We begin today’s study of Sukkah on 11b, nine lines from the bottom. The Gemara says that the thatch must be made from something that grows from the ground and is not susceptible to ritual impurity. Stated positively, the thatch must grow from the ground and must not be capable of becoming impure.
What does it mean that it must not be susceptible to ritual impurity? It cannot be made from something that has been turned into a utensil. For example, wood comes from the ground, but if you fashion it into a utensil, it becomes susceptible to ritual impurity. The requirement, therefore, has two components: it must come from the ground, and it must not be susceptible to ritual impurity.
Where do we derive this? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said that it is derived from the verse, “And a vapor will rise from the earth.” Just as a vapor rises from the earth and is not susceptible to ritual impurity, the material used for the thatch must also come from the earth and not be susceptible to ritual impurity.
One might ask: Why are we deriving the laws of the sukkah from a cloud? A cloud emanates from the earth. Evaporation begins on the ground, rises upward, and becomes a cloud. Furthermore, according to the opinion that the sukkot in the wilderness were the Clouds of Glory, the comparison is appropriate: the sukkah is connected to those clouds.
But there is an opposing opinion that the sukkot were actual huts. According to the opinion that the Jews made actual huts, the comparison to clouds would not be appropriate. This reflects an important dispute: were the sukkot in which the Jewish people dwelled actual booths, or were they the Clouds of Glory?
The Gemara then compares this requirement to the laws of the festival offering. An animal is not susceptible to ritual impurity while it is alive, but how can an animal be considered something that grows from the ground? It eats from the ground and receives its nourishment from the ground. Since it is nourished by the ground, it is considered, in this context, as though it grows from the ground.
Look at Rashi for a moment. Rashi asks what the connection is to the festival offering, and explains that animals are considered products of the ground because they grow and are nourished from the ground. Rashi brings verses and raises several questions. At the end of his commentary, he says that the Gemara will challenge Rabbi Yohanan’s explanation and will ultimately derive the requirement from a different verse.
The Gemara will derive it from the verse concerning the time of year when one gathers the produce: the grain and the grapes. When the grain is cut, straw remains; when grapes are harvested, branches and twigs remain. The residue from the threshing floor is the straw, and the residue from the winepress is the branches. These are the materials that may be used for the thatch.
Accordingly, animal skins may not be used for the thatch. If that were the final conclusion, one might have thought that animal skins should be permitted, since an animal is nourished by the ground and is not susceptible to ritual impurity while alive. The Gemara therefore clarifies that the material must actually grow from the ground; it is not enough merely to be nourished by the ground.
The Gemara brings another proof from the connection between the festival offering and the sukkah. We have already used a similar connection for another purpose, so do not be concerned that the same verse is being used again. Sometimes a verse is used for more than one teaching, and in this case a different connection is being made.
There is also a question regarding the use of the verse about the festival. The Torah refers to the festival offering, and we call it by that name because the Torah says that one must bring an offering. The term itself is connected to the festival. The verse concerning the festivals is also used earlier by the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel to teach that one does not make up a festival offering throughout all seven days. That is a different interpretation of the verse. Here, the Gemara is concerned with the connection between the festival and the sukkah.
The Gemara then says: perhaps the comparison to the festival offering teaches that the thatch must come specifically from an animal. Just as the festival offering comes from an animal, perhaps the sukkah’s thatch must also come from an animal. The Gemara rejects this. The verse says to make the sukkah at the time when one gathers the produce of the threshing floor and the winepress, referring to the residue of the grain and the grapes.
The residue of the threshing floor is straw, and the residue of the winepress is branches. The Gemara asks: perhaps the verse is referring to the actual threshing floor and the actual winepress. Maybe one could make the thatch from grain itself or from wine itself.
Rabbi Zeira answers that the verse says “winepress,” not “wine.” One cannot make thatch from wine. If one poured wine on top of the sukkah, it would simply fall through. Therefore, when the verse refers to the winepress, it is referring to what remains from the winepress, namely the branches. Similarly, when it refers to the threshing floor, it is referring to the residue of the grain rather than to the grain itself.
The Gemara then suggests that perhaps the verse refers to congealed wine. Maybe there is a substance made from wine that solidifies and could be used as thatch. When Rabbi Yirmeyah heard this, he said that they had almost found a source for the law of thatch, and then this suggestion came along and chopped it up like an axe.
There is a significant question in Tosafot. From another passage, it appears that Rabbi Zeira accepts this interpretation of the verse. Here, however, it sounds as though Rabbi Zeira has rejected it. Tosafot says that the wording of the Gemara indicates that Rabbi Zeira still accepts the interpretation that the verse refers to the threshing floor and the winepress, meaning the residue of each one. All Rabbi Zeira is saying is that he does not know how to answer Rabbi Yirmeyah’s question.
In other words, Rabbi Yirmeyah asked a strong question, but Rabbi Zeira did not withdraw his interpretation of the verse. He still maintains that the verse is referring to the residue of the threshing floor and the winepress. He simply does not have an answer to the possibility of congealed wine. We should not assume that the question caused him to abandon his interpretation.
The Gemara then answers the question about the winepress by analyzing the wording of the verse. It says “from your threshing floor” and “from your winepress,” rather than simply “the threshing floor” and “the winepress.” This indicates that the reference is to what comes from them, not to the winepress itself or to the grain itself. What one gathers from the threshing floor is the residue, and what one gathers from the winepress is the residue.
Rav Chisda brings a different verse: “Go up to the mountain and bring branches of olive, branches of the oil tree, branches of myrtle, branches of palms, and branches of a leafy tree, to make booths.” This verse clearly refers to branches and not to the actual trees. It therefore demonstrates that the materials used for the sukkah are branches that grow from the ground and are not susceptible to ritual impurity.
The Gemara raises a side question. Are myrtle branches and branches of a leafy tree not the same thing? The expression describing the leafy tree appears to be another name for myrtle. Why does the verse list them as two separate items?
The Gemara answers that one refers to myrtle used for the sukkah and the other refers to myrtle used for the lulav. The myrtle used for the sukkah is a regular myrtle branch. The myrtle used for the lulav must have three leaves growing from the same level. Since not every myrtle branch has that form, the verse lists the two uses separately.
The Mishnah then discusses bundles of straw, bundles of wood, and bundles of reeds. These bundles may not be used for the thatch. If they are untied, however, they may be used. Even if they remain tied, they may be used for the walls; the problem applies to the thatch, not to the walls.
The Mishnah does not immediately explain why bundles may not be used for the thatch. At first glance, they are made of wood or other materials that grow from the ground and are not susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara therefore investigates the reason for the prohibition.
Rav Huna explains that the reference is to reeds used for bundles. When they are still moist, animals eat them. When they dry, they are used as fuel. One may not use them for the thatch while they are tied in bundles. If they are untied, they may be used.
Everything stated in this Mishnah concerns the thatch. When the Mishnah says that they may not be used for a sukkah, it is referring to the thatch. The laws of the walls are discussed separately. Although the Gemara previously derived that the walls also fall under certain laws of the sukkah, that derivation was based on an additional word in the verse, not simply on the word “sukkah” itself.
Rabbi Yohanan taught two laws. He taught the law of the bundles in our Mishnah, and he also taught the law of a person who hollows out a space in a pile of grain or straw in order to make a sukkah. In that case, the sukkah is invalid. Rabbi Yohanan gave two reasons for these two laws, but it was not initially clear which reason applied to which case.
One reason is a rabbinic decree concerning storage. A person may bring a bundle of wood home from the field and place it on top of the sukkah merely to dry it. Later, he may decide to leave it there and use it as the thatch. The rabbis were concerned that a person might place bundles on the sukkah for storage and then treat them as valid thatch. This is a decree against using material that was originally placed there for another purpose.
The second reason is the requirement that the sukkah be made rather than come into existence on its own. The verse teaches that the sukkah must be made, not that it should simply be found ready-made. If a person hollows out a space in a pile and a roof and walls are thereby created, the sukkah was not constructed in the proper manner.
This distinction is important. If the prohibition against the bundles is merely a decree concerning storage, it is a rabbinic prohibition. If the problem is that the sukkah was not made properly, it is a Torah-level defect.
The Gemara attempts to determine which reason applies to each Mishnah. Since the Mishnah concerning bundles says that one may not use them for the thatch, that wording sounds like a decree: one might place the bundles there for storage. By contrast, the Mishnah concerning the hollowed-out pile says that it is not a sukkah, which sounds like a Torah-level defect resulting from the requirement that the sukkah be made.
Rabbi Yaakov, however, had not heard Rabbi Chiya’s explanation clearly and was uncertain which reason applied to which Mishnah. Rav Ashi challenged this uncertainty. In the case of the bundles, there is certainly a concern that one might use them for storage, but why assume that there is no issue of a sukkah that was not made? And in the case of the pile, there might also be a concern that one will use the pile for storage.
Perhaps both cases are rabbinic. The bundles may be prohibited because of the decree concerning storage, while the hollowed-out pile may also be prohibited by a rabbinic decree that a person might fail to make the sukkah properly. Conversely, perhaps both cases involve a Torah-level problem. The fact that one Mishnah uses one expression and the other uses another expression does not prove that one is rabbinic and the other is from the Torah.
That is the point of Rav Ashi’s question. How did Rabbi Yohanan know so easily that one case involved a Torah-level prohibition and the other involved a rabbinic decree? The language of the Mishnah can be explained in either way.
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yohanan inferred the distinction from the exact wording of the Mishnah. Our Mishnah says that the bundles may not be used for the thatch. That wording indicates a decree: perhaps a person will place them there for drying and later decide to use them as thatch. The prohibition is therefore a rabbinic safeguard.
In contrast, the Mishnah concerning the pile says that the resulting structure is not a sukkah. That wording indicates that the sukkah itself was not made in the required manner. It was created by hollowing out the pile rather than by constructing the sukkah, and therefore it is invalid on a Torah level.
There is still another possibility. Suppose a person hollowed out the pile and then lifted the thatch and replaced it properly. In that case, the thatch was made in the proper manner. Perhaps the sukkah should now be valid on a Torah level, but the rabbis might still prohibit it as a safeguard, lest people fail to perform that correction. This would mean that the case could still involve a rabbinic decree even after the person corrected the thatch.
Similarly, in the case of the bundles, perhaps the bundles were placed there originally for storage, but the person later untied them and placed them on the sukkah for the sake of the sukkah. If they were untied and properly placed, the Torah-level concern would no longer apply. Nevertheless, there might still be a rabbinic decree because people might not distinguish between this case and the ordinary case in which the bundles remain as they were.
The Gemara’s distinction is therefore precise. If the bundles were placed on the sukkah for storage and later merely left there, the thatch was not made for the sake of the sukkah. If the person lifts them, unties them, and places them again for the sake of the sukkah, there is no Torah-level problem. The question is whether the rabbis nevertheless imposed a decree in that case.
This is also the practical halachic issue discussed in the Shulchan Aruch. One may not simply place bundles on the sukkah, because a person may initially put them there for drying or storage and later decide to leave them as thatch. The rabbis therefore prohibited bundles as such.
The decree applies specifically to bundles of the type ordinarily used for drying. The rabbis did not prohibit every collection of branches. Since the decree was made because bundles are commonly placed on roofs for drying, it applies to the type of bundle used for that purpose.
The standard bundle consisted of approximately twenty-five branches. If a person places fewer than that on the sukkah, it may not have the appearance of the type of bundle used for drying. If the branches are cut apart and are no longer a bundle, the decree does not apply in the same way.
These distinctions matter. If a person takes twenty-five branches and places them together on the sukkah, that resembles a bundle used for drying. If he places the branches separately, or uses a smaller number in a way that is not the normal method of drying wood, there may be no reason for the decree.
This discussion concerns moist wood that people ordinarily dry. It does not refer to a mat that was manufactured as a mat and is already dry. Nobody places a finished mat on the roof in order to dry it. The reason the wood is tied together is crucial. If the material is tied in the ordinary manner of a drying bundle, the decree applies even if the person claims that he intended it for the sukkah.
A mat is different because its pieces are tied together in order to create the mat. The tying is not a method of drying the wood. Therefore, one cannot automatically compare a manufactured mat to a bundle of branches. The question is always what kind of tying is involved and what that form of bundle ordinarily signifies.
This leads to another question: what is used to hold the material together? Some mats are tied with twine or other fibers. The material holding the wood together may itself come from the ground, such as flax or another plant fiber. We will have to discuss whether that connector is considered a supporting element and whether it creates a problem because it is capable of becoming ritually impure.
The principle of a supporting element is important. If the material holding the thatch together is itself susceptible to ritual impurity, one might argue that it invalidates the thatch. We will return to that issue. For now, the question is being held for the discussion of arrows and other implements.
The Gemara then discusses arrows. An arrow consists of a wooden shaft and a metal arrowhead. The wooden part has a point that enters the arrowhead, or the arrowhead may have a hole into which the wooden part is inserted. The Gemara distinguishes between the male and female components.
One might ask how the wooden shaft could be considered a utensil and therefore susceptible to ritual impurity. The wooden handle comes from the ground, but if it is part of a utensil, it may become susceptible to impurity. The answer is that the shaft itself may not be considered a utensil because it has no receptacle. A utensil normally has a place to contain something, whereas a simple stick does not.
A broomstick, for example, is simply a stick. The fact that one uses it for a purpose does not automatically make it a utensil. Likewise, a long piece of bamboo is not necessarily a utensil merely because it is useful. If one fashions the wood into a knife or another actual implement, that is different. But a plain stick remains a stick.
The Gemara says that arrows whose wooden shafts have a hollow or receptacle may be invalid for the thatch. The arrowhead has a hole into which the shaft enters, and that may make it a utensil capable of receiving ritual impurity.
The Gemara asks why it needs to teach that a male shaft is valid and a female shaft is invalid. The invalid case seems obvious: a hollow object is a utensil. The Gemara answers that the hole in the arrowhead is made in order to be filled. One might have thought that such a hole is not considered a receptacle because it is not intended to hold anything permanently. The Gemara teaches that it is nevertheless considered a receptacle.
Even if the receptacle was made only to be filled with the other part of the arrow, it is still considered a receptacle. Once the shaft is inserted into the hollow arrowhead, the two parts function together as a utensil. The fact that the hole is not used to store an independent object does not eliminate its status as a receptacle.
The practical halachic discussion is brought in the Shulchan Aruch: an arrow whose wooden part does not have a receptacle may be used, whereas an arrow whose wooden part has a receptacle may not be used. Once the wooden shaft is attached to the metal arrowhead and functions as an arrow, it may acquire the status of a utensil.
The same issue arises with hollow bamboo. Bamboo grows from the ground, but some bamboo has a natural hollow space. If the hollow space is significant enough to receive something, the bamboo may be considered a utensil and may become susceptible to ritual impurity. This is not because a person necessarily fashioned it into a utensil; its natural form may already provide the receptacle.
A wooden shovel or a similar implement can also contain objects. Its handle may simply be a stick, but the shovel itself has a functional part that receives or holds material. Because it has a significant function and may contain something, it can have the status of a utensil. The question is not only whether the object grows from the ground, but also whether its form or function makes it capable of receiving ritual impurity.
The Gemara then returns to flax. Rabbi Yohanan says that thatch made from processed flax is invalid, while thatch made from unprocessed flax is valid. Flax that has already been prepared for use as thread is susceptible to ritual impurity. Since it is already a usable material, it has lost the status of raw growth from the ground.
Unprocessed flax, however, is still merely plant material. It has not yet been combed or prepared into thread, and it is not yet susceptible to ritual impurity in the same way. Therefore, it may be used for the thatch.
The Gemara is uncertain about an intermediate stage. Suppose the flax was soaked in water, and perhaps beaten, but not yet combed into fibers. Is that still considered raw flax, or has it already entered the category of processed flax? That is the uncertainty in the Gemara.
One possibility is that soaking alone is called the initial processing, while beating and combing are later stages. If so, the uncertainty concerns material that has been beaten but not combed. Another possibility is that the term for processed flax applies only after it has been beaten, in which case the uncertainty may already begin with soaking.
The Rif discusses this passage and explains that flax is invalid once it has reached the stage at which it can become susceptible to impurity through the laws of skin afflictions. Raw flax, before it has been sufficiently processed, does not have that status.
There is a broader dispute among the commentaries about the reason for the invalidity of processed flax. One approach is that the problem is ritual impurity: once the material can become impure, it cannot be used as thatch. Another approach is that the processed material no longer looks like something that grows from the ground. Even if it does not actually become impure at that precise stage, it may no longer satisfy the requirement that the thatch come from the ground.
This distinction affects other materials as well. According to one approach, cotton may be permitted because it grows from the ground and is not necessarily susceptible to ritual impurity in its raw form. According to another approach, cotton may be problematic because it can be used as stuffing for a pillow and no longer looks like a natural growth of the ground.
The question is therefore whether the material must merely grow from the ground, or whether it must also retain the appearance of a natural growth from the ground. According to the stricter approach, once the material has been processed into something whose normal use is as stuffing or fiber, it may no longer be acceptable as thatch.
The same issue applies to hemp and plant fibers. Technically, one might be able to take twine made from plant material and spread it across the sukkah. From the Torah perspective, it may grow from the ground and not be susceptible to impurity. Nevertheless, according to the stricter opinion, it may be invalid because it no longer looks like a natural growth from the ground.
This creates an important practical distinction. The thatch itself may need to consist of material that retains the appearance of wood or another natural growth, while twine used only to hold the thatch together may be treated differently. The twine may be permitted as a supporting element even if it could not itself serve as the thatch.
That is why the question of the material used to tie the mats is significant. If the twine is only holding the wood together, perhaps it does not determine the status of the thatch. The thatch remains wood, while the twine is merely a supporting element. We will have to see whether a supporting element that is susceptible to ritual impurity creates a problem.
The Gemara then brings another teaching from Rav Yehudah concerning certain plants that people do not eat. These plants may be used for the thatch. Since they are not food, they are not susceptible to impurity as food, and they also grow from the ground. They therefore possess both requirements: they grow from the ground and are not susceptible to impurity.
Abaye distinguishes between two of these plants. One may be used for the thatch, while the other may not. The reason is that the second plant gives off a strong smell. People cannot comfortably remain in a sukkah made from it, and the smell makes the sukkah unfit for use.
This is an important point in the laws of the sukkah. Even if the material is technically valid as thatch, one may not use a material whose smell makes the sukkah intolerable. If a person would leave his house rather than remain in such a sukkah, the sukkah is not considered a suitable dwelling.
The smell must be sufficiently strong and persistent to make the sukkah unpleasant. It is not enough that a small amount of odor occasionally emerges from the thatch. If the wind blows and one notices an ordinary smell, that does not invalidate the sukkah. The issue is a material that continuously gives off an intolerable odor.
The same applies to material that constantly sheds. Rav Chanan bar Rabbah says that thorns may be used for the thatch. The Gemara asks why they are not prohibited, since they are not edible and therefore satisfy the basic requirement. It answers that another plant may not be used because its thorns fall continuously.
If the thorns fall into a person’s food while he is eating in the sukkah, he cannot remain there comfortably. The problem is not that the material is susceptible to ritual impurity, but that it makes the sukkah uninhabitable.
The Shulchan Aruch therefore rules that if material constantly sheds onto a person, or if it gives off such a bad smell that the person would leave the sukkah, he must leave the sukkah. This applies when the shedding or smell is constant and significant. Ordinary shedding caused occasionally by the wind does not invalidate the sukkah.
The principle is that the sukkah must be a place in which a person can live normally. Material can be valid in its basic composition and still create a problem if it makes the sukkah impossible to inhabit. The thatch must therefore satisfy both the technical requirements of growing from the ground and not being susceptible to impurity, and the practical requirement that the sukkah remain a livable place.