The rabbis permitted the woman to marry. This refers to a case mentioned in the Mishnah: a man states, "If I do not return within twelve months," and then dies within those twelve months. To prevent the birth of a child who would be a mamzer, the rabbis permitted this woman to marry without needing a halachic ruling or any further action. This implies that the woman is considered divorced, even though the man did not explicitly say "from now" (me'akshav). This seems to contradict the Mishnah, which states that since the condition was not fulfilled (because his death occurred before the twelve months passed and he did not say me'akshav), the divorce document (get) is not valid, as a get cannot take effect after death (get la'achar mitah). However, the rabbis permitted it, ruling that the get is indeed valid.
The Gemara asks: who are these rabbis? Rabbi Avida states in the name of Mar Shmuel that these are the same Bet Din (rabbinical court) that permitted the oil of non-Jews. We learned in Massechet Avodah Zarah that if the rabbis permit the wine of non-Jews, they will also permit their oil. Thus, the same rabbis who permitted the oil of non-Jews hold that when a get includes a specific date (zman), this date automatically implies that the get takes effect "from now" (me'achshav). Otherwise, there would be no purpose in dating the document if the intention wasn't for it to be effective from that date. Therefore, even if the husband did not explicitly say me'achshav or me'hayom, and even if he died before the stipulated time, the get is considered retroactive due to the date explicitly stated in the document (shtar). Rashi elaborates on this point, explaining that the date in the document proves the intent for immediate effect. This principle is illustrated by a case where a man bequeathed his property (nechassim) to his son, stating that if he dies, the gift takes effect from today, while he is still alive. The date in the document serves as proof of this intent.
So, we understand that "our rabbis" (Rabbotenu) in this context refers to Rabbi Yosef. However, Rabbi Abba, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, states that Rabbi Yosef's ruling, which considers the get valid due to the date in the document, was not agreed upon by all his colleagues. Some say that his colleagues disagreed with this halacha as long as he was alive. Either way, this is Rabbi Yosef's unique position.
The Gemara then raises a question: when the rabbis permitted her to marry, did they permit her to marry immediately (le'altar), or only after the full twelve months had passed (le'achar shneim asar chodesh)? The original case was: "If I don't come within twelve months," and the man died. Is she permitted to marry immediately because he is certainly not returning, or must she wait the full twelve months to fulfill the original condition? The Gemara suggests that this question could be asked directly from the Mishnah itself, which presents the same scenario. The Gemara concedes that the question could indeed be asked from the Mishnah, but since a specific incident occurred, the question was directed to those who issued the ruling in that particular case. The Gemara leaves this question unresolved (teiku).
The Gemara then presents another case. Abaye states that there is a significant disagreement between "our rabbis" (Rabbotenu, referring to Rabbi Yosef) and the other rabbis regarding cases where the phrase "from now" (me'hayom) was not explicitly stated. Rabbi Yosef holds that the date in the document (zmano shel shtar mokhiach) implies immediate effect, while the other rabbis maintain that unless "me'hayom" or "me'achshav" is explicitly stated, the get is not valid. However, if a man tells his wife at night that the get will be valid "when the sun comes out," and he dies that night, everyone agrees that the get is not valid. This is because he explicitly stipulated a future time. Rashi clarifies that even Rabbi Yosef would agree in such a case, as the explicit stipulation overrides the implication of the date in the document. Similarly, if the phrase "al minat" (on condition that) is used in a stipulation, even the rabbis who typically disagree with Rabbi Yosef would agree that the get is retroactive and therefore valid.
The real disagreement, then, is not in cases where "al minat" is used, nor in cases where a future time is explicitly stated. Rather, the dispute between Rabbi Yosef and the other rabbis lies in situations where the man says, "If the sun comes out tomorrow morning, you will be divorced." Here, the question is whether "if" (im) implies "from now" (me'achshav) or "from then" (me'az). This is similar to the Mishnah's case of "if I do not come within twelve months" without explicitly stating "from now." In such cases, Rabbi Yosef holds that the date in the document implies "from now," while the other rabbis argue that without an explicit statement, the get is problematic.
The Gemara then discusses a different scenario: a man instructs his agent (shaliach) to "write the get and give it after twelve months." The agent writes the get within twelve months but gives it after twelve months. Rabbi Yosef rules that this get is valid. This ruling is perplexing, as the man clearly stipulated a condition for giving the get. The explanation offered by the later commentaries (Nishtanim) is that if the husband was explicit and said, "Do not write the get until after twelve months," then even Rabbi Yosef would agree that the condition must be fulfilled. However, in this case, the husband was vague; he merely said "write it and give it after twelve months." This could be interpreted as merely instructing the agent on the timing of the delivery, not as a strict stipulation on the validity of the get itself. Perhaps he simply wanted the agent to ensure the get was prepared and delivered without delay after the twelve months. In such a vague condition, Rabbi Yosef holds the get is valid even if written within twelve months.
The Gemara then offers an alternative explanation: Rabbi Yosef generally upholds conditions, but in this specific phrasing, the man said, "Write it whenever you want, but give it after twelve months." The proximity of "after twelve months" to "give it" (ten) indicates that the condition applies only to the delivery, not to the writing. Thus, the instruction was to write it now ("kitvu me'achshav") and give it if he doesn't return ("u'tenu im lo bati"). The other rabbis, however, argue that regardless of the exact phrasing, the husband's intent was for the entire process to be effective only after twelve months, and therefore they do not differentiate between the timing of writing and giving.
The Gemara then presents several rulings from a Baraita regarding the interpretation of time-based stipulations. If a man says, "This is your get after the Sabbatical year (shevi'it)," it means after the eighth year has concluded. The entire eighth year is considered "after the Sabbatical year." So, if he returns anytime within the eighth year, the get is not activated. It only becomes effective if he returns after the eighth year is over. Similarly, if he says, "after the year," it means after thirteen months (i.e., one month after the year is up). If he says, "after the month," it means after the fifth week (i.e., one week after the month is up).
A particularly interesting case is "after Shabbat." What is considered "after Shabbat"? The Gemara explains that Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday are still considered within the period following the previous Shabbat. Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday are considered "before the next Shabbat." Therefore, if he says, "If I don't show up after Shabbat," he has until Wednesday. If he shows up on Tuesday, he is still within the "after Shabbat" period. The "after Shabbat" period does not end until Tuesday is finished.
Another Baraita states that if a man says, "This is your get after the festival (regal)," Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Nabi) says it means thirty days after the festival. The rabbis praised him for quoting this as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's singular opinion, implying it is not a universally accepted halacha. When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi later tried to present it as a universally accepted opinion, they did not praise him, indicating that the halacha does not follow this view. So, if not thirty days, how many days? Some later authorities (Nishtanim) suggest three days, like the period after Shabbat. Others, like the Ridba, suggest half the time between one festival and the next, similar to how "after Shabbat" is half a week.
We now begin a new section of the Mishnah: "If a man throws a get to his wife..." The Mishnah teaches that a get can be given against a woman's will. If he throws it into her house (beto chatzerah) or into her lap (cheika) or basket (kalata) while she is present, she is divorced. The Mishnah specifically mentions "while she is standing there."
The Gemara immediately asks: does a married woman (nesuah) own property? Since everything she acquires belongs to her husband, how can throwing a get into her domain (chatzerah) effect a divorce? We learn in Ketubot that while the husband benefits from the usufruct (perot) of her property, she retains ownership of the principal (nechasei melog). So, she does have property. However, if he throws the get into his own house or courtyard, even if she is present in the same house, she is not divorced, because the get has not left his possession and entered hers.
The Gemara then asks a fundamental question: where do we derive the concept that a get can be given by throwing it into her domain (chatzerah koneh)? The Torah states, "and he shall place it in her hand" (v'natan b'yadah). This implies direct physical delivery. The Gemara answers that the phrase "v'natan b'yadah" (and he shall place it in her hand) can be read as "v'natan" (and he shall place) in any way, as long as it reaches her domain, similar to "b'yadah" (in her hand). We have a similar proof from the laws of a thief (ganav). The Torah states, "if the theft is found in his hand" (b'yado). However, we know that a thief is liable even if he acquires the stolen item through his domain (chatzerah), for example, by hitting an animal into his courtyard and closing the fence. The Torah's phrasing "found" (yimmatzei) implies any way it is found in his possession, not just in his hand. Thus, both from the laws of gittin and the laws of theft, we learn that a domain (chatzerah) can effect acquisition.
The Gemara asks why both sources are needed. If one source teaches that chatzerah effects acquisition, that should be sufficient. The Gemara explains that each case has a unique leniency or stringency that prevents learning one from the other. In the case of a get, we might think that because a get can be given against a woman's will (al korcha), we are lenient to allow acquisition through her domain. However, in the case of a thief, he must acquire the item willingly. Conversely, in the case of a thief, the Torah imposes severe penalties (e.g., double payment), which might lead us to be stringent and say that even acquisition through a domain is sufficient to make him liable. But in the case of a get, where there is no such penalty, we might not extend the leniency. Therefore, both sources are necessary to teach that chatzerah effects acquisition in both contexts.
Returning to the Mishnah's case of throwing a get into her domain, the Gemara reiterates the problem: if the husband has the rights to the usufruct (perot) of her property, then her domain is considered his domain. So, how can throwing the get into her domain effect a divorce, since it never truly leaves his possession? The Gemara answers that this applies to a specific scenario: where the husband wrote a declaration (din v'devarim ein li b'nechasaich) stating that he has no claim to her assets. However, a mere declaration of "I have nothing to do with it" is generally insufficient to relinquish rights. One must explicitly state, "I am gifting it to you" (matana). So, the question remains: how does his declaration work here?
The Gemara clarifies: this declaration is effective only if it was made before the property came into his possession, specifically when they were engaged (arusin), before they were married (nisuin). Once they are married, the property is already in his possession, and he would need to explicitly gift it. But to prevent it from coming into his possession in the first place, a declaration of "I have no claim" is sufficient. Thus, if he was engaged to the woman and made such a declaration regarding her domain, that domain belongs entirely to her, and he can then throw the get into it, and it will be effective.
The Gemara asks where we find that such a declaration is effective. A Torah-level inheritance (yerusha) from father to son cannot be blocked by such a statement. However, a rabbinical-level inheritance, or any rabbinical benefit (takana), can be refused. For example, if the rabbis made a takana to benefit a person, that person can refuse the benefit. Similarly, the husband's right to the usufruct of his wife's property is a rabbinical enactment. Therefore, he can block this benefit by making a declaration of "I have no claim" before the marriage. The Gemara provides an example: a woman can tell her husband, "Do not support me, and I will not give you my earnings (ma'aseh yadayim)." The rabbis enacted that a husband supports his wife and receives her earnings. However, if the wife makes a lot of money and prefers to keep her earnings rather than receive a small amount of support, she can refuse this rabbinical benefit. Similarly, the husband can refuse his rabbinical benefit from his wife's domain, thereby ensuring it remains hers.
Rava offers a different answer, simpler and without needing the mechanism of relinquishing rights during engagement. He asks: if the problem is that the husband has a stake in her domain, why don't we ask the same question about her hand (yadah)? Her hand, and its produce, also belong to the husband. Yet, we say that if a get is placed in her hand, it is valid. The answer there is that her hand and the get come together simultaneously to effect the divorce. Similarly, when the get is thrown into her domain, the domain and the get come together simultaneously to effect the divorce.
The Gemara challenges Rava's analogy: a woman's physical hand is her own property, even if its produce belongs to her husband. The husband does not own her hand itself. Therefore, the analogy to her domain, in which the husband has a direct stake through usufruct, is flawed. Rava clarifies that he was not comparing it to a woman's hand, but to the hand of a Canaanite slave (eved Canaani). There is an opinion that a slave can accept his own emancipation document (shtar shichrur). Since the master owns the slave's physical body and hand, how can the slave's hand effect acquisition for himself? The answer must be that the slave's hand and the emancipation document come together simultaneously to effect his freedom. Similarly, by a woman, her domain and the get come together simultaneously.
Thus, we have two answers: either the husband relinquished his rights to her domain when they were engaged (arusa), or the domain and the get come together simultaneously to effect the divorce, even if the husband has a stake in the domain.
The Gemara then presents a story: a man on his deathbed wrote a get for his wife on Friday but did not manage to give it to her. On Shabbat, his condition worsened. He could not give the get on Shabbat because the get is muktzeh (forbidden to move on Shabbat). The problem was that if he died before the get was delivered, she would be a widow, not a divorcee, leading to complications (yibum). Rashi explains that the get is muktzeh because it is a document that has no purpose for Shabbat itself. A non-Jew (goy) cannot be made an agent (shaliach) to deliver a get, as the delivery of a get requires a Jewish hand.
The rabbis were consulted. They instructed: "Go tell the man to transfer (makneh) the space (makom) where the get is located to his wife. Then, she should go and close the door." This utilizes the principle of "acquisition through land" (kinyan karka). Just as one can acquire land by building a fence or plowing, one can acquire it by closing a door. Once she acquires the land, she also acquires anything on that land (kinyan agav). So, by acquiring the space where the get lay on the table, she simultaneously acquired the get itself, without anyone touching the muktzeh get on Shabbat. The Mishnah supports this by stating that one acquires a courtyard by locking a door, building a fence, or making a hole in a fence.
Rabbi Ashi challenged Rava's ruling, arguing that whatever a married woman acquires belongs to her husband. So, even if she acquired the space and the get, it would immediately revert to her husband, rendering the divorce ineffective. Rava was initially embarrassed, thinking he had made a mistake. However, upon investigation, it was discovered that the couple was only engaged (arusin), not fully married (nesuin). In the case of an arusa, what she acquires remains her own. Therefore, the get was valid, and Rava's ruling was correct. Rava then declared that it makes no difference whether she is engaged or married; the principle remains that the domain and the get come together simultaneously to effect the divorce. This is the same principle Rava had stated earlier, which he developed and applied in this specific case.