May the merit of the Torah and mitzvot of Yaakov Yisrael ben Simcha, who was raised in Torah, mitzvot, and good deeds and brought great satisfaction to his family, stand for a blessing. Amen. May there be forgiveness for all the people of Israel.
We begin today’s study on page 46, in the section dealing with the Eglah Arufah. We will begin with the Mishnah, a few lines down, after the wide spacing.
The Mishnah says that if a corpse is found exactly equidistant from two cities, both cities bring an Eglah Arufah. Rabbi Eliezer says that Jerusalem does not bring an Eglah Arufah. In other words, the cities that are close to the corpse bring it, but Jerusalem does not.
The wording seems unusual. Since both cities bring one, the Mishnah should seemingly say that they bring two. The Mishnah then discusses a case in which the head is found in one place and the body in another. The question is whether the body is brought to the head, or the head is brought to the body. From which place do we measure the distance to the cities?
The Mishnah’s conclusion is that the body is brought to the head, and the measurement is made from there. The Gemara will explain the reason for this ruling.
The Mishnah also discusses the precise point on the body from which the measurement is made. Is it from the navel, from the nose, or from the place where the person became a corpse—usually the place where the wound was inflicted, namely, the neck?
Rashi explains that when the two cities are exactly equidistant, there is not even a rope’s length of difference between them. We will later explain why Jerusalem does not bring an Eglah Arufah. For now, the question is simply whether the measurement is made from the body or from the head, and which part must be moved to the place from which the measurement is taken.
The Gemara explains the reason that both cities bring an Eglah Arufah when they are equidistant. It is possible to measure precisely and determine that the two cities are genuinely equal in distance. The verse says “the closest,” and the Gemara understands this to include a case in which both cities are equally close. “Closest” does not necessarily mean that one city must be closer than the other; it can also refer to two cities that are equally close.
Rabbah asks: If one maintains that it is impossible to measure with absolute precision, then one of the cities must actually be closer. We simply would not know which one. In that case, perhaps the two cities should bring one Eglah Arufah jointly, with a stipulation that the share of the offering belongs to whichever city is ultimately found to be the closer one.
The fact that the Mishnah requires each city to bring its own Eglah Arufah therefore teaches that precise measurement is possible. When the Mishnah says that the cities are equidistant, they are genuinely equidistant. Since both cities are equally close, both bring an Eglah Arufah. The word “closest” can include two equally close cities.
Why does Jerusalem not bring an Eglah Arufah? The verse speaks of a corpse found in the land that God gave to the Jewish people as an inheritance, in order to inherit it. The law applies to land that was given as an inheritance to the tribes. Jerusalem, however, was not apportioned as an inheritance to one tribe. Although members of the tribes of Judah and Benjamin lived there, Jerusalem belonged to all of Israel and was not inherited by those tribes in the ordinary sense. Therefore, Jerusalem does not bring an Eglah Arufah.
The Mishnah then returns to the case in which the head is found in one place and the body in another. The Gemara asks what the dispute is really about. At first glance, it seems to be a question of measurement: should one measure from the nose, from the place of the wound, or from the neck?
The Gemara explains that the issue is not initially a question of measurement. The principle of a neglected corpse is that the corpse acquires the place where it is found for burial. The question is: which part of the corpse acquires that place? Does the body acquire the place where the body is found, or does the head acquire the place where the head is found?
Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the body is brought to the head, because the head is considered the place that acquires the corpse’s burial location. Rabbi Akiva maintains that the head is brought to the body, because the body is considered the primary place of the corpse. The dispute applies specifically when the corpse is decapitated. If the corpse is intact, everyone agrees that it is buried where it is found. The dispute is not whether the corpse acquires its location at all; it concerns which location is considered the corpse’s place when the head and body are separated.
The Gemara then asks what circumstance the Mishnah is describing. It explains that the body remained at the place where the person was killed, while the head rolled to another location. Alternatively, the head was severed, and the body moved slightly before falling. The essential question is which part is considered to have remained at the place where the killing occurred.
Once the Gemara clarifies that point, it returns to the issue of measurement. One opinion says that the measurement is made from the navel, while another says that it is made from the nose. The underlying question is: from which part is a person considered alive, and from which part is he considered a corpse?
One side reasons that the primary source of life is the nose, because a person breathes through the nose. The other side reasons that the primary source of life is the navel, because a person receives nourishment through that area. The Gemara compares this to a different question: from which place is a child considered to begin forming?
One source uses the expression “cut off your hair and cast it away,” in a context referring to the head. The Gemara understands that the expression points to the head as the primary part. From there, one might conclude that the nose is the relevant point, because it is the place through which a person breathes. The place through which life is expressed is also the place from which death is determined.
The Gemara notes that even if one maintains that a fetus begins forming from the center, that does not necessarily determine the law concerning a corpse. Formation may begin from the center, while the determination of life and death may depend on breathing. This is why the discussion relates to the question of how death is determined: by breathing, by the heartbeat, or by another indication of life.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says that the relevant point is the place where the person became a corpse, meaning the neck. He supports this from the verse that speaks of a corpse whose blood was spilled. Since the killing was carried out at the neck, that is the place from which the measurement is made.
After the measurement has been completed and the closest city has been identified, the members of the Great Court leave. Their task is finished. The elders and the court of the city then take the calf. It is like a red heifer in that it must never have carried a load, but a physical blemish does not disqualify it. There is no law of blemishes that invalidates the Eglah Arufah.
The elders bring it to a place called the Rough Valley. The word may refer to a valley or to a river, and the term “rough” indicates hard ground. Even if the terrain is not visibly rocky, it is understood to be hard ground.
They take a large instrument, like a knife or a saw, and strike the animal at the back of the neck. The area where the calf is struck may never again be used for planting or for working the ground. It is nevertheless permitted to comb flax there or to remove stones from the area, because those activities are not considered ordinary cultivation of the soil.
Afterward, the elders wash their hands at the place where the calf was struck. They declare that they did not cause the death of the victim. Surely no one imagines that the elders of the court were murderers. Rather, they testify that the victim never came to them and was sent away without food, and that they did not fail to see him or neglect him.
What does it mean that they did not send him away without food? Rashi explains that they are saying: He did not die because of us. We did not allow him to leave without food, forcing him to steal from others in order to survive and possibly to be killed when they resisted him. Nor did we allow him to travel alone. Had we seen him, we would have ensured that he had an escort.
The priests then say, “Atone for Your people Israel whom You redeemed,” and, “Do not place innocent blood in the midst of Your people Israel.” They do not need to add the words, “And the blood will be atoned for them,” because the conclusion of the verse already says that the blood will be atoned for.
The Gemara explains that this was not a voice heard from Heaven. Rather, Moses was the agent who transmitted the words that God would say after the process was completed: If you carry out this procedure, atonement will be achieved.
The Gemara then examines the law that a physical blemish does not invalidate the Eglah Arufah. Perhaps we should derive the opposite through an a fortiori argument. Concerning a red heifer, the age of the animal does not disqualify it, yet a blemish does disqualify it. Concerning an Eglah Arufah, there is a requirement that it be within its first year; once it passes its first year, it is invalid. If the Eglah Arufah is subject to this additional stringency, surely a blemish should invalidate it as well.
The Gemara answers that the verse concerning the red heifer says, “which has no blemish.” The word “it” limits the law: a blemish invalidates the red heifer, but not the Eglah Arufah. The same word is therefore used to prevent the a fortiori argument.
However, this answer creates another difficulty. If the word “it” limits the law to a blemish, then perhaps other forms of work should not invalidate the red heifer either. The Gemara responds that the other forms of work are learned from the Eglah Arufah. The Eglah Arufah is described as an animal upon which no work was performed, and the law of work is therefore extended to the red heifer.
The Gemara asks why a stringency should be transferred from the Eglah Arufah to the red heifer when the verse seems to limit the word “it” specifically to the red heifer. The discussion then turns to the statement that if one places a bundle of empty sacks on the animal, it is disqualified. Empty sacks are not an ordinary load, and the animal has not necessarily been made to pull them. Nevertheless, regarding the Eglah Arufah, the animal is disqualified only once it has actually been drawn. Regarding the red heifer, placing the sacks on its back is sufficient.
The Gemara explains that the laws of the red heifer are linked to the laws of the Eglah Arufah through the shared expression “yoke.” Once this connection is established, the law can be transferred between the two passages. The word “it” must then be used for another purpose.
The Gemara proposes that the word “it” teaches a law concerning consecrated animals. If an animal was consecrated for the altar and someone performed work with it, that work does not invalidate the animal as a sacrifice. It is prohibited to perform the work, but the animal may still be brought as a sacrifice.
One might have argued by an a fortiori principle that if work invalidates the Eglah Arufah, then it should certainly invalidate a consecrated animal. The verse therefore teaches that work performed with a consecrated animal does not invalidate it for the altar.
The Gemara challenges this derivation. Perhaps the stringency of the Eglah Arufah exists because the Eglah Arufah has other special stringencies, such as its limitation to a particular age. Since those stringencies do not necessarily apply to consecrated animals, one cannot derive the law from the Eglah Arufah through an a fortiori argument.
The Gemara therefore returns to the shared expression “yoke.” Just as placing a nonstandard load on the Eglah Arufah disqualifies it, the same applies to the red heifer. The word “it” is needed to teach that work performed with an animal designated for a sacrifice does not invalidate the sacrifice.
The Gemara then examines whether the relevant verse already teaches this law. The verse lists several blemishes—blindness, broken limbs, and similar defects—and says that such animals may not be brought as offerings. The word “these” may be understood as limiting the prohibition to those defects. An animal that was worked, even if it was worked after being consecrated, could therefore still be brought to the altar.
The Gemara asks why another verse is needed. It answers that one might have thought the law applies only when the work was permissible in itself, such as ordinary work performed before the animal was consecrated. Perhaps work that constituted a prohibition—for example, work performed on Shabbat—would render the consecrated animal invalid. The additional word teaches that even such prohibited work does not invalidate the animal for the altar.
The Gemara then cites another verse concerning an animal from a foreigner and derives from the limiting expression there that work performed with an animal does not disqualify it from being brought as a sacrifice. The discussion considers whether that verse applies only to ordinary work or also to prohibited work. The conclusion is that the relevant verses establish both points: work performed with the animal, whether permitted or prohibited, does not invalidate it as a sacrifice.
At this stage, the practical conclusions are as follows. A blemish does not invalidate the Eglah Arufah, while a blemish does invalidate the red heifer. A nonstandard load does invalidate both the Eglah Arufah and the red heifer. The connection between them is derived through the shared expression “yoke.” The word “it” in the relevant verse is needed to teach that an animal consecrated for the altar remains valid even if work was performed with it.
The Gemara then returns to the distinction between placing something on the animal and actually causing it to pull. In the case of the Eglah Arufah, a bundle of empty sacks does not disqualify the animal until it has been drawn. In the case of the red heifer, merely placing the bundle on its back is sufficient. The Gemara asks how this difference can be derived if the source is the shared expression “yoke.”
Some authorities derive the law of work performed with the red heifer from the Eglah Arufah through the expression “yoke.” According to that approach, the red heifer would require actual drawing, just as the Eglah Arufah does. Others derive the law directly from the verse concerning the red heifer, which says that no yoke was placed upon it. That wording includes even a stationary object placed on its back. The distinction is therefore that a nonstandard load is sufficient to disqualify the red heifer, while other forms of work disqualify it only when the animal is actually being worked.
The Gemara analyzes the wording through the rules of a general statement, a specific statement, and a subsequent general statement. The expression describing an animal upon which no yoke was placed is broad, while the mention of the yoke limits the law. The Gemara concludes that the broad expression includes all objects placed upon the animal, whereas the specific reference to a yoke teaches that the stringency applies even when the animal is not actually pulling. Other forms of work require actual work.
The Gemara next asks how much the animal must be drawn in order for the work to disqualify it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Shaul asks whether the required distance is the length or the width of a yoke. The discussion indicates that the measure is a handbreadth. If a person asks to purchase a yoke and receives one that is less than a handbreadth, that may constitute a mistaken transaction, because a yoke of that type is understood to be at least that size.
This measurement is relevant to the Eglah Arufah, where the animal must actually be drawn. It is not relevant in the same way to the red heifer, where merely placing the object on its back can disqualify it.
Rabbi Yohanan ben Shaul then asks why the Eglah Arufah is brought to hard, infertile ground. He explains that the calf is young and cannot yet bear offspring. The hard ground is likewise barren and cannot produce crops. The calf and the ground are therefore connected by the fact that neither produces.
The Gemara challenges this explanation by noting that an old person or a eunuch also cannot produce offspring. Why, then, should the symbolism be limited to a young calf and barren ground?
The Gemara answers that the issue is not only biological reproduction. The verse is also referring to the performance of mitzvot. By causing the death of the victim, the murderer deprived him of the opportunity to perform further mitzvot. The hard ground is a place that produces nothing, and the calf represents the loss of the victim’s future ability to produce mitzvot.
The word describing the ground as hard is then analyzed. It refers to strong foundations of the earth and to land that has not been transplanted or newly formed. The Gemara discusses the expression “old land,” meaning land that remains in its original place rather than soil that was uprooted and transferred elsewhere.
The calf is struck with a saw-like instrument at the back of the neck. The Gemara compares this to the procedure used in the slaughter of a bird, where the act is performed at the back of the neck. The expression used for the Eglah Arufah is therefore connected to the expression used for the bird. The Gemara is clarifying not merely that the act involves cutting, but the precise location at which the cutting is performed.
The verse says that the area may not be worked or planted. The Gemara asks whether this is a command concerning future activity or a statement of fact that the land was never worked. Rabbi Hoshaya understands the wording as indicating that the land had not previously been worked. Rabbi Yonatan interprets the wording differently and derives additional laws from it.
The Gemara explains that activities performed outside the soil itself are permitted. One may comb flax or remove stones, because those activities are not direct cultivation of the ground. Planting is singled out because it is the clearest example of work performed within the soil. The broader wording then includes other forms of cultivation that are similar to planting.
The elders wash their hands at the place where the Eglah Arufah was struck. The Gemara asks whether this is an ordinary washing of the hands or whether it expresses their removal of responsibility for the blood. The answer is that the location is significant: they wash their hands at the place where the calf was killed and declare that they did not cause the death.
They also declare that they did not send the victim away without an escort. From here, the Gemara teaches the importance of escorting a person who leaves a city. A person may even be compelled to escort another person. If someone refuses, the court can force him to fulfill the mitzvah. The reward for escorting a person is described as having no fixed limit.
The Gemara brings a passage from Judges involving the conflict between Ephraim and Menashe and the capture of Beth-el. The city had a concealed entrance, and the people outside the city saw a man leaving. They asked him to show them how to enter, promising to perform an act of kindness for him. He showed them the entrance, and they entered and destroyed the city while allowing the man to leave.
The Gemara asks what kindness the man had actually done. It answers that he had shown them the entrance, enabling them to capture the city, and they allowed him to go. The account is used to illustrate how a person may be saved through the merit of helping others.
The man went on to build a city called Luz. That city had special qualities. It was associated with the production of the blue dye used for ritual fringes, and it was never destroyed, not even by Sennacherib. How, then, do people die there? When a person’s time comes, he leaves the city, and the Angel of Death does not enter it.
The Gemara says that the man did not perform an elaborate act of escorting. He merely pointed with his finger and showed the people where the entrance was. Nevertheless, that act of assistance protected him. The Gemara compares this to other instances in which a person was escorted a short distance and was subsequently saved from danger.
Abraham was escorted by Pharaoh four cubits outside Egypt. The Gemara understands that this escort contributed to Abraham’s protection. The point is not that Pharaoh was required to escort him specifically for that reason, but that the act of escorting another person provides merit and protection.
Ravina escorted Rav Avira bar Yitzchak four cubits within the city. When the man later encountered danger on the road, he was saved. The Gemara therefore says that escorting a guest is a significant obligation. The question is how far one must escort different people.
For a student, a teacher must escort him until the boundary of the city. For a friend, the escort extends until the boundary of the Sabbath domain, meaning two thousand cubits beyond the city. Another opinion says that one should escort a person the distance of a parasang. In the case of one’s principal teacher, the distance is even greater—three parasangs.
The Gemara discusses the last house of the city and the point at which the city’s boundary is considered to end. According to one opinion, the escort extends from the final inhabited house. According to another, it extends beyond the city to the boundary of the Sabbath domain.
The Gemara then mentions palm trees and records a statement that these trees had existed since the time of Adam. Rabbi Yosef bar Rav Huna explains the verse describing a land that was not worked and in which no person lived. It is obvious that if no one lived there, no one worked the land. The verse is teaching that Adam established which parts of the world would be settled and which would remain uninhabited. The trees in that area remained because it had been designated as a place for trees rather than for human settlement.
The Gemara further emphasizes that failing to escort a person, or refusing to be escorted, is comparable to shedding blood. If the people of Jericho had escorted Elisha when he left the city, the incident involving the bears would not have occurred. The lack of an escort left him exposed to danger.
Elisha had gone up from the city, and young people came out and mocked him. They said, “Go up, bald one; go up, bald one.” The background is that Elisha had sweetened the city’s bitter water. Before that, water sellers had earned their livelihood by selling water, and after the water was sweetened, they lost their source of income. They therefore mocked Elisha because they believed he had taken away their livelihood.
The Gemara explains that these were not necessarily small children. The expression may refer to people who were empty of mitzvot, or it may refer to people from a place with a similar name. Their conduct, however, was immature and disrespectful toward a prophet.
Elisha looked at them and cursed them, and bears emerged from the forest. The Gemara asks how such a severe punishment could be imposed on people who might eventually perform mitzvot. It answers that there was no trace of mitzvah in their conduct. They had adopted a distinctive haircut associated with idolatrous practice, and their behavior toward the prophet was brazen.
The Gemara discusses whether the haircut itself indicated that they had adopted the practices of gentiles. The implication is that their appearance and conduct showed that they had removed themselves from the possibility of leniency. They were not merely innocent children who happened to mock Elisha; they were acting deliberately and with contempt.
The Gemara concludes by returning to the importance of escorting a person. Escorting someone is not merely a courteous gesture. It is a mitzvah that protects the person who leaves and brings merit to the one who escorts him. The elders’ declaration in the Eglah Arufah therefore includes not only the claim that they provided food and did not neglect the victim, but also that they sent him away with the protection of an escort.