The discussion today begins with a case regarding a Korban Todah, a thanksgiving offering. The scenario describes someone who slaughtered a Korban Todah with the intention that it should be for their friend's Korban Todah. For instance, Reuven brings his Korban Todah, but his intention is for Shimon's Korban Todah. The question is whether this offering is valid.
The Gemara clarifies that this is not a simple case of changing the owner, but rather a change in the designation of the sacred item. Reuven has his own Korban Todah, and Shimon has his own Korban Todah. Reuven slaughters his animal with the intention that it should be for Shimon's Korban Todah. This is a specific type of intention that causes the offering to be invalid for its intended purpose. The invalidation stems from the concept that the intention for the sprinkling of the blood must align with the owner for whom the offering is brought. If one has an intention for another person's offering, it invalidates the atonement for the original owner.
There are different interpretations of the exact nature of this invalidation. One view suggests that if the intention was to sprinkle the blood for someone else, it would certainly be invalid. Another scenario considered is if one slaughters Reuven's offering with the thought that it should count as Shimon's Korban Todah. This is not considered a typical change of owners, but rather a broader intention that the entire offering, not just the act of slaughtering, should be for Shimon. The question then becomes whether this broader intention invalidates the offering. This is a significant point of discussion, as it involves the core principle of whether the owner's intention for the entire offering or just specific actions (like sprinkling the blood) is what determines its validity.
The Gemara then asks how to resolve this. It is established that even if the intention was wrong, the offering itself might still be considered valid, but it would not fulfill the obligation for Shimon. The question is whether Reuven's Korban Todah can fulfill his own obligation if he intended it for Shimon. It is not about whether it can fulfill Shimon's obligation, as it clearly cannot. The Gemara cites a disagreement between Rava and Rabbi Huldai. Rava states that it is valid, while Rabbi Huldai declares it invalid.
Rashi explains Rava's position: the offering is valid and counts for the original owner. This is not considered an invalid change of sacred designation because it is still a Korban Todah for a Korban Todah; the type of offering has not changed. Furthermore, there was no explicit intention during the sprinkling of the blood for Shimon. Therefore, it is not an invalid change. However, Rabbi Huldai maintains it is invalid because it is as if one has changed the sacred designation, treating Reuven's Korban Todah as if it were Shimon's. This is akin to bringing two different types of offerings, or two offerings for different purposes, even if they are both Korban Todah. This is considered a change in the sacred designation, which invalidates the offering.
The Gemara seeks a source for this ruling, citing a verse that states, "On the day that he brings his offering, it shall be accepted." This verse teaches that a Korban Todah is similar to a Korban Shelamim (peace offering) in certain respects. Rabbi Abba Hanin in the name of Rabbi Eliyahu teaches that the term "thank you" (referring to Korban Todah) is used for "people" (referring to Korban Shelamim), and "people" is used for "thank you." This implies a connection between the two. The Gemara clarifies that while a Korban Shelamim brought with the intention of a Korban Todah is invalid, a Korban Todah brought with the intention of a Korban Todah is valid. The latter case refers to Reuven bringing his own Korban Todah with the intention for a different Korban Todah of his own, perhaps for a different salvation he experienced. This is valid because it is still a Korban Todah for a Korban Todah. However, the initial case of Reuven bringing his Korban Todah for Shimon's Korban Todah is problematic because it involves a change of owners.
The Gemara then presents another case: a Korban Chatat (sin offering) that was designated for a particular sin (e.g., eating forbidden fat, chelev). If one slaughters it with the intention that it should be for the blood of another sin (e.g., eating blood, dam), it is valid. This is because both are Korban Chatat, even if for different specific sins. However, if one slaughters a Korban Chatat with the intention of it being a Korban Olah (burnt offering), it is invalid. This is because a Korban Chatat must be for a Korban Chatat, not for a Korban Olah.
A further distinction is made regarding the sprinkling of the blood. If the blood of a Korban Chatat is sprinkled with the intention for Shimon, it is invalid, as this is considered a change of owners. However, if one slaughters a Korban Chatat with the intention that it should fulfill Reuven's obligation for a Korban Olah, it is valid. This is a profound novelty. The verse states, "And it shall atone for him," implying that an offering atones for its owner, not for another. This teaches that one cannot bring a Korban Chatat for another person who is also obligated to bring a Korban Chatat, because their obligations are similar. But if the friend is not obligated to a Korban Chatat, and one brings their Korban Chatat for the friend's Korban Olah, it is valid because the two offerings are of different types.
The Gemara then considers a case where a Korban Chatat is brought for someone who has no specific obligation. It is still considered invalid. Why? Because everyone in Israel has likely transgressed some positive commandment (mitzvah aseh), and a Korban Chatat can atone for such transgressions. Therefore, even if the person is not specifically obligated to a Korban Chatat for a particular sin, they are considered to have a general need for atonement that a Korban Chatat could address. This makes it akin to bringing a Korban Chatat for another person who is also obligated to a Korban Chatat, which is invalid.
The Gemara then asks: if someone transgressed a positive commandment, their obligation is generally for a Korban Olah, not a Korban Chatat. So if Reuven brings his Korban Chatat for Shimon, who is obligated to a Korban Olah, why is it invalid? It should be valid, as a Korban Chatat for a Korban Olah is valid. The answer lies in the nature of atonement. A Korban Chatat does not atone for a Korban Olah in the same primary way that a Korban Olah atones for a positive commandment transgression. While a Korban Chatat can offer a weak form of atonement for a positive commandment transgression, it is not the primary offering. Therefore, if the friend is specifically obligated to a Korban Olah, bringing a Korban Chatat for them is considered bringing two different types of offerings, and thus valid. However, if the friend has no specific obligation, but has generally transgressed positive commandments, the Korban Chatat is considered to be for a similar type of atonement, making it invalid.
Abba states that if a Korban Olah is slaughtered not for its own sake, and its blood is sprinkled not for its own sake, it is invalid. This means that if one slaughters a Korban Olah with the intention of it being a Korban Shelamim, and then continues to sprinkle the blood with the same incorrect intention, it is invalid. However, if one makes an initial mistake (e.g., slaughtering a Korban Olah for a Korban Shelamim), they should correct their intention for subsequent actions, such as sprinkling the blood, and intend it for a Korban Olah. This is derived from the principle that one should not continue to make a mistake throughout the process.
The Gemara then discusses a case from the West (Land of Israel): if a Korban Olah was designated by a person who subsequently died, and their son brings it. If the son slaughters this Korban Olah with the intention of it being a Korban Shelamim, it is invalid, and the son must bring another offering to fulfill his father's obligation. However, if the son slaughters it with the intention for a different owner, it is valid. This is because the original owner is dead, so there is no specific owner for whom the atonement is intended. Therefore, changing the owner's intention does not invalidate the offering itself, as there is no owner to be affected by the change.
The Gemara clarifies that the Korban Olah brought for a positive commandment transgression is not for atonement in the strict sense, but rather a gift to God, a sign of repentance. The actual forgiveness for transgressing a positive commandment comes immediately upon sincere repentance. The Korban Olah serves as a "gift" after the transgression.
Rabbi Shimon asks why the Korban Chatat is always brought before the Korban Olah when both are required for certain sins. He explains that the Korban Chatat acts as a "defense attorney" (praklit) to secure acceptance and atonement, after which the Korban Olah is brought as a "gift." This indicates that the primary atonement is achieved through the Korban Chatat.
The Mishnah teaches that the Korban Pesach (Passover offering) must be slaughtered specifically for the sake of the Korban Pesach and for its owners. Unlike other offerings where an incorrect intention might still render the offering valid (though not fulfilling the obligation), for the Korban Pesach, an incorrect intention renders the offering entirely invalid, preventing it from being brought on the altar. The Gemara seeks the source for this stringency.
The verse "Observe the month of Aviv and make the Passover" (Deuteronomy 16:1) teaches that all actions related to the Korban Pesach must be for the sake of Pesach. This establishes that one cannot change the sacred designation of the Korban Pesach (e.g., slaughtering it as a Korban Shelamim). To learn that one cannot change the owner's intention, another verse is cited: "And you shall say, 'It is the Passover offering'" (Exodus 12:27). The word "offering" (zevach) refers to the act of slaughtering. This teaches that the slaughtering must be for the sake of Pesach, implying it must be for the correct owners. Thus, one verse teaches against changing the sacred designation, and another against changing the owner's intention.
However, these verses only teach that it is a commandment to have the correct intention. How do we know that if the intention is incorrect, the offering is invalid? A third verse is brought: "And you shall slaughter the Passover" (Exodus 12:21). This repetition, after already establishing the need for correct intention, must come to teach that an incorrect intention renders the Korban Pesach invalid. The Gemara challenges this, arguing that the verse "And you shall slaughter" is needed for Rabbi Nachman's teaching: if a Korban Pesach animal was designated but then lost, and another was brought in its place, the original animal, when found, is brought as a Korban Shelamim. This is derived from the verse implying that sometimes a Korban Pesach is brought from cattle (bakar), which is only possible for a Korban Shelamim. Therefore, this verse is already utilized.
The Gemara responds that the verse "And you shall make the Passover" teaches that all actions must be for the sake of Pesach. The additional word "it" (hu) in the verse "It is the Passover offering" comes to teach that this requirement is essential and renders the offering invalid if not met. This applies to both changing the sacred designation and changing the owner's intention. The Gemara then extends this to all services of the offering, not just slaughtering. Just as changing the sacred designation applies to all services, so too changing the owner's intention applies to all services.
Rava disagrees with this extension, stating that one cannot simply infer from one case to another without explicit proof. Therefore, the Gemara seeks a different source for applying the law of changing owners to all services. It cites a verse in Leviticus (7:37) that lists various offerings: "This is the law of the Olah, of the Mincha, of the Chatat, and of the Asham, and of the Korban Shilamim." This verse compares all these offerings, implying that the laws of changing sacred designation and changing owners, which are explicitly written regarding the Korban Shilamim, apply to all other offerings. While the Korban Pesach is not explicitly mentioned in this verse, a subsequent verse (Leviticus 7:38) states, "These are the offerings that God commanded Moshe for the Children of Israel," and the word "offerings" (korbanotam) is understood to include the Korban Pesach, thereby connecting it to the laws of the Korban Shilamim. Thus, the Korban Pesach is subject to the laws of changing sacred designation and changing owners for all its services.
The additional verses ("And you shall make the Passover," "And you shall slaughter the Passover") are then understood to teach that these laws are not merely optional but essential, rendering the offering invalid if not followed. The word "it" (hu) in the verse "It is the Passover offering" is then reinterpreted. According to one opinion, this word teaches that for the Korban Pesach, an incorrect intention renders it invalid, but for other offerings like the Korban Asham (guilt offering), it does not. This is because for an Asham, even if the parts are not placed on the altar, the offering can still be valid. Therefore, an incorrect intention during the placement of parts on the altar for an Asham does not invalidate it, unlike the Korban Pesach where every action is critical. This proves that for the Korban Pesach, changing the intention for the type of offering or the owner, in any of its services, renders the offering invalid.