We begin on Sukkah, daf 3, at the bottom of the daf, and continue to the passage beginning with “Ma’aseh.” The Gemara states that a sukkah whose height is more than twenty amot is invalid. Rabbi Yehudah, however, validates a sukkah even at forty or fifty amot, which means that, according to him, a sukkah may be of any height. Tosafot addresses the fact that the Gemara mentions both forty and fifty. If fifty is valid, certainly forty is valid. Tosafot explains that this is sometimes simply the style of the Gemara; there is no need to be troubled by the wording.
Rabbi Yehudah brings a proof from an incident involving Hilni the Queen, who lived in Lod. She made a sukkah that was more than twenty amot high. The sages entered and left the sukkah throughout Sukkot, yet they said nothing to her. Rabbi Yehudah argues that this demonstrates that a sukkah higher than twenty amot can nevertheless be valid.
The Gemara rejects the proof. It says that one cannot bring a proof from Hilni the Queen, because she was a woman, and a woman is exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah. Since she was exempt, the sages had no reason to tell her that her sukkah was invalid. In reality, the sukkah may have been invalid, but what could they have said to her? She was not obligated to sit in a sukkah in the first place.
Rabbi Yehudah responds that the proof comes from the fact that Hilni had seven sons, and everything she did was in accordance with the direction of the sages. Why does the Gemara add that everything she did followed the sages? If the only point were that she herself was exempt, that detail would be unnecessary. Her sons, after all, were minors and were also exempt from the mitzvah itself.
Rabbi Yehudah explains that among her seven sons, at least one must have reached the age of education and no longer required his mother’s assistance. Such a child is obligated in the mitzvot at least on a rabbinic level. Hilni was careful to follow the rabbinic instructions in all other matters, and the sages went in and out of the sukkah throughout Sukkot without saying anything. This suggests that the sukkah was valid even though it was higher than twenty amot. That is Rabbi Yehudah’s proof.
The Gemara then considers another possibility. Perhaps the sukkah’s walls reached the roofing, and the reason Rabbi Yehudah brought the incident as a proof was that the walls were capable of providing shade. If so, even the Sages would agree that the sukkah was valid. Therefore, the Gemara concludes that the case must have involved a sukkah whose walls did not reach the roofing. The fact that a queen would sit in such a sukkah, where the shade was provided by the roofing rather than by the walls, is what makes the incident relevant to Rabbi Yehudah’s position.
The Gemara offers another approach. Perhaps the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages concerns a small sukkah. According to one version of Rav’s teaching, the minimum size of a sukkah is itself subject to dispute. A small sukkah is one measuring seven by seven handbreadths, and perhaps this is the case in which Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages disagree. Rabbi Yehudah could then say that the sukkah of Hilni the Queen was valid because it was higher than twenty amot, while the Sages would not necessarily agree.
The Gemara challenges this interpretation. Is it reasonable to say that Hilni the Queen sat in such a small sukkah? She had attendants, maidservants, and people constantly coming in and out. It would be highly unlikely for her to sit in a tiny sukkah. The Gemara therefore suggests that the sukkah consisted of small compartments. The queen sat in one compartment, while her attendants and helpers occupied other compartments. Each compartment was a small sukkah, and this would allow the incident to serve as a proof.
The Gemara challenges that answer as well. It is not normal to sit in sukkot constructed as a series of small compartments. Rabba bar Avuha therefore explains that there was one large sukkah, with a smaller sukkah in the back. Hilni sat in the smaller rear section, while her attendants sat in the larger section. In this way, there is no difficulty: the queen was sitting in the small sukkah, and Rabbi Yehudah used that fact as a proof of his position.
At this point, the Gemara examines what “a small sukkah” means in the context of the dispute. One possibility is that the dispute concerns a sukkah measuring between seven and four amot. If that is the range under discussion, Hilni could have sat in a reasonably sized sukkah, and her sons could have fit there as well. Since her sons were obligated at least on a rabbinic level, and she followed the instructions of the sages, the fact that the sages did not object would support Rabbi Yehudah.
There is, however, another opinion that the dispute concerns a sukkah of seven by seven handbreadths. According to that view, how could Hilni and her children have fit into such a sukkah? The Gemara acknowledges that this is a difficulty. Tosafot, however, offers a way to understand the case. As the Bach explains Tosafot, seven by seven does not necessarily mean a square seven by seven. It can mean a total area of forty-nine square handbreadths. The sukkah could therefore have been longer on one side and narrower on the other. The children could have sat along the longer wall.
Although the Gemara usually says “seven by seven,” Tosafot explains that the measurement refers to the total area rather than necessarily to a square. Thus, even according to the opinion that the minimum sukkah is seven by seven, it is possible that Hilni and her children fit inside by arranging the sukkah differently.
The Gemara then asks where the attendants were. The answer is that Hilni sat with her children in the rear section, while her attendants sat in the front section. According to one explanation, the children were in the front sukkah, and Hilni was in the back for reasons of privacy. The Gemara is therefore presenting different ways of understanding the incident: whether the children were with Hilni in the rear sukkah, whether they were in the larger front sukkah, and precisely how the sukkah was arranged. These interpretations determine whether the incident can serve as a proof for Rabbi Yehudah.
There is also a practical point here. A sukkah measuring four by four amot is not so small. One person would occupy part of the space, and another person could occupy the remainder. It is not an impossible arrangement, particularly when the people are seated in different sections. Nevertheless, the Gemara’s discussion is focused on how to understand the case technically, not on whether it would be comfortable by ordinary standards.
The Gemara now proceeds to the minimum size of a sukkah. A sukkah must be large enough to contain a person’s head, the majority of his body, and his table. The minimum measurement is seven handbreadths by seven handbreadths. When Levi heard this, he asked, “According to whom is this teaching?” He understood it to reflect the position of Beit Shammai. When he was asked who had taught him this, he was told that it was Levi, and that he should not move from that understanding.
Rabbi Nachman bar Yitzchak challenges this identification. Who said that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel are arguing about the minimum size of a sukkah? Perhaps they are arguing about a large sukkah. The person is sitting at the edge of the sukkah, while his table is inside the house. Beit Shammai may say that this is invalid because of a rabbinic decree: a person might become drawn after his table and end up eating in the house. Beit Hillel may say that there is no such concern.
According to this approach, the sukkah itself could be enormous, the size of this entire room. The issue is not the size of the sukkah at all. The issue is that the person is sitting at the edge, while his table extends into the house. Beit Shammai says that this is not acceptable because a person may follow his table into the house. Beit Hillel does not make that decree and therefore permits it. Consequently, one cannot automatically use this Mishnah as a source for the minimum size of a sukkah.
The Gemara seeks to prove that the dispute does concern the size of the sukkah. The wording of the Mishnah says that Beit Shammai invalidates and Beit Hillel validates. If the only issue were that a person might be drawn after his table, the sukkah itself would not be invalid. The person would simply not have fulfilled the mitzvah by sitting in that arrangement. The wording “invalid” therefore seems to indicate that the dispute is also about the size of the sukkah.
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is abbreviated and is dealing with two separate cases. In the first case, the sukkah is large, but the person’s table is in the house. Beit Shammai says that he has not fulfilled the mitzvah because of the concern that he may be drawn after his table, while Beit Hillel permits it. In the second case, the discussion concerns a sukkah that is not large enough to contain the person and his table. There, the dispute is about the minimum size of the sukkah itself.
Accordingly, there are two disputes. The first is about a large sukkah in which the table is outside, in the house. Beit Shammai prohibits this, while Beit Hillel permits it. The second is about the minimum dimensions of a sukkah. Beit Shammai requires that it contain the person’s head, the majority of his body, and his table. Beit Hillel requires only that it contain the person’s head and the majority of his body.
One version gives the minimum size according to Beit Shammai as seven by seven handbreadths and according to Beit Hillel as six by six handbreadths, since Beit Hillel does not require room for the table. The two schools are therefore arguing about the size of a small sukkah, while they are also arguing about a separate case involving a large sukkah in which the table is in the house.
The second Tosafot discusses this understanding and says that the opinion requiring a sukkah of seven by seven handbreadths is the opinion of Beit Shammai. Tosafot then says not to move from that interpretation. The wording refers to the opinion that the halakhah follows Beit Shammai in six matters. We do not need to enumerate those matters now; the point relevant here is that Tosafot identifies the seven-by-seven requirement with Beit Shammai.
Tosafot then discusses the broader principle of what happens when a person follows the opinion of Beit Shammai when the halakhah follows Beit Hillel. The discussion appears in the context of the laws of reciting the Shema. Beit Shammai says that one must recite the evening Shema while lying down, whereas Beit Hillel says that one may recite it in the ordinary manner. The Gemara states that the halakhah follows Beit Hillel.
The Gemara asks whether a person who acted in accordance with Beit Shammai has nevertheless fulfilled the mitzvah. It brings the case of the sukkah. When the sages saw a person sitting in a sukkah with his table in the house, they told him that if this was the way he sat in a sukkah, he had never fulfilled the mitzvah of sukkah. From this, the Gemara derives that following the position of Beit Shammai does not merely mean that one has acted in a less preferable manner; in certain cases, one has fulfilled nothing at all.
The Gemara does not state an explicit proof for the opposite direction. It derives from the words of Beit Shammai that a person who sits in the sukkah with his table in the house has accomplished nothing. Since the halakhah follows Beit Hillel, and Beit Hillel permits that arrangement, the Gemara reasons that the same principle applies in the other direction: a person who follows Beit Shammai’s ruling in a case where Beit Hillel is the halakhic authority has not fulfilled the mitzvah.
This is the novelty of the Gemara. It is not saying merely that the person acted improperly or that he receives credit only after the fact. It is saying that even on the Torah level, the person has not fulfilled the mitzvah. For example, if a person recites the Shema while lying on the floor, Beit Hillel would say that there is no need to do so, but one might have thought that the person nevertheless fulfilled the Torah obligation. The Gemara teaches that in this type of case, the sages can impose a penalty and remove even the Torah-level fulfillment.
We now continue to another passage on the same daf. The Beraita discusses a small house that does not measure four amot by four amot. Such a structure does not require a parapet around its roof, is not subject to the laws of leprosy-like afflictions of houses, and does not have the ordinary status of a house in a walled city regarding redemption. Normally, a house sold in a walled city may be redeemed only during the first year; afterward, the sale becomes final. This small structure is not treated as a house for that purpose. It is treated more like a field, which can be redeemed even later.
The Beraita also discusses the laws of exemption from military service. A person who builds a house is ordinarily exempt under the relevant law, but this structure is not considered a house. The reason for all these distinctions is that a dwelling smaller than four amot by four amot is not considered a proper house. It is not a place in which people ordinarily live.
The Gemara then asks whether such a structure participates in an eruv courtyard. When several houses open into a shared courtyard, the Sages require an eruv so that the residents can carry from one house to another and within the courtyard. Each house contributes a piece of bread, and the bread is placed in one of the houses. This creates the legal impression that all the residents are living in a single dwelling.
The question is whether this miniature house must contribute to the eruv, and whether its presence can interfere with the eruv if it does not contribute. It appears to be a private domain, just like the other houses, and the courtyard is also a distinct domain. The eruv unifies the houses and the courtyard for the purpose of carrying. Perhaps, therefore, this structure should also be required to participate.
The Gemara raises a similar question regarding a shared alleyway. An alleyway may have courtyards opening onto it, and the residents of those courtyards must make a partnership for the alleyway. This is called a partnership of alleyways. Just as an eruv unifies the houses within a courtyard, the partnership unifies the courtyards in relation to the alleyway. The question is whether the miniature structure must contribute to that partnership.
The Beraita teaches that the residents do not contribute to the eruv through this structure, and the eruv is not placed there. They also do not use it to divide the boundaries between two cities. The Gemara proceeds to examine each of these laws and to determine why the structure is treated differently in each case.
With regard to an eruv courtyard, the reason is that the eruv is placed in a house because the residents are considered as though they are all living in that house. This structure is not fit for dwelling, so it cannot serve as the house in which the eruv is placed. It is therefore neither required to contribute nor suitable as the location of the eruv.
With regard to a partnership for an alleyway, however, the Gemara initially suggests that the law may be different. The bread for the partnership does not necessarily have to be placed in a dwelling. It can be placed in the courtyard itself, which is not a dwelling. Since the miniature structure is no worse than a courtyard, perhaps the partnership may be placed there.
The Gemara explains that this is because the partnership for an alleyway is not dependent on the structure being a place of residence. The residents of the courtyards are being joined together as a group in relation to the alleyway. Therefore, one can place the partnership in the courtyard, and one may also place it in this structure. It is enough that the location is a protected place; it does not need to be a proper dwelling.
The Gemara then cites a Mishnah that says that the eruv of courtyards is placed in a courtyard and the partnership for an alleyway is placed in an alleyway. This cannot be understood literally, because the eruv is not actually placed in every courtyard, nor is the partnership necessarily placed in the alleyway. The Gemara explains that the reference is to an eruv placed in a small structure associated with the courtyard, such as a gatehouse, a covered passage, a porch, or a guardhouse.
These structures are not considered houses because people do not live in them as ordinary dwellings. A person may pass through them or even sleep there temporarily, but that does not make them proper houses. The eruv of courtyards therefore cannot be placed there, because the purpose of the eruv is to make the residents appear as though they are all living in one dwelling. A structure that is not suitable for dwelling cannot serve that function.
The partnership for an alleyway is different. Since it is enough for the partnership to be placed in a courtyard, and the courtyard itself is not a dwelling, the partnership can also be placed in such a small structure. The structure is treated as an extension of the courtyard for this purpose.
The Gemara then discusses the law of a structure located between two cities. If the structure is less than seventy and two-thirds amot from each city, it may join the two cities for purposes of the city boundary. One may walk through the first city, across the intervening space, and into the second city; the two cities are treated as connected for this purpose. The measurement of seventy and two-thirds amot on each side creates a total of one hundred forty-one and one-third amot.
The novelty of the Beraita is that a house in the middle can connect the two cities, but only if it is a legitimate house. A miniature structure that is smaller than four amot by four amot does not create this connection. It is not substantial enough to be considered an intervening house, and the two cities therefore remain separate.
Rashi explains the case by discussing two cities, each with an extension of seventy and two-thirds amot. If a proper house is located between them, the house joins the two areas, and the entire distance is treated as one connected area. If the structure is not a proper house, it does not join them, and the two-thousand-ama boundary is measured separately from each city.
The Gemara then discusses brothers or partners who share such a small structure. The Beraita says that they do not divide it. One partner cannot force the other to divide an asset that is less than four amot by four amot, because dividing it would make each portion insignificant. The Gemara asks who is the author of this teaching. Perhaps it is Rabbi, who requires a sukkah to measure four amot by four amot. If even a sukkah smaller than that is invalid, certainly a house smaller than that is not considered significant.
But perhaps the teaching could also follow the Sages, who allow a sukkah to be as small as the space needed for a person’s head and majority of his body. The Gemara answers that the laws are not comparable. A sukkah is a temporary structure, and its minimum size can be smaller. A house, however, is a permanent dwelling, and people do not ordinarily live in a space smaller than four amot by four amot. Therefore, even according to the Sages’ measurements for a sukkah, a house still requires its own minimum size.
The Gemara now returns to the various laws and asks why the requirement of a proper dwelling applies in each case. It explains that the word “house” is written in the relevant sources: regarding a parapet, regarding afflictions of houses, regarding a house in a walled city, and regarding the exemption from military service. These laws are therefore limited to an actual house.
With regard to an eruv and a partnership for an alleyway, however, the Gemara cannot derive the law from a verse, because those laws are rabbinic. Instead, the reason is that the structure is not suitable for dwelling. Regarding an eruv courtyard, the bread is placed in a house because the entire courtyard is treated as though everyone is living in that house. A structure in which no one can properly live cannot be used for that purpose.
The Gemara asks a side question: if this structure cannot be used for the eruv of a courtyard, why can it be used for the partnership of an alleyway? The answer is that a courtyard itself is not a dwelling, yet the partnership may be placed there. The partnership does not require a house; it only requires a protected location within the area being joined. The miniature structure is no worse than a courtyard, and therefore it is suitable for the partnership.
The Gemara then discusses guardhouses located in fields, known as burganin. People would build small temporary huts in their fields so that they could watch the crops. These structures were built for a specific function and were sometimes large enough for one person to sleep in. Nevertheless, they could join cities only when they were constructed as legitimate dwellings. A temporary hut made merely for a watchman or for trapping birds is not considered a proper house.
The distinction is that a burganin serves a practical purpose. It is built according to the needs of the person using it, and it can be large enough for him to sleep there. A small structure that was not designed for dwelling, and in which people do not actually live, does not have that status. Even if one person could technically sleep there for a night, that alone does not make it a permanent dwelling.
Finally, the Gemara returns to the division of a shared courtyard. The issue is not necessarily that the small house itself is being divided. Rather, the question is how the courtyard is divided among the partners. A person who has a house with three entrances may require more area of the courtyard for access than a person whose house has only one entrance. The courtyard is used for entering and leaving, unloading packages, bringing in goods, and moving bicycles and other belongings. Each entrance therefore creates a need for access.
One opinion says that the courtyard is divided according to the number of entrances. A partner with three entrances receives three portions, while a partner with one entrance receives one portion. Another opinion says that each entrance receives four amot for access, and the remaining area of the courtyard is divided equally among the partners.
The Gemara limits this discussion to a permanent house. If the structure is temporary and is eventually going to be removed, it does not receive a portion of the courtyard merely because it has an opening. Since it is not a permanent dwelling, its opening does not create the ordinary right of access associated with a house.
The four-amah area is measured directly outside the entrance, according to the width of the entrance, so that the resident has enough space to load and unload. This area is needed for access to the courtyard and for bringing objects in and out. The discussion continues with the precise way that the access area is measured and how the remaining courtyard is divided among the partners.