The Eddie B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bubbly. Last time, we discussed a mouse that fell into beer. Today’s page discusses another creature, let us say a mouse, that falls into vinegar. What does it do to the vinegar?
The question is whether we say that vinegar is so strong that the mouse cannot impart its flavor to it and therefore does not affect it, or whether we say that just as the mouse affects beer, it also affects vinegar.
We learned on the previous page that Rav held that beer into which a mouse falls is prohibited. One explanation was that the mouse imparts flavor to the beer. The question here is whether the mouse also imparts flavor to vinegar and therefore makes it prohibited, or whether the vinegar is so strong that it neutralizes the mouse’s flavor.
There was an incident in which the mouse dissolved into pieces. It was not merely a mouse that was in the vinegar; there were pieces of a mouse in it. Perhaps the concern was not the flavor at all. Perhaps the vinegar would neutralize the flavor, but the concern was the actual pieces of the mouse that had dissolved into it. If one eats even a lentil-sized piece of the mouse, it is prohibited.
Rabina thought about how much would be needed to nullify the mouse. We do not yet know the answer to the original question; we only know about that incident, in which there were pieces of a mouse. But what is the law if a mouse falls into vinegar?
The conclusion would have to be stringent: one should not drink the vinegar unless one knows for certain that the flavor imparted by the mouse has been nullified. The question, then, is how much is needed to nullify the mouse’s flavor. Is it sixty times the amount of the mouse? One hundred times? Fifty times? What is the required measure for nullifying a mouse in vinegar?
The Torah says one hundred and one. It should not be worse than terumah. Terumah is also a prohibition, and one portion of terumah is nullified in one hundred portions of ordinary produce. The same should apply here.
Thalifa bar Gizal said to Rabina: Who told you that you can compare this to ordinary terumah? Perhaps it is comparable to a terumah spice. A spice of terumah is not nullified at all—not in one hundred portions and not in two hundred portions—because it contributes flavor. Perhaps a mouse is likewise considered a flavoring ingredient, and its flavor is never nullified. In that case, there would be no nullification at all.
Rabbi Hiyya said that fifty times is sufficient. Rabbi Shuel and Rabbi Ika said fifty times as well. They returned to the case of beer: if a mouse falls into beer, sixty times is enough to nullify it. Regarding vinegar, because vinegar is strong, fifty times should already be enough to neutralize the mouse’s flavor.
Another rabbi said that sixty times is required, in accordance with the general law of the Torah. Rashi explains the opinion requiring fifty times as follows: because vinegar is strong, even fifty times will neutralize the mouse’s flavor. The final opinion, however, requires sixty, which is the standard measure accepted by Israel: a mixture of one species with another is nullified in sixty.
There is an exception for chametz, which is prohibited even in the smallest amount. Ordinarily, a mixture of one species with another is nullified in sixty—for example, milk and meat. A mixture of one species with the same species, however, is prohibited even in the smallest amount, as we find in Tractate Pesachim. The novel point here is that chametz, even when mixed with another species, is also prohibited in the smallest amount. This is a rabbinic decree intended to prevent people from treating a mixture of chametz with another species as less serious than a mixture of chametz with its own species.
We now return to the wine. The Mishnah discusses a non-Jew who is transporting barrels of wine. The Jew is walking with him and watching him carry the barrels. At some point, the Jew leaves the non-Jew unattended. The concern is that the non-Jew may open the barrels, drink from the wine, or otherwise handle it.
The law depends on how the Jew left him. If the Jew said, “I will be back in three hours,” the non-Jew knows that he has three hours in which to interfere with the wine. But if the Jew does not tell him anything and simply leaves, the non-Jew is afraid that the Jew may return at any moment. The law therefore depends on the circumstances in which the Jew left him unattended.
The Mishnah says that when the Jew does not tell him how long he will be gone or how far he is going, the wine remains under the presumption that it is being watched. The non-Jew is afraid to touch it because the Jew may appear at any moment. The wine is therefore considered protected, and there is no concern that the non-Jew handled it.
If, however, the Jew tells him that he is going far away, even if the barrels are sealed, the wine is prohibited if the Jew remains away long enough for the non-Jew to interfere with it without being detected.
What is the required amount of time? The Gemara says it is enough time for the non-Jew to make a hole in the barrel, drink from it, reseal the barrel, and allow the seal to dry. The barrel is sealed, so how can the non-Jew make it prohibited? He must puncture the barrel, drink from it, reseal it, and wait until the seal dries. Then the Jew will not be able to tell that anything happened.
For the sake of example, suppose this process takes twenty-five minutes. If the Jew tells the non-Jew, “I am going far away and will not return for a long time,” and he remains away for twenty-five minutes, then when he returns and sees that the barrel is sealed, the wine is prohibited. The non-Jew had enough time to puncture the barrel, drink from it, reseal it, and let the seal dry.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees. He says that the required amount of time is enough for the non-Jew to open the barrel, replace the seal, and let it dry. This is a much longer process, perhaps an hour. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, we are not concerned merely that the non-Jew made a hole and covered it, because the Jew might notice that. Rather, the concern is that the non-Jew removed the entire seal, opened the barrel, and then replaced the seal so that it would appear as though nothing had happened.
The Mishnah then discusses the same case when the Jew and the non-Jew are traveling together in a wagon, on a caravan, or on a boat. The Jew takes a shortcut and leaves the wine behind. He later returns after enough time has passed for him to wash and attend to his needs.
Because the Jew did not tell the non-Jew when he would return, the non-Jew does not know how long he will be gone. The non-Jew is therefore afraid to touch the wine, since the Jew might return at any moment. If, however, the Jew tells him that he is going far away, the same dispute applies regarding the amount of time that he must remain away.
Why does the Mishnah present the same law in several different cases? It discusses people walking together, people traveling in a wagon or on a boat, and people in a store. Each case is necessary because one might have thought that the circumstances were different. When they are walking on the road, the Jew may appear suddenly. On a boat, however, the non-Jew may be able to travel to a secluded place. In a store, he might even lock the door. Nevertheless, even in the store, if the Jew says, “I will be back in a moment,” the non-Jew remains afraid to touch the wine.
The Mishnah also discusses a Jew who is eating with a non-Jew at the same table. There are cups or jugs of wine on the table, and additional wine in a pantry. The Jew gets up and leaves.
The wine on the table is prohibited because the Jew invited the non-Jew to sit and eat with him. The non-Jew is therefore not afraid to touch the wine on the table. The wine in the pantry, however, remains permitted, because the non-Jew will not ordinarily enter the pantry and handle the wine.
If the Jew told him, “Help yourself. Pour wine and drink as much as you want,” then even the wine in the pantry is prohibited. The non-Jew feels completely comfortable handling the wine because the Jew explicitly gave him permission to drink.
The bottom line is that the open barrels in the house are prohibited. All the barrels that were open are prohibited. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, even sealed barrels are prohibited if the Jew was away long enough for the non-Jew to open them, drink from them, replace the seal, and allow it to dry. The novel point is that even the sealed barrels may be prohibited under those circumstances.
The Gemara explains that the final case of the Mishnah follows the principle that the item remains under the presumption that it is being watched. When a Jew is walking with a non-Jew who is carrying the wine, and the Jew does not say how long he will be away, the non-Jew is afraid to do anything because the Jew may return at any moment.
The Gemara gives another example. Workers are carrying items that have been made ritually pure. Even if the owner is more than a mile away, the items are still considered protected. But if he tells them, “Go ahead, and I will catch up with you,” then once they are out of his sight, there is a concern that they may handle the items improperly.
What is the difference between the two cases? In the first case, the workers do not know when the owner will return, so they are afraid to do anything wrong. In the second case, the owner tells them that he is going away and will return later. Since they know that they have time, they are no longer afraid that he will suddenly appear.
The Gemara asks about the precise circumstances. Suppose the non-Jew is actually holding the ritually pure items. If the owner tells him, “I will be back in a moment,” why should that help? The non-Jew is still holding them. The Gemara explains that the concern is not necessarily that the non-Jew himself will touch them, but that he may allow someone else to touch them.
When the owner says, “I will be back in a moment,” the non-Jew is afraid that the owner may suddenly appear from a shortcut or around a corner. He therefore will not allow another person to touch the items. But when the owner says, “I am going away for two hours,” the non-Jew knows that he is not likely to be caught. The concern then is not only what the non-Jew himself may do, but that he may allow someone else to handle the items.
The same principle applies when a Jew and a non-Jew are transporting wine together. If the Jew tells the non-Jew carrying the wine, “I will be away for a long time,” there is reason for concern. If he does not tell him anything and may return at any moment, the non-Jew is afraid to touch the wine.
The Gemara explains why the Mishnah needs all three cases—walking together, traveling on a boat or in a wagon, and being in a store. If we were taught only the case of walking on the road, we might say that the non-Jew is afraid because the Jew can immediately return and catch him. On a boat or in a wagon, however, the non-Jew controls the vehicle and could travel to a secluded location. One might therefore think that the non-Jew would not be afraid. The Mishnah teaches that he is still afraid if the Jew did not tell him that he was going away.
Similarly, one might think that in a store the non-Jew could lock the door and handle the wine without being seen. The Mishnah teaches that even in the store, if the Jew says, “I will be back in a moment,” the non-Jew remains afraid to touch the wine.
We now come to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages. What is the measure of time? The Sages say that it is enough time to make a hole in the barrel, drink from it, reseal it, and let it dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it must be enough time to remove the entire seal, open the barrel, replace the seal, and let it dry.
Rava bar bar Hanan bar Rabbi Yochanan explains that the dispute concerns two types of seals. One type is made from lime, which is white, and the other is made from tar, which is dark. The difference between them is that when the seal is made from white lime, the non-Jew can puncture it, repair it, and smooth it over. The owner may not be able to distinguish the new seal from the old one.
When the seal is made from tar, however, it is dark. A new tar seal is initially very dark, and it takes a day or two to lighten. If the non-Jew punctures it and reseals it, the owner will be able to notice the difference in color. Therefore, even the Sages would agree in the case of a tar seal that there must be enough time to remove the entire seal and replace it. The concern is not merely that the non-Jew punctured it, because that would be detectable.
Rashi explains that the dispute concerns the white lime seal. The Sages are concerned that the non-Jew may puncture it because a new white seal cannot be distinguished from an old one. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel responds that one can distinguish the seal both from above and from below.
If the non-Jew makes a hole in the seal, he can smooth the top so that it appears intact. But when the barrel is opened, the underside of the seal may reveal that it is new. The color may be different, and one may be able to see that it was repaired.
The Gemara asks: If so, when Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the Sages’ concern is unnecessary because the difference can be detected from above and below, he must be speaking about a tar seal. With tar, the difference can be seen from both sides. But if he is speaking about a lime seal, the difference cannot necessarily be seen from above, since the non-Jew can smooth it over.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel responds that he did not know which material the Sages were discussing. If they were speaking about tar, then they were mistaken, because the difference can be seen from above and below. If they were speaking about lime, then it is possible that the difference can be seen on the underside even though it cannot be seen on top.
The Sages answer that even with lime, the underside may eventually take on the same appearance as the original seal. Simply remaining in place can cause the repaired section to blend in with the surrounding material. In that case, the difference may not be detectable at all. Thus, the Sages were indeed discussing lime, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s concern remains.
What is the halakhic ruling? The law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, because the anonymous Mishnah follows his opinion. We have a general principle that when the compiler of the Mishnah presents a case according to one opinion without mentioning the dispute, the law follows that anonymous Mishnah.
Here, the dispute concerns how long the Jew must leave the non-Jew unattended. The Sages require only enough time for the non-Jew to puncture the barrel, drink from it, reseal it, and let it dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel requires enough time to remove the entire seal, replace it, and let it dry. The law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel because the final case in the Mishnah appears to follow his view.
That case says that if a Jew is eating with a non-Jew at the table, leaves wine on the table and in the pantry, and then leaves, the open barrels are prohibited. If the Jew told the non-Jew to drink and make himself at home, the wine in the pantry is also prohibited. The sealed barrels are prohibited only if the Jew was away for enough time to open the seal, drink from the wine, replace the seal, and let it dry. This is clearly the measure given by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
The Gemara asks why it is necessary to state explicitly that the law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Since the anonymous Mishnah follows his opinion, that should already be obvious. The answer is that perhaps the final case is not an anonymous Mishnah at all. Perhaps it is merely a continuation of the previous case, in which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion was already stated.
If it were merely a continuation, it would not establish an independent ruling. The Gemara therefore teaches that it is considered a separate case. Although it appears next to the previous dispute, it is an independent anonymous Mishnah, and the fact that it follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teaches that the halakhah follows him.
Once we follow Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, we are not concerned that the non-Jew will make a hole in the barrel and reseal it, because that takes less time and may be detected. Earlier, we also learned that when wine is left with a non-Jew, one seal may sometimes be sufficient. Rabbi Eliezer was lenient and said that one seal is enough, because we are not concerned that the non-Jew will forge a new seal.
A seal is a distinctive covering or sign that identifies the container. One might suspect that when the Jew returns and sees the seal intact, the non-Jew may have removed it, drunk from the wine, and then placed a new seal on the barrel. Rabbi Eliezer says that we do not have to be concerned about such forgery.
We therefore have two leniencies. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, we are not concerned that the non-Jew will puncture the barrel and reseal it, because that is not the process we are worried about. According to Rabbi Eliezer, we are not concerned that the non-Jew will remove the entire seal and replace it with a new one. With both leniencies together, it would seem that a sealed barrel could be left with a non-Jew.
The Gemara asks why, then, we may not leave wine with a non-Jew in a sealed barrel. If the seal itself is considered one seal, why is another seal necessary?
The Gemara answers that there is another concern: the non-Jew may drink through a very small opening in the seal. A sealed barrel generally has a tiny opening through which one can insert a straw. The opening allows the wine to breathe and permits its smell to escape. The concern is that the non-Jew may insert a straw into this opening and draw out wine.
This is a new concern. Without it, there would be no reason to worry about leaving the wine with the non-Jew. We are not concerned that he will puncture the barrel and reseal it, and we are not concerned that he will remove the entire seal and replace it. The concern is that he may drink through the existing opening.
If the non-Jew drinks from the wine, the wine is prohibited. Touching the wine is already prohibited, and drinking from it is certainly prohibited. The concern is not that he will spit the wine back; once he drinks from it, the wine is prohibited.
That is why wine today requires a double covering or a double seal. Even after we rely on the leniency of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding puncturing and resealing the barrel, and on the leniency of Rabbi Eliezer regarding forging a new seal, we still have to address the possibility that the non-Jew will drink through the small opening.
Accordingly, the small opening must also be covered. This is why sealed bottles do not ordinarily have an opening through which one can insert a straw. A bottle that is purchased has a seal and an additional covering, without an accessible opening from which the non-Jew could drink.
With a sealed barrel, however, one must be concerned that the non-Jew may remove the wrapper or the cork, replace it, or drink through the small opening. If there is no opening at all, and the container is fully sealed, then the concern that he drank through a hole does not apply. That is the basis for the protection provided by fully sealed bottles.