Shemen hamishchah (anointing oil): there are 38 sections here in Aruch Hashulchan (the Set Table). Zorea (planting) is an av melachah (primary labor), and it was done in the Mishkan (Tabernacle), where they planted the sammanim (dye plants) needed for the shemen hamishchah and for making techelet (blue dye). Planting was therefore an av melachah in the Mishkan: they planted seeds to make dyes, or the different herbs used to make dyes. They also planted for the shemen hamishchah, the oil used for anointing, and for the different dyes needed to make techelet.
Whether a person sows seeds, tevuah (wheat), or yerakot (vegetables), plants trees, or does mavrich (layering a branch): “Is he well?” Mavrich is when you attach two trees together, or take the top of a tree and put it on the bottom; when it takes root, you cut through the middle, and you have two trees. Markiv (grafting), as you said, is grafting. Zomer (pruning) is cutting the tree so that it will grow more and stimulate growth. That is the word: pruning. He cuts some of the branches so that they will grow. All these are avot (primary categories), but they are one av melachah: one is with seeds and the other is with trees. This is planting with seeds, and this is planting with trees, but it is the same av melachah, zorea.
They are all one matter, because each of these causes growth; “dvaru mitkaven,” and this is the concept of planting. The Yerushalmi in Klal Gadol (General Principle) says: “Kol davar shehu mavchil”—anything that causes the fruits to grow—is liable on account of zorea. It lists planting, layering, grafting, pruning, and other activities: cleaning up leaves and other growth that has fallen, which also helps the tree grow; and smoking the tree, which they used to do as a kind of fertilizer to help it grow. It also mentions killing bugs and worms, and watering the garden. Watering is also zorea. “Ve’oseh batim,” and anything done to make the fruit grow is liable on account of zorea, and so on. These activities apply to trees, as in Shvi’it (the Tractate of Sabbatical Years).
Watering plants and trees on Shabbat is a toldah (derivative labor) of zorea or planting. Likewise, soaking wheat and barley, and similar things, in water is a toldah of zorea, and one is liable. That is what the Rambam says. What is the shi’ur (measure) for sowing? Kol shehu (any amount). The shi’ur for zorea is kol shehu, and one is liable; the same applies to planting and the other activities, as well as soaking wheat and barley. Even if you put only a small amount into the water, kol shehu, you are liable.
Even regarding carrying, we learned at the beginning of the chapter “HaMotzi Yayin”: “Ha-motzi la-zera”—one who carries something for planting is liable for kol shehu. The shi’ur for carrying is therefore kol shehu if you are carrying something to plant, because that is the shi’ur for zorea: kol shehu is significant for planting, and kol shehu is enough for the act of planting itself.
Although regarding charishah (plowing), the Gemara asks about the Mishnah’s statement that one who plows even kol shehu is liable: “L’mai chazi?”—what is such a small amount good for? Perhaps plowing requires more than kol shehu, since what can you do with such a small amount? That will be explained. But this question does not apply to planting, because one seed is suitable for planting. One seed is enough; it is significant for planting. Therefore, it is considered a significant shi’ur.
Now, charishah. Charishah is an av melachah. There is no distinction between plowing before sowing and plowing after sowing. The Gemara discusses how they used to plow before sowing to soften the ground, and plow after sowing to put the seeds into the ground. For example, in Eretz Yisrael, where the ground is hard, after sowing they need to plow again, and this too is charishah. The Gemara says this, and the Yerushalmi in Klal Gadol says: “Mah charishah hayetah ba-Mishkan?”—what plowing was done in the Mishkan? They plowed to plant the sammanim. To put the sammanim in the ground, they first had to plow it.
Plowing, digging, and making a furrow are all one labor, and each is an av melachah, because they all have the same purpose: lerepuyei ar’a (to soften the ground). That is what plowing does: lerepuyei ar’a, to soften the ground. Each of these is digging in the karka (ground).
The Rambam writes at the beginning of chapter 8 that weeding around the roots of trees, clearing weeds, or cutting branches to improve the ground are toldot of plowing. Likewise, leveling the surface of a field—for example, flattening a mound so that you can plant—is preparing the ground for planting. You cannot plant on the mound, so you first smooth it out. “Verided doch o milei ha-gai”: if you fill in a hole, you can now plant there. This is liable on account of plowing. The same applies to leveling depressions in the ground.
The Yerushalmi there teaches in the name of Rabbi Chiyya: digging, making furrows, and thrusting a pole into the ground are toldot of plowing. The Gemara indicates that thrusting a pole into the ground, to soften it, is an av, as the Rambam wrote. The Yerushalmi also says that anything done to improve the ground is liable on account of plowing. This includes digging, making furrows, thrusting a pole into the ground, bringing manure onto the field, hoeing, fertilizing, sweeping, sprinkling water, breaking up clods of earth, and cutting small trees in a forest so that the others will grow thicker and larger. It also includes setting fire to a thicket of reeds so they will burn and not obstruct plowing.
Cleaning up the ground so that you can plow it is also part of preparing the ground, and is a toldah of plowing. The same applies to clearing away bad growth in a grove of date palms so that it will not obstruct plowing. A water channel that levels a field for sowing, improving fields, removing stones from the ground, making terraces in the ground, filling depressions, planting olive trees, and making basins around grapevines are all included. Anything done to improve the ground is included. Basically, anything you do to set up the ground for planting is preparing the ground; it is not planting itself.
One more point about the shi’ur for plowing. We learned, “Ha-choresh kol shehu”—one who plows even a small amount is liable. The Gemara asks, “L’mai chazi?” What is it good for? “Le-bizra”—for a seed. What can you plant in a small amount of plowed ground? A gourd seed, “bizra de-kara,” can be planted in it. This corresponds to what was done in the Mishkan, where that amount was suitable for planting one stalk of dye plants. See there.
The Yerushalmi there asks how much one must plow to be liable. Rav Matya says, enough to plant cress. Another opinion says enough to plant a particular part of a wheat seed. That too means kol shehu, as is clear from the explanation of “L’mai chazi?” In our Gemara, that part is the top of the wheat, where there is no split. Cress is also a small seed. The same applies to all the toldot of plowing: even kol shehu is enough, as we learned in the Mishnah there. One who weeds, clears weeds, or trims branches is liable for kol shehu. One who gathers wood or weeds is liable for kol shehu if doing so to improve the ground. The Rambam also writes there that leveling the surface of a field, filling a hole, and leveling depressions have a shi’ur of kol shehu.
Now we know what zorea is, and what plowing is. David, take over.
Ketzirah (reaping) is an av melachah, and it was done in the Mishkan, where they reaped the sammanim. After the sammanim grew, they had to cut them down; that is ketzirah. Reaping grain or legumes, harvesting grapes, gathering dates, olives, or figs: all of these are one av melachah, because in each case you uproot something from its growth. That is the key: uprooting something from its growth. Anyone who uproots something from its growth is liable on account of reaping.
A toldah of reaping is pulling something off by hand, whereas ketzirah is done with a magal (sickle). Reaping is done with a utensil, such as a sickle or another implement. Pulling something off by hand, or with another object, is a toldah of reaping, and one is liable.
The Rambam writes there: therefore, if a clump of earth with weeds growing on it, or a pot with weeds growing on it, is on top of a barrel, pulling the weeds off is liable, because that is their place of growth. But if you pull them from an atzitz she’eino nakuv (non-perforated pot), you are exempt, because that is not their place of growth. An atzitz she’eino nakuv is a pot that does not have a hole on the bottom, so it is not actually receiving sustenance from the ground, although it may be receiving sustenance from the pot itself. It is patur aval asur (exempt but prohibited).
A perforated pot, even one with a hole only large enough for a small root, is considered like the ground. If a flowerpot has even a small hole on the bottom, it is considered attached to the ground. Therefore, if you pull something out of the flowerpot, you are pulling it out of the ground, and you are liable for uprooting. This is the measure for making seeds suitable for planting, as explained at the end of the chapter “HaMotzi Yayin.”
There is a question whether there is a nafka mina (practical difference) between a wooden pot and an earthenware pot. In Menachot, regarding first fruits, there is a distinction between them. According to Rashi, an earthenware pot does not need a hole; perhaps it draws sustenance from the earthenware itself, because the earthenware is like earth. So perhaps, when it comes to a pot, an earthenware one does not need to be perforated. According to Rabbeinu Tam, a wooden pot does not need a hole—the opposite. Perhaps in those cases, if it is made of earthenware, it could be a Torah-level issue, and a non-perforated pot would be treated like a perforated one. See there.
A tree planted in a pot is always treated as though the pot were perforated for the laws of orlah, because a tree’s roots penetrate, as stated in the Yerushalmi, chapter 1 of Orlah. So regarding orlah, a non-perforated pot is treated as a perforated one. Even if the pot has no hole on the bottom, it is treated as if it does. That means that, for orlah, you count it as a year of growth. The Rambam rules this way in chapter 13 of Ma’aser Sheni. See there.
What about Shabbat? In chapter 2 of Uktzin, we learned: “Kishut she-net’ah be-atzitz”—a gourd planted in a pot that grew and extended beyond the pot is pure. Even if the pot is not perforated, what grew beyond it, into the air above the ground, is considered attached. Although the pot is in an impure area, it follows the pot, and what grew out is still attached to the pot. Regarding impurity and purity, then, it is considered attached enough that it did not become susceptible to impurity. That could lead you to think that you would be liable for uprooting it.
But what about Shabbat? If you pulled it from there, would you be liable? That needs further examination, because you see different nafka minot: for one matter it is considered attached, and for another it may not be considered attached in the same way. In practice, though, there is no nafka mina, because it is prohibited to pull something from a non-perforated pot as well. Even though we found some nafka minot regarding an atzitz she’eino nakuv, it is still prohibited. The only question is whether one might be liable; it is certainly prohibited either way, so there is no practical difference for us. We learned: one who uproots from a perforated pot is liable; one who uproots from a non-perforated pot is exempt. All exemptions on Shabbat are patur aval asur. What, then, is the nafka mina? The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch rule this way as well.
The shi’ur for reaping is the size of a grogeret (a fig), following the measures for food, as written in section 11. If a person prunes grapevine branches so that they will grow more, and also needs the wood, he is liable for two: one on account of reaping and one on account of planting. He is taking the wood, so that is reaping, and he is doing it to stimulate growth, so that is also planting. But if he does not need the wood, he is liable only on account of planting. He is not liable for reaping, because he does not need the wood; he only wants to stimulate growth.
Even according to Rabbi Yehudah, who holds that one is liable for melachah she’einah tzrichah legufah (labor not needed for its purpose), one might think that if he does not need the wood, he should still be liable for reaping. But that is not called reaping. Reaping means that you need the item. Even according to Rabbi Yehudah, who says that labor not needed for its purpose is liable, it still has to be a melachah. It has to be called something. If you take the wood and throw it away, that is not called reaping.
The Rambam’s ruling there is evidence: he writes that one who prunes and needs the wood is liable for two. The Rambam holds like Rabbi Yehudah, that labor not needed for its purpose is liable. Why, then, does he specify that the person needs the wood? He should have said that even if he does not need the wood, he is still liable for two. Rather, you see from there that according to Rabbi Yehudah, if you do not need the wood, it is not called reaping at all. Reaping is specifically when you need the item. The Rambam rules like Rabbi Yehudah, so it seems to me that the opposite case should also apply: if he needs the wood but does not intend to make the grapevine grow more, he is liable for two. That is not only according to Rabbi Yehudah; even according to Rabbi Shimon, it is a pesik reisheih (inevitable consequence), and he wants the result.
Now consider the opposite case: you need the wood, but you do not want to stimulate growth. Even according to Rabbi Shimon, you would be liable, because it is a pesik reisheih. A person cuts down the tree because he needs the wood. He is immediately liable for reaping, because he needs the wood, according to everyone. He does not intend to stimulate growth, but it will happen automatically; that is a pesik reisheih. So even according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that labor not needed for its purpose is exempt, he did not care about that result, but the act produces it. Is that wood then forever off limits? That goes back to the regular law: whether it was done intentionally or inadvertently, for the person or for others, and the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Meir.
“Does that first case count as reaping according to Rabbi Shimon too?” “No, according to everyone, it is only when you need the wood.” “So according to everyone, he is liable in the case where he needs the wood?” “No, you don’t need the wood.” “Oh, you don’t need the wood.” There is no doubt: according to Rabbi Shimon, it is not a pesik reisheih either. The chiddush (novel point) is that even according to Rabbi Yehudah, who says labor not needed for its purpose is liable, it is still not a melachah, because it is not a melachah of reaping. Reaping is only when you need the wood. That is the proof from the Rambam.
They also say there: “Hai man de-katel aspasta”—one who cuts aspasta (grass), cutting animal fodder that will grow again, is liable for two: one on account of reaping and one on account of planting. You are giving it to the animals to eat, so that is reaping, because you need the item itself; and it causes growth, so you are liable for planting too.
One who cuts silka (beets), which is a kind of vegetable, is liable for two, on account of reaping and planting. Here they do not say that he needs the beets. I raised that point: the Aruch Hashulchan just gave the rule that to be liable for reaping, you need the item. So why did the Gemara say this without saying that he needs the beets? It is different. The Rambam writes that any seed whose cutting causes it to grow and develop, such as aspasta and silka, if one cuts it inadvertently, he is liable for two offerings.
At first glance, why is he liable for two if cutting it causes it to grow? Causing it to grow should make him liable only on account of planting. It seems that even if he does not presently need the fodder or the beets, nevertheless, because he did it in the customary manner of reaping, he is liable. The customary manner in this case is to reap these things in order to stimulate growth. Some kinds of reaping are done when you need the item; other kinds are done to stimulate growth.
So according to this, every act of pruning would be liable for reaping. Look at the first case: if he prunes grapevine branches so that they will grow more, we said that if he does not need the wood, he is not liable for reaping. Continue, because he is going to say, “ve-lo dami”—it is not comparable.
Even according to Rabbi Shimon, for the reason explained, this is not comparable to wood. When a person prunes and does not need the wood, there is no concept of reaping at all. That is not so with seeds and vegetables. The reason is that ordinary wood is for fuel. It does not produce fruit, so if you do not need it, it is not called reaping. Therefore, when reaping from a fruit-bearing tree, you need to intend to take the wood. If you are not intending to use it as wood, then you are doing nothing that is called reaping.
Grain and vegetables, though, are customarily reaped, and their growth is improved by it; therefore, in every case, one is liable. That is the distinction. With vegetables, it is customary to reap them to encourage the other vegetables to grow. But with wood, you do not cut it for nothing: you cut it because you need it as wood. If you do not need to use it, why are you cutting it? So he is saying that you are not liable for reaping. The grapevine branches are not the same case. The grapes themselves might be liable too, because it is customary to cut grapes so that more grapes will grow. Wood is different: you need it for use, whereas vegetables are cut to help the rest of the patch grow.
“But the default use of the wood is fuel, so he needs that intention?” Yes. That is the distinction. Otherwise, the next line of the Rambam would contradict the rule he just gave. The explanation is that ordinary wood is for fuel; that is its default use. This refers to trees that do not produce fruit. When cutting from a fruit-bearing tree, such as grapevine branches, he needs to intend to take the wood. What are you doing with the wood? If you are not doing anything with it, that is not reaping. Beets are vegetables; they are the fruit itself. They are generally used for eating, and cutting them also stimulates growth. Even if you are not doing it to eat them, that is the customary way of reaping in this case: reaping is done to stimulate the rest to grow. That is what reaping means here. You are taking something from its source in order to encourage what remains to continue growing. It is therefore planting, because you are causing growth, and it is reaping because that is the customary manner of reaping in such a case. With grain and vegetables, this is their customary manner of reaping, and it improves their growth; therefore, in every case, one is liable.
One more point, section 10. The Rambam writes that if a clump of earth with weeds growing on it is lifted from the ground and placed on poles, one is liable for uprooting. You had a clump of earth with weeds growing on it, and you lifted it from the ground and put it on something else, perhaps on poles. You took it away from its source. If it was on poles and you put it on the ground, you are liable on account of planting. It was not connected to a source, and you put it into a source.
“Te’enim she-yavshu ve-’odan be-’iveihen”—figs that dried while still on their stems—and likewise, if a tree’s fruits dried, one who pulls them off on Shabbat is liable, even though they are not considered uprooted regarding impurity. That is the Rambam’s wording. Even if the tree died, if you pull the fruit off the tree, you are liable on Shabbat, even though there is no life source. Rashi and Tosafot at the end of “HaMotzi Yayin” say that regarding the relevant case, it is only a rabbinic prohibition.
The Rambam also writes: one who pulls chicory or cuts shoots, if it is for human consumption, its shi’ur is a grogeret. If it is for an animal, its shi’ur is enough to fill a kid’s mouth. If it is for fuel, its shi’ur is enough to cook an egg. Chicory is a kind of vegetable, and the shoots are a kind of reed. While they are moist, they are for people to eat; once they harden a little, they are for animals; when they dry, they are for fuel.
These are all introductions to these melachot. The Yerushalmi says that one who cuts certain kinds of trees is liable on account of both reaping and planting. They are kinds of trees, and it does not explain that he specifically needs the wood. That creates another problem: he is liable for reaping even though he does not need the wood. The rule we just discussed seemed to say that with wood, you certainly need it.
According to this, the Yerushalmi disagrees with our Gemara, which says that one is liable for reaping wood only if he needs it. That is not the halachah. Or perhaps these are kinds of trees that are used for fuel, like grain, and so he is liable in any case. Their ordinary purpose is fuel, and therefore he was using them for fuel. This need not mean specifically for fuel; the same law would apply if the customary purpose of cutting them were something else. That is presumably the point of the first answer: the trees were intended for fuel, or their cutting was intended for some other use.
The Yerushalmi also says: a person cuts coriander, leeks, or celery and is liable on account of reaping and planting. These are kinds of vegetables. The simple explanation is that they are like aspasta: the customary manner is to reap vegetables in order to encourage growth.
The Yerushalmi further says that one who places a perforated pot on top of another perforated pot is liable on account of reaping and planting, because the lower pot is blocked and stops growing, while the upper one grows from the earth. By covering the lower pot’s hole, you stop its growth; that is considered reaping. The upper one is growing from the earth. This is evidence for the Rambam’s approach in the previous section. If something is attached to the ground and you seal its bottom, that is like taking it away from its source and is considered reaping. You put the other one down, and that is planting.
One who cuts down a shikmah tree is liable on account of reaping and planting, because it is intended for building. Nevertheless, the Rambam’s words say that the person is liable on account of striking with a hammer, meaning that he smooths or prepares the wood so it can be used for building. That is a different melachah.
The Yerushalmi also says: “Ha-tzayad kaveret”—one who traps a beehive—and anything that you separate from its life is liable on account of reaping. That is a novel point. What are you doing to a beehive? You are separating it from its source? What source does a beehive have? You are not detaching it; you are trapping it, plastering it. You are sealing up the hive. How is that a source? The honey is not alive, and it is not attached to the ground. A beehive is just a house that holds the bees; it is a container. The bees live in it and produce honey there, but that is not a source of life. The Rambam does not mention this.
That would mean that every time you catch a fish, because you take it from its place of life, you should be liable for both trapping and reaping. The commentators explain “uprooting something from its growth” in this way too. See there. I found that the case is “d’tzayed k’vara”: k’vara here means a fish, not a beehive as we understand that word in Hebrew. “D’tzayed k’vara”—he trapped a fish—and anything that you separate from its life is liable on account of reaping. That is a novel point. The Rambam does not mention it.
Doesn’t that mean that every time you trap a fish, you should be liable for two? Nobody says that. The Yerushalmi holds that trapping a fish is liable on account of reaping, although we do not rule like that Yerushalmi. That makes more sense: the water is its place of growth, just as the ground is a seed’s place of growth. You cannot argue that it is not its place of growth. But perhaps you are liable for something else, such as trapping. Perhaps “place of growth” for reaping applies only to things that grow from the ground. Zorea, plowing, and reaping are all associated with growth from the ground. We define reaping as uprooting something from its growth, meaning from its growth in the ground, not from some other kind of growth.
If you strangle a person, you have uprooted him from his source of growth because you took away his oxygen. You would not be liable for reaping for killing a person. You are liable for taking a life, or for the relevant act of slaughtering, but not for reaping. Based on this reasoning, you would be liable for reaping and planting, and we do not see that. The commentators explain that the Rashba points out this Yerushalmi and says that it does not follow our Gemara.
In the Gemara, a person put his hand into an animal’s womb and shook the fetus, causing a miscarriage. That is uprooting something from its growth. But the Gemara does not call it reaping; it calls it taking a life. Perhaps that is because it is not in the ground. The Radbaz writes that this is indeed what the Gemara means: separating it from its life makes one liable. Even if the Gemara meant taking a life, when it said “mefardio,” it did not mean uprooting something from its growth; it meant separating it, meaning taking a life.
Now we begin. That was all the introduction. We learned three melachot today: zorea, plowing, and reaping. Joe, do you want to begin section 13? What time is it? We have time.
The Sages made a rabbinic safeguard against climbing a tree on Shabbat. This applies to anything attached to the ground, whether it is still moist or dry. You may not hang from it, and you may not hang anything on it. The concern is that you might climb up and detach something. You may not put your clothes on a tree to dry, or fold them over a branch, because we are worried you might climb up and detach something.
Although, if the tree is dry, detaching from it is not a Torah-level prohibition, one might ask whether this is a safeguard on top of a safeguard. The Rambam we brought in section 10 says that if a tree’s fruits have dried, one who pulls them off on Shabbat is liable. Perhaps, then, we do not rule like that? The Rambam clearly says that one is liable. It is explained in the Gemara in Chullin that this refers to a case where only the fruits dried, but not the tree. The tree is still drawing sustenance from the ground, and one is liable for detaching its fruits. But when the tree itself has dried out, there is no longer the same issue.
You might ask: if so, why is it really prohibited to climb or use a dry tree? The answer given in Eruvin is that it is certainly prohibited during the rainy season, because you cannot tell the difference between a moist tree and a dry one. In addition, even in the summer there is concern that you might break off branches. That would be prohibited by Torah law. Perhaps you might not take off wood, but might tear off leaves; the leaves are still drawing sustenance somehow. Even if the leaves are detached, there may be a problem of cutting. Cutting applies even to detached things. We are concerned that you might tear off leaves, and that may be a problem even on a dead tree.
“So pulling leaves off a dead tree is considered cutting? How is that different from smelling hadasim on Shabbat? They are detached, aren’t they?” “You are allowed.” “How is this different?” “You might accidentally step on them and tear them off when you are on the tree?” “No, you might tear the leaf.” “You said it is already detached?” “I heard your question; I am not answering it. He is still reading.” Perhaps they made a safeguard against cutting when something is still on the tree, but not when it is already off the tree. Hadasim are off the tree.
You are allowed to walk on grass, even though you might come to detach it. They did not make a safeguard against walking on grass, even though when you walk on it you might pull some of it out of the ground. That would be an act done without intention. The concern is that, as he walks, he might detach something. That is different from doing it intentionally: when he sees fruit on the tree, he reaches up and picks it. That is a greater problem. The prohibition applies to all trees; the Sages made no distinction.
If someone climbed a tree on Shabbat, he has committed a transgression, and they penalized him so that he may not come down until it gets dark. If he went up inadvertently, or climbed up with permission, they did not penalize him. Some say this applies specifically when he climbed up on Friday intending to come down before Shabbat. If he intended to stay in the treehouse on Shabbat, they penalized him.
Why did they not impose the same penalty regarding an animal? If a person gets onto an animal on Shabbat, why not penalize him and make him stay on it? The Yerushalmi asks this. The answer is that you are commanded to let your animal rest. Once the animal takes four steps, it is working on Shabbat, and you are mitzvah al shevitat behemtor (commanded to rest one’s animal). If you make him stay on the animal, you will cause a transgression: the animal will carry you on Shabbat, or you will violate the requirement that it rest. Each moment, it is carrying you and working. Sitting in a tree does not create that transgression; the penalty only limits your movement.
When do we say that someone who climbed inadvertently, or before Shabbat, may come down? Because it is difficult to stay in the tree for all of Shabbat. But suppose he put something on the tree, such as his jacket, which is also prohibited. Even if he did it inadvertently, he must leave it there. We let him come down only because it is difficult. The jacket stays there, even if he put it there before Shabbat. That is for a different reason, not because of a penalty: when you take it off, you are also using the tree. That is the prohibition.
The Rosh wants to say that taking something off a tree might not be considered using the tree; perhaps only putting something on it is. He brings evidence from section 307, where it is permitted to tie a rope in a cow’s mouth. See there. The first opinion has no proof from that case, because that is not the customary way to use an animal. But with a tree, putting something on it is a customary way of using it. His proof is that you may do something with an animal’s mouth and it is not considered using the animal; perhaps the same applies to a tree. The Sages might say that it is different: you do not use an animal in that way, but perhaps you do use a tree that way, both by putting something on it and by taking something off.
We will have to see how Maran rules. Can you take something off a tree? The practical difference would be something that was already on the tree before Shabbat: perhaps something was left there to dry, and on Shabbat you want to take it down. We will have to see. We have already done half the section in Aruch Hashulchan.
“Rabbi, we just learned that you cannot tie something on an animal, because it is a knot that you sometimes leave for two weeks.” “Fine, that is regarding keshirah (tying).” “But why didn’t they say it is because you are using the animal?” “That is regarding tying. It is tying.” “So are you using the animal?” “No, that is not called using the animal.” “Then perhaps it is not considered using a tree when you do that.” “Maybe not. Maybe an animal is different: you do not use an animal in that way, but perhaps you do use a tree that way.” So the Rosh’s proof may not be conclusive.
Rabbi Chananya ben Akashya omer (Rabbi Chananya ben Akashya says): ratzah HaKadosh Baruch Hu l’zakot et Yisrael, l’fichach hirbah lahem Torah u-mitzvot (The Holy One wished to make Israel meritorious; therefore He gave them many Torah teachings and commandments). How is that connected? Using the tree is going to be coming down, you know?
Yitgaber adir. Yitgadal v’yitkadash shemeih raba (May His great name be exalted and sanctified), amen, be’alma di vera chiruteih, ve-yamlich malchuteih, ve-yatzmach purkaneih...