In the Eri B. Sit edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, we discussed the following case concerning second tithe. A person redeemed his second-tithe produce onto silver coins, as the Torah requires that it be redeemed onto money. He now wants to exchange the silver coins for gold coins. Bet Shammai says that he may not do so. We explained that Bet Shammai considers gold a commodity. The sanctity of second tithe may not be transferred onto a commodity; it may be transferred only onto money.
Bet Hillel, however, says that one may transfer the sanctity from silver to gold, because gold, relative to silver, is considered money. We then discussed a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan. We do not know which rabbi said which position. One rabbi says that the dispute between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel concerns transferring sanctity from silver to gold, but that everyone agrees that one may transfer it directly from produce to gold, because gold is considered money in relation to produce. The other rabbi says that even transferring directly from produce to gold is a matter of dispute: Bet Shammai remains stringent, because gold is considered a commodity. Thus, there is a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan concerning the transfer from produce to gold, although we do not know which rabbi expressed which view.
The Gemara now attempts to determine which rabbi said that one may not transfer the sanctity from produce to gold. Rabbi Yohanan said that one may not lend one gold dinar in exchange for another gold dinar. Why not? The Gemara explains that perhaps the value of the dinar will rise. We learned that one may not lend commodities on the condition that the same quantity of the commodity will be returned, because the commodity may increase in value. When the borrower returns the same quantity, he may effectively be returning less than he borrowed, and the difference is considered interest.
Therefore, when it says here that one may not lend one dinar for another, it must be referring to a gold dinar. In that case, the dinar is not being treated as currency but as a commodity. Who made this statement? Rabbi Yohanan. It would follow that Rabbi Yohanan is the one who says that, according to Bet Shammai, one may not redeem produce onto gold dinars, because one is transferring from one commodity to another. We have therefore demonstrated that Rabbi Yohanan considers gold a commodity.
The Gemara asks: “It is forbidden to lend one dinar for another dinar.” What kind of dinar are we discussing? If we are discussing silver, let him lend one for another. No one says that silver is not money. We learned that when dealing with money, one may always lend one unit in exchange for another, because money does not fluctuate in value in the same way that commodities do. It must therefore be referring to lending one gold dinar in exchange for another gold dinar.
Who is this statement according to? It cannot be according to Bet Hillel, who clearly says that gold is considered money. One may lend money for money. Rather, it must be according to Bet Shammai, who says that one may not transfer produce onto gold because gold is considered a commodity. We have therefore shown that the person who made this statement considers gold a commodity, and that, according to Bet Shammai, one may not transfer produce onto gold because gold is a commodity.
The Gemara rejects this proof. We could tell you that the statement is actually according to the opinion that allows one to transfer produce onto gold, because gold is considered money. Lending, however, is different. The third line of the discussion raises the following question: Did we not learn in our Mishnah that, in a monetary transaction, gold is considered a commodity in relation to silver, while silver is considered money?
Since the Gemara treats gold as a commodity in that context, perhaps it should likewise treat gold as a commodity in the laws of lending and say that its value fluctuates. The Gemara answers that this does not follow. We are stringent regarding loans only because we found another context in which gold is treated as a commodity in a transaction. Since we found that gold is treated as a commodity in a transaction, such as when gold acquires silver, we are stringent regarding loans as well. But with regard to second tithe, gold is treated as money, and therefore transferring produce onto gold is not a problem.
In other words, since, with regard to buying and selling, it makes sense to treat gold as a commodity, even though we learned that it is forbidden to lend one gold dinar for another, one is nevertheless permitted to redeem second-tithe produce onto gold. The stringency applies to lending, but not to second tithe. This is a proof.
Come and hear another proof: “One who exchanges a sela of second-tithe money for coins.” What is the person doing? He is exchanging a sela. The discussion explains that he has copper coins from second tithe and wants to exchange them for silver coins. He wants to bring the money to Jerusalem, but copper coins are too heavy, so he wants to exchange them for a smaller number of more valuable coins.
The Mishnah says: “Bet Shammai says that he may exchange the entire sela for coins.” He may transfer all of the copper into silver. Bet Hillel says that he may exchange only half of it—half the value of the sela into silver coins.
Rashi explains that one may transfer only half because copper coins are used in Jerusalem. When a person arrives there, he will immediately need copper coins. He will need them in order to buy the silver coins or to purchase what he needs to eat. If he converts everything into silver, he will arrive in Jerusalem without the smaller coins that he needs immediately.
Bet Hillel is concerned that if everyone converts all of his copper coins into silver coins before going to Jerusalem, then, once they arrive, they will all need to convert silver back into copper. The money changers will charge for that service. The result will be that the copper coins will become more expensive, and the people will have less purchasing power. Second tithe will lose out because part of its value will be lost in the exchange.
Therefore, Bet Hillel says that one may transfer some of the copper into silver, but one should keep some copper coins. When one reaches Jerusalem, one will at least have money immediately available for spending. Once the copper coins have been used, one can then exchange the silver coins as necessary. Bet Shammai, however, says that one may convert the entire amount. Bet Hillel says that one may convert only half.
The Gemara asks: Here, the Mishnah is telling us that one may transfer copper coins into silver coins. If you say that silver is money, then certainly silver should be considered money in relation to gold as well. Why, then, would there be a question about transferring produce onto gold?
The person must initially have had copper coins. If one is permitted to redeem second-tithe produce onto copper coins, then certainly one should be permitted to redeem it onto gold, which is more valuable. The Gemara is assuming that if one may transfer produce onto copper, which is not as valuable, one should certainly be able to transfer produce onto gold, which is more valuable.
The Gemara answers that copper is different because, in the places where it is used, it circulates more widely. It is more prevalent and functions as an ordinary currency. Gold, however, may not circulate as currency in the same way. Therefore, one cannot argue simply that because copper is permitted, gold must be permitted as well. The question is not which is more valuable. The question is what people actually use as currency.
If people use copper coins as ordinary currency, then one may redeem produce onto copper. But that does not prove that one may redeem produce onto gold. Who says that gold is current? Who says that it is prevalent? Who says that it circulates? That is the first approach.
We are going to present three approaches to this discussion of second tithe. The first approach is that the dispute between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel concerns transferring from silver to gold. Bet Shammai says that one may not transfer from silver to gold, while Bet Hillel says that one may.
What is the basis of their dispute? It depends on how one views gold in relation to silver. Bet Shammai considers gold a commodity, and therefore he treats the transfer as a transfer onto a commodity. Bet Hillel considers the transfer from silver to gold a transfer from one form of currency to another. According to him, gold is money in relation to silver, and therefore the transfer is permitted.
That is one way to understand the dispute. The Gemara then presents another approach. Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan disagree about whether the dispute concerns silver dinars. According to this approach, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that gold is money. Their dispute is whether one may perform two transfers.
Bet Shammai says that one may perform only one transfer. One may go from produce to silver, but one may not then go from silver to another form of money. Bet Hillel says that one may make the second transfer as well. The verse says “silver” in order to teach that one may transfer from produce to silver and then transfer that silver again to another form of silver or money.
However, according to one opinion, everyone agrees that one may go directly from produce to gold. That is the first transfer, and no problem has yet occurred. The other opinion says that even going from produce directly to gold is a matter of dispute. According to Bet Shammai, gold is considered produce—a commodity—and therefore one may not transfer from produce to produce.
We now have a new way of understanding the dispute. The question is not whether gold is money or whether it is a commodity. Rather, the question is whether one may perform two transfers. Bet Shammai says that once one has transferred from produce to silver, one has already used his one opportunity. He may not transfer from that silver to another form of money. Bet Hillel says that the verse permits transferring from produce to silver and then from silver to another form of silver or money.
The Gemara challenges this approach. If the issue is whether one may perform a second transfer, why present the case as a transfer from silver to gold? The case could have been stated as a transfer from silver to silver. The point of the dispute is supposedly that a person receives only one opportunity to transfer. Why choose the case of silver to gold?
The answer is that if the case had involved silver to silver, one might have thought that Bet Hillel permits only silver to silver, because both are the same type of currency. Perhaps Bet Hillel would agree with Bet Shammai that one may not transfer from silver to gold, because gold is considered produce. Therefore, the Mishnah specifically presents the case of silver to gold to teach us how lenient Bet Hillel is. Bet Hillel permits not only silver to silver, but even silver to gold, because gold is considered money in relation to silver.
The Gemara brings another version of the same story. A person brings a sela of second-tithe money to Jerusalem and wants to exchange it for smaller copper coins, because copper coins are used in Jerusalem.
Bet Shammai says that he may exchange the entire amount. Bet Hillel says that he should exchange only half. Rashi explains that he should not exchange everything at once because perhaps he will not remain in Jerusalem long enough to spend all of the copper coins. He may have to leave the coins in Jerusalem until he returns for the next festival.
There is another concern as well: copper oxidizes and can deteriorate. The coins may become damaged and lose value. Silver holds its value better. Therefore, Bet Hillel says that one should not convert everything into copper at once. One should exchange the coins as needed.
Someone might ask: If there are leftover copper coins, why not change them back into silver? The answer is that every time a person exchanges money with the money changer, the money changer takes a percentage. Second tithe would lose value through the repeated exchanges. Bet Hillel therefore says not to transfer everything at once, but to exchange only half.
The Gemara asks: Here we are saying that one may go from silver to copper. That is a transfer from one kind of money to another kind of money. Why, then, in the earlier case involving silver and gold, did Bet Shammai object to the transfer? If Bet Shammai permits silver to copper, why does he not permit silver to gold?
Rav answers that Jerusalem is different. In Jerusalem, one may do whatever is necessary, because the Torah requires a person to use his second-tithe money to purchase products there. If he needs smaller coins in order to buy what he needs, he may exchange the money. There is no problem with transferring money to money in Jerusalem. The earlier discussion concerned what a person may do outside Jerusalem, before he goes there. In that context, the question of the number of transfers remains. In Jerusalem, however, he may exchange the money as necessary.
That is the second approach to the story of second tithe. According to this approach, everyone agrees that gold is money. The dispute is whether one may transfer from the first silver to a second form of money. The second approach that we mentioned earlier is therefore not rejected: the dispute concerns whether one may transfer from one money to another money twice.
Now the Gemara presents a third approach. “One who exchanges a sela of second-tithe money.” Here the person is outside Jerusalem. He exchanges silver for copper. Bet Shammai says that he may exchange the entire sela for coins. Bet Hillel says that he may exchange only half.
This seems to contradict the earlier explanation. According to that explanation, perhaps the issue was that, outside Jerusalem, one may not make a second transfer. But here Bet Shammai says that even outside Jerusalem one may transfer from silver to copper. Therefore, that approach cannot fully explain the dispute.
Perhaps the statement of the earlier sages should be understood differently. Everyone agrees that one may transfer from one form of silver or money to another, even a second form of money. The dispute is not about the transfer itself. Rather, according to Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, the dispute should be understood as follows.
Everyone agrees that one may go from silver to silver, even a second silver. The concern is that a person who transfers silver into gold may delay his ascent to Jerusalem. If he converts his money into gold, he may wait until he has enough gold or until the value of his silver rises to equal the gold he wants. As a result, he may postpone going to Jerusalem.
We do not want him to delay his ascent until the following year. A person has three pilgrimage festivals in which to spend the second-tithe money. If he waits until the next year, he may miss the proper time and violate the requirement by delaying his second tithe.
Bet Shammai therefore makes a decree. The issue is not really the transfer from money to money. The concern is that transferring from a lower denomination or currency to a higher one, such as gold, may cause a person to delay. Bet Hillel says that no such decree is necessary. Even if he is unable to convert all his money into gold, he will go to Jerusalem with whatever money he has. Silver is not so burdensome that he will refuse to bring it.
According to this approach, everyone agrees that one may transfer produce directly to gold. Gold is considered money, and there is no concern that the person will delay, because produce spoils. If a person has produce in his possession, he will not postpone the redemption indefinitely. He knows that if he waits, the produce may spoil.
One rabbi therefore says that produce may be transferred directly to gold, because there is no concern that the person will delay. Another rabbi says that even the transfer from produce to gold is a matter of dispute, because perhaps the person will still delay, the produce will spoil, and he will lose the value of the second tithe. That is the third way of understanding the dispute.
Let us review the three approaches. The first approach concerns the status of gold. Is gold considered money or a commodity? According to that approach, Bet Shammai says that one may not transfer from silver to gold because gold is a commodity, while Bet Hillel says that one may because gold is considered money in relation to silver.
The second approach concerns whether one may transfer from one form of money to a second form of money. That approach was challenged by the case showing that one may transfer from silver to copper. The third approach says that gold is considered money, but there is a concern that a person who transfers silver into gold may delay going to Jerusalem. Bet Shammai is concerned about that delay, while Bet Hillel is not.
According to this third approach, the dispute concerning produce and gold is also understandable. One rabbi says that produce may be transferred to gold because the person will not delay when the produce may spoil. The other rabbi says that even there, perhaps the person will delay, and the produce will spoil. That is the third way of understanding the case.
Abaye says that, according to the version we have just learned, the dispute is understandable on a rabbinic level. According to Torah law, it is permitted to transfer from silver to gold. The Sages made a decree because of the concern that a person might delay. That is why the wording says, “Do not do it,” rather than “You may not redeem it.” If the act were invalid, the Mishnah would say that the transfer is not effective. Since it says only, “Do not do it,” it implies that if the person did it, the transfer would nevertheless be valid.
However, according to the version that says that the dispute concerns whether gold is considered money or a commodity on a Torah level, the dispute is already biblical. If gold is not considered money, then the Torah does not recognize the transfer from silver to gold. In that case, the wording should have been “You may not redeem it,” because even after the person has performed the act, the redemption would not be valid. The Gemara answers that, according to that version, the wording of the Mishnah is indeed difficult.
We now move to another subject. One of the methods of acquisition is an exchange acquisition. This does not mean that a person purchases an item in the ordinary way. It means that he exchanges one item for another. When one of the parties lifts one item, the other item automatically becomes the property of the other party. The second item does not require a separate act of pulling or taking.
The question is whether an exchange acquisition can be performed with money. We know that an exchange acquisition is ordinarily performed with objects. Can a coin serve as the item that activates the exchange acquisition? Or perhaps exchange acquisition applies specifically to objects and not to money?
Rashi explains that when a coin is used in an exchange acquisition, the transaction is not taking place as an ordinary sale. In an ordinary sale, money does not complete the acquisition; the taking of the object completes it. Here, however, we are dealing with a form of acquisition, like the classic exchange acquisition performed with a cloth.
The buyer gives the cloth, and the seller lifts it. When the seller lifts the cloth, the land or movable object being acquired becomes the property of the buyer. The act of lifting the cloth creates the acquisition. This is what we find in the Book of Ruth: “A man would remove his shoe and give it to his fellow.” Whatever the object was—whether a shoe or something else—it served as the item through which the acquisition was completed.
Perhaps a coin can serve the same function. Although we learned in our Mishnah that when money is given as money it does not make the sale binding, that applies when the money is being used as the purchase price. If the money is given as an item for an exchange acquisition, then the person who lifts the money may effect the acquisition of the other item.
The first position therefore says that money can serve as the instrument of an exchange acquisition. The Gemara then presents the opposing position: money cannot serve as an exchange-acquisition instrument. What is the reason? The person’s intention is focused on the image stamped on the coin.
The image on the coin, however, can be annulled. The king can remove the coin from circulation. Once the king invalidates that particular design, every coin bearing that image may become unusable. The person who takes the coin is relying on its image, but the image is not permanent.
Rashi explains that this is not because an exchange acquisition requires specifically a utensil. Do not say that the issue is that only a utensil can serve as the instrument, as Rav Nachman says based on the verse in the Book of Ruth concerning a shoe. The verse teaches that an object is required, but it need not necessarily be a utensil.
Rather, the issue is specifically the coin. All movable objects can ordinarily serve for an exchange acquisition, but a coin is different because a person’s intention is focused on its image. The person who takes the coin relies on the form stamped upon it. That form can be annulled, and therefore the coin is not considered a complete and significant object for this purpose.
For an exchange acquisition to work, the item that activates it must be a significant, complete object. An item that can suddenly be nullified is not sufficiently defined. A shoe remains a shoe. No one can simply declare that it is no longer a shoe. It is a complete, defined object. A coin, however, can be removed from circulation by the king. Its ability to function as a coin can be revoked.
Therefore, the coin is not considered a sufficiently defined item for exchange acquisition. The entire subject is that the coin’s value depends on its stamp or image. If the king removes that image from circulation, the coin is no longer a coin in the relevant sense. Since exchange acquisition is derived from the shoe in the Book of Ruth, it requires an object that is complete and defined, and a coin does not meet that standard.
The Gemara now begins bringing proofs. We learned in the Mishnah: “Gold acquires silver.” What did we learn from that? When the person lifts the gold, the silver is automatically transferred. Perhaps the Mishnah is discussing an exchange acquisition. If so, it is a proof that a coin can serve as the instrument of an exchange acquisition.
According to this reading, gold is being treated as money. Once the person lifts the gold coin, the silver is transferred. The Mishnah would therefore demonstrate that money can be the item that activates an exchange acquisition.
The Gemara rejects the proof. The Mishnah may be referring to a monetary sale, not an exchange acquisition. The phrase “gold acquires silver” may mean that the person has to pay the silver once he has taken the gold object. The taking of the object completes the sale, because the act of pulling or taking the object is what binds the transaction.
The Gemara asks: If that is the case, why does the Mishnah say that gold acquires silver? The proper wording should be that gold obligates the person to give silver. The gold does not acquire the silver; rather, once the person takes the gold, he becomes obligated to pay the silver.
Rav Papa answers that the Mishnah should indeed be read as saying that gold obligates the payment of silver. If one understands the Mishnah as referring to exchange acquisition, the wording “acquires” makes sense: the person lifts the gold and the silver is transferred. But if the transaction is an ordinary sale, the gold does not acquire the silver; the person is merely obligated to pay the silver after taking the item.
The Gemara says that it makes more sense to understand the Mishnah in this way because of the end of the Mishnah: “Silver does not acquire gold.” If the discussion were about exchange acquisition, what difference would it make whether the person lifted the silver or the gold? In an exchange acquisition, once either item is lifted, the other item should be transferred.
The distinction between gold and silver therefore suggests that the Mishnah is discussing ordinary money. Gold is being treated as a commodity, while silver is being treated as money. When the person performs the acquisition on the silver, which is money, the transaction is not completed. The money does not acquire the commodity.
If the Mishnah were discussing exchange acquisition, it would not matter which item was lifted. Once the act of exchange occurred, the other item would transfer. The fact that the Mishnah distinguishes between gold acquiring silver and silver not acquiring gold indicates that the discussion concerns money and an ordinary sale, not exchange acquisition.
There is also a baraita. It says that silver does not acquire gold. What does that mean? A person sold twenty-five silver dinars for one gold dinar, because that was the agreed value. Even though the buyer had taken the silver, the acquisition was not complete until he took the gold.
If this were an exchange acquisition, why would it matter which item the person lifted? Once he lifted the silver, the gold should have transferred automatically. The fact that he must take the gold demonstrates that the transaction is an ordinary sale involving monetary payment. Silver does not acquire the gold, because money does not complete the acquisition. The acquisition is completed only when the buyer takes the gold object.
The Gemara therefore concludes that the baraita must be discussing money. It may be that the gold and silver are being used as the payment in a monetary transaction. The gold is not acting as the instrument of an exchange acquisition.
However, the Gemara asks from the beginning of the baraita: “Gold acquires silver.” The wording sounds like exchange acquisition. Once the person lifts the gold, the silver transfers, regardless of where the silver is located. If it were an ordinary monetary transaction, the wording should say that the person becomes obligated to give the silver, not that the gold acquires it.
If gold is serving as ordinary money, the Mishnah should say that once the person lifts the gold, he becomes obligated to give the silver. It should not imply that ownership of the silver has already transferred. In exchange acquisition, however, the wording is appropriate: once he lifts the gold, the silver is transferred.
The Gemara answers that if the matter were being discussed as exchange acquisition, money would be transferable in every situation, because that is the nature of exchange acquisition. But if the case is an ordinary monetary transaction, the person is obligated to give the silver only in accordance with the agreement.
That means he cannot change the type of silver that he promised to give. If he promised newly minted coins, he cannot give old coins instead. Even if the old coins are currently more valuable, the buyer may specifically want new coins because he does not intend to use them immediately. By the time he uses them, they will have aged. If he receives old coins now, they may be too worn by the time he needs them.
Thus, according to the deal that was made, he must give precisely what he agreed to give. If he promised new coins, he cannot substitute old coins, and if he promised old coins, he cannot substitute new ones. This is what the baraita means when it says that the person must give the silver in the agreed form.
Rav Papa says that even according to the opinion that money cannot serve as the instrument of an exchange acquisition, money can nevertheless be acquired through an exchange acquisition. There are two separate questions. The first question is whether money can activate an exchange acquisition: if I lift money, does the other item transfer? The second question is whether money itself can be the item being transferred through an exchange acquisition.
Even according to the opinion that a coin cannot activate an exchange acquisition because its image can be annulled, money can still be acquired through an exchange acquisition. If one person wants to transfer money to another, the other person can give him produce, and when he lifts the produce, the money is transferred. In that case, the produce activates the exchange acquisition, while the money is the item being transferred.
The distinction is therefore as follows. Suppose I own land and want to transfer it to you. You give me money, and I lift the money. Does that act transfer the land? That is the question whether money can activate an exchange acquisition, and there is a dispute about it.
But even according to the opinion that money cannot activate an exchange acquisition, money can still be the object transferred through one. If I want to transfer money to you, you can give me produce. I lift the produce, and the money is transferred. The exchange acquisition is activated by the produce, not by the money.
The Gemara applies the same distinction to Rav Nachman’s position. Rav Nachman says that only a utensil can activate an exchange acquisition, based on the shoe mentioned in the Book of Ruth. Produce cannot activate the exchange acquisition. Nevertheless, produce can be transferred through an exchange acquisition. Thus, even though produce cannot serve as the activating object, it can be the object that is transferred.
Likewise, money cannot activate an exchange acquisition, but it can be transferred through one. That is the entire point of the statement.
The Gemara then turns to a related issue. When a person redeems his second-tithe produce, he must add an additional fifth. This is the Torah’s requirement when a person redeems his own second tithe. If, however, a person redeems someone else’s second tithe, he does not have to add the fifth.
People might therefore try to create a legal arrangement to avoid adding the fifth. One person gives his produce to someone else, and the other person redeems it on his behalf. Since the produce now belongs to someone else, the original owner hopes that the redemption will not require the additional fifth. The discussion concerns these kinds of legal devices that people might use to avoid the fifth.
Come and hear: A person is standing in the granary, and he does not have money available to redeem the produce. He says to his fellow, “Here is this produce; it is given to you as a gift.”