? I do not know. With food, it is a one-time item. It is consumed, and you use it once. The Gemara’s reasoning is: Instead of eating it while forbidden, wait and eat it when permitted. You are going to use the item one time, so instead of relying on nullification now, wait and eat it later. You only get one use out of it.
But a chair can be used a hundred times. If you tell me to wait, I lose all those uses until the end of Shabbat. The reasoning, “Instead of using it while forbidden, use it later,” does not apply in the same way. No matter what you do, you will eat the egg only once: either now or later. The Gemara says that you can eat it only once, so wait it out; that is davar sheyesh lo matirim. But a chair does not have only one use. If you tell me to wait, I lose all its uses until Shabbat ends.
Therefore, with an item that has many uses, we do not say davar sheyesh lo matirim. We can say batel berov, which is the Torah-level rule, and be lenient in this case. We do not have to worry about the basis because the rule of davar sheyesh lo matirim applies specifically to food.
Does everyone agree with that? The Noda BiYehudah agrees, but there are those who argue. You are right. But Muktzeh is rabbinic, basis is rabbinic, so in a case of pressing circumstances, we can rely on the Noda BiYehudah. We can use that permission. It will not be the same permission; we will have to find other permissions, but this happens all the time: a person has a knife that was not immersed in the mikveh (ritual bath), and it gets mixed up with all the knives. You put a knife aside because it has to be immersed in a mikveh, and suddenly it gets mixed up. Where is the knife? The housekeeper put it back in the drawer. They are all the same knives.
But the Shulchan Aruch discusses that. What does it say? I forget. I think it is nullified by a majority. In Yoreh De'ah? I did not know. If it discusses it, I would assume it is in Yoreh De'ah, not Choshen Mishpat, David. We know that trick. I do not think you are a great Torah scholar just because you said Yoreh De'ah. If you gave me the siman, I might be impressed, but just saying Yoreh De'ah does not impress me. That is automatic. It is going to be in Yoreh De'ah. The laws of immersing utensils—Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah. That is a tactic the wise guys use to show they know something. The people over there got impressed: “How did you know, Yoreh De'ah? Amazing!” But the people who really know are not impressed by that. Where is it going to be, in Choshen Mishpat, the laws of immersing utensils? You took a shot. You do not know, and we do not know either. You could also give a siman.
Anyway, the issue there is the same: davar sheyesh lo matirim. What is the davar sheyesh lo matirim? Go take all the knives and immerse them. “I can fix this.” Why should I rely on bitul? I cannot extract milk from a pot that milk fell into; the only way to permit it is bitul. Here, I have a way out: take all 50 knives and immerse them, and then it is resolved.
But that is still davar sheyesh lo matirim. First, I will tell you that bitul applies only to food; we say that. Second, I have to hear more. I have to perform an action. When do we say davar sheyesh lo matirim? Maybe when you can just wait it out. But now you are telling me I have to take it to the mikveh. Maybe that stringency does not apply in such a case, especially when there is a loss now. I have to go get water, and—
So in that case, they are lenient as well. One of the reasons they are lenient is this Noda BiYehudah again. The starting point is that it applies only to food. A knife can be used; wait until it is immersed. Or perhaps wait until its day passes, and then I can use it 52 times. And as Benny said, maybe davar sheyesh lo matirim means something that will become permitted automatically. Wait until after Yom Tov and the egg becomes permitted. Mashiach can come, but until someone immerses the knives, they will not become permitted. That is another way to answer it.
But after Shabbat, you have to immerse them. Why? We just came up with an answer. Why do I have to immerse them? We are discussing Shabbat? I did not discuss Shabbat. I am talking about Tuesday. On Tuesday, I have 50 knives, one was not immersed, and it got mixed up with the rest. Use it now and immerse it later? Why do I have to immerse it? What is the prohibition in using it? It is nullified. We have the nullification. Immerse it now if you want to eat. But he is bringing it back to davar sheyesh lo matirim.
That was a similar question. With meat and milk, I said bitul beshishim: eat it, and when I'm done, throw out the rest? That is not the halachah. In this case, you may eat it. The knife can be used 20 times. Bitul, get out of here. I am trying to tell you that davar sheyesh lo matirim does not apply in this case, Benny. It applies only to something that will become permitted automatically, not something you have to perform an action to permit. Here, you have to take it to a mikveh. It is not waiting for Yom Tov to end or Shabbat to end.
So in that case, perhaps I can rely on nullification. In the egg case, it is not a loss. Here, there is a loss. The egg case involves food; this is not food. There are many reasons to be more lenient in the knife case than in the egg case.