We begin today’s page of Yevamot, page 111, on the second side. We are at the two dots, several lines before the words “they begin to turn white.” The Mishnah presented a case in which a man was married to a minor and to a deaf-mute woman, both of whom could be married only through rabbinic enactment. We said that if he died and the levirate marriage was performed with one of them, that act would not exempt the co-wife. The co-wife would therefore remain subject to the bond of levirate marriage.
The Gemara explains that Rav Nachman saw Rav Ada bar Ahava and another sage—apparently Rav Huna—sitting and teaching large groups of students in the streets of Pumbedita. They said that the Mishnah’s case concerns women who fell before the levirate brother from a husband who had been mentally competent. The reason is that we do not know which of his two wives he preferred.
Perhaps he was pleased with the minor, because she might eventually become a mentally competent woman. Alternatively, perhaps he preferred the deaf-mute woman as she was, because she was already suited to him in her present condition and shared his disability. Since the deceased husband was mentally competent, there is therefore uncertainty as to which wife he regarded as primary.
If, however, the deceased husband himself had been deaf-mute, one might have assumed that he certainly preferred the deaf-mute woman. She had two advantages from his perspective: she was mentally competent in the relevant sense, and she was like him. According to that approach, there should be no uncertainty. The deaf-mute woman would be considered the primary wife.
Those sages said that when they heard this interpretation, they rejected it. Even if the deceased husband had been deaf-mute, there would still be uncertainty as to whether he preferred the minor or the deaf-mute woman. Thus, according to this explanation, there is uncertainty regardless of the husband’s condition.
This explains the Mishnah in the manner we discussed previously. The reason that an act of intercourse with one wife does not release the other is that, even though both marriages are rabbinic, one woman may be considered more fully a wife than the other. That is an important innovation: the rabbinic status of the two marriages does not necessarily make them equal. Since we do not know which woman is the primary wife, an act of levirate marriage with one of them does not necessarily remove the bond from the other.
What, then, is the procedure? We do not know whether the deaf-mute woman is the primary wife or whether the minor is the primary wife. The Gemara therefore asks how the bond can be removed so that these women can eventually marry others. Levirate marriage cannot be performed with both of them, because one may not perform levirate marriage with two women from the same household. The only viable procedure is to perform levirate marriage with the deaf-mute woman, give her a divorce document, and wait until the minor becomes an adult. Once the minor becomes an adult, she performs the release ceremony.
Why is the release ceremony necessary? Why can the levirate brother not simply remain married to the deaf-mute woman? He cannot remain with her, because when the minor becomes an adult and performs the release ceremony, that release will prohibit him from continuing to live with the other woman.
In general, a release ceremony performed after levirate marriage has no effect. Once levirate marriage has been performed, the bond has already been removed, and a later release ceremony does not prohibit the man from continuing to live with the woman whom he married through levirate marriage. Here, however, the two women were both married to him through rabbinic arrangements, and we do not know which one was the primary wife. Even after he performs levirate marriage with one of them, the other may still be the primary wife. The act with the first woman therefore did not necessarily remove the bond from the second.
For that reason, the deaf-mute woman must also be released. She cannot be released immediately, because a deaf-mute woman cannot perform the release ceremony. Thus, the only option is to perform levirate marriage with her, give her a divorce document, and wait until the minor becomes an adult so that she can perform the release ceremony. Only then are both women free.
Ordinarily, if a man performs levirate marriage with one woman and then performs the release ceremony with her co-wife, that later ceremony would not prohibit him from remaining with the woman whom he married. In our case, however, the other woman may be the primary wife, and the levirate marriage with the first woman may not have removed the bond from her. Therefore, there is no choice but to remove the bond from both women in the manner described.
That is one approach to the discussion. Based on it, Rav Chisda formulates a general rule that will be used to explain this Mishnah and the Mishnayot that follow on the next page. The rule is that the deaf-mute woman has a definite but incomplete marital acquisition, whereas the minor’s status is uncertain: either she has a complete marital acquisition or she has no marital acquisition at all.
In other words, when a man marries the deaf-mute woman, there is certainly a marriage and a valid act of betrothal, but it is incomplete. Something definite exists, and that bond must be removed. Regarding the minor, however, the status is all or nothing. Either her betrothal is a complete marriage, making her the primary wife, or her betrothal has no effect.
This distinction produces practical consequences. Suppose we reverse the formulation and say that the minor has the definite, partial acquisition, while the deaf-mute woman is in the all-or-nothing category. If the deaf-mute woman’s marriage is either complete or nonexistent, why did the Mishnah require the man to perform levirate marriage with her, give her a divorce document, and wait for the minor to become an adult? If the deaf-mute woman’s marriage was complete, then the levirate marriage with her should remove the bond from the minor, whose marriage was only partial. If the deaf-mute woman’s marriage did not exist, then the minor would not be considered her co-wife at all.
In the first possibility, the later release ceremony performed by the minor would accomplish nothing, because the man had already acquired the primary wife through levirate marriage. In the second possibility, the deaf-mute woman would not be related to the minor as a co-wife, and she would not fall before him for levirate marriage at all. According to either side, there should be no need for the procedure described in the Mishnah.
Levi bar Rav therefore raises a difficulty. If the minor is the woman whose status is all or nothing, why must we wait until she becomes an adult and then have her perform the release ceremony? She should perform levirate marriage immediately. If her marriage was complete, the levirate marriage would remove the bond from the deaf-mute woman, whose acquisition was only partial. If the minor’s marriage was nonexistent, then the deaf-mute woman would be an unrelated woman, and the man could remain with the minor without difficulty.
In either case, the argument continues, levirate marriage with the minor should be sufficient. Why does the Mishnah require levirate marriage with the deaf-mute woman first?
The Gemara answers that the deaf-mute woman still has to be dealt with. If levirate marriage were performed with the minor first, the deaf-mute woman would become the co-wife of the minor on the side that the minor’s marriage was complete. One may not perform levirate marriage with two women from the same household. Nor can the deaf-mute woman perform the release ceremony. Thus, if the minor were married first, there would be no way to remove the bond from the deaf-mute woman.
On the other hand, if the minor’s marriage was nonexistent, she would be no more than a stranger, and the man could remain with her without concern. But we do not know which possibility applies. Since the deaf-mute woman has a definite partial acquisition, the uncertainty concerning the minor creates a problem that cannot be resolved by marrying the minor first. Therefore, the procedure must be performed in the order stated: levirate marriage with the deaf-mute woman, a divorce document for her, and then waiting for the minor to become an adult so that she can perform the release ceremony.
The point is not merely that we do not know which wife the deceased preferred. Rav Chisda’s formulation is a different approach. It is based on the mechanics of the legal acquisitions: the minor is in the all-or-nothing category, while the deaf-mute woman has a definite partial acquisition. The first explanation focused on the deceased husband’s preference; this explanation focuses on the halachic structure of the two marriages.
The Gemara now examines which way the formula should be stated. Is the definite partial acquisition associated with the deaf-mute woman and the all-or-nothing status with the minor, as Rav Chisda said? Or is it the reverse? The Gemara brings a teaching involving two brothers who were married to two orphaned sisters, one a minor and the other a deaf-mute woman.
Suppose the husband of the minor died. The surviving brother, who was married to the deaf-mute woman, is now faced with the minor, who has fallen before him for levirate marriage. He must give his current wife, the deaf-mute woman, a divorce document and wait until the minor becomes an adult, at which point she performs the release ceremony.
If, however, the husband of the deaf-mute woman died, the minor wife of the surviving brother is sent away with a divorce document, and the deaf-mute woman is forbidden to him. If he nevertheless had intercourse with the deaf-mute woman, he gives her a divorce document, and she becomes permitted in the sense described by the teaching.
The Gemara explains that the latter ruling makes sense if the minor is in the all-or-nothing category and the deaf-mute woman has a definite partial acquisition. If the minor’s marriage to the surviving brother was complete, then the deaf-mute woman, as the sister of his wife, would be his wife’s sister and would not fall before him for levirate marriage. If the minor’s marriage was nonexistent, then the deaf-mute woman would fall before him for a complete levirate marriage. In either case, if he had intercourse with her, giving her a divorce document would suffice according to that explanation.
If, however, the deaf-mute woman were in the all-or-nothing category and the minor had the definite partial acquisition, the ruling would be difficult. The surviving brother was certainly married to the minor to some degree. When the deaf-mute woman’s husband died, we would not know whether her marriage had any effect. If it did, the intercourse with her would be a defective act of levirate marriage because she might be the sister of his wife. A defective act of levirate marriage would require not only a divorce document but also the release ceremony.
Why, then, does the teaching say that a divorce document is sufficient? This appears to prove that the minor is the woman whose status is all or nothing, while the deaf-mute woman has the definite partial acquisition.
The Gemara rejects this proof. Perhaps the author of the teaching is Rabbi Nehemiah, who holds that defective intercourse in a levirate context is sufficient to release the woman through a divorce document and does not require the release ceremony. If so, even if the deaf-mute woman were the all-or-nothing wife and the minor had the definite partial acquisition, the teaching could still say that a divorce document is sufficient. The teaching therefore does not conclusively establish Rav Chisda’s formulation.
The Gemara then presents another case. A man was married to two orphaned women, one a minor and the other a deaf-mute woman. He died, and the levirate brother performed levirate marriage with the minor. He then had intercourse with the deaf-mute woman as well, or another brother had intercourse with her. Since one may not take two women from the same household through levirate marriage, both women become prohibited to him.
Why does the second act affect the first wife? Ordinarily, if a man performs valid levirate marriage with one woman and then another brother has intercourse with one of the co-wives, that later act does not undo the first man’s valid levirate marriage. Here, however, the two women are not equal. The minor’s status is all or nothing, while the deaf-mute woman has a definite partial acquisition. The Sages therefore enacted a restriction in order to prevent people from treating the two cases inconsistently.
If the minor’s marriage is complete, then the deaf-mute woman is the sister of his wife, and the levirate marriage with the minor was valid. If the minor’s marriage was nonexistent, then she is effectively a stranger, and the deaf-mute woman may have been the woman who fell before him. Because we cannot know which situation applies, the Sages prohibited him from remaining with either woman after intercourse had been performed with both.
The deaf-mute woman is released with a divorce document, while the minor must wait until she becomes an adult and then perform the release ceremony. The reason for waiting is that perhaps the opposite sequence occurred or will occur. If intercourse is first performed with the deaf-mute woman and then with the minor, the act with the minor may be defective intercourse, because on the side that the deaf-mute woman’s acquisition is valid, the two women are co-wives from the same household. A defective act of levirate marriage requires the release ceremony.
Although the case under discussion involved intercourse first with the minor, the Sages imposed the same requirement in order to prevent people from permitting the reverse case without a release ceremony. This is a rabbinic safeguard. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, however, a defective act of levirate marriage is sufficient with a divorce document, so this entire argument cannot prove which woman has the definite partial acquisition.
The Gemara returns to the earlier teaching involving the two orphaned sisters. It says that the first part of that teaching may nevertheless support the Sages’ position. There, when the husband of the deaf-mute woman died and she fell before the brother who was married to the minor, the teaching mentioned the case in which he had intercourse with the deaf-mute woman and then required him to give her a divorce document. It did not mention the reverse case, in which he had intercourse with the minor.
The reason may be that when he had intercourse with the deaf-mute woman, that was the only available way to free her from the situation. She could not perform the release ceremony, and the intercourse was prohibited because she might be the sister of his wife. Nevertheless, the Sages allowed a divorce document to free her. They did not need to mention the reverse case, because in that case they could simply wait until the minor became an adult and have her perform the release ceremony. One cannot infer from the omission that a divorce document alone would have been sufficient in the reverse case.
The Gemara now reviews additional cases in the Mishnah. When two women are both in the same rabbinic category, such as two deaf-mute women, an act of levirate marriage with one of them removes the bond from the other, because neither one is stronger than the other. Whatever bond the man was able to remove from the first woman, he also removed from the second. This would be true even if both women were adults; the significant issue is that their legal status is equal.
When the women are a minor and a deaf-mute woman, the result differs. If the levirate brother first has intercourse with the minor, that can be effective on the side that her marriage was complete, and on the other side she is treated as a stranger. The deaf-mute woman is therefore not necessarily affected. If he first has intercourse with the deaf-mute woman, however, her definite partial acquisition means that the bond to the minor is not necessarily removed. He cannot remain with both women, and the case requires the procedures discussed earlier.
The Mishnah also discusses a man who was married to a mentally competent woman and to a deaf-mute woman. If he performed levirate marriage with the mentally competent woman first, that was a complete act of levirate marriage. His subsequent intercourse with the deaf-mute woman was prohibited, but it did not undo the valid levirate marriage with the first woman. The later act was not permitted, but it did not affect the original valid acquisition.
If he performed levirate marriage with the deaf-mute woman first, however, her marriage involved a definite partial acquisition. When he then performed levirate marriage with the mentally competent woman, there was a concern that he had taken two women from the same household. He must therefore give a divorce document to the deaf-mute woman and perform the release ceremony with the mentally competent woman.
The final case in this section involves an adult woman and a minor. If the levirate brother first performs levirate marriage with the minor and then has intercourse with the adult woman, the adult woman becomes prohibited to him. The minor’s status is all or nothing, but the adult woman has a definite Torah-level status. On the side that the minor’s marriage is complete, the adult woman is a co-wife, and one may not perform levirate marriage with both women.
The Mishnah teaches that Rabbi Elazar would resolve some of these cases through refusal. The minor can formally refuse the marriage, retroactively removing her rabbinic marriage, and the levirate brother can then remain with the adult woman. This principle was seen earlier in the case of two sisters: when the minor’s presence creates a forbidden relationship and prevents the performance of levirate marriage, she can be told to withdraw through refusal so that the levirate obligation can be fulfilled with the other woman.
The Gemara asks whether this principle is required in both situations. In the case of two sisters, it is needed because the levirate marriage cannot be performed at all while the minor remains married to the brother. In the case where the man already performed levirate marriage with both the minor and the adult woman, one might think that the mitzvah of levirate marriage has already been fulfilled on at least one level, and that there is no reason to undo what happened through refusal. The Gemara therefore establishes that Rabbi Elazar’s principle applies in both types of case.
The Rambam’s version includes all of these cases under the same principle. Whenever a minor is involved and her rabbinic marriage creates a conflict with the proper performance of levirate marriage, we follow the approach that removes her through refusal. This resolves the difficulties created by the minor’s uncertain status.
The Mishnah then turns to the case of a minor levirate brother who had intercourse with a minor levirate widow. The boy must be at least nine years old for the act to have the legal significance discussed here, and the girl must be at least three years old. The two remain together until they become adults. Afterward, if he wishes to divorce her, he can do so with a valid divorce document. While he is still a minor, his divorce document is not effective.
If the minor levirate brother had intercourse with an adult levirate widow, the act also creates the relevant acquisition, and they remain together until he becomes an adult. He can then divorce her if he wishes. The details are straightforward: the legal consequences of the act exist, but the boy cannot yet perform all the acts of an adult husband.
The Mishnah then discusses a levirate widow who received a divorce document from the levirate brother and says that she never had intercourse with him. If she makes this claim within thirty days of the time he took her, she is believed. Since a man can restrain himself for thirty days and refrain from intercourse, there is no established presumption that intercourse occurred. Her statement therefore creates a doubt as to whether levirate marriage was completed.
As a result, the divorce document does not free her completely. She still requires the release ceremony, because she may never have entered into complete levirate marriage. The man, however, is also believed when he says that he did have intercourse with her. His statement creates a legal status for himself, and he is prohibited from her unless the appropriate procedure is completed.
After thirty days, the situation changes. We no longer accept the woman’s statement as sufficient to establish that no intercourse occurred, because it is no longer reasonable to assume that a man could live with the levirate widow for thirty days without having intercourse. The thirty-day period therefore marks the limit of her credibility in this context.
This does not mean that she becomes believed after thirty days. Her claim that she never had intercourse would ordinarily leave her subject to the levirate obligation, and she cannot free herself merely through her own statement. The issue is that within thirty days, her claim is consistent with the ordinary possibilities; after thirty days, the presumption changes.
The Gemara then discusses a woman who made a vow prohibiting herself from benefiting from her brother-in-law while her husband was still alive. If her husband subsequently died, the vow remains relevant to the levirate relationship. The Sages require the brother-in-law to perform the release ceremony, because levirate marriage would provide her with a benefit from him, which her vow prohibited.
Although the vow was made while the husband was alive, the innovation is that it continues to apply after his death. One might have thought that she was merely angry with her husband’s brother at that time and intended the vow only while her husband was alive. Since she did not limit the vow to that period, however, it applies even after she falls before him for levirate marriage.
The Gemara distinguishes between a vow made before the husband died and one made after the levirate obligation had already taken effect. If she made the vow after she had fallen before the brother, it may appear that she intended to exempt herself from levirate marriage. She cannot use a vow to cancel an established levirate obligation. In that case, the brother may technically perform levirate marriage, although the court tries to persuade him to perform the release ceremony.
If the vow was made while the husband was alive, however, it was not made in order to evade an existing levirate obligation. The court can therefore require the brother to perform the release ceremony, because the vow genuinely prevents the levirate marriage from providing her with the benefit that she prohibited.
The Gemara says that the court must examine her intention. If it is clear that she made the vow because she was trying to protect herself from the possibility of levirate marriage, then the vow does not accomplish what she intended. But if she made it while her husband was alive, when the levirate obligation did not yet exist, the vow may remain valid after his death.
The discussion concludes by questioning whether the Mishnah follows Rabbi Meir. Earlier, Rabbi Meir maintained that the marriage of a minor and the marriage of an adult cannot be treated in the same way when one of the relationships may create a prohibition. The Mishnah appears to allow the minor and the adult to remain together in certain cases, which would not seem to follow Rabbi Meir.
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah may be teaching the law after the fact, even if the arrangement should not be entered into initially. In a case involving a minor and an adult, the adult may already be subject to punishment while the minor is not, and the minor may later become a sexually undeveloped woman who is not eligible for levirate marriage. There is therefore concern about creating a prohibition by allowing the two relationships to continue.
This concern does not apply in the same manner when both the levirate brother and the levirate widow are minors. The boy may later prove incapable of fathering children, and the girl may later prove to be sexually undeveloped, but while both are minors they are not yet subject to the same punishments. The court does not intervene in the same way in a minor’s conduct, even though the act may eventually prove problematic.
The Gemara finally asks how a minor levirate brother can perform levirate marriage at all. The purpose of levirate marriage is to establish the name of the deceased brother through offspring, and a minor is not yet capable of fathering children. How can his act fulfill the mitzvah?
The answer is that the verse speaks of brothers living together, and the Sages interpret this to include a brother who was alive in the world even for a single day. Once the two brothers lived at the same time and one later died, the surviving brother has the relevant connection to the levirate obligation. The act is therefore valid even though he cannot yet father children.
At the time the woman falls before him, the minor brother is not yet capable of completing the entire purpose of levirate marriage. Nevertheless, the obligation applies to him, and he waits until he is capable of intercourse. He does not have to wait until he becomes a fully adult man. The central point is that the brothers existed together in the world, and the levirate obligation can therefore take effect even when the surviving brother is only one day old.