The Evey B Sit edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, specifically Masechet Kiddushin, has been sponsored by our good friend Mr. Chaimy Dana, who may he be protected and live, in honor of his wife, Bina bat Rivka, wishing her many years of shalom bayit, Masechet Kiddushin, and success, livelihood, and all good things: health, happiness, nachat from the children, and all the berachot. Amen. Today’s daf has been sponsored for the elevation of the soul of l'ilui nishmat Mordechai ben Kehot Yosef ben Sara, Menatzeach ben Yehudit, Yaffa bat Sara, and for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther. May their souls be bound in the bond of life. Amen. Today’s daf is being sponsored for refuah sheleimah for Sarah bat Rachel, Inna, and Moshe ben Dina. May it be Your will that they have a complete recovery of body and soul, along with all the other sick among the people of Israel, and let it be Your will, and we say Amen.
We begin today’s daf on samech daled amud rishon, starting from the new Mishna, the second line from the top. The Mishna states: “I have married off my daughter.” An interesting case arises: the father says, “I gave, I received kiddushin for my daughter.” He states, “I married her off and divorced her while she was a ketannah.” Not only did I accept kiddushin, but I also accepted her divorce. And she is still a ketannah when he gives this testimony. He is believed. The practical implication is that she will be forbidden to a kohen because she is a divorcee.
In the next case, he states, “I received the kiddushin and the geirushin for her when she was a ketannah. But now, by the time he gives his testimony, she is a gedolah.” He is not believed. The distinction must be made clear. The Mishna raises the question: “What is the difference that he is not believed?” The answer is that she is disqualified from marrying a kohen. If the father claims, “My daughter was taken into captivity by the goyim and I redeemed her,” we have a law that if a girl is taken into captivity by the goyim, we must assume that they violated her. Hence, she has the status of a zonah, and she is forbidden to marry a kohen. The father’s testimony is not accepted, regardless of whether she is a ketannah or a gedolah.
Now, let’s review the cases: If he states, “I married off my daughter and divorced her,” and she is still a ketannah, he is believed. If he states, “I married off my daughter and divorced her,” but she is a gedolah, he is not believed. In the case of captivity, whether she is a gedolah or a ketannah, he is not believed. The Gemara then asks, “Why is there a distinction between the first case and the last case?” The Gemara answers: “In the first case, it is in his control to declare her disqualified from kehunah, but in the last case, it is not in his control.”
The Gemara continues to explain: “In the first case, he can say, ‘I married her off as a ketannah and accepted her divorce,’ and therefore he is believed. However, in the case of captivity, he cannot claim that he has the power to make her a zonah.” The reasoning follows that he never has the right to place her in the hands of the goyim, whether she is a gedolah or a ketannah. The Gemara elaborates that this is not a simple scenario, and the father’s testimony is not accepted. The Gemara then states that even in the last case, he should have a degree of credibility when he claims that she was taken into captivity because he could have made her disqualified from kehunah by marrying her to a chalal.
The discussion continues to explore the implications of the father’s testimony, and the Gemara notes that the father’s ability to disqualify his daughter from kehunah is a crucial factor in evaluating his credibility. The Gemara emphasizes that if the father had the ability to disqualify her, he should be believed when he claims that she was taken into captivity. The Gemara also examines the implications of marrying a daughter to a chalal, and the potential consequences for her status regarding kehunah.
As the discussion progresses, the Gemara highlights the importance of understanding the nuances of each case and the varying levels of credibility that apply. The analysis of the father’s testimony reveals the complexities of halachic rulings regarding marriage and divorce, particularly in situations involving captivity and the status of women in Jewish law.
In conclusion, the Gemara provides a comprehensive examination of the various cases and the halachic principles that govern them. The distinctions made throughout the discussion underscore the importance of careful consideration in matters of kiddushin, geirushin, and the implications of a father’s testimony regarding his daughter’s marital status.