kuf mem daled (one hundred forty-four), amud rishon (first folio side). min hashamayim (from Heaven). Baruch Hashem. Sometimes you get lucky. Normally, Moshe (Moses) should do that every time, because Hashem knows what page you want to open to. Yesterday you saw me struggle. Anyway, on kuf mem gimmel (one hundred forty-three), it said, chavit shenishberah (a barrel that broke), ein sochatin et haperot lehotzi mehem mashkin, ve'im yatzu me'atzman, asurin (One may not squeeze fruit to extract liquid; if it came out on its own, it is forbidden.). So, ein sochatin et haperot (One may not squeeze fruit.): if it came out by itself, it is asur (forbidden).
Rabbi Yehudah said, im le'ochlin, hayotze mehem mutar, ve'im lemashkin, hayotze mehen asur (If intended for eating, what comes out is permitted; if for liquid, what comes out is forbidden.). It depends on what a person's kavanah (intention) is for these items. If the fruit is for achilah (eating), there is no problem with what comes out—not that there is no problem of sechitah (squeezing), but there is no problem with what comes out. If it is for liquid, what comes out is problematic.
The Gemara narrowed down the machloket (dispute). Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said, mistabra betutim verimonim peligi (It stands to reason that they disagree about strawberries and pomegranates.). The dispute is really about tutim verimonim (strawberries and pomegranates). Detanya, because we have a beraita. It says: zeitim is forbidden across the board, and so are grapes. Olives from which they drew oil and grapes from which they drew wine were brought in both for eating and for liquid; what comes out is forbidden. So zeitim is forbidden in every case, and so are anavim (grapes).
The teaching continues: tutim shemashach mehem mayim verimonim shemashach mehem yayin, vekhnisan le'ochlin, hayotze mehem mutar, lemashkin velistam, hayotze mehem asur, divrei Rabbi Yehudah. Vachachamim omrim, bein le'ochlin bein lemashkin, hayotze mehem asur (They drew water from strawberries and wine from pomegranates, and brought them in for eating; what came out was permitted. If they were for liquid or for an unspecified purpose, what came out was forbidden. These are the words of Rabbi Yehudah. The Sages say that whether they were for eating or for liquid, what came out is forbidden.). Beautiful. So the dispute is about strawberries and pomegranates. With she'ar perot (other fruits), the chachamim (Sages) would be modeh (agrees) to Rabbi Yehudah and make a chiluk (distinction) between ochlin (foods) and mashkin (liquids). That is basically where Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages argue: strawberries and pomegranates.
Go to page kuf mem daled, first folio side. Three lines from the bottom, the Gemara asks, Ashkachan Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yehudah demodeh lerabbanan bezeitim va'anavim, rabbanan demodu leRabbi Yehudah bishe'ar perot minalan (We have found that Rabbi Yehudah agrees with the Rabbis about olives and grapes; from where do we know that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehudah about other fruits?). How do we know there is no dispute in the extreme cases, olives and grapes, or other fruits? The Gemara is now going to try to prove it. We have found that Rabbi Yehudah agrees with the Rabbis about olives and grapes. We saw that Rabbi Yehudah agrees there; the Gemara seems to have proved it. But how do we know that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehudah's distinction between eating and drinking for other fruits? That is the Gemara's question. Rabbi Yehudah agrees with the Rabbis about olives and grapes; we already established that he is stringent in all cases there. But from where do we know that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehudah about other fruits, meaning his distinction: if they are for eating, what comes out is permitted; if they are for liquid, it is forbidden?
Detanya—because we have a beraita—says, “sochatin bifga'in uviferishin uve'uzradin (One may squeeze certain kinds of fruit), but not pomegranates.” These are different kinds of fruit. What does sochatin (one may squeeze) mean? What is the perush (meaning) of sochatin? It says, “But not pomegranates.” And the household of Beit Menashya bar Menachem used to squeeze pomegranates. That is a big chidush (novel insight): with other fruits, not only is the juice that comes out mutar, but it is mutar to squeeze them. That is what the Gemara says. When it says that one may squeeze these fruits, it is not just talking about what comes out; it is talking about squeezing them.
So this is an extreme case. Until now, rabbotai (my teachers), we were only discussing what comes out. We had not discussed squeezing. Yesterday we said that everybody agrees squeezing is forbidden in all circumstances. Now we see that is not the case. For other fruits, there is not even an issur (prohibition) of squeezing, which obviously needs to be understood. It is ochel mitoch ochel (food within food). Why? Because they are not omed lemashkeh (designated for liquid). Since they are not designated for liquid, this is considered food within food, and therefore there is no toledah mefarek (derivative of extracting).
The Hacham begins here by explaining that the discussion makes clear that, for other fruits, everyone agrees that not only are the liquids that come out permitted, but one may squeeze them lechat'chilah (from the outset), because the liquids that come out are not considered a liquid at all. The Sages agree with Rabbi Yehudah that the act of squeezing is also permitted. That is unlike the straightforward reading of the Gemara above, which discussed only what comes out of the fruit. Exactly. Above, when the Gemara said that the Sages agree with Rabbi Yehudah, it was talking only about what comes out. Now we see that, for other fruits, the Gemara does not even consider what comes out to be a liquid, and therefore it is permitted to squeeze them.
The Gemara says, “Amar Rav Nachman, halachah keshel beit Menashya bar Menachem (Rav Nachman said: The law follows the practice of the household of Menashya bar Menachem).” Let’s find that. About 10 lines down: “The household of Menashya bar Menachem used to squeeze pomegranates.” They even used to squeeze pomegranates—not just the more unusual fruits we mentioned, uzradin and perishin. Even pomegranates. According to Rav Nachman, you can even squeeze pomegranates.
Rava said to Rav Nachman, “Menashya bar Menachem tanna hu (Is Menashya bar Menachem a tanna (Mishnaic sage)?)” Is he a tanna? The Gemara asks betimha (with astonishment): “Vechi palig lemeimar deveshabbat asur detema hilcheta kavateh, vehalo lo huzkar ela ledivrei hatanna lere'ayah dehai tanna hu savar kavateh (Did he disagree to say that it is forbidden on Shabbat, so that you would say the law follows him? He was mentioned only as evidence that the tanna holds like him).” Exactly. You want to posek (decide the law) like a tanna? Decide it like the tanna. The tanna only brought Beit Menashya as a re'ayah (proof) for his shitah (position).
The point is that a tanna held it was permitted to squeeze uzradin, perishin, batichin, and similar fruits. Then the Gemara said, “But not pomegranates,” and that the household of Menashya bar Menachem used to squeeze pomegranates. Who is Beit Menashya? A farmer? The Sages held that you cannot squeeze pomegranates. Is this household a tanna? Not a rabbi. At this point, we do not know who they are. Saying that the law follows them is like saying the law follows Joe Habert because they did it in his house. God bless him; he's a tzaddik yesod olam. But there are tannaim here, and you are quoting a person whose status we do not know.
The Gemara repeats the question: “Rav Nachman said the law follows the household of Menashya bar Menachem.” Rava asked, “Is Menashya bar Menachem a tanna?” What is the answer? Again, the question is asked with astonishment. The passage says that the household was mentioned as evidence for the tanna's position; it does not say that they themselves were a tanna. So the law follows the tanna who agrees with them, not the household itself. The Gemara then asks, “Vechi tema halachah kehai tanna desavar lah keshel beit Menashya (And if you say the law follows this tanna, who agrees with the household of Menashya)?” It explains that perhaps the law follows the tanna who agrees with the practice of Menashya ben Menachem. But if that tanna did not hold like Menashya ben Menachem, why would Menashya ben Menachem give the argument any credibility?
So the Gemara asks whether Menashya ben Menachem represents ruba de'alma (the majority of the world). Is he the majority? He is one household, one person in the world who squeezed pomegranates. You want to prove from that that the pomegranate juice is not really considered juice, because they squeezed it on Shabbat and did not consider it juice? Does one farmer establish what the whole world considers juice? The Gemara answers, “In”—yes—and brings a Mishnah: “Hamekayem kotzim bakerem, Rabbi Eliezer omer kidesh, vaChachamim omrim eino mekadesh, ela davar shekamoto mekayemim. Ve'amar Rabbi Chanina, mai ta'ama deRabbi Eliezer, sheken be'Aravya mekayemin kotzei sadot ligmaleihem (One who maintains thorns in a vineyard: Rabbi Eliezer says it renders the vineyard forbidden, and the Sages say it does not, unless it is something people maintain. Rabbi Chanina said: What is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason? In Arabia, they maintain field thorns for their camels).”
So the Gemara brings a rare case: in Arabia they maintain these thorns for their camels. But you have the same question. Because you found some people in Arabia doing it, why should that affect the din (law) of kil'ei hakerem (vineyard mixtures)? Are you saying that because people in Arabia do something, it becomes the law for everyone? mid i irya (what are you comparing?)—the Gemara answers: Arabia is an atra, a place. Over there, Arabia is at least a place where this is the practice. Here, batlah da'ato etzel kol adam (his view is nullified by everyone). Arabia is a place; this is one person.
The Gemara then says, “Ela hainu ta'ama kederav Chisda, de'amar Rav Chisda (Rather, this is the reason, according to Rav Chisda).” It explains: the Gemara rejects the comparison by saying that Arabia is a place, whereas the individual's view is nullified by everyone. That is, specifically there, the practice of Arabia affects the rest of the world because it is a place of many people. A practice of a place with many people can affect the whole world; we do not nullify them. But here, individuals are doing this. The household of Beit Menashya squeezed pomegranates, and their view is nullified by everyone.
That is the Gemara's question: what gives you the right to decide the law like this tanna just because he holds like Menashya ben Menachem? Chazak uvaruch! If they squeezed it during the week, then on Shabbat it is asur. Once again: “The household of Menashya used to squeeze pomegranates.” Rashi explains: they were accustomed to squeeze pomegranates during the week; therefore, there are people who squeeze them, and consequently they are forbidden on Shabbat. Correct. They did it during the week, which shows that the juice is significant to them. Therefore, pomegranates are forbidden on Shabbat, like the tanna of the Mishnah.
We said that the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages is about pomegranates and strawberries. For pomegranates, the Rabbis are stringent, while Rabbi Yehudah is lenient: if they were for eating, what comes out is permitted; if they were for liquid, it is forbidden. The Sages say there is no difference, because they put pomegranates in the category of olives: a prominent item that people squeeze. The proof is the household of Menashya. As Benny said—and I stand corrected—they used to do it during the week. That means they squeezed them. The Gemara then says the law follows the opinion that forbids it, like the household of Menashya. The Gemara asks: what do you mean? Is Beit Menashya a tanna? Say that the law follows the Rabbis. The answer is that the law follows the Rabbis because Beit Menashya had this practice.
Then the Gemara asks, “Vechi Beit Menashya ruba de'alma (Is Beit Menashya the majority of the world)?” They do not have to be the majority of the world. We saw the case of thorns in Arabia. Arabia is a place, a town, a city. Beit Menashya, on the other hand, is an individual household whose view is nullified by everyone. That is the discussion. The Gemara wants to establish that, yes, it is forbidden, because we did not find a tanna who permits it.
Now, the other fruits are permitted. This one is not, but the other ones are. That is why I got confused; she had to straighten that out for us. There are pomegranates in the discussion as a proof: since they used to squeeze them during the week, that tells us something about squeezing them on Shabbat. Look at the first Tosafot, with the dibur hamatchil (opening words) “mi damei (Is it comparable?).” It says, “Mi damei Aravya atra hu (Is Arabia a place?).” The Gemara could have asked, “Granted, Rabbi Eliezer holds that, but what can the Rabbis say?” Instead, it asks in a way that does not work even for Rabbi Eliezer. Tosafot says the Gemara could have rejected the proof another way.
Tosafot explains that the discussion about Arabia is according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that because Arabia maintains thorns, thorns are forbidden throughout the world because of kilayim. But the Rabbis disagree with him. They hold that since the whole world does not maintain thorns, it does not matter that Arabia does. If so, the Gemara could have answered the same way about squeezing pomegranates on Shabbat. It could have said: why are you asking according to Rabbi Eliezer? Look at the Rabbis' position there. The Rabbis hold that Arabia does not affect the law because it is not the majority of the world. So do not bring a question from Rabbi Eliezer to the Rabbis. If the Rabbis do not count Arabia as the majority, perhaps they also would not count the people squeezing pomegranates.
That is Tosafot's alternative answer. The Gemara's answer is that Arabia is a place, and an individual is nullified. Tosafot says the Gemara could instead have answered that this comparison only works according to Rabbi Eliezer; the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, and they do not take Arabia into account. Tosafot says, “De-hu hadin de-yachlah Gemara lidchot et hare'ayah (The Gemara could have rejected the proof in the same way).” According to this, the distinction the Gemara makes between a place and individuals applies only according to Rabbi Eliezer. According to the Rabbis, even if there are people in a place squeezing pomegranates, their practice is nullified, and it is permitted for everyone to squeeze them.
This gives us a major nafka minah (practical consequence) according to Tosafot. If Tosafot says the Gemara could have answered this way, it is a legitimate answer, and the practical consequences that follow from it are legitimate too. The consequence is that, according to the Rabbis, even if there is an atra where people squeeze a particular item, that does not necessarily affect the law. We follow the world; an atra alone is not enough. According to Rabbi Eliezer, a place may be significant: if one town does something, it is not nullified. But if you learn like Tosafot's alternative, then according to the Rabbis you need an actual majority of the world doing it to prohibit the squeezing. This is a leniency concerning squeezing.
I am in the Rabbis' position now. The Gemara went with Rabbi Eliezer, but Tosafot is saying the Gemara could have given a different answer. What question is the Gemara answering? It asks why Beit Menashya's practice means that squeezing pomegranates is forbidden. The Gemara says: they are a minority. The proof that minorities can matter is Rabbi Eliezer's case of the thorns in Arabia. The Gemara answers: no, that is different. Arabia is an atra; a place is not nullified, but one individual can be. So we are back to the question of why we take a minority practice into account.
Someone asks whether the Gemara's statement means Menashya is the majority of the world. No. Continue reading: “detnan (as it was taught).” It does not mean there were four million people in Beit Menashya; the Gemara is not a census bureau. It means there is a halachic majority. Arabia was not the majority of the world either, but the Gemara dealt with it as a place. The point of the proof is not that Beit Menashya was literally the majority. The comparison is between a place and an individual household. In Arabia, the practice has the status of a majority with respect to the law of thorns; Beit Menashya is one household, and its view is nullified.
So the Gemara's answer is that Arabia has the status of a majority for the law of thorns, even though it is not the majority of the world. But there is no direct connection between the two discussions: Arabia is a place, whereas Beit Menashya is one family. A place is different; we do not nullify a place in the same way. Beit Menashya's practice is nullified. This whole give-and-take is according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that Arabia's practice matters. Tosafot points out that the Gemara could have avoided the analogy by asking why Rabbi Eliezer's position is relevant when we are discussing the Rabbis.
According to that Tosafot answer, the Rabbis require a real majority before a practice affects the law of squeezing. Just because people in Florida squeeze a particular fruit would not establish the law. According to the Gemara's actual answer, if there were an atra concerning squeezing, we would take it seriously. So therefore it's a question on the Point; the household of Menashya simply is not an atra. According to Tosafot's alternative, even an atra is not enough according to the Rabbis. That is the distinction in the possible readings.
Tosafot refers us to the chapter HaMatznia. There, the Gemara says, “Amar Rav mishum Rav Chiyya: Ha-motzi masui beShabbat al rosho (Rav said in the name of Rav Chiyya: One who carries a load on his head on Shabbat),” is liable for a sin offering. But is that not an unusual manner of carrying? How can he be liable for a sin offering when he carries something on his head? The Gemara answers, “Sheken anshei Hutzal osim ken (For the people of Hutzal do this).” The people of Hutzal carry things on their heads. But is that not a shinui (unusual manner)? How can he be chayav chatat (liable for a sin offering) when he carries something on his head? The Gemara then asks, “Ve-anshei Hutzal ruba de-alma (Are the people of Hutzal the majority of the world)?”
The Gemara revises the statement: “Ela i itmar hachi itmar, amar Rav mishum Rabbi Chiyya: echad mi-bnei Hutzal she-hotzi masui al rosho beShabbat, chayav, she-ken bnei iro osim ken (Rather, this is what was said: Rav said in the name of Rabbi Chiyya, one of the people of Hutzal who carried a load on his head on Shabbat is liable, because the people of his city do this).” The Gemara narrows it down to a person from Hutzal, because the people of his city carry that way.
Then it asks: “Ve-tibatel da'ato etzel kol adam (Should his view not be nullified by everyone)?” Let the person from Hutzal be nullified by the rest of the world, which does not carry that way. The Gemara revises it again: “Ha-motzi masui al rosho, patur (One who carries a load on his head is exempt).” Even if the people of Hutzal do this, their view is nullified by everyone. The novelty is that someone else who carries it that way is exempt. And even the people of Hutzal are nullified. Tosafot asks there, with the opening words “Ve-im timtzi lomar anshei Hutzal (And if you should say that the people of Hutzal do this),” because it seems there that even a place can be nullified by everyone.
That is a proof: if a person from New Jersey carries something on his head on Shabbat, what is the law? He is exempt. What about the people of Hutzal? Their view is nullified by everyone. It seems from that Gemara that even a place can be nullified. But in the chapter of Chavit, regarding Menashya, Tosafot says, it seems that only individuals are nullified; in a settled place with many people, we do not say their view is nullified. In our Gemara, Arabia is a place, and a place is not nullified. So Tosafot has a question: in the carrying case, it seems that even the practice of a place is nullified.
At first glance, according to Tosafot's earlier suggestion—that the Rabbis make no distinction between a place and individuals, and in every case the view is nullified—there would not be a contradiction. The Gemara about Hutzal could be following the Rabbis. Tosafot could have said that the people of Hutzal follow the Rabbis' view about thorns: the fact that Arabia maintains thorns does not matter, because the practice is not the majority. But Tosafot gives three distinctions between the discussion of carrying on one's head and squeezing.
One distinction is that sometimes the world does not follow a minhag (custom) because people do not want to follow it. That is the practice of the people of Hutzal. People do not carry things on their heads because they do not want to. Who wants to walk around with things on their head? Even if the people of Hutzal do it, the world's practice does not change. In such a case, even a place is nullified by everyone.
There is another kind of practice that people do not follow because it is not a metzi'ut (reality) for them, because they have no need for it, or because they lack the means. If they had the relevant circumstances, they would follow it. There is a distinction between the practice of a place and the practice of individuals: a practice of a place is not nullified, as with growing thorns in Arabia. If the rest of the world had camels and thorns, they might use the thorns too. They are not opposed to the practice; they simply do not have the circumstances. But when individuals squeeze pomegranates, the practice is nullified even if other people do not have pomegranates. If the rest of the world had pomegranates, they would squeeze them for liquid, and nevertheless the practice of Beit Menashya is nullified.
That is an interesting distinction Tosafot gives. In the case of Hutzal, the Gemara says not to pay attention to their practice, even though Hutzal is a place. Why? Who wants to carry luggage on his head? We have heads and luggage, but we have made a conscious decision not to carry our things that way. So it is not that we lack the circumstances. We do not want to do it. Hutzal does not change that. But in the case of thorns in Arabia, they fed the thorns to their camels because they had camels and thorns. The rest of the world did not do it because they did not have camels or thorns, and had no need for it. If they had both, why would they not feed the thorns to their animals? It is food, and it is free. In that case, we cannot nullify Arabia's practice so quickly.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with feeding the thorns to camels, and people might do it if they had the same circumstances. Tosafot is saying that the practice of Arabia can therefore affect the rest of the world. With carrying things on the head, on the other hand, people have the circumstances but consciously do not want to do it. That is why Hutzal's practice does not matter. I do not know whether Tosafot is saying it is a safek (doubt); he is saying that we are not against the practice of feeding thorns to camels, but we do not carry things on our heads because we do not do that.
According to this, a minhag (custom) of yechidim (individuals) is nullified even if we do not have pomegranates where we live. Even if they squeeze them, we nullify the practice of individuals. Individuals are always nullified, while a place may not be. The Gemara's question was, “Who cares about Beit Menashya?” Its practice is nullified because it is not a place. The whole discussion is about whether a place is sometimes nullified; individuals are nullified. Beit Menashya was brought as a proof for prohibiting the squeezing of pomegranates. The Gemara is trying to be stringent: since Beit Menashya squeezes pomegranates during the week, they are an item normally squeezed, like olives and grapes. The Gemara asks whether they represent the majority. It then answers that a place can count as significant, but one household is nullified.
The practice in Arabia was not a practice of heter (permission) concerning Shabbat. It was relevant to the law of vineyard mixtures: because they fed the thorns to their camels, the thorns were considered significant, and the law required dealing with them. That discussion is about vineyard mixtures, not Shabbat.
The Maharsha raises a question here. Look at the Maharsha on page tzadi-bet. As the class dwindles, we have more Gemaras, so we may as well take advantage of it. The Tosafot is on tzadi-bet (ninety-two), amud bet (second folio side); in your book, it is on page chaf-vav (twenty-six) in kuf-yud (one hundred ten). The Maharsha says that Tosafot could have attached its question earlier, when the Gemara first says that the people of Hutzal carry a load on their heads. It waits until later in the discussion to raise the question, in order to strengthen it. Here, even the people of Hutzal themselves are exempt, while in the other discussion Arabia's practice affects the rest of the world.
The Maharsha is saying there is an even bigger difference. In the Hutzal discussion, even the people of Hutzal are nullified with respect to their own practice. In the other discussion, people outside of Beit Menashya are forbidden to squeeze pomegranates because Beit Menashya did it. That seems like a direct contradiction between the discussions. The Maharsha asks why Tosafot did not raise this stronger question at the beginning of the chapter, when the Gemara first says that carrying a load on one's head is liable because the people of Hutzal do so.
The answer is that Tosafot could have asked then, but waited to strengthen the question. At the end of the discussion, the Gemara says that the practice is nullified even for the people of Hutzal themselves; they are exempt even though this is their practice. In Arabia, however, the practice is not nullified, and it affects the rest of the world. Tosafot then answers by distinguishing between kinds of practices. The Maharsha's point is about why Tosafot placed the question there: at the end, the contradiction is stronger.
Read the Gemara: “Amar Rav mishum Rabbi Chiyya: Ha-motzi masui beShabbat al rosho chayav chatat, sheken anshei Hutzal osim ken. Ve'anshei Hutzal ruba de-alma.” The initial statement says he is liable for a sin offering because the people of Hutzal carry that way. Then the Gemara asks whether they are the majority of the world. At that point, it is questioning whether Hutzal's practice establishes the law. The Gemara later revises the statement and concludes that a person carrying a load on his head is exempt. That's the hava amina, not the conclusion.
At the start, there is no contradiction yet between the two discussions: the Gemara says Hutzal's practice matters, just as it says Arabia's practice matters. Then it asks whether the people of Hutzal are the majority of the world. Tosafot could have objected right there: Hutzal does not need to be the majority of the world if it is a place; was Arabia the majority of the world? Clearly not. Arabia is one place, and we said that a place is significant. Tosafot lets the Gemara run its course. The Maharsha says Tosafot waited because the question is stronger at the end: not only is Hutzal not the majority of the world; its practice is nullified even for the people of Hutzal themselves. In Arabia, by contrast, the practice affects other places.
The Gemara is correcting Rav's statement. Rav said the person is liable; the Gemara asks, “What do you mean, liable? Are the people of Hutzal the majority of the world?” It then corrects the ruling. The Maharsha's observation is that Tosafot could have pointed out the apparent contradiction as soon as the question arose, but waited until it was stronger. Tosafot then gives the distinction between a practice that people reject and a practice they do not follow only because they lack the circumstances.
There are two kinds of practices. One is a practice the world rejects because people do not want it. That is Hutzal: people do not want to carry things on their heads. The other is a practice people do not follow because they lack the means or the need. That is Arabia: if people had the camels and thorns, they would do it. Give them camels and thorns, and they would use the thorns. That answers the question. The Maharsha is making an observation, not necessarily giving us a new explanation. Tosafot could have asked the question at the first opportunity, but let it develop and made it twice as strong.
Baruch Hashem le'olam amen ve'amen (Blessed is Hashem forever, amen and amen.). Practically, what have we learned today about squeezing? Is the local place not going to determine the law? It depends how you learn the discussion. If you learn it as the Gemara presents it, according to Ulla and Rabbi Eliezer, a place can determine the law, so an atra can matter for squeezing. But if you follow Tosafot's suggestion—that the Gemara could have asked according to the Sages—then according to the Sages even an atra does not determine the law for squeezing. That is the practical consequence.
It is important to know Tosafot's point. If the Rabbis are the majority and, according to them, even a place does not matter, then seemingly one needs an actual majority of the world. The Rabbis would not count a place as significant even in the case of thorns. But that is the alternative Tosafot says the Gemara could have used. We did not resolve the question. According to Tosafot, the Gemara could have answered that way; according to the Gemara's actual discussion, we still have the question about Beit Menashya. The Gemara says that Arabia is a place and this is not, but we are left asking why the pomegranates are forbidden. The speaker also says, “Vechi anavav... Take anavav off the table; anavav is an atra.” It is a give-and-take; we do not have teshuvot (answers) yet.
We are learning. All this just so I can make lemon juice—lemonade. Enjoy it. We have more to do on this passage. Review the points, because you have to hold kop, you have to hold—can't go further, because you forget the points. Tomorrow morning we will review, go back two steps, and then move forward again.
These shiurim (lectures) are given to the kollel. That's real stuff. This is not material made for ba'alei batim (laymen); these are lessons given in the kollel. The difference is that in kollel they learn this for three hours in the morning, and then the rabbi comes and gives a lesson. They have the passage at their fingertips. Here, we do not have three hours to learn, so we read it once and go straight into the iyun (in-depth study). You have to review it many times just to begin to follow the give-and-take. They come to the lesson with the discussion already clear, and then the rabbi starts to take it apart. We are taking it apart before we have fully learned it.
They have read all the meforshim (commentaries), and the rabbi gives them the marei mekomot (source references): read all this, read that. We would like to understand more or less what the discussion is. But do not be discouraged by that. Maybe the rabbi should give us homework before the lesson. I just said to review it so we can start fresh tomorrow. That is all.