We begin today’s daf on the second side of Tzadi, starting approximately eight lines from the bottom. The Mishnah lists ten categories of people to whom we do not distribute priestly gifts at the granary, even though some of them may be permitted to eat those gifts. We do not allow them to come to the granary to collect them publicly.
They are a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, a minor, a tumtum, an androgynos, a Canaanite servant, a priest’s wife, an uncircumcised priest, an impure priest, and a priest who married an ineligible woman. The deaf-mute is someone whose intellectual capacity is limited, and a minor is a child. A tumtum is someone whose sexual characteristics are concealed, while an androgynos has characteristics of both sexes. The servant refers to a Canaanite servant belonging to a Jew. A priest’s wife is included in the list; an uncircumcised priest is one who cannot circumcise himself because his brothers died as a result of circumcision; and an impure priest is one who is currently impure. Finally, the priest who married an ineligible woman is subject to a penalty.
The Mishnah then says that all of these people are sent the priestly gifts to their homes, except for the impure priest and the priest who married an ineligible woman. The Gemara asks: when the Mishnah says “all of them,” does that include the intellectually disabled person and the minor? Why should they not receive the gifts at the granary? The answer is that doing so would be disrespectful to the priestly gifts. It is degrading to distribute them publicly to people who are not fully responsible members of the community.
The same explanation applies to the tumtum and the androgynos. They are distinct creatures in their own right, and giving sacred priestly gifts to them publicly would also be considered disrespectful. The same applies to a Canaanite servant, because people might mistakenly assume that he is a priest. We learned yesterday that some authorities maintain that anyone who collects priestly gifts is elevated, in the eyes of the public, to the status of a priest. If the servant were seen collecting them at the granary, people might conclude that he was a priest.
An uncircumcised priest and an impure priest are also not given the gifts publicly because their condition is repulsive in a certain sense. As for a priest who married an ineligible woman, he is penalized and may not even eat priestly gifts until he divorces her.
The question, however, is why a priest’s wife may not come to the granary. She should be permitted to collect the gifts. Rav Pappa and Rav Huna offer different explanations. One explanation is that this restriction is necessary because of divorce. If she were to collect the gifts in public and later become divorced, people might not know that she was no longer married to a priest. They might continue giving her priestly gifts even though she was no longer permitted to eat them.
Another explanation is that the concern is seclusion. The granary may be a private location, and if a priest’s wife goes there alone to collect the gifts from a man, there may be a concern of improper seclusion.
What is the practical difference between these two explanations? The difference would arise in a granary located near the city, but in a private place where there are no people. Since the granary is near the city, everyone would know whether she had been divorced, so the concern about people continuing to give her priestly gifts would not apply. Nevertheless, there would still be a concern of seclusion. Conversely, if the granary were far from the city but many people were present there, the concern of seclusion would not apply, but people might not know whether she had been divorced. Thus, the two explanations produce different practical outcomes.
The Mishnah says that all of these people are sent the priestly gifts to their homes, except for the impure priest and the priest who married an ineligible woman. The Gemara asks why an uncircumcised priest is not also penalized and prevented from receiving the gifts at home. The answer is that his situation is beyond his control: his brothers died because of circumcision, and he therefore may not circumcise himself.
The Gemara challenges this answer by pointing out that an impure priest may also be beyond his control. He did not necessarily choose to become impure. The answer is that the two cases involve different levels of responsibility. The uncircumcised priest could not circumcise himself at all, whereas the impure priest may have been able to exercise greater caution and avoid becoming impure. Since his lack of care contributed to his situation, he is not sent the priestly gifts even to his home.
The Sages taught: A servant and a woman are not given priestly gifts at the granary. In a place where the gifts for the poor are distributed, however, the woman is given them first, and then she is dismissed.
The Gemara asks what this means. It has just said that the woman is not given the gifts. The answer is that the statement refers to a place where poor people receive the tithe for the poor. A poor woman may collect that tithe, and there is no concern about seclusion or about people mistakenly assuming that she is a priest, because even an Israelite may eat the tithe for the poor. When she comes to collect it, she is given priority because it is disrespectful to make a woman wait.
Rava said that originally, when a man and a woman came before him for judgment, he would resolve the man’s case first. He followed the general practice that men are given priority in court, perhaps because men are obligated in more commandments. Once he heard that a woman should not be made to wait because of the disrespect involved, however, he began resolving the woman’s case first. The reason is that it is disrespectful to make a woman wait in court.
The Gemara then discusses the case of a child whose status is uncertain because a priest and the son of a servant became mixed up. Since no one knows which child is the priest and which is the son of the servant, when they grow up they must free one another. The wording might suggest that they have an option to free one another, but the Gemara explains that they must be forced to do so.
Without being freed, neither of them could marry. He could not marry a servant woman, because he might actually be a legitimate Israelite or priest, and he could not marry an Israelite woman, because he might be a servant. They are therefore compelled to free one another so that they will at least be able to marry. Once freed, each one receives the stringencies of both a priest and an Israelite.
One of those stringencies concerns a voluntary meal offering. An Israelite’s meal offering requires a handful to be removed, but the remainder is normally eaten. A priest’s meal offering, by contrast, is entirely burned on the altar. Therefore, in this case a handful is removed, as with the offering of an Israelite, but the remainder is not eaten, as with the offering of a priest. The handful is offered separately, and the remainder is also treated with the stringency of a priest’s offering.
The Gemara challenges this procedure. Once part of the offering has been placed on the altar, the remainder cannot ordinarily be placed there, because the remainder of an offering from which a handful was removed is not itself offered on the altar. How, then, can the remainder be placed there in this case?
Rav Judah son of Rabbi Shimon explains that the remainder is not placed on the altar as an offering. It is placed there for the sake of fuel, like wood. Rabbi Eliezer derives this from the verse that says that certain material may not be brought upon the altar “for a pleasing fragrance.” The implication is that it may not be brought as an offering for a pleasing fragrance, but it may be placed there for the sake of fuel.
This answer works according to Rabbi Eliezer. According to the other Sages, however, even placing the remainder on the altar for the sake of fuel would not be permitted. What can be done in the case of this doubtful priest?
The Gemara answers that the offering is handled according to the position of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. A teaching states that, according to Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, the handful is offered separately, while the remainder is scattered on the ash pile, in the place where the ashes and the feathers of the bird offerings are placed. The remainder is not placed on the altar itself.
Even the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon do so only in the case of a priest’s sin offering. In that case, the entire offering must be placed on the altar, because it is fundamentally the meal offering of a priest. In our case, however, there is uncertainty about whether the person is a priest at all. Therefore, even the Sages agree that the remainder is scattered on the ash pile after the handful has been offered.
The Mishnah then discusses a woman who did not wait three months after leaving her first husband before marrying another man. Ordinarily, a woman who becomes widowed or divorced must wait three months before remarrying, because otherwise, if she gives birth, we will not know whether the child was born after seven months to the second husband or after nine months to the first husband.
If she remarried before the required waiting period and gave birth, and it is not known whether the child belongs to the first husband or the second, she has definite children from each husband, as well as the child whose status is uncertain. If that uncertain child later marries and dies without children, his widow must undergo the release ceremony but may not perform the levirate marriage, because we do not know which brothers are actually related to him paternally.
The sons of the first husband perform the release ceremony for the widow of the doubtful child, but they may not perform the levirate marriage, because perhaps the doubtful child was the son of the second husband. In that case, the doubtful child is only their maternal brother, and a levirate marriage with a maternal brother’s widow is prohibited. The same applies in the other direction: the sons of the second husband perform the release ceremony but may not perform the levirate marriage, because perhaps the doubtful child was the son of the first husband.
The Mishnah then presents a case in which the doubtful child has brothers from the first husband and brothers from the second husband, but those brothers are not from the same mother. In that case, the doubtful child may either perform the release ceremony or perform the levirate marriage with the widow of one of those brothers. Since they are not his maternal brothers, there is no concern that the widow is the wife of a maternal brother. If they are related to him, the relationship is paternal, in which case a levirate marriage is possible; and if they are not related to him, she is simply a stranger.
As for the definite brothers, one performs the release ceremony and the other performs the levirate marriage. Since they are not maternally related to the doubtful child, there is no concern that one of them is marrying the wife of a maternal brother. One of them may be his paternal brother, while the other may be unrelated to him, so one can perform the levirate marriage and the other the release ceremony.
The Gemara emphasizes that the release ceremony must come first. If the doubtful child performs the levirate marriage first, perhaps the woman is actually the widow designated for the other brother, and he would be marrying a woman who is forbidden to him. Once he performs the release ceremony first, the bond connecting her to the other brother is removed, and he may then perform the levirate marriage with the second woman.
The Mishnah next discusses a case in which one of the two husbands was an Israelite and the other was a priest. We do not know which one is the father of the doubtful child. The child may marry only a woman who is suitable for a priest, because if he is a priest, she must be suitable for him; and if he is an Israelite, he may certainly marry her as well.
He may not become impure through contact with the dead, because he may be a priest. If he does become impure, he is not liable for the penalty, because perhaps he is an Israelite. He may not eat priestly gifts, because perhaps he is an Israelite; but if he does eat them, he does not pay the additional fifth or the principal, because the one seeking to collect money from another must prove his claim, and perhaps the person who ate the gifts was in fact a priest.
He may not collect priestly gifts at the granary, because the people there might attribute priestly status to him. He may, however, take his own priestly gifts and sell them, since even a priest may sell the gifts that belong to him. He may use the proceeds, but he does not receive a share in the sacred portions distributed to the priestly divisions in the Temple.
Nor are sacred portions given to him, and he does not remove his own portion from a sacrifice before distributing the portions to the priestly division. He is exempt from giving the priestly gifts associated with a nazirite’s offering, the firstborn animal, and the foreleg, jaw, and stomach of an animal. Since he may be an Israelite, he cannot eat those portions; and since he may be a priest, they cannot simply be given to another priest.
In the case of the firstborn animal, it is allowed to graze until it develops a blemish. Once it has a blemish, it may be slaughtered and eaten according to the applicable laws. He receives the stringencies of both priests and Israelites, including the rules governing the meal offering described earlier.
If both possible fathers were priests, the doubtful child observes the laws of an acute mourner for both of them if they die, because perhaps one of them is his father. The same fathers observe the laws of acute mourning for him if he dies, because perhaps he is their son. He may not become impure for either of them, because even if he is a priest, he does not know which one is his father, and a priest may not become impure for a stranger.
The Gemara raises a difficulty. If the first husband divorced the woman and the second husband was a priest who married a divorcee, the second husband would be disqualified, and their son would be a disqualified priest. Why, then, does the Mishnah say that the doubtful child may not become impure for the first husband? If he is the first husband’s son, he should be permitted to do so; and if he is the second husband’s son, he is disqualified and may become impure even for a stranger.
The Gemara answers that the laws of acute mourning are imposed stringently in both directions. The doubtful child may not eat sacred food on the day of either possible father’s death, because perhaps that man is his father. Likewise, each possible father may not eat sacred food on the day of the child’s death, because perhaps the child is his son.
The Mishnah continues: The doubtful child does not inherit from either possible father, but the other sons inherit from him. When one of the possible fathers dies, the child cannot claim the inheritance, because perhaps that man was not his father. The other sons, however, may claim the inheritance from him, because they are his possible paternal brothers. Since the money is in doubt, they may take possession of it, while he cannot prevent them.
He is exempt from liability for striking either possible father or cursing either one, because we do not know which man is his father. If he strikes both of them or curses both of them, the Gemara later discusses whether he is liable.
He may serve in the priestly division of either possible father. Neither division may prevent him from serving, because each family would appear defective if he did not serve at all. People might say that he is disqualified from Temple service. Nevertheless, he does not receive a share of the sacred portions, because either division can tell him that he belongs to the other one.
If both possible fathers belonged to the same priestly division, the doubtful child serves with that division and receives a share of the sacred portions, because in that case he certainly belongs to the division, even though we do not know which father he descended from.
The Gemara then discusses a child born to a woman who had relations with one of ten eligible priests, but it is not known which priest was the father. The child is called a foundling, but his priestly status is certain. Since all ten possible fathers were proper priests, the child is certainly a priest, even though his specific father is unknown.
The Gemara asks why the child is called a foundling, since he does not have the ordinary problem associated with that status. The answer is that he is a foundling only with respect to lineage. He is certainly a priest, but he cannot serve in the Temple because the verse says that the covenant of priesthood applies to the priest and to his descendants after him, and the descendants must have established lineage. A priest whose father is unknown may not serve.
The Gemara challenges this derivation from the verse. The same expression is used regarding Abraham: “To be a God to you and to your descendants after you.” Abraham was not a priest, so the expression cannot mean that one must know the identity of one’s father in order to serve as a priest.
The Gemara answers that the verse concerning Abraham teaches that a person must not marry a gentile woman or a servant woman if he wants his descendants to follow him in Jewish status. A child follows the mother with respect to Jewish identity. Therefore, the phrase “your descendants after you” teaches that one should marry a Jewish woman rather than a servant or a gentile woman.
The Gemara returns to the child born to a woman who remarried before the three-month waiting period. If the first and second husbands were priests, perhaps the child should be eligible to become the High Priest. The difficulty is that the verse requires a priest to have established lineage, and this child’s father is unknown.
The Gemara answers that the requirement of established lineage in this context is a rabbinic enactment supported by a verse, rather than a Torah-level disqualification. The Rabbis made this enactment in a case of forbidden relations, such as when a priest had relations with an unmarried woman. In a case of marriage, however, they did not make the enactment. Since the child in this case was born through a marriage framework, the fact that the father is unknown does not prevent him from serving.
The Gemara challenges this answer from the Mishnah, which states that a woman who did not wait three months after leaving her husband, remarried, and gave birth produces a child who may serve in both priestly divisions. If the case involved the death of the first husband, the child should be subject to the laws of acute mourning for him, but the first husband is already dead before the child is born.
The Gemara therefore considers a case in which the first husband divorced her. But if the first husband divorced her and the second husband was a priest, the second marriage would make the child a disqualified priest. The child should then be permitted to become impure for the first man if he is the child’s father, since the first man is a priest, and if he is the second man’s child, he is disqualified and may become impure even for a stranger.
The Gemara concludes that the case must involve forbidden relations rather than marriage. Both men had relations with her outside marriage, and the child’s father is uncertain. Since both men are alive, the child’s status as a priest is not disqualified by the rabbinic enactment concerning unknown lineage. Nevertheless, this appears to conflict with the rule that a priest born from forbidden relations may not serve in the Temple.
The Gemara resolves the difficulty by presenting a case of a minor girl who had been married through a rabbinic marriage and later exercised her right to refuse the marriage. Because she was a minor, the marriage could be annulled retroactively without a formal divorce. She then married another man within three months, and the child’s father is uncertain.
The Gemara asks whether a minor could become pregnant in this case. Three categories of women were advised to use a protective absorbent during relations: a minor, a pregnant woman, and a nursing woman. A minor was advised to do so because she might become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman was advised to do so because a second pregnancy might injure the first fetus. A nursing woman was advised to do so because pregnancy might cause her milk to stop, and the nursing child could die.
What is considered a minor in this context? From eleven years and one day until twelve years and one day, there is a concern that she might become pregnant and die. Before that age, she is not physically capable of becoming pregnant, and after that age she is strong enough that pregnancy does not pose the same danger. The Sages, however, say that both a younger girl and an older girl may engage in ordinary marital relations, because God protects the vulnerable.
The Gemara therefore asks how the case of a girl who exercised her right to refuse the marriage could involve an uncertain pregnancy. If she was still a minor, she could not become pregnant; and if she had reached twelve years and one day, she could no longer exercise that right.
The Gemara answers that the case involves a marriage that was based on a mistaken assumption. The first man betrothed the girl on the basis of a condition, but the condition was not fulfilled. The betrothal was therefore never valid, and she was able to leave without a divorce. She then married the second priest within three months. Since the first relationship was retroactively invalidated, the relations with the first man are considered a form of forbidden relations, but not the type of forbidden relationship that disqualifies the child from priestly service.
The Gemara derives this from the verse concerning a woman suspected of adultery: “She was not seized.” If she willingly had relations with another man, she becomes forbidden to her husband and to the other man. If she was seized against her will, she remains permitted to her husband. There is another case in which, even though she willingly had relations, she remains permitted: a woman whose marriage was based on a mistaken assumption. Even if she had a child from that relationship, she may leave without a divorce.
Thus, in our case, the first marriage was treated as having never existed. The woman was not considered a married woman who committed adultery with the second man. Since the first relationship was a marriage that was retroactively annulled, the child is not treated as the child of an ordinary forbidden relationship, and the rabbinic enactment disqualifying a priest of unknown lineage does not apply.
This resolves the various difficulties in the Mishnah. Both possible fathers are alive, the child is not disqualified as a priest, and he may serve in either priestly division. He cannot become impure for either possible father because he does not know which one is his father, and neither possible father may become impure for him because he may not be his son.
The Gemara then returns to the question of striking or cursing the two possible fathers. The Mishnah says that if he strikes one of them or curses one of them, he is exempt, because perhaps that man is not his father. What happens if he strikes or curses both of them simultaneously?
One teaching says that if he strikes both at the same time, he is liable. Rabbi Judah, however, says that he is exempt. The reasoning is connected to the requirement of a warning before punishment. If he is warned, “Do not strike your father,” the warning is uncertain because we do not know which man is his father. If he strikes both at once, however, one could argue that he certainly struck the correct man, namely, his father.
The Gemara explains that the first opinion maintains that such a warning is sufficient, while Rabbi Judah maintains that it is not. Another possibility is that Rabbi Judah distinguishes between striking the two men at the same time and striking them separately. If he strikes them simultaneously with one blow, he is liable because the blow certainly reached the father. If he strikes them separately, he is exempt because we do not know which blow was directed at the father.
The Gemara derives this distinction from the juxtaposition between striking a parent and cursing a parent. Just as a curse must be directed exclusively at the parent, so too a blow must be directed exclusively at the parent. A blow directed at the parent and another person together does not satisfy the requirement.
Although there is a verse between the laws of striking and cursing, the Sages still derive one from the other through juxtaposition. The result is that the discussion is not only about an uncertain warning. Even where the warning is otherwise sufficient, the act must be directed specifically at the parent and not at the parent together with another person.
Finally, the Gemara returns to the doubtful priest who serves in either priestly division but does not receive a share of the sacred portions. The Gemara asks why he serves at all. The answer is that he is encouraged, or even compelled, to serve so that people will not cast aspersions on the families of the two priestly divisions. If he never served, people might conclude that he was disqualified from Temple service.
He serves without receiving a share. Each division can tell him that he belongs to the other division, but neither can prevent him from working, because allowing him to serve does not cost them anything. If both possible fathers belonged to the same division and the same daily family within that division, however, they cannot push him away. In that case, he certainly belongs to that division and must receive a share of the sacred portions.
This concludes the discussion of the daf.