So he says here a few halachot (laws): k'shem she'asur (forbidden) likshor kach asur lehatir (just as it is forbidden to tie, so it is forbidden to untie), ve'oto kesher (knot) she'asur lekoshro asur lehatir (and the same knot that is forbidden to tie is forbidden to untie). If tying it is forbidden min haTorah (by Torah law), untying it is likewise forbidden min haTorah; if tying it is forbidden derabanan (rabbinic), untying it is likewise forbidden derabanan. It works both ways: koshér (tying) and matir (untying).
There is no Torah prohibition in untying unless untying it is metaken, a positive function. But if untying it is mekalkel (destructive), the prohibition is rabbinic. If you untie a knot destructively, the prohibition is rabbinic. Some say that if a person unties a knot shelo al menat likshor (in order to tie), even if he thereby makes a positive correction, there is no Torah prohibition. Others disagree: if untying it makes a correction, there is a Torah prohibition even shelo al menat likshor (in order to tie).
This is a major subject in itself. Regarding matir, do you need to untie in order to tie again? We said that matir is forbidden as long as you are doing something positive. Soter (demolishing) is in order to build, and mochek (erasing) is in order to write. There is always a positive function.
He says: uvegabei koshér yesh safek laTosafot (Tosafot) im mikivan shelo huzkar baMishnah davka al menat litpor (in order to sew) chayav (liable), im ken mimela chayav bekhol inyan, kol shehavi metaken. O dilma, ein hochachah mimah shelo huzkar, ve'achen hatanna, dilma hatam nachit leshi'ura dekore'a hayah al menat litpor shetei tefirot; veda'at haRosh (Rabbenu Asher) bePerek Zayin de'eino chayav bematir rak al menat likshor (in order to tie). UveBi'ur Halachah (a halachic commentary) tamah al haRosh. The Tosafot raise a question about tying: since the Mishnah does not say that one is liable only when tying in order to sew, perhaps one is liable in every case, whenever it is constructive. Or perhaps the fact that the Mishnah does not say so proves nothing, because there the Tanna was specifying the measure for tearing: it had to be in order to sew two stitches. The Rosh holds that one is liable for untying only when doing so in order to tie again. The Bi'ur Halachah questions the Rosh.
The Rosh says that one is liable for untying only in order to tie again. So, according to the Rosh, it has to be in order to tie again: you untie with the intention of tying it again.
The Bi'ur Halachah questions the Rosh based on tearing: even in that case, a person is liable whenever the act is constructive, all the more so for untying. The Mishnah says, “One who tears in order to sew.” The law of tearing is that even if he does not intend to sew, he is liable if the tearing serves a positive function. The Mishnah says this explicitly. It says, “One who tears in order to sew.” But regarding tying and untying, it does not say, “One who unties in order to tie again.” If, regarding tearing, the Mishnah says it and we still say that one is liable even without intending to sew, all the more so one should be liable for untying even without intending to tie again. That is the Bi'ur Halachah's question.
However, the Bi'ur Halachah follows his own reasoning. He writes regarding tearing that the view that liability applies only when one tears in order to sew is the unique view of the Radbaz (Rabbi David ben Zimra). But we have already written, regarding tearing, that there is evidence that several opinions agree with the Radbaz, namely the view of the Rambam (Maimonides), the Tosafot, and the Rosh here. If so, there is no question against the Rosh on this point. In particular, the Tosafot understood that this was also the view of Rabbenu Chananel (Rabbenu Hananel).
The question raised by the Bi'ur Halachah is that the Gemara does not distinguish, in its question about one shoe compared with another, between untying in order to tie again and untying without intending to tie again. From this, he learns that even untying without intending to tie again is forbidden by Torah law.
The Gemara has a contradiction: in one place, untying a shoe is forbidden by Torah law, and in another place it is forbidden rabbinically. The Bi'ur Halachah says the Gemara could have answered simply: the case where it is forbidden by Torah law is when one unties in order to tie again, and the case where it is forbidden rabbinically is when one unties without intending to tie again. Since the Gemara did not give that simple answer, the Bi'ur Halachah learns that it must always be a Torah-level liability. Why didn't the Gemara resolve the contradiction that way and say that untying without intending to tie again is only rabbinic? The Bi'ur Halachah says that it must be a Torah prohibition.
He says he does not know why that is a question. He answers: i nami, lo muchrach, deyesh lomar demishum dehaGemara de'atiya beraita lamdanu din meyuchad bekoshér, velo shehavi din shel kol dinei Shabbat patur bemekalkel. It is not conclusive. We can say that the Gemara, by bringing the baraita, teaches us a special law about tying, not the general law of Shabbat that one is exempt when acting destructively. Normally, if you are mekalkel on Shabbat, you are patur (exempt). Perhaps the Gemara is teaching a separate novelty: in the case of untying, even though it is destructive, one could still be liable. It is not necessarily teaching that untying must be in order to tie again. The Gemara is teaching a broader novelty.
In any event, in practice, it is a kind of safek sefeika (double uncertainty) whether one is liable whenever the act is constructive. Perhaps the opinions that hold that one is liable for tearing only when it is in order to sew are correct; and perhaps, in any case, one is liable for tying even without intending to tie again. In particular, Maran (the authoritative halachic decisor)'s view at the end of Siman 340 is that even for tearing, one is liable only when doing it in order to sew. We have not left the realm of uncertainty, however, so whenever there are other grounds to be lenient, one can include the Rosh's view among them.
That is why he does not reach a conclusion here. This is a whole question in itself. Untying is constructive. How does he make that comparison? If it serves some kind of correction—say, you want to take off your shoes, and untying the knot lets you get the shoe off—that is a positive result. The question is that you are not tying it again, say, on Shabbat. So if you take off your shoe without intending to tie it again, there is uncertainty whether it is a Torah prohibition.
“Untying is to seat, to put it on or get—”
“No, putting it on and trying to preserve a knot is not what we want to discuss. We are talking about something else.”
“Right, we are not talking about that. You are assuming the shoe is tied with a bad knot.”
“Obviously.”
“Obviously. It is tied with a knot that you cannot untie; that is why it is matir.”
Im koshér kesher (knot) veyesh safek im yehei hakesher le'olam (forever) o sheyatirenu miyad (immediately). If a person ties a knot and is uncertain at the time whether it will remain forever or whether he will untie it immediately, it should be treated as a kesher shel kayama (a permanent knot) in every respect. If it seems likely that it will not remain forever, there is someone whose words appear to indicate that it is not forbidden by Torah law.
Regarding the case above, if it is uncertain whether the knot will remain for half a year or longer, and then after half a year it is certain that it will remain longer—or o diyoter bazeh—one can rely on the view that it is not a permanent knot, even by Torah law.
If a person tied a permanent knot and then changed his mind and decided not to make it permanent—we saw that yesterday—there is uncertainty whether we follow the later machshavah (thought) or whether the machshavah cannot undo the ma'aseh (act) he already performed. This is the reverse case we discussed: he performed the act with the intention that it remain, and afterward changed his mind. Can changing his mind undo the act?
Someone asks: “It is interesting, Rabbi. A person ties a knot and says, ‘Oh, that is forbidden,’ and then unties it. Did he perform two melachot (prohibited labors), or did he undo his original one? He ties a carpet, realizes it is forbidden, and unties it.”
He brings a case here, the same question as earlier. He did it intending to leave it for later in the day, and he brings the case Benny mentioned yesterday. He says: dinim elu yesh lilmod mehaGemara bePesachim (the tractate Pesachim). We saw the Yere'im (Sefer Yere'im) yesterday, and vechen huchach bena. If the knot is not permanent, such as a knot in a rope, but it is customary to make that rope into a permanent knot, the Gemara—or the Yere'im—says that making it is forbidden rabbinically, shema yimalech—you might change your mind—and make it permanent.
“A bucket rope.”
Exactly. The plain meaning indicates that in this case it is a Torah prohibition. But that is difficult: a machshavah (thought) cannot undo a ma'aseh (act). His ma'aseh was permitted, or let us say, rabbinic. How can a machshavah turn it into a Torah prohibition?
Perhaps in such a case it is not considered an action, because what determines whether it is permanent is primarily the thought, not the action. We said yesterday: what makes it a permanent knot? The thought. According to this, even if at first it was a permanent knot and then he changed his mind and decided not to make it permanent, that could be effective, because it does not become permanent until his thought takes effect. Nevertheless, this is not clear.
Regarding this case, if on Shabbat a person thinks about a nonpermanent knot and decides to make it permanent, we have to consider whether that is a Torah prohibition. Earlier I discussed a distinction: if he made it nonpermanent on Shabbat and then changed his mind and decided to make it permanent, one could say that it is a Torah prohibition, even though we seemingly do not see a prohibition in thought without action.
It is an amazing thing: how can there be a Torah prohibition through thought? The thought is what causes it. He performed the act, but he performed the act permissibly, or as a rabbinic prohibition. Nevertheless, perhaps in such a case it is considered an action, since he tied it on Shabbat itself.
That is different from a case where, for example, he tied it on Friday and then changed his mind on Shabbat. We find something similar in the Gemara and the early authorities regarding placing a micham, a pot, near the fire before the water reaches yad soledet bo (hot enough to scald). They prohibited this in case he changes his mind and leaves it there until it becomes hot enough to scald.
That is the case. I put a pot of water on the fire intending to take it off after one minute. Am I allowed to do that? No. I just want to warm it up. Technically, there is no problem with warming it on Shabbat; I am not going to boil it, I just want to take the chill off. Am I allowed to do that?
“No. Why?”
“A gezerah (rabbinic decree): you might leave it there.”
“And what is the problem if I might leave it there?”
“It will cook.”
It will cook. But when I put it there, my intention was to leave it there for only one minute. The prohibition would come after that act was done. Obviously, if I leave it there and it cooks, that would be a Torah prohibition; I would be liable to bring a sacrifice. So you see that one can perform an act that was permitted, and later one's thought or negligence can change its status.
“Is there a difference between the cases?”
“The difference is that yesterday it was clear that it was different.”
No, yesterday we did not discuss whether it is forbidden to do that. It is forbidden to do that. Why? Shema yimalech—you might change your mind. If he does so, then the thought is without an action. Why is it forbidden, and why do we make a decree? It must be that since he began the action, it is considered an action. If so, in the same way, if someone ties a nonpermanent knot on Shabbat and then changes his mind on Shabbat and decides to make it permanent, we have to consider whether that is a Torah prohibition.
“Wow, that is a proof! It is a practical case.”
A person tied the tie on Shabbat. The case we discussed yesterday: a person like me, Eliyahu Mansour, ties a tie on Shabbat, and initially, when he ties it, he says, “After Shabbat, I will undo it.” After tying it, he says, “You know what? It came out well. I am going to put this in my ready-made section, and it will last for two years, usually.” So on Shabbat, through thought, he changed the tie from nonpermanent to permanent. Perhaps that is a Torah prohibition.
Then, by the same token, there should be a prohibition against tying knots, just as there is a concern that a person might leave the pot on the fire—not because he might forget it there, but because he might change his mind and leave it there. What about a person who ties things and forgets to untie them? Why did they not make a decree against tying? Untying—to say it is the same prohibition.
“Unless you say that with food there is a greater likelihood that someone will leave it to heat up than that someone will make a permanent knot. It will cook in ten minutes, whereas a knot has to be left for a week before it is considered permanent.”
“No, not only that. I am also less likely to make a permanent knot than I am to heat up my water. The similarity would be that if I leave this alone, it becomes a Torah prohibition. If I put the pot on the fire, and leave it alone, it becomes a Torah prohibition. If I tie a knot and leave it alone, it becomes a Torah prohibition. I do not have to do anything to it.”
“Even though—”
“I need a thought. I need a thought.”
“Oh, so wait. We would not say that if someone ties a knot and has no thought about it, and just leaves it, it becomes—”
“No, it seems he has to have a thought now.”
“Because he does not really have to have a thought. It is going to happen automatically.”
“Automatically, then that is a different case.”
Correct. The question was, how does thought take him out of the action? If you had a thought, that is one thing. But if you have no thought and it simply turns out that way and remains that way, my intention at the time was not that. I had no intention of that, and that is not what I am discussing. For him, that is obvious; it is similar to the case of the hot-water vessel, because there you also have no thought. It just happens automatically. It is a concern that you might change your mind and leave it until the water is hot enough to scald. That is how he understands the case: you might change your mind and leave it there. If that is how he understands it, then it is exactly the same.
But he says: if the knot was tied on a weekday, and then on Shabbat you changed your intention, that would not be a Torah prohibition. Since you did not perform an action on Shabbat, you have only thought. There is no comparable case with the hot-water vessel: if you put it on the vessel—
“The hot-water vessel is like putting it on Erev Shabbat (Friday). You put it on Erev Shabbat and then decide on Shabbat that you will leave it there; that would be forbidden.”
He says: ve'im hayah kesher shel kayama venimalch beShabbat la'asoto lo shel kayama, mistabra de'afilu im beShabbat atzmah kesharo lihyot shel kayama, mikol makom mistabra de'ein bazeh issur shel matir. If it was a permanent knot and on Shabbat he changed his mind and decided it should not be permanent, it stands to reason that even if he tied it on Shabbat intending it to be permanent, there is nevertheless no prohibition of untying in this case.
“But why?”
He wants to untie the knot now on Shabbat, but he has decided that it is not a permanent knot.
“Exactly. He wants to untie it.”
Regarding untying, if it was a permanent knot and he changed his mind on Shabbat and decided it should not be permanent, it stands to reason that even if he tied it on Shabbat intending it to be permanent, there is nevertheless no prohibition of untying. But why? There is the same uncertainty as above: can thought change it into something nonpermanent? If I am now untying a permanent knot, it is no longer permanent.
“No, but when I made it, it was permanent.”
“I understand, but we are discussing untying now.”
“On Shabbat I made it permanent.”
“Then that is a prohibition.”
“On Shabbat I made it permanent, and then I changed my mind. I said, ‘I do not want this tie to remain; I am going to take it off after Shabbat.’ Can I take it off now?”
That is the question. It is the same question regarding untying.
“Why can he not do it if he made it permanent? It is supposed to remain forever.”
“Because I changed my mind.”
“The action must remain permanent.”
That is the question we are discussing: does thought change it? If thought makes it something else, then take it off; it is not stuck that way.
“So on Shabbat can I be liable for thought without an action? The thought itself—”
“No, the thought turned it into a permanent knot.”
“Is thought just an idea in the air, or is it thought that has meaning? He has worn the same tie for two months and has not opened it. He wears it and only loosens it a little and puts it back.”
“So you are proposing an enormous novelty: that a person could be put to death for thought on Shabbat. The action I actually did was nonpermanent. I changed my mind, so now I will leave it.”
The question is whether thought can uproot the act. If I tied the tie as nonpermanent and, on Shabbat after the meal, changed my mind and decided to leave it forever, that would be shev ve'al ta'aseh (sit and refrain from action), so there would be no problem. But here it is kum va'aseh (arise and act). The Ben Ish Chai (Rabbi Yosef Chaim) asks in Rav Pe'alim (Responsa by the Ben Ish Chai): how could anyone ever violate the prohibition of borer (selecting) if he is doing it for later in the day? At the time he does it, he could eat it le'alter (immediately). So how could you hold the person liable? The early authorities discuss this at length. That is a good question. You raised borer right away yesterday.
So, if a person tied a permanent knot and on Shabbat changed his mind and decided it should not be permanent, there is no prohibition of untying. If he tied a nonpermanent knot on Shabbat and then on that same Shabbat changed his mind and decided it should be permanent, there is room to say that there is a Torah prohibition. That is the question, an amazing question.
He has one more case here. We saw that in the Bi'ur Halachah. Let us look at one more law he says, a question we did not discuss: making a knot in food. Im kashar bidavar shera'ui lema'achal adam, o lema'achal behemah, yesh mi she'omer sheyesh bazeh mishum koshér. Veyesh cholkim, de'ein bazeh issur koshér. Ule'inyan dina, im yesh od tzad heter, kegon she'eino ma'aseh uman, o she'eino kesher le'olam, yesh lehatir bazeh. If someone ties something suitable for human consumption or animal feed, some say that this involves tying, while others disagree. In practice, if there is another reason to permit it—for example, it is not a ma'aseh uman (craftsman's knot), or it is not a kesher shel kayama (permanent knot)—one may permit it.
“The food will be eaten. Food cannot be permanent; it gets used up or starts to dry out. How could it be permanent?”
“What about spaghetti?”
“In two days it is gone.”
“Licorice, for example.”
The Mishnah Berurah (a halachic commentary) seems to indicate that one should not permit it. What would be an example? Spaghetti? A person ties spaghetti for his child? String candy—licorice candy, string candy. It could be that a food company decides to make knotted licorice. Someone buys it, and the licorice has twenty knots in it, made two months ago in the factory. According to Rashi, it is a permanent knot. What should you do: untie it or eat it? What do you call it if you eat it—does it untie in your stomach? I do not know.
“That is not how the world generally works. Where do you make knots in food?”
“Children have string candies and knot them.”
“What about the chamin (slow-cooked Sabbath stew)? They sew the chamin.”
“That is sewing. When they come to eat it, they have to untie it.”
“They do not untie it; they rip it apart. That is a kor'a issue.”
But here we are discussing foodstuffs. I think Menuchat Ahavah (a halachic work) discusses it. What is the law regarding food? If someone wants to eat it that same day, that is the normal way of eating; it is not a permanent knot. That is why he says there is room to permit it.
Look at the Bi'ur Halachah, boys, at the end of Siman 317. He writes: vehaynu harambam, afilu ma'aseh uman, nismach bemitzvot, vekhu'. Al korchach lomar desavira lei lerambam, lo kashya, ela dehama'aseh hayah begemi yavesh, she'eino ra'ui shuv lema'achal behemah. There it was discussing putting the gemi (reed) on the deli (bucket). The gemi is suitable for animal feed, so what should the problem be? The Bi'ur Halachah says the Rambam must be referring to dry gemi, which is no longer suitable for animal feed. He holds that in dry gemi there is “kesher akuvim derabanan.”
Rashi writes that the case involved a moist reed, which is suitable for animal feed. Perhaps Rashi really holds that, according to the law, there was no knot prohibition at all, even rabbinically, as Rashi explains that he does not set it aside. What Rashi says afterward—that from their words we learn that knots may be tied on Shabbat—refers to the basic law that a nonpermanent knot is permitted from the outset. He is not discussing a somewhat permanent knot, which is forbidden rabbinically.
So the question is whether this reed is suitable for eating or not. If it is suitable for eating, there is no problem of tying?
“Correct. That is what he is saying. There would be no problem.”
Why? He says: yesh omrim, shemutar likshor beShabbat kol kesher shehu bidavar shera'ui lema'achal behemah. Some say that on Shabbat it is permitted to tie any knot in something suitable for animal feed. This is what the Rambam wrote: anything suitable for animal feed may be tied on Shabbat. Therefore, if a sandal strap breaks in a karmelit (rabbinic public domain), one takes a moist reed suitable for animal feed, wraps it around the strap, and ties the reed.
The Maggid Mishneh writes that the source is the following: Rabbi Yirmiyah was walking with Rabbi Abahu in a karmelit, when his sandal strap broke. Rabbi Abahu told him to take a moist reed suitable for animal feed and wrap it around the strap. The Rambam explains that he wrapped the reed and tied it onto the strap. The Ra'avyah also writes that if a sandal strap breaks in a karmelit, or in a similar case, and it cannot be fixed otherwise, one can take a moist reed and wrap it around the strap and tie it, since it is suitable for animal feed.
See also the glosses of Maharikash, who corrected the Rambam's ruling, and the glosses of Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law). I also saw that Maran HaChida (Rabbi Chaim Yosef David Azulai), in Moreh Ba'etzba (a halachic work), writes that in the morning one should bind the lulav (palm branch), hadas (myrtle), and aravah (willow) with the leaves of the lulav that he prepared on Erev Yom Tov (festival).
“You take the leaves of the lulav on Yom Tov and make a knot? Why?”
“Because in this case, the law of tying does not apply. Animals can eat the leaves of the lulav.”
It seems that this is the reason: according to what the Rambam wrote, anything suitable for animal feed is not subject to the law of tying. The Tosefta (early rabbinic teachings) also says: one should not bind it on Yom Tov, but one may take a stalk from it and bind it. What is a sharvit? It is a piece of the lulav.
The Bi'ur Halachah also cites the book Me'ah She'arim, leharitzgat, where it says that if it becomes undone again on Yom Tov, one may bind it with a bundle of greens. Regarding a bow, Rav Abba said according to Rabbi Yehudah, who says that a bow is an excellent form of tying. According to the Rabbis, a bow is not tying, so one may make a bow. That authority writes that Rabbi Yitzchak's view is that one may bind it with greens because it is like food and animal feed, and there is no prohibition of tying.
“But the lulav is not permanent; it lasts seven days.”
“That is a rabbinic prohibition.”
“Why is it rabbinic?”
“According to the Ashkenazim, at least—”
“According to Rashi, perhaps there is a rabbinic prohibition for one day.”
Perhaps. Even if it lasts seven days, the truth is that he is leaving it for seven days, until afterward.
“Right, but he is not going to untie it during those seven days. He does not care about the seven days; he is not untying it.”
If he does it from the outset, it is as though it is for a week. Nevertheless, he knows it will remain permanent forever. It does not matter; he made it on the basis of a week, and from his perspective it is fine if it falls apart after seven days.
There are osrim, the ones who prohibit. Who are they? He says that this is also evident from what the Rif (Rabbi Isaac Alfasi) wrote regarding the lulav: “He should bind it on Yom Tov, but not in a regular binding; rather, he should bind the two ends of the palm leaf together, insert it underneath like a hoshanah, or make a bow.” The Rif understood that the reason this is permitted is that he is making an anivah (bow), not that the leaves are suitable for food.
This is also how Rabbenu Chananel and the Rosh explained it, as well as the Sefer Pardes. From the Rif's words about binding the two ends of the palm leaf, it is necessary to say that even when binding it with lulav leaves, one may not make a regular knot. The Erech HaShulchan (a halachic work) and the Kaf HaChaim (a halachic commentary) rule this way, and this also appears to be Maran's view. The ruling follows the prohibitive opinion, since the Rif and the Rosh prohibit it, as we discussed earlier, and they are two of the three pillars of halachic ruling. As we know from Maran's sefer, when two out of the three agree, we follow them.
This also seems to be Maran's view, since he left out of his authoritative Shulchan Aruch the Rambam's ruling that there is no prohibition of tying something that is food. This is also necessary from what Maran says in Siman 651: if he did not bind the lulav before Yom Tov, or the binding came undone, he cannot bind it on Yom Tov with a regular knot, but he may bind it with a bow. Why did Maran say that he cannot? He could have told us to bind it with lulav leaves, since they are suitable for animal feed. It must be that even if he wants to bind it with lulav leaves, he cannot make a regular knot.
This is the ruling of the Erech HaShulchan, Rabbi Chaim Palagi, Moed LeKhol Chai (a halachic work), Beit Oved (a halachic work), and the Kaf HaChaim, among others, and this seems to be the primary ruling. It is not like what Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef (Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef), the chief rabbi, permits: tying the lulav on Yom Tov with a regular knot using lulav leaves.
Nevertheless, someone who is accustomed to replacing the hadasim or aravot in his lulav during Chol HaMoed, unties the knot he made and makes a new knot when he binds the lulav again, may tie a regular knot on Yom Tov, since it is not intended to remain for seven days.
That is a nice practical case. A person has a lulav, and it is Yom Tov. He wants to tie the hadas and aravah together. His practice is to replace the hadasim and aravot during Chol HaMoed, so he will untie the knot. Since he replaces them during Chol HaMoed, it is not a craftsman's knot and it is not permanent, so it would be permitted. Also, he is using lulav leaves.
“But you are not tying a knot?”
“I am tying a knot.”
“A double knot?”
“A double knot, which he says is permitted.”
“Some opinions say that is a craftsman's knot.”
First of all, the Chida says that in our communities the practice is—there is a disagreement. Choose a side. David, you have double knots that some say are permitted, food that they say is permitted, and it is not permanent. Pretty good, no? He writes there that you do not have to make a double knot, by the way. You can make a knot and a bow. That is what I will do. You can do it that way too, a knot and a bow, which would normally also be a problem, but I am taking it off in two days. So that is a great practical ruling that comes out of the laws of tying.
“Rabbi, can I tie my lulav set on Yom Tov?”
“You are not allowed to tie on Yom Tov, my friends.”
“So it sounds like Rabbi Yitzchak was permitting it altogether because it is food?”
“Then he permitted it because it is food. We have to look at it. There is also the mitzvah consideration, once you have the disagreement and—”
“But all these righteous authorities say otherwise: the Erech HaShulchan, Rabbi Chaim Palagi, the Kaf HaChaim, Beit Oved—”
“He probably has his sources too.”
“I am sure he does. We have Yalkut Yosef Moadim (Yalkut Yosef on festivals)?”
“We could. Do you want to get it, Dave? In the meantime, I found a passage in Minchat Elazar (a responsa work). It connects borer and tying in a short note.”
“I will look at it, bli neder (without a vow). Bring us Yalkut Yosef Moadim.”
He even gives you the page. Why would he tell you it is permitted? The Rambam. He relied on the Rambam. Why did he rely on the Rambam? Maran did not bring it, and the Rif and the Rosh disagree. On the face of it, his reasoning makes sense to me.
Someone raises another point: perhaps with the lulav, tying it is not just because he needs to bind it together; there is a mitzvah for it all to be together. You can take it even without tying it, but perhaps the mitzvah requires tying it. Is there a mitzvah? Does that change the picture?
That is a good question. But according to the halachah, a nonpermanent knot for a mitzvah purpose is permitted. Here, that is not a mitzvah purpose; that is the point. Here there is no craftsman's knot, so it would be permitted.
“According to the Ashkenazim, when they tie the Torah scroll, they do it at Minchah on Shabbat, right? And then they use it on the following Shabbat, perhaps, or on Rosh Chodesh.”
“That is a permanent knot.”
“They say it is for a mitzvah purpose.”
Maran writes in paragraph one: “For a tzorech mitzvah (for a mitzvah purpose), such as tying something in order to measure one of the measurements of Torah, it is permitted to tie a nonpermanent knot.” It is permitted to tie a nonpermanent knot for a mitzvah purpose. That is a different matter. This one is permanent, perhaps? Is a permanent, ordinary knot the same as a nonpermanent knot?
Look what he says here: “It is a mitzvah to bind the lulav and its species on Erev Yom Tov.” You see? It is a mitzvah. The lulav requires binding—some say it does not require binding—with two knots, one on top of the other, so that it fulfills zeh Eli ve'anvehu (This is my God, and I will glorify Him). If he did not bind it before Yom Tov, the Shulchan Aruch says he may not bind it on Yom Tov with a regular knot, but he may bind it with a bow.
“So what should they do? Tie it? Do you mean that one may tie a permanent knot for a mitzvah purpose?”
Maran said that for a mitzvah purpose it is permitted to tie a nonpermanent knot. He says, “That means even if it is made for a set period.” What does “nonpermanent” mean here? Perhaps it means that it is not a craftsman's knot. He is asking your question: it is a mitzvah, so why not?
He answers that since we rule that the lulav does not require binding, this is not a full-fledged mitzvah, but only a mitzvah min hamuvchar (an ideal mitzvah). Therefore, they did not permit a rabbinically prohibited knot for a mitzvah min hamuvchar (an ideal mitzvah). Although Maran HaChida, in Moreh Ba'etzba, wrote that one should tie the lulav with a permanent knot on Yom Tov, the primary ruling follows Maran, who prohibits it. This is also the ruling of Koreh Yeshuot, and the Chazon Ovadia (a halachic work). It was also discussed in Orchat Ahavah. The Chazon Ovadia on Sukkot concludes that, nevertheless, someone who ties the lulav and its species with two knots, even though it is a permanent knot, has authorities on whom to rely.
“Because it is food.”
“So this is a major source. It states the halachah. What does Rabbi Yitzchak write at the bottom?”
He writes: “The lulav should be bound with the hadasim and aravot before Yom Tov. If he did not bind them before Yom Tov, he may bind them on Yom Tov with lulav leaves, with an actual knot; the law of tying does not apply to lulav leaves.”
“But the Kaf HaChaim prohibits it. He cites him, but he does not say there is—”
“What are you bringing from Moreh Ba'etzba, that lulav leaves are not subject to the law of tying? The Kaf HaChaim is here. But do we have the Chida, everyone? Is Moreh Ba'etzba here?”
“No, Moreh Ba'etzba is in Avodat HaKodesh.”
“I am asking whether we have him on the permissive side. Was he one of the authorities who permitted it? Who were the matirim, the permissive authorities? Do we have Moreh Ba'etzba here?”
“What does Chacham Ben Zion say?”
He says that the lenient authorities have something on which to rely. He sounds more lenient. The Sefer HaIttur (a halachic work)—but I do not see the Chida. Then he says there are those who prohibit it, and he mentions all the prohibitive authorities here. Does he not mention the Chida? I thought he did.
Here it is, Moreh Ba'etzba. He says: although Maran HaChida, in Moreh Ba'etzba, says that in Chemdat Yamim they permitted tying a permanent knot on Yom Tov, here, against Maran's ruling to prohibit it, he prohibits it. So he disagrees with Rabbi Yitzchak. Basically, the principle we learned is that a rabbinic knot may be permitted for a mitzvah purpose. In this case, it is not a craftsman's knot, but it is permanent.
“But tying is not a mitzvah. That is the point.”
“But tying the Torah scroll is not a mitzvah either.”
“What about tying the lulav?”
“Tying the lulav is a mitzvah. That is why it is given this importance, I understand.”
“Why can you not just put the Torah scroll away?”
“It is invalid. If you tied it, it would not open.”
“I am saying, is tying it a mitzvah?”
“It is a mitzvah min hamuvchar, as with the lulav.”
“Could be. I am asking.”
“From what basis? zeh Eli ve'anvehu is the same thing as the lulav.” By the way, I have a basis for saying that this could be a Torah-level mitzvah. If you need it, it is a Torah mitzvah. No one ties a Torah scroll for a Torah mitzvah? Perhaps there is an idea in tying the Torah scroll. I am not saying there is no idea; I think there is an idea, for sure. There is more of an idea with the lulav. I do not know if it is more, but for sure there is.
“You said yesterday that Maran says it is permitted for a mitzvah purpose.”
“To make a knot using the lulav's own leaves—the Maggid says it is permitted.”
Someone asks: “Is the loop we make, which is not one knot on top of another, considered permanent or nonpermanent?”
“What do you mean by permanent? It holds, but it is not a knot; it is a bow.”
“A bow. Ah, yes, you are right.”
“That is much easier. But we make a knot.”
“Yes, but we do not have to. You can do it this way, and that is it.”
“That is easy. Rabbi, can we be lenient?”
“Yes, right.”