Today’s discussion in Sukkah is dedicated to the success of Shmuel ben Yehudit and his family. We begin on the first page of the second chapter, with the Mishnah’s discussion of those engaged in a mitzvah: they are exempt from the sukkah.
A person who is considered an emissary for a mitzvah is exempt from the sukkah. Rashi gives examples: someone traveling to study Torah, to visit his rabbi, or to redeem captives. All of these people are engaged in a mitzvah, and therefore they are exempt from the sukkah.
Rashi explains that this exemption applies even when they are resting at night, when they are no longer traveling and are waiting until the following morning. They remain exempt because they are preoccupied with the mitzvah that they must fulfill.
Tosafot immediately asks why they should be exempt. If a person can perform two mitzvot at the same time, we do not exempt him from one mitzvah merely because he is performing another. We do not exempt someone from wearing tefillin because he is wearing ritual fringes. If he can fulfill both mitzvot, he should fulfill both.
Why, then, does the Mishnah say that these people are exempt even when they are resting? Tosafot answers that the exemption applies when building or locating a sukkah would delay them from performing the mitzvah. However, if they can fulfill both mitzvot without interfering with one another, then certainly, while they are waiting for the next morning, they must sit in the sukkah.
This is what Tosafot means when it writes: “It is necessary to say that the case is one in which fulfilling the mitzvah of sukkah would interfere with the other mitzvah, because otherwise one mitzvah would be nullified because of the other.” That is why they are exempt. If they can perform both mitzvot, however, they are not exempt.
The Mishnah continues: “The sick and those attending them are exempt from the sukkah.” We will see why. It also teaches: “One may eat and drink casually outside the sukkah.” Although one must eat in the sukkah, a temporary or casual snack may be eaten outside it. We will also discuss what qualifies as casual eating.
The Gemara asks: From where do we know that those engaged in one mitzvah are exempt from another mitzvah? The Sages taught in a baraita from the verse, “When you sit in your house.” This verse appears in the passage of the recitation of the Shema. It teaches that a person recites the Shema when he is sitting in his house, meaning that he is occupied with his ordinary affairs. It excludes someone who is engaged in a mitzvah.
The Gemara understands that not only is someone engaged in a mitzvah exempt from reciting the Shema, which is the example provided by the Torah; he is likewise exempt from other mitzvot.
The verse continues, “And when you walk on the road.” A person walking on the road is required to stop and recite the Shema. This excludes a groom. The Gemara is referring to a man marrying a virgin. Why is such a groom exempt? Because he is preoccupied. His thoughts are occupied with the mitzvah he is about to fulfill, the mitzvah of marital relations with a virgin. He may be wondering whether she will in fact be a virgin and how he will fulfill the mitzvah. These thoughts occupy his mind, and this is considered preoccupation connected to a mitzvah. Therefore, he is exempt.
The Gemara asks why two verses are needed. Why do we need “When you sit in your house” to teach that someone engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from reciting the Shema, and then “When you walk on the road” to teach that a groom is exempt? They appear to teach the same principle: someone engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah.
Rashi explains that if we had only one of these verses, we would not have been able to derive the law of the groom. A groom is not necessarily performing the mitzvah itself at that moment; he is merely preoccupied with it in his thoughts. We might have said that the exemption applies only when a person is actively performing a mitzvah—for example, when he is traveling to visit his rabbi—but not when he is merely sitting and thinking about a mitzvah. Therefore, the second verse teaches that even when a person is not performing the mitzvah itself, but is sitting and is preoccupied with it, he is also exempt.
Because of this, Tosafot introduces a different version of the Gemara. According to our version, “When you sit in your house” refers to someone engaged in a mitzvah, while “When you walk on the road” refers to the groom. Tosafot argues that the opposite arrangement makes more sense. “When you sit in your house” should refer to the groom, who is sitting and merely thinking about the mitzvah without performing an act. “When you walk on the road” should refer to someone who is actually traveling to perform a mitzvah.
The Gemara continues: “One who marries a virgin is exempt, but one who marries a widow is obligated.” Marriage to a widow is also a mitzvah, but the groom is not exempt in that case because he does not experience the same preoccupation. The Gemara asks: What does one matter have to do with the other? He can perform the mitzvah of marrying a widow and still recite the Shema.
The Gemara first challenges the assumption that “when you sit in your house” necessarily refers to a person engaged in ordinary, non-mitzvah activities. Perhaps the verse is teaching that even when a person is involved in a mitzvah, he must still recite the Shema. Perhaps a person is studying Torah in his house, visiting his rabbi, or performing another mitzvah, and the Torah is nevertheless telling him to recite the Shema. What evidence is there that the verse excludes someone engaged in a mitzvah?
Rav Huna answers that the wording of the verse provides the indication. The expression “when you walk on the road” generally refers to a person traveling for his own purposes—to work or to conduct business. Such activity is optional rather than obligatory. The verse therefore refers to optional travel, excluding travel undertaken for a mitzvah.
The Gemara challenges this as well. Is every journey undertaken for business? Perhaps a person is traveling in order to perform a mitzvah, and the Torah is still telling him to recite the Shema. The Gemara answers that if the verse had intended to include every kind of sitting and walking, it could have said simply “when you sit” and “when you walk.” Instead, it says “when you sit in your house” and “when you walk on your road,” indicating a person’s own, private activities. When the road belongs to the mitzvah, however, he is exempt.
The Gemara then returns to the case of marrying a widow. If the principle is that one engaged in a mitzvah is exempt, why does the Mishnah mention only one who marries a virgin? The Gemara answers: marrying a virgin causes the groom to be preoccupied, whereas marrying a widow does not.
What is the difference? The groom marrying a virgin is preoccupied with thoughts connected to the mitzvah itself. His concern about whether she is a virgin and how he will fulfill the mitzvah is a mitzvah-related preoccupation. By contrast, marrying a widow does not generate that specific preoccupation.
This distinction is important. Not every preoccupation exempts a person from a mitzvah. Suppose a person receives news that his business has suffered a tremendous loss. He is certainly preoccupied and distressed. Nevertheless, we do not say that he is exempt from reciting the Shema. We tell him to make an effort to set those thoughts aside for a moment and recite the Shema.
The groom, however, is preoccupied with the mitzvah itself. His mitzvah-related thoughts began before the obligation to recite the Shema. Therefore, we do not require him to force those thoughts out of his mind for a moment in order to recite the Shema. That is the difference between ordinary distress, which is optional and unrelated to a mitzvah, and preoccupation with a mitzvah.
The Gemara asks whether this principle can be derived from another incident. We learn in a baraita that two people came to Moses. They were impure through contact with the dead and were unable to bring the Paschal offering. They asked Moses what they should do.
Why were they unable to bring the offering? They had come into contact with a corpse and needed a seven-day purification process, including sprinkling on the third and seventh days. They would not be purified in time to bring the Paschal offering.
Before discussing the halachic point, the Gemara asks who these people were. One opinion says that they were carrying the bones of Joseph. When the Jewish people left Egypt, the righteous carried Joseph’s bones. Moses had taken Joseph’s bones from the Nile, and members of the tribe of Joseph carried them. According to this view, they became impure through contact with the dead while carrying Joseph’s bones.
Rabbi Akiva says that they were Mishael and Elzaphan, who carried the bodies of Nadav and Avihu after they died in the Sanctuary when the fire went forth.
Tosafot observes that the case cannot be understood according to the opinion that Nadav and Avihu were completely burned, because ashes do not transmit impurity in the same manner. Rather, it must follow the opinion that the fire entered their bodies while their bodies remained intact. Tosafot also explains that even according to the opinion that they were burned, their spines and skeletons may have remained, so they could still transmit impurity.
The Gemara challenges the possibility that these people were carrying Joseph’s bones. Joseph’s bones had been taken out of Egypt a year earlier. The Mishkan was erected in the second year, and the laws of the red heifer began on the second of Nisan. From that date until the fourteenth of Nisan, when the Paschal offering was brought, there was sufficient time for the people carrying Joseph’s bones to purify themselves. Why, then, would they still be impure?
The same question applies if they were Mishael and Elzaphan. Nadav and Avihu had died earlier, and even if Mishael and Elzaphan had become impure when removing their bodies, they had enough time to purify themselves before Passover. Therefore, the Gemara concludes that they must have become involved with another dead person shortly before Passover.
Perhaps a relative had died, and they were obligated to take care of the burial. The person may not have been a communal “neglected corpse” in the narrow sense; he may simply have been an ordinary relative whose burial they were required to handle. The seventh day of their purification fell on the eve of Passover. They would become fit to bring the Paschal offering only at night, after the time of the offering. At the time of the slaughter, they were not yet fit to participate.
The Gemara asks why they had become involved with this burial when doing so would cause them to miss the Paschal offering. Did they not know how to calculate? They should have realized that if they attended to the burial, they would lose the opportunity to bring the offering.
The Gemara answers that this demonstrates the principle that one engaged in a mitzvah is not concerned with the loss of another mitzvah. They were engaged in the mitzvah of burial and did not stop to calculate the effect on the Paschal offering. The verse says that they were unable to make the offering “on that day.” The Gemara understands this to mean that they could not do it on that day, but they would have been able to do it on the following day. Thus, they missed the opportunity by only one day.
The Gemara asks why two sources are needed to teach the principle that someone engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah. The case of the Paschal offering is different. At the time they became involved in the burial, the obligation of the Paschal offering was not yet immediately before them. One might therefore have said that a person need not interrupt the mitzvah in front of him because of a mitzvah that will arise a week or two later.
But perhaps when both mitzvot are immediately before a person, the law is different. Perhaps a groom should be told to set aside his thoughts about the mitzvah of marriage for a moment and recite the Shema, since both mitzvot are currently due. The case of the Paschal offering would not establish that point.
Conversely, if the only source were the case of the groom, one might have said that the principle applies only to the Shema, which is a Torah mitzvah but does not carry the punishment of excision if omitted. Perhaps when the competing mitzvah carries the punishment of excision, such as the Paschal offering, one would have to interrupt the mitzvah in front of him in order to fulfill the more severe mitzvah. Therefore, both sources are necessary. Even when the other mitzvah is more severe and its omission can carry the punishment of excision, the person remains engaged in the mitzvah before him and is exempt from the other one.
Rabbeinu asks: Why is a verse needed at all? Why would we think that a person should abandon the mitzvah he is currently performing in order to do another mitzvah? If he is already engaged in one mitzvah, why would he leave it and perform the second?
There are two approaches among the early authorities. The Ran understands the verse as teaching that even when a person can perform both mitzvot, he remains exempt from the second mitzvah. He should concentrate on the mitzvah that came before him and perform it properly, rather than divide his attention and perform both without the proper concentration.
Tosafot, however, understands the matter differently. According to Tosafot, someone engaged in a mitzvah is exempt only when performing the second mitzvah would interfere with the first. If he can perform both without interference, he must perform both. This is why Tosafot explains that the travelers are exempt only when building or locating the sukkah would delay them from carrying out their mission.
This difference has practical implications. According to the Ran, even when a person can perform both mitzvot, he should perform the mitzvah already before him with proper concentration and is exempt from the other. According to Tosafot, if both can be performed, both must be performed.
The Shulchan Aruch follows the approach of the Ran. It rules that someone engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah even when he could technically perform both. The Mishnah Berurah explains that this ruling is not obvious. The novelty is that the first mitzvah exempts him from the second even when there is no actual interference.
There is also a further question: once the first mitzvah has come to a person and he was exempt from the second, does that exemption continue even if the second mitzvah later becomes available? The idea is that when the mitzvah first came before him, he was exempt. The second mitzvah is therefore treated as optional for him, even if he could later perform it. This is another aspect of the principle taught by the verse.
The Gemara then discusses a mourner. Rabbi Abba bar Zavda says in the name of Rav that a mourner is obligated in all the mitzvot of the Torah, except for tefillin. Regarding tefillin, the verse says that they are a person’s glory. God told Ezekiel, who was mourning, to wear his glory. From this exception, we understand that other mourners are exempt from tefillin.
This exemption applies on the first day of mourning. The verse describes the day of mourning as a bitter day, and the first day is the primary day of mourning. From the second day onward, the mourner is obligated to wear tefillin.
This creates a practical question when the death occurs on one day but the burial takes place later. For example, if a person dies on Friday and is not buried until Sunday, is Sunday considered the first day of mourning, so that the mourner is exempt from tefillin, or do we consider the day of death to have been the bitter day? This is a major dispute among the authorities.
There is also a case in which the first two days of mourning are treated as days of exemption. If the mourners pray early in the winter, before sunrise, they must be careful regarding tefillin. Since part of the second day has passed, there may be a principle that part of the day is considered equivalent to the entire day, allowing them to wear tefillin. However, they should be careful not to pray at sunrise in a way that creates confusion about the relevant day of mourning.
Rashi explains the verse concerning Ezekiel as referring to his “delightful one,” his wife. God told him that even though he was experiencing mourning, he should not observe the ordinary signs of mourning. He was an exception, while other mourners do not wear their glory on the first day.
This recalls the situation during a time of widespread death, when there may be nobody available to comfort the mourners because everyone is suffering the same loss. Such a circumstance was described as a sign of the destruction, when people were dying and there was no one available to console others. Ezekiel’s case hints at that unique situation, in which ordinary mourning could not be observed in the usual manner.
The Gemara then turns to the sick. We might have thought that a person is exempt from the sukkah only when the affliction comes upon him involuntarily, such as illness or physical pain. But perhaps when the distress is caused by his own thoughts, he should be required to control himself and enter the sukkah.
For example, if someone suffers a financial loss and is distressed, one might say that he should put those thoughts aside temporarily and fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah. His distress is not created by the sukkah itself, and he may be able to remove it from his mind.
That is different from distress caused by the sukkah itself. If it is extremely cold, excessively hot, filled with insects, or has an unpleasant smell or something dripping from it, the discomfort comes directly from the sukkah. In such a case, the person is exempt because he is suffering through the sukkah itself.
Rashi’s explanation makes this distinction clear. A person who is ill is exempt under the separate exemption of the sick. But a person who is uncomfortable because of the conditions of the sukkah is exempt under the law of one who suffers in the sukkah. The source of the discomfort matters.
This raises a question regarding sleeping in the sukkah. Some Hasidic authorities are said to have argued that a person need not sleep in the sukkah because his wife is exempt from sleeping there. If he sleeps in the sukkah, he will be separated from his wife during the festival, and that itself will cause him distress. The principle is that one must live in the sukkah as he lives in his home. If he ordinarily lives with his wife, how can he be expected to sleep away from her in the sukkah?
There were Hasidim who said that their Rebbe did not sleep in the sukkah. They explained that they likewise could not sleep in the sukkah because they were distressed on his behalf. This was an extension of the argument that separation from one’s wife creates distress. However, this is not the same as distress caused by illness or by the physical conditions of the sukkah. It is a separate discussion involving the requirement to live in the sukkah as one lives in his home.
If a person is distressed in the sukkah and goes into his house, we do not necessarily require him to remain distressed there as well. Once the law exempts him because of his distress, he is exempt from that mitzvah. The exemption is not dependent on whether leaving the sukkah completely eliminates the distress.
The Gemara then discusses a groom and the people assisting him. The groom and his attendants are exempt from the sukkah throughout the seven days of rejoicing. The reason is that they must be involved in the celebration. The Gemara asks why they cannot eat in the sukkah and celebrate there as well.
The answer is that the celebration must take place where the groom and bride are living. The sukkah is not necessarily that place. The principle is that rejoicing follows the place of the meal, and the meal and the celebration must take place together. Since the wedding celebration is associated with the place where the groom and bride are residing, they cannot simply move the celebration to a sukkah elsewhere.
The Gemara suggests that they should build the wedding canopy in the sukkah. The discussion indicates that “canopy” does not necessarily mean the decorated structure under which the wedding ceremony takes place. It can refer to the place where the groom and bride are living as husband and wife.
Rashi explains that there may be a problem of seclusion. In those times, the sukkot were built on rooftops, and people did not constantly pass through them. If the groom excused himself during the meal, the bride could be left alone with one of the attendants, creating a concern of seclusion. That is one reason the wedding meal could not simply be held in the sukkah.
Rava gives another explanation: the exemption is because of the groom’s distress. Even if there were no concern of seclusion, the groom would be embarrassed to engage in marital intimacy in the sukkah. The place is not sufficiently private for him to live there comfortably with his bride.
The practical difference between these explanations concerns a sukkah located in a public place, where people are constantly entering and leaving. According to the explanation based on seclusion, there would be no concern because people are always present. According to the explanation based on the groom’s embarrassment, the concern remains, and perhaps becomes even stronger, because the groom will be uncomfortable with people constantly seeing or hearing him.
Rashi describes the groom’s distress as a situation in which the place is open and does not have sufficient walls, so that people can see the couple. Even if there are walls, if the surroundings are exposed and people can look in, the groom may still be embarrassed. The issue is whether the place provides the privacy necessary for the couple to live there.
According to the discussion, the groom and his attendants are exempt from the sukkah throughout the seven days of celebration. It sounds as though the wedding celebration takes place in the house where the groom and bride are living. They have their furnishings there, and that becomes their place of residence.
After the seven days are over, the attendants leave. If the groom remains in his home, there is no question of leaving the place of celebration to go somewhere else. The house has a roof and walls, and he is not embarrassed there. The question of seclusion and embarrassment applies to the temporary public setting of the sukkah, not to the groom’s private home.
This discussion is relevant to the place where the seven blessings are recited. The implication of the Gemara is that the blessings are connected to the place where the groom and bride are living, referred to as the groom’s house. This is the source of the discussion among Tosafot, the Rosh, and other authorities regarding whether the seven blessings must be recited specifically in the groom’s home or may be recited elsewhere.
There is a story involving Rabbi Zeira. He ate in the sukkah but was in the house for the wedding canopy, and he rejoiced there. The Gemara challenges this account because there is a teaching that a person should not marry during the festival. The case must therefore be understood as referring to a wedding that took place under circumstances in which marriage was permitted, or to a particular situation discussed by the commentators.
In any event, the question is whether the groom may choose to remain in the sukkah and conduct the wedding celebration there, or whether the place where the groom and bride are living determines the location of the celebration and the seven blessings.
Tosafot discusses the meaning of the groom’s house. It may refer to the place where the couple is actually residing after the wedding, rather than only to the location of the initial ceremony. The word “canopy” may also refer not merely to the temporary structure used for the ceremony but to the place established for the couple’s residence.
The Rosh takes a broader approach. If the groom and bride leave the original location and go with their attendants to another place, and they establish themselves there together, that place may also be considered their wedding residence. The essential point is that the groom, bride, and attendants are together in the place where the celebration and the meal are taking place.
According to this approach, if the groom returns to his ordinary home, that is the place where he lives, and the seven blessings may be connected to it. But if he and the attendants move together to another location and establish the celebration there, that location may likewise qualify. The exact application is a major discussion among the later authorities.
The central issue is whether the place must belong to the groom in a permanent sense, or whether renting a place for the wedding celebration gives it the status of the groom’s house for that occasion. Many weddings today take place in halls or restaurants, and the authorities discuss whether renting the facility makes it equivalent to the groom’s residence for the purposes of the seven blessings.
There are different approaches among the Sephardic authorities as well. Some explain that the circumstances of the earlier sources were different from those of contemporary weddings, because the groom and bride actually established their residence in the place where the celebration was held. In a modern hall, the place may be rented only temporarily, which raises a separate question about whether it can be considered the groom’s house.
This is the conclusion of the discussion for today: the groom and his attendants are exempt from the sukkah because they must be involved in the wedding celebration, and the celebration is tied to the place where the groom and bride are living. The Gemara’s discussion of seclusion, the groom’s embarrassment, the location of the meal, and the place of the seven blessings all revolve around determining what qualifies as that place.