We begin today with the second line, which discusses pottery makers. The Gemara explains that this was the practice of people who manufactured pottery in those days: they would build one structure where they lived and stored their wares, and another where they worked and conducted their business.
The ruling is that the second structure is not a valid sukkah, even though it has four walls and valid roofing. Why not? Later today, we will learn that a sukkah does not have to be built specifically for the sake of the Festival of Sukkot. Even if someone built it without any particular intention, using four walls and valid roofing, it is still generally valid. So what is the problem with the pottery maker’s sukkah?
The answer is that this case is different. The person lives there throughout the year. He eats there, sleeps there, and conducts his life there. It is not recognizable that he is sitting there for the sake of the mitzvah of sukkah. When a person sits in a structure where he works and lives all year long, people will not recognize that he is now using it as a sukkah. Although the walls and roofing are technically valid, there must be some indication that the structure is being used for the mitzvah.
This raises an interesting question: where does this halachah come from? The Gemara continues, “And it requires a mezuzah.” You see that he lives there; it is his dwelling. A person’s dwelling requires a mezuzah. The other structure, however, where he does not spend most of his time, may qualify as a sukkah.
The Gemara then says that one does not have to dismantle the structure and rebuild it specifically for the sake of the Festival. A sukkah does not need to be built specifically for the sake of the Festival; it needs to be built for shade. If it was built for shade, that is sufficient. This structure, however, was built as a permanent dwelling, and there is no recognizable indication that it is being used for the mitzvah.
The Gemara asks: if the issue is that the structure is a dwelling, why does it require a mezuzah? The answer is that it is not actually a dwelling. It is merely an entranceway used to reach the inner structure, where the pottery maker speaks with customers. He does not truly live there. A mezuzah requires a dwelling, and this is not a dwelling; it is only an entryway or vestibule.
One might nevertheless argue that the outer structure should be no less than the gatehouse of the inner structure. A gatehouse is a small structure through which one passes in order to enter the main house, and it requires a mezuzah. Why should this outer structure be any different?
The answer is that a gatehouse is considered a permanent structure, whereas this structure is not permanent. Neither the outer structure nor the inner structure is established as a regular home. The inner area is the main dwelling, while the outer one is only a temporary structure leading into it. The Rabbis did not require a mezuzah for such a temporary structure.
Now let us see the halachah, because this is an important ruling. The halachah states that in the case of a pottery maker who has two structures, one inside the other, and who lives in the inner one all year while conducting his business in the outer one, the inner structure does not qualify as a sukkah. Since it is his dwelling throughout the year, it is not recognizable that he is sitting there for the sake of the mitzvah.
Even if he explicitly says that he is sitting there for the sake of the mitzvah, it is still not recognizable. If, however, he lifts the roofing or makes some other change to show that the structure is now being used as a sukkah, it becomes valid. The change creates an indication that this is not merely his ordinary dwelling.
This is similar to a person’s house, where he lives all year. He does not have to build a sukkah on his roof. If he makes an alteration to the structure on the roof, however, that alteration demonstrates that he is now using it as a sukkah. The principle is that a physical act can create the necessary indication.
This is the novelty of the halachah in the Gemara. We will soon learn that certain sukkot are valid even though they were not built specifically for the Festival. Examples include structures built by shepherds, people who guarded figs, and people who guarded cities. They built these structures for shade, not specifically for the Festival. Nevertheless, the Gemara says that they are valid. The important condition is that it must be recognizable that the person is now sitting there as a sukkah.
The Bach writes that the requirement for this recognition may be rabbinic rather than biblical. According to the biblical law, a sukkah built for shade is valid even without an explicit intention for the mitzvah. The requirement that it be recognizable as a sukkah may be a rabbinic enactment. That is the Bach’s interpretation, and it creates a distinction between the biblical validity of the sukkah and the additional rabbinic requirement of recognition.
According to another approach, a sukkah built for dwelling purposes rather than for shade is not valid. A structure built merely to protect someone from the sun, however, is valid, even if it was not built specifically for the Festival. The main point is that it must have been built for the purpose of providing shade. That is the primary intention required when building a sukkah.
The Gemara then discusses the terms “ganbach” and “rakbash.” Ganbach refers to sukkot built by gentiles, women, animals, shepherds, people guarding figs, and people guarding cities. Rakbash refers specifically to sukkot built by shepherds, people guarding figs, or people guarding cities.
These structures were not built specifically for the Festival. Shepherds would build huts in the fields because it was too hot, and they needed a shaded place from which to watch their sheep. People who guarded figs would build a structure in the fields to watch the figs. People who guarded cities would build a structure from which to watch the city. These structures were built for shade and protection, not for the Festival.
The Gemara says that even such structures are valid, provided that the roofing is proper. When the Gemara says that the roofing is proper, it does not mean that the regular laws of sukkah may be ignored. These are inferior types of sukkot, but they still require valid roofing. The Gemara is teaching that they must have enough shade and that the ordinary laws of sukkah still apply.
The Gemara then asks what “proper roofing” adds. The answer is that the roofing must clearly have been placed there for shade. It is not enough that the structure happens to provide privacy, storage, or a place to live. The essential purpose is shade. One does not need to build it specifically for the Festival, but one does need to build it as a sukkah—that is, as a structure intended to provide shade.
The Gemara says that “a sukkah of any kind” includes the category of rakbash. The first teaching says that ganbach is valid and even rakbash is valid. A second teaching says that rakbash is valid and even ganbach is valid. The Gemara asks why each teaching presents the other category as inferior.
The answer is that ganbach is considered stronger because it is more permanent. The people who build such structures remain there, and the structure is more established. Rakbash is considered inferior because shepherds and the other people in that category may move from place to place. Their structures are temporary and less permanent. Thus, one teaching begins with the more permanent category and adds the temporary one, while the other begins with the temporary category and adds the more permanent one.
There is also a distinction concerning who built the structure. A structure built by Jews for Jews is considered stronger than one built by non-Jews for animals or for other purposes. The novelty of the teaching is that even the latter may be valid, provided that it was built for shade and has proper roofing.
This is relevant to a practical case. Suppose a non-Jewish worker in an office builds a structure because he enjoys being outdoors. He uses it throughout the year, and all the technical specifications of a sukkah are present. Is it valid? Not necessarily. If he lives in it throughout the year, it may not be recognizable that someone sitting there during Sukkot is doing so for the mitzvah. One might therefore need to lift the roofing or make another change to demonstrate that it is now being used as a sukkah.
By contrast, if a person enters a structure that was never his home and sits there during Sukkot, it is more readily recognizable that he is using it as a sukkah. The issue is not only how the structure was built, but also the relationship of the person sitting there to the structure.
The halachah states that a sukkah is valid even if it was not built specifically for the mitzvah, provided that it was made for shade. This includes sukkot built by gentiles, women, animals, people who guard figs, shepherds, and people who guard cities. If a person built a structure to protect the produce itself from the sun, rather than to protect himself, that may not be sufficient. The question is whether the structure was intended to provide shade in the sense of a sukkah, or whether it was intended for some entirely different purpose, such as storage.
We assume that these people built the structures for shade. Otherwise, why would they build them? They were not using them as permanent homes, and therefore the natural assumption is that the structures were made to provide shade. The roofing must still provide more shade than sunlight. Once that is established, the structure is valid.
The Mishnah then introduces the law of an old sukkah. “Old” does not mean that the sukkah is physically old in the sense that every sukkah eventually becomes old. It refers to a sukkah that was built before the Festival without being built specifically for the Festival.
Beit Shammai disqualifies such a sukkah, while Beit Hillel validates it. The case is one in which a person built the sukkah six months before Sukkot without any intention for the Festival. Beit Shammai says that it is invalid because the sukkah must be built for the sake of the Festival. Beit Hillel says that it is valid because a sukkah only needs to be built for shade.
Even Beit Shammai agrees that if the sukkah was built within thirty days of the Festival, it is valid. During the thirty days before the Festival, a person’s mind is already occupied with Sukkot. He is studying the laws, speaking about the holiday, and preparing for it. Therefore, even if he did not explicitly state that he was building the sukkah for the Festival, his actions within that period are understood in that context.
There are therefore three cases according to Beit Shammai: a sukkah built more than thirty days before the Festival without specific intention is invalid; a sukkah built a year earlier with explicit intention for the Festival is valid; and a sukkah built within thirty days of the Festival without explicit intention is also valid. According to Beit Hillel, none of these additional requirements is necessary. It is enough to build the structure for shade.
What is the source of Beit Shammai’s ruling? The verse says, “The Festival of Sukkot for seven days.” Beit Shammai understands this to mean that the sukkah must be made for the sake of the Festival. The phrase “for the sake of the Festival” teaches that the sukkah must be built with that purpose in mind.
The Gemara also derives that a sukkah is set aside for the mitzvah throughout the seven days of the Festival. Just as a festival offering is prohibited for ordinary use once it has been designated, so too the sukkah is set aside for the mitzvah during all seven days.
Rabbi Yehudah ben Beteira teaches that just as the festival offering is designated for the sake of the Festival, the sukkah is designated for the sake of the Festival. The comparison between the offering and the sukkah is used to establish that the sukkah has a special status during the Festival.
Beit Hillel uses the verse differently. Beit Hillel derives from it that one may build a sukkah during the intermediate days of the Festival. One might have thought that if a person had not built a sukkah before the Festival, it would be too late to build one. The verse teaches that he may still build it during the intermediate days.
Beit Shammai, however, needs that verse to teach that the sukkah must be built for the sake of the Festival. The phrase “the Festival of Sukkot” indicates that the sukkah must be made for the Festival, not merely for shade.
The Gemara then compares this issue to ritual fringes. One might ask: if a sukkah does not require specific intention for the mitzvah, perhaps ritual fringes do not require specific intention either. The Gemara answers that there is a special derivation concerning ritual fringes, teaching that they must be made for the mitzvah. The laws of ritual fringes therefore cannot be used to prove the law of sukkah.
The Gemara next discusses a stolen sukkah. The verse says, “You shall make for yourself” a sukkah. The word “for yourself” teaches that one may not fulfill the mitzvah with a stolen sukkah. This appears to be a biblical derivation, not merely a general application of the principle that one cannot perform a mitzvah through a transgression.
Why is a special verse necessary? Why not simply apply the general principle that a mitzvah performed through a transgression is invalid? Tosafot explains that the general principle may be only rabbinic, whereas the verse concerning the sukkah teaches that a stolen sukkah is invalid on a biblical level.
This is similar to the requirement that a person possess the ritual citron on the first day of Sukkot. The verse says that it must be “for you,” meaning that it must belong to you. On the first day, one cannot fulfill the mitzvah with a stolen citron, and one cannot even fulfill the mitzvah with a borrowed citron. On later days, the requirement of personal ownership does not apply in the same way, but the prohibition against using a stolen object remains.
Thus, the verse concerning the sukkah teaches that a stolen sukkah is invalid. This is the important novelty derived by Tosafot: the invalidity is not merely a rabbinic consequence of performing a mitzvah through a transgression, but is specifically established by the verse.
The Gemara then discusses the status of the wood and roofing of the sukkah during all seven days. Once the materials have been designated for the mitzvah, they are prohibited for ordinary use. This is a biblical prohibition according to the interpretation that derives the law from the verse. Tosafot asks how this fits with the principle that such materials are muktzeh, which is generally a rabbinic prohibition.
Tosafot explains that there are two possible levels. While the materials are serving as the sukkah, the prohibition may be biblical. If the materials fall off the sukkah, they are still prohibited because they were designated for the mitzvah, but that later prohibition may be rabbinic and related to muktzeh.
This creates a practical distinction. If the roofing falls off during the Festival, one may not use it for another purpose. One may, however, replace it on the sukkah after the Festival or at a time when the laws of muktzeh do not prevent doing so. The materials remain associated with the mitzvah even after they have fallen.
The halachah states that the sukkah and its walls are prohibited for ordinary use throughout the seven days. This applies to the walls and the roofing. Even if only a small amount of roofing falls to the ground, one may not use it for another purpose.
The same ruling applies if the person built a beautiful sukkah for the Festival and then left town before ever using it. Suppose he traveled elsewhere for Sukkot and never sat in the sukkah he built. Did the materials become sacred merely because he designated them for the mitzvah?
The ruling is that designation alone is not enough. The sukkah becomes prohibited for ordinary use only once the person has actually sat in it at least once during the Festival. If he built it for the mitzvah but never used it, the designation did not yet take effect. He may therefore use the materials for another purpose.
This is an important practical distinction. If someone built a sukkah for the Festival, traveled away, and never sat in it, he may use the wood for another purpose. If he sat in it once and then left, the sukkah and its materials remain prohibited for ordinary use for the duration of the Festival, even if the sukkah later collapses.
The same applies if rain fell during the first several nights and the person never sat in the sukkah. Since he never used it, it never became active as a sukkah for the mitzvah. Once he enters and sits in it, however, the mitzvah takes effect and the materials become prohibited for ordinary use.
The Mishnah then discusses a sukkah built beneath a tree. A person who makes a sukkah beneath a tree is considered as though he made it inside a house. The problem is that there are two roofs: the roofing of the sukkah and the branches of the tree above it. A sukkah may not be placed beneath another roof.
The Mishnah also discusses one sukkah above another sukkah. The upper sukkah is valid and the lower sukkah is invalid. The lower sukkah is invalid because it has another roof above it. If people cannot live in the upper structure, however, the lower sukkah may be valid, because the upper structure is not considered a meaningful roof.
The Gemara asks what type of tree is being discussed. It must be a tree whose branches provide more shade than sunlight. If the branches provide more sunlight than shade, the tree does not create the problem of an additional roof. The Gemara compares the tree to a house: just as a house has a roof that provides more shade than sunlight, the tree in this case must provide more shade than sunlight.
The Gemara then considers a case in which the tree provides more sunlight than shade, while the sukkah beneath it has valid roofing. One might think that the invalid roofing of the tree could combine with the valid roofing of the sukkah to create a problem. The answer is that the branches are treated as though they are not present because they do not provide more shade than sunlight.
Abaye explains that the case in the Mishnah involves lowering the branches down and mixing them with the valid roofing of the sukkah. When the branches are lowered and intermingled with the valid roofing, the invalid roofing can be nullified in the majority of valid roofing. The valid roofing is the majority, and therefore the sukkah may be valid.
The Gemara asks why this additional detail is necessary. If the branches provide more sunlight than shade, they are already insignificant. Why must the Gemara tell us that they were lowered and mixed with the valid roofing?
The answer is that the Mishnah is teaching that even when the branches are lowered and mixed with the valid roofing, the invalid material is nullified. One might have thought that a rabbinic decree would prohibit lowering the branches because people might mistakenly use the sukkah when the branches were still standing above it. The Mishnah teaches that we do not make such a decree.
The Gemara then asks whether this principle was not already taught elsewhere, in the law of a vine, gourd, or ivy that is draped over a sukkah. If the valid roofing is greater than the invalid roofing, the sukkah is valid; alternatively, one may cut the branches and thereby make the roofing valid. Since that case already teaches that one does not make a decree concerning branches that were not lowered, what is the novelty here?
The answer is that the earlier teaching may be understood as referring only to a case in which the branches had already been lowered after the fact. The Mishnah here teaches that one may lower them even initially, as an acceptable way of constructing the sukkah.
Tosafot presents another interpretation. According to Tosafot, the case involves a sukkah whose valid roofing alone would not provide more shade than sunlight. The valid roofing becomes sufficient only when combined with the branches of the tree. In that case, the invalid branches are relevant because they are part of what creates the majority of shade.
If, however, the valid roofing of the sukkah itself already provides more shade than sunlight, the tree does not matter. Even if the branches are removed, the sukkah remains valid. Therefore, according to Tosafot, the Mishnah is discussing a case in which the combination of the tree and the sukkah creates the necessary shade.
Other authorities, including the view brought in the name of Abaye, do not understand the matter that way. They maintain that even if the sukkah beneath the tree already provides more shade than sunlight, the tree can still create a problem when it provides more sunlight than shade in the relevant configuration.
The distinction is as follows. According to Tosafot, if the sukkah itself has sufficient valid roofing, the branches are treated as though they are not there. According to the other view, the branches may still be considered in determining whether the invalid roofing combines with the valid roofing. This creates a disagreement among the early authorities.
The practical halachah is brought in the Shulchan Aruch in a formulation of “some say” and “some say.” Since the matter is presented as a disagreement, one should be stringent. If the sukkah has sufficient valid roofing by itself, but the tree above it has more sunlight than shade, the question remains whether the tree is considered absent or whether it creates an additional roof.
If the branches are only at the side of the sukkah, one may be able to disregard that area and sit in the remaining portion, provided that the remaining area has the required walls and roofing. If the branches are in the middle and create a significant gap, however, they may affect the validity of the entire sukkah. The area beneath the tree may have to be treated as though it is not part of the sukkah.
The Gemara then returns to the source for the prohibition of sitting beneath two roofs. The verse says, “You shall dwell in sukkot.” This teaches that one must dwell in a sukkah and not in a sukkah beneath another sukkah, not beneath a tree, and not in a sukkah inside a house.
The Gemara discusses whether the plural form of the word is derived from the written text or from the way the word is traditionally read. The verse can be understood as referring to two sukkot, but the exact derivation depends on whether one follows the written form or the received reading.
Tosafot explains that even an authority who generally follows the written form recognizes that the traditional reading also has significance. Therefore, although the primary derivation may come from the written form, the reading can still teach that one may not sit beneath two roofs.
The Gemara then presents several possible arrangements of two sukkot. Sometimes both sukkot are valid, sometimes both are invalid, sometimes the lower one is valid and the upper one is invalid, and sometimes the upper one is valid while the lower one is invalid. The Gemara must explain the precise circumstances of each case.
The first case in which both sukkot are valid is when the lower sukkah has more sunlight than shade, and the upper sukkah has more shade than sunlight. The lower sukkah’s roofing is therefore insignificant. The person sitting in the lower sukkah is effectively sitting beneath only the upper sukkah. If the upper sukkah is within twenty cubits of the ground, it is valid, and the lower sukkah is also valid because its own roofing is not functioning as a meaningful roof.
The case in which both sukkot are invalid is one in which both have more shade than sunlight, but the upper sukkah is more than twenty cubits above the ground. The upper sukkah is invalid because it is too high. The lower sukkah is also invalid because it is beneath another sukkah. Even though the lower sukkah has valid roofing, it is still a sukkah beneath a sukkah.
The Gemara then discusses the case in which the lower sukkah is valid and the upper one is invalid. The lower sukkah has more shade than sunlight, while the upper one has more sunlight than shade. Both structures are within twenty cubits of the ground. The upper one is invalid because it lacks sufficient shade, but it does not invalidate the lower sukkah because its roofing is considered insignificant.
The Gemara nevertheless emphasizes that the upper sukkah must be within twenty cubits. If the upper sukkah were more than twenty cubits above the ground, its roofing would be invalid for an additional reason. It could then combine with the valid roofing of the lower sukkah and create the problem of invalid roofing mixed with valid roofing. The Gemara teaches that we do not make such a decree when the upper structure is within twenty cubits.
Finally, the Gemara discusses the case in which the upper sukkah is valid and the lower one is invalid. The upper sukkah has more shade than sunlight and is within twenty cubits of its floor. The lower sukkah is invalid because it is beneath another sukkah, even though its roofing itself provides more shade than sunlight. The upper sukkah is valid because it has the required roofing and is within the proper height.
The Gemara then asks why it must state the case in which the upper sukkah is invalid because it has more sunlight than shade. If roofing that provides more sunlight than shade is considered insignificant, then the lower sukkah should obviously remain valid. The answer is that the Gemara is teaching that we do not extend the invalidity of roofing that is above twenty cubits to a case in which the roofing is below twenty cubits. We do not say that people will confuse the two situations.
In other words, when the upper sukkah is above twenty cubits, its roofing is invalid and may combine with the valid roofing below it. When the upper sukkah is below twenty cubits but has more sunlight than shade, however, its roofing is simply treated as though it is not there. The Gemara does not create a preventive decree based on the higher case.
The Gemara next asks how much space must exist between one sukkah and the sukkah above it for the lower one to be considered a sukkah beneath another sukkah. Rabbi Huna and Rabbi Chisda say that the minimum is one handbreadth. Once there is a handbreadth of space between the two structures, the upper structure is considered a separate roof, and the lower sukkah is invalid.
The source for this measurement is the laws of ritual impurity. In the laws of a tent over a corpse, a space of one handbreadth is sufficient to create a separate area that conveys impurity and also blocks the impurity from passing through in the same way. A space smaller than a handbreadth does not have that status.
Thus, when there is a handbreadth between the two sukkot, the upper structure is considered a separate roof. It can bring impurity to objects beneath it and can also block impurity from objects above it. When the space is less than a handbreadth, it does not have the status of a separate tent.
Another opinion says that the relevant measurement is four handbreadths. Four handbreadths constitute an independent domain in other areas of halachah. A space smaller than four handbreadths is not considered a distinct domain, while a space of four handbreadths is. A third opinion gives a measurement of ten handbreadths.
We therefore have three opinions concerning the space between the two sukkot: one handbreadth, four handbreadths, and ten handbreadths. The Gemara will continue by examining the source and practical significance of these measurements.
The central point of the entire discussion is that two roofs can invalidate the lower sukkah, but only when the upper structure has the status of a meaningful roof. If the upper material provides more sunlight than shade, it may be treated as though it is absent. If it is above twenty cubits, however, it can become invalid roofing that combines with the valid roofing below it. The precise result depends on the amount of shade, the height of the upper sukkah, whether the roofing was lowered and mixed with the valid roofing, and the distance between the two structures.