The tractate of Masechet Makot has been anonymously donated in honor of Morris Dweck, Sammy Esses, Yaron Mizrahi, and Tuvi Asis for their endless work for the holy community of Beit Yaakov. May God grant them continued strength to serve the community for the sake of Heaven in good health, prosperity, and peace. Amen. Today's page is being studied for the sake of Heaven. Amen.
To begin today's page on the first column, we are on the second line, starting from the Mishnah: "We divide monetary payments, but we do not divide lashes amongst the conspiring witnesses." What does this mean? If witnesses testified that a certain man owes two hundred zuz, and then they were found to be conspiring witnesses, they divide the payment; each witness pays one hundred zuz. But if they testified that this man is liable for lashes, and then they were found to be conspiring witnesses, each one receives forty lashes. The question arises: why does each one receive forty lashes? Why not divide the lashes, giving each twenty? The law of giving lashes uses the word "evil," and the law of capital punishment also uses the word "evil." Just as you cannot kill a person halfway or give a person half a death penalty, so too, when it comes to lashes, you do not give half lashes.
Rabbah offers a different explanation: you must do to the conspiring witnesses what they tried to do to their friend. They tried to give their friend forty lashes, so you cannot give them twenty, as that is not what they were trying to do. This principle also applies to money: they were trying to cause their friend to lose two hundred zuz, so why should they only pay one hundred?
The Gemara states: "Money can be combined, but lashes cannot be combined." The commentators struggle to understand what this means. Why, when it comes to money, can you combine the two payments, but when it comes to lashes, each one is separate? There are different interpretations here.
One explanation is as follows: when it comes to the two hundred zuz, the bottom line is that the victim receives the amount of money the witnesses tried to cause him to lose. They tried to make him lose two hundred, and he got the two hundred. When it comes to lashes, however, you cannot combine one witness's twenty lashes with the other witness's twenty lashes. These are different bodies. Money is combined, but you cannot combine two different bodies such that twenty lashes on one body and twenty lashes on another body combine to forty lashes on a single body. When the victim received the two hundred zuz, the money was combined. But when it comes to lashes, one body and another body are not combined.
Another explanation, to make it clearer, is that when it comes to paying money, you combine it: you give one hundred, and you give one hundred, and that is fine. In the case of lashes, however, if one witness receives twenty and the other receives twenty, the twenty lashes that one receives are not truly combined with the other twenty. Why? Because if a person receives twenty lashes, the twenty-first lash hurts much more than the first. If you give twenty lashes to one person, and then twenty-one, twenty-two, and twenty-three lashes to another, the pain increases with each subsequent lash. Therefore, you cannot combine twenty and twenty, because that is not what they were trying to do to the victim. They were trying to give one person forty lashes, which would hurt much more than splitting it up. Therefore, you cannot combine lashes; you can only combine monetary payments. The pain cannot be combined. That is how they explain it.
Regarding monetary punishment, the Torah says that the money is for the person who was forced to lose it. You tried to make him lose two hundred, so you pay two hundred. It is a compensation. The victim says, "I want two hundred," and it is divided. However, in the case of lashes, there is no one benefiting. When there is a benefit, like when you give me money, I get my two hundred, and I am happy, I do not care how I got paid. You give one hundred, and you give one hundred. But here, I am not benefiting anything from the lashes you are receiving. You tried to give me lashes, so you have to get lashes. One is more of a compensation; you tried to take two hundred. But here, you are not compensating me by getting lashes. You tried to give me lashes, you will get lashes. I do not benefit if you get lashes. It has to be exactly what you tried to do to me.
The next Mishnah states that witnesses do not become conspiring witnesses until you actually prove them false. You have to testify something directly against them. Let me explain a little: if we testified that a certain man killed someone, and then two other witnesses come along and say, "How could you have testified? The man you claimed killed was with us," or "The man who got killed was with us." They are not testifying against the witnesses themselves; they are testifying against the perpetrator or the victim. Do you accept their testimony to make the first witnesses conspiring witnesses? No, it is not considered conspiring testimony. It could be that you invalidate their testimony, throwing it out because it is two against two, whatever it is. But you do not do to them what they tried to do. How are you testifying? You were with us. So then, the second set of witnesses is giving testimony against the first set: "You were with us on that day, and we killed them as a result of it."
This is the rule of conspiring witnesses: even if a hundred groups come, they will all be killed. This means, if the first two witnesses say, "You were with us," and they are declared conspiring witnesses and killed, and then two other witnesses show up and say the same thing, "You were with us," and they are also killed, and another two witnesses come, "We saw, you were with us," and so on, even a hundred times, these same two original witnesses can invalidate a hundred groups. Every time another group comes along and says, "You were with us," the first group is finished; they become conspiring witnesses. It does not matter; the same group can invalidate even a hundred groups.
Rabbi Yehudah, however, says that this is suspicious. This is a group of witnesses that has swayed. It means it is a little fishy. According to Rabbi Yehudah, this one group is being told, "You were with us, you were with us, you were with us." They must have been in cahoots; they must have made a deal among themselves, these two guys, no matter who comes to court, "we are going to just say you were with us." Therefore, you only kill the first group. After that, we do not believe them if they come along and say, "You were with us." You know what I am saying, Rabbi Yehudah thinks it is strange. "Everybody was with you? The whole world was with you?" Any two guys that show up, "Yeah, you were with us, you were with us, you were with us." It might have been a hundred times. Rabbi Yehudah is suspicious that these two guys who are invalidating everybody are, as I said, in cahoots. Therefore, he only considers the first ones, because for the first ones, you do not know anything at the time, so they are killed, and then everything is okay.
How do I know this concept that the Mishnah said, that conspiring witnesses do not become false until they themselves become invalid, until you go after them? "You were with us." This means the verse is saying that the testimony gave a cross-testimony about the witness. This means you have to go after the witness himself, the body of the testimony. That is the first interpretation. It says, "The wicked witness testifies a false testimony." It is not about the testimony; it is about the witness himself. How do you prove the witness himself false? "You were with us." If it is a false testimony, it is done. "The guy who you said killed was with us." That is the testimony; it is going to be on the guy. The verse says, "He has a liar, a bad witness against the person that he is testifying against, the victim." So that means crooked. The word "crooked" means we have to testify that the first witnesses themselves were removed. "Removed" means you have to remove them from the scene. "You were not there, you were somewhere else." Until you actually remove the witnesses themselves, that is what "removed" means. They were not there; they were elsewhere, away from the actual place.
Rava presents several cases. Two men come along and say, "This man killed a person in the eastern part of the building." Then two other men come along and say, "What are you talking about? You were with us on the west side of the building. How could you have testified?" We investigate. You go to the west side and see: are you able to see to the east side? If witnesses are able to see from the west to the east side, they do not become conspiring witnesses, because they could be on the west side and still see what happened on the east side. In that case, they are not conspiring witnesses. But if you go to the west side and you cannot see the actions going on the east side, then they become conspiring witnesses. Is that obvious? Perhaps even if you went to the west side and you cannot see, maybe the witnesses have great vision, and therefore you would say that even if we cannot see in our experiment, maybe the witnesses can. No, you do not say that. You go to court with a regular vision. If a normal person cannot see from the west side to the east side, and they said, "Ah, we saw it on the east side," he becomes a conspiring witness.
Another case from Rava: they give very specific information. They said, "In Sura, in the morning, on Sunday, this man killed a person." And two other witnesses come along and say, "What are you talking about? In Panya, on Sunday, you were with us in Har Da'a in the afternoon." So they are placing them in a different place in the afternoon. What do you have to judge now? Can you get there? We investigate: from Sura in the morning to Har Da'a in the afternoon, can you get there? If you can get from Sura to Har Da'a, then they are not conspiring witnesses. But if they cannot get there, how were they in the afternoon over there? It is impossible for them to get there from one place to the other. So they must have been conspiring witnesses. It is obvious. What do you think about that? So now the question is, maybe you have to consider a flying camel. This means maybe a normal person can get from Sura to Har Da'a, but maybe this guy is a flying camel. Who knows what? Maybe he has a fast camel. They get there somehow. You do not suspect that. You assume normal travel. You do not have to suspect there is a magic carpet in the sky that is how he got there. You have to assume he is going like regular people. If he cannot get from point A to point B by the afternoon, he becomes a conspiring witness.
Next case: they come along and say, "On Sunday, this man killed." What are you talking about? "You were with us already on Sunday. But the man killed, you are right, he killed on Monday." So the conspiring witnesses were saying two things in this case: number one, "What are you talking about? You were with us on Sunday." And anyway, "the man killed on Monday." We are not with him. Even if they came along and said, "You were with us on Sunday, and this man killed on Friday." So whether they place the murder after their testimony or before their testimony, when they place the murder on Monday or when they place the murder on Friday, they become conspiring witnesses and you kill them. Why? Because at the time that these guys came to testify, the victim or the murderer was not yet liable for death. They are coming on Tuesday. The first witnesses came on Tuesday and said, "This man killed on Sunday." Two other witnesses came on Tuesday and said, "What are you talking about? You were with us on Sunday. First of all, you did not see it. And anyway, he killed on Monday." And even if he killed on Friday, before you said it, it does not matter. When they came on Tuesday, they were trying to kill a man that technically could have gotten off. If a man kills on Tuesday and then admits that he killed before anybody took him to court, he gets off the hook. You do not give him a death penalty. You cannot give a person a death penalty if he comes along and admits his crime in front of the court before any witnesses testify. Do I understand that? Good. A man comes on Tuesday. Two witnesses say nothing yet. "This man killed; we saw him kill." They did not see him kill; they were not there. Even though he did kill, he really did kill, but it does not matter. When they testified, they were trying to kill somebody that technically could have gotten off from a death penalty, because by walking to the court, he could have come to court on Sunday, he could have come on Monday, he could have come on Tuesday before these witnesses came and confessed. That is every case. Is there a timeframe? It is not every case; these are conspiring witnesses. Not every case of a conspiring witness, because these guys are not only being said to be conspiring witnesses; the other group was saying the murder was done on a different day. So since from the time of the murder to the time these false witnesses are coming to testify, the murderer himself could have come and exonerated himself. So at the time that they are testifying, you are testifying against a man to be liable for death, even though he would not have been liable for death for his crime. He was planning to come, of course. When they come on Tuesday, he is locked in. "I did murder. I was planning on coming." You are false witnesses. If they are real witnesses, then of course he is finished. But they are false witnesses. So at the time you testified, you took away this man's option to confess. You took this man's confession to your end. That is exactly why you kill them. Because they were trying to kill somebody that would not be liable for death, and therefore they are punished. Since he could have confessed and gotten off, and you are coming and saying he is liable for death, you are trying to kill a man that is not innocent, that can get off the punishment. He could. The second set of witnesses will get him. I am talking about the first set. Of course, the second set comes along and says he is liable, he is liable. Exactly. The process of going forward. But the first set, when they came on Tuesday, they came along and put this man in a position now that even though he did murder, they took away his right to confess. They were lying. See, he was trying to kill this man. The ruling came after. That is what Rashi says. Look at the Gemara again. Go back to the Gemara. "Two came and said, 'On Sunday, he killed a person.'" Everyone came on Tuesday. They said he did it on Sunday. "What are you talking about? You were with us." "Rather, on Monday, he killed a person." Or, "Even if they said he killed on Friday," they are killed. At the time of the testimony on Tuesday, the man was not liable for death, because as I said, he could have admitted anytime. Whether he did it on Friday, when he did it on Sunday, Monday, bottom line, before these guys came, this man had a chance to come along and confess. When they came on Tuesday and said he did it on Sunday, they became false witnesses; they were trying to kill somebody that technically could have gotten off. It is simple. What is the meaning? We learned it already. We learned in a Mishnah: "If one of them was found to be conspiring, he and they are killed, and the second is exempt." Right. You have a case over here. You have a Mishnah. Let us see what it says in the Mishnah, which is really said in this case. "If one of them was found to be conspiring." Our case here: we have two groups. The first group became conspiring witnesses. The second group said that "we did it on Monday or Friday." You are going to kill the victim because, bottom line, you have the second set of witnesses that are valid, but you are going to kill the conspiring witnesses also. So this is a case where you kill the victim and the conspiring witnesses get killed also. Normally, you have a rule: when you kill the victim, the conspiring witnesses do not get the punishment; they only get the punishment for what they tried to do, but not what they actually did. But in this case, you have a second set of witnesses. So therefore, the first set of witnesses comes along, they became conspiring witnesses. So what do you do? They tried to kill a man that could have gotten off. You kill them. But since the second set that was invalidating, they also put the murder on a different date, and they did not become invalidated. You kill the man, you kill the murderer afterwards. This is the case where you kill the conspiring witnesses, the first ones, and the man. Right? So therefore, what will you teach me? We have this case already. This case is a Mishnah. So the Gemara says...
The innovation here is the second part of the statement. The Gemara's question is like this: Rabbi, what are you teaching me? Is your innovation that even though the victim gets killed, even though the murderer gets killed, you kill the conspiring witnesses? We know that already from the Mishnah. So what is your innovation in saying this statement? He says the innovation is the second part of the statement. Two men came with different testimony. They came along and said, "On Sunday, this man had a final judgment." He was already sentenced. This means the court already put a gavel on him. The man's final judgment was on Friday or his final judgment was on Monday after they said, "They said Sunday." The witnesses called and said, "What are you talking about? You were with us on Sunday." The final judgment was either on Friday or on Monday. You do not kill these conspiring witnesses now. Why? Exactly, at the time that they testified on Tuesday, the man was on death row already. When they came to court on Tuesday, could this man have admitted anything? Because either he had a final judgment not on Sunday, because they said Sunday, "we invalidated you," he had a final judgment on Monday, but there was a final judgment already on Friday. This man did not have the ability now to come after a final judgment and say, "Ah, I did it." Of course, you did it. So therefore, at the time that they testified on Tuesday, they were not trying to kill a man; the man was dead already. So therefore, in that case, you are not going to kill the conspiring witnesses, because at the time that they testified, they were not trying to kill anybody; he was dying anyway because he had a final judgment before.
Similarly, this applies to monetary payments. What is the case? Two of us come along and say, "On Sunday, the man stole and slaughtered." He stole somebody's sheep and he slaughtered. We have to pay four times, correct? Or he stole it and he sold it, so you have to pay again four times. That is a fine. It is a fine because I stole one animal, so if I stole it, I pay double. That is already a fine. I have to double, like you said, stealing, you pay double. The fact that you want even more, not only you stole it, you slaughtered it, you have to pay another two, so that is a fine case. They are coming along and saying, "By the way, on Sunday, he did all this stuff, he owes four." Two other ones come along and say, "What are you talking about? You were with us on Sunday. Rather, on Monday, he stole, slaughtered, or sold, and they pay." And not only that, they say, "Even if they said, 'On Friday, he stole, slaughtered, or sold,' they pay." What is the matter? Why? Because at the time that they came on Tuesday, this man could have come in the interim and confessed, "I did it." And what is the rule? When you confess to a fine, you are exempt. So even though the second set of witnesses say, "What are you talking about on Sunday? You were with us on Sunday. Anyway, he did exactly what you said. He did it on Monday." Or better, "He did it on Friday, even before you say he did it." Very good. But bottom line, from Friday to Tuesday, this man could have come to court and said, "I sinned, I transgressed, I rebelled." So when the two false witnesses come to court, they are taking away his ability to confess, and therefore they are making him liable for something that he could have gotten off. They are going to have to pay. At the time they came and testified, exactly. When they came and testified on Tuesday, falsely, mind you, was this man liable? If he was liable, he could have gotten off. By them testifying, they are taking away his ability to confess, and therefore they are making him liable for something that he could have gotten off. Therefore, when it comes to a fine, they have to pay. Always the victim. Always the man they were trying to take away from. You are right. You are right. What do they do with the money now? Give it to the court, maybe. He has to pay anyway. You guys see a good question. No, maybe not. Maybe once already they were proven guilty from the second set. They were proven guilty from the second set, so maybe they paid the money to the court. They do not pay it to him, because by the way, he really did it. Or you say, no. At the time that they testified, they were really trying to take it away from him. And then they pay him, and then he pays after when the second set comes. That is scrambling. Two witnesses came and got him. At the end of the day, two witnesses caught the man. But when you testified on Tuesday, at the time you testified, you were getting a man that technically did not have to pay. Now, the second group comes along, they are innocent. They did not get invalidated. Of course, I always want two witnesses to come and say, "This man did something," of course he is guilty. But this man, the false witnesses, is the issue.
Next case: two men come along and say, "On Sunday, this man stole, slaughtered, or sold, and he had his final judgment." Same story. He had his final judgment. They come along and say, "On Sunday, the man was a thief, a slaughterer, or a seller; he did everything. And he was sentenced. Guilty. They gaveled him." After they gavel, after they rule him guilty, he cannot confess anymore. Two men come along and say, "What are you talking about? You were with us on Sunday." "Rather, on Friday, he stole, slaughtered, or sold, and they pay." And not only that, they say, "Even if he said, 'On Monday, he stole, slaughtered, or sold,' they pay." Why? Because at the time that they came on Tuesday and they say, "This man had a final judgment on Sunday, paying four or five," two other witnesses come along on Tuesday and say, "What are you talking about? You were with us on Sunday." So when did he do it, and when was he sentenced? He was sentenced either on Friday or sentenced on Monday. Bottom line, he was sentenced already, he was done. So when they came on Tuesday, it does not matter; the man was sentenced regardless before. So therefore, there was no way for him to admit, so therefore they were not trying to make him liable, because he was going to pay regardless. He was paying regardless. What did they try to do? What did they try to do? Answer the question. What did they try to do? By saying that he did. They were trying to make an innocent person liable? He was not innocent. He was liable. No, it was not exactly. That is why they do not have to pay. I only have to pay if you did not have to pay. Wait, wait, wait. When I say you have to pay, why am I liable? Because they did not have to pay, and I tried to make an innocent man pay. They are not innocent; they would have to pay anyway. When I came on Tuesday, they were liable already. So I am testifying against a liable person. This man is liable to pay four and five. He is liable to pay four and five. "Oh, you were with us on Sunday." Okay, we are going to throw you out, but I do not have to pay. According to the second testimony, by Friday or Monday, there was a final judgment. So by the time the first witnesses showed up to court, he was paying the four and five already. This is my ruling. So they came here as witnesses to pay on somebody that was paying anyway. They were testifying against a guilty man. They were testifying against a guilty man. They came on Tuesday and said, "Yes, they came on Tuesday and said, 'By the way, this man was sentenced on Sunday. This man was sentenced on Sunday. He owes four and five.'" The court accepts the testimony, "Wow, four or five, okay buddy, we have two witnesses, pay the four and five." All of a sudden, after a bit, he says that two other witnesses walk in on Tuesday, right after that, two minutes later, "What are you talking about? These guys, on Sunday, they saw nothing. But anyway, the man was guilty from Friday." Or, "The man was guilty from Monday already, and he was sentenced in a court, I have four or five." So by the time they came on Tuesday, the first witnesses, the man was sentenced already. So they were testifying on somebody that was paying already. The president did not take care of it? They did not know. He did not pay yet. They sentenced him. He escaped. He ran away. Sentenced. He said, "Okay, I will pay. I am going to the bedroom." He left. They did not know where he was. Now, all of a sudden, the man comes back. He said, "By the way, I am letting you know he was sentenced." "Oh, sentenced? Okay. That is good you told us that. We did not know. He escaped." But bottom line, by Tuesday, the man was guilty. So nothing happened. Why do you not say that there is only one testifying on a different case entirely? The man stole on Tuesday, and they came to him and said, "No, he stole on Sunday." He did steal on the day that they testified, on the day of the 36th. Okay, so the Gemara says, Rabbi Yehudah says, "They are plotters." That is the word, plotters. Which means, back to the Mishnah, the Mishnah says, you have two witnesses come along and say this man did a crime. You have two guys standing there, "You were with us." "You were with us," that is what we mean. Two other guys come in, "He did the crime." The same two guys, "You were with us." Kill them. Next two guys. "He did the crime." Same two guys, "You were with us." These guys are just standing there, they are the designated, and they are invalidating everybody. "You were with us, you were with us, you were with us," it does not matter. Bottom line, we accept them. If they can invalidate a hundred groups, they will be with us. This is "plotters," like you said, he is a bunch of plotters. He is a little suspicious. Everybody in the world was with them. It sounds like they got together in cahoots and said, "You know what, anybody who walks into court, we are going to just say, 'You were with us.'" Simply, you do not believe them. It says only you believe them for the first group. Now we have to see what that means. Why should we believe for the first group if they are a bunch of plotters? They should not be believed even on suspicion. That is all. I get a killer man and a suspicion. Kill the first two just like that. If you do not believe them, you do not believe anybody. The first two will, will kill them. Look at the Gemara, Gemara said, "If you tell me that they are a bunch of plotters, even the first group, why would you kill the first group? They are liars, they are liars. Why are you killing the first group?" Amar Rav Papa says, "You are right, they did it already. They did it, they killed the first group." Which means, before the second group came, are you supposed to know anything? There were invalidating witnesses in one group. The Gemara says they killed the first guys. So then the Gemara says, if that is the case, "What was was." Which means, why are you telling me that you killed the first group? It is not so. You do not kill the first group. It happened to me, you killed them. It is not a deed that you kill the first group. And the Mishnah says, "It is a deed." The group over here, they are doing this all the time. You only kill the first group. It is not so. The case is talking about you really are not supposed to kill anybody, because really these guys are plotters. But what happened, he happened to kill the first group before the second group came. But that is not what the Mishnah sounds like. "You only kill the first group." You kill them, not that you have to kill them. If only one group comes, then you will kill them. I am sorry. Which means, if it is the only group, then you are right, then you kill the first. If only one group comes, two guys come along and say, "We saw this man murdered." These guys come along and say, "You were with us." If that is the only group, you will kill them. That is what it means in the Mishnah. However, if there is more than that, two other guys come along and say, "You were with us," well then you do not kill anybody. It is not implied like that, because the Mishnah says, "It is only them." It is implied more guys came, but you are only killing them. According to the way we are learning that once more guys can be looking at any of them. Not the first one, not the second one. But you, the Mishnah does not imply like that. The Mishnah implies, "Only the first group." Implied, six groups came. You only kill the first group. That is not what you are saying. If six groups came, you do not kill anybody. That is what I said, a good question. It is a good question, we can answer. We will have to figure out an answer. But by the way, I am not changing the law. The law is going to be that once more than one group comes, and these guys invalidate one group, not to say you do not kill any of them, because we say these guys are a bunch of plotters, and you do not kill any of them. But you are right, if they happen to kill the first group first, I cannot control that. But bottom line, once the second group comes and says, "You are with us," nobody gets killed. We say, "Just like you plotted on the second guys, you plotted on the first guys as well."
The Gemara tells a story: a lady brought witnesses who lied. They themselves became contradicted in their testimony, as they became invalidated. She brought other witnesses; they also became invalid; they could not corroborate the testimony. She brought a third group; the third group's testimony was finally good. She keeps on bringing groups. Reish Lakish says, "She has a presumption already." Once she already brought two groups that were no good, she is a lady that has a presumption; we cannot trust the witnesses that she brings, because she is bringing false people here. So therefore, she is already presumed; we cannot even trust the third group here. She has proven herself to be somebody that brings false witnesses to the court. So the Gemara says, Rabbi Yochanan does not accept this from Reish Lakish. He tells him like this: "If she is presumed to bring false witnesses, are all the Jewish people presumed to testify falsely? They have free will." Which means, what are you saying? "Oh, she is already presumed, we see her, she is bringing witnesses off the street to testify falsely. Cannot trust anybody she brings." What do you mean? If she is already established, are all the Jewish people already established to testify falsely? No, just because she brought the first group and the second group, that does not mean that all people in the street are now predetermined to say false testimony. Could be the third group is honest people. What does her business affect the people in the street? "Oh, she is presumed. We see how she brings people that give false testimony." Just because she is presumed, what does it have to do with the people? Maybe the people that came are honest. That is her. Who said they can listen to her? Who said they can listen to her? Just because she is presumed, that means anybody she talks to... I will tell you what I have also told you. Why? One time they were talking, and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan were sitting in front of Rabbi Yochanan. He said, "This is the sin, they came to you." That story came in front of them. A lady brought witnesses, they were proven guilty. They themselves did not corroborate the testimony. And two witnesses came along again, she brought, no good. But by the third time, so what happened? Reish Lakish said, "No good. He cannot accept the third group already. She is already established to bring false witnesses to the court." Rabbi Yochanan tells Reish Lakish, "What are you talking about?" He said, "Just because she is presumed, does that mean everybody is presumed?" Meaning Rabbi Yochanan said, "We trust the third group." Reish Lakish got upset. Reish Lakish, he did not know that Rabbi Yochanan argued with him. Rabbi Elazar, before he told Reish Lakish, "You are wrong," but he did not tell him in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. So now he is going to get upset. He will say, "Hey, when I told you that I had before, you argued with me, but you did not tell me that Rabbi Yochanan agrees with you. If you would have told me Rabbi Yochanan, you would have told the story." It says, Rabbi Elazar looked at Reish Lakish, and he looked at him angrily. He gave him an angry look. He said to him, "Did you hear it from Bar Nafcha?" The son of the blacksmith. Rabbi Elazar's father was a blacksmith. "You heard the teaching of Bar Nafcha, and you did not tell it to me in his name." "Why did you not tell me he said it?" If he would have known Rabbi Elazar had it like that, he would have changed his mind.
The Gemara makes a last point: we want to pair up the disputes here. Reish Lakish is the one that says what? "Once already she brought one group that became false, a second group became false, and with the third group, you cannot trust her anymore." That is like Rabbi Yehudah in the Mishnah. What did Rabbi Yehudah say? "Once already they come along and say, 'You were with us, you were with us, you were with us,' already they are plotters." Just like you suspect the plotters in the Mishnah, you suspect this lady as well. So we put Reish Lakish with Rabbi Yehudah, and we will put Rabbi Yochanan that says, "No, no, no, it is okay," like the Rabbis that say, "No, you can invalidate a hundred. We trust you." Because we go with the witnesses. We want to put Reish Lakish with Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yochanan with the Rabbis. That is the Gemara's thought. The Gemara says, Reish Lakish says, "No, why are you doing that to me? I can agree with even the Rabbis of the Mishnah that say what? That one group could invalidate a hundred. And still I can say that this lady that brought witnesses, she is already out. We do not trust the third set of witnesses." What is the difference between the cases? Over there in the case of the Rabbis, nobody is bringing them. Over there, the two witnesses are standing in court, two guys show up, "You were with us, you were with us." There in the case of Reish Lakish, she is going out and bringing them. So it could be she is working on them. So therefore, in that case, it is more suspicious. In the case of the Mishnah, two guys are standing there. Two guys are walking, "You were with us." Maybe they were with them. You do not have a reason to suspect them. When the lady is going out, bringing, soliciting, then you have to suspect. There is somebody going after them. Somebody is soliciting, it is worse. Rabbi Yochanan says, "I agree even with Rabbi Yehudah in the Mishnah." Which means, even though in the case of the lady that is soliciting, I say it is not a problem. But in the case of two witnesses that keep on saying, "You were with us, you were with us," that case I suspect. Why? What is the difference? Right, so suspicious. The whole world was by these two guys. Every guy that comes in, "You were with us, you were with us." What was it, 800 people with them that day? No matter who comes in, "You were with us, you were with us, you were with us." That is so strange, that every single guy that comes to testify, "I happen to be with these two guys." However, but they are very simple. These two people knew the testimony, and these two people did not know the testimony. When she is coming along and bringing witnesses, these ones got to this point, she is not saying she was with every single one of these people, she is bringing to it. It is possible that two witnesses do not know testimony, and two others do know testimony. That is not a problem. She is not getting to say that the same two guys were with every single group of the hundred. That is already far worse. I could agree with Rabbi Yehudah, because Rabbi Yehudah, that is suspicious. Look at Rashi, she says exactly the last group knew the testimony, and the group before did not know that. Rabbi Yochanan does not have a problem with that. But to come along and say that one group saw what was with every single group here that came, that is where he is from. So that we are not forced to say that the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan is the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and the Rabbis in the Mishnah. You are not forced to pair them up. Each rabbi can say, "I can even agree with the other opinion."
We continue with the Mishnah: the law of the conspiring witnesses is, "We do not kill them until they get to the point of conviction." Which means the victim or the criminal has to be convicted. He is convicted, so now they say, "Then already we kill the conspiring witnesses if they become conspiring witnesses." The Sadducees argue. The Sadducees say, "You only kill the conspiring witnesses if they actually kill the man." They learn the verse, "A soul for a soul." Kill the man, you get killed. The Sages say, "And we, since it says, 'And you shall do to him as he intended to do to his brother,' and his brother is still alive." The verse says, "his brother." That is why he says it is a fact. If not, why is it that we say, the Rabbis say, "What do I do with the verse, 'A soul for a soul'?" You might have thought that the witness who is liable for death gets killed once the court accepts the testimony. It has to be "a soul for a soul," which means only until after conviction. That is what it means, "a soul for a soul." Not that they actually killed the man, they convicted him to die. They convicted him to die. So now already the conspiring witnesses have a liability.
Now we have a statement. Rabbi says, "If they did not kill him, they are killed." "If they did not kill him, they are killed." "If they did kill him, they are killed." It sounds like a reverse logic: they did not kill him, they get killed; if they did kill him, they do not get killed. So the father of Biniya says, "Biniya, is it not that if you are killing the conspiring witnesses for what they tried to do, certainly you should kill the conspiring witnesses for what they did if they did kill an innocent person?" So he tells his father, "You taught us that you cannot give a person a punishment from a logical inference." You need a verse. Even though you can make logical inferences all day long, from a logical inference you do not punish. That is the rule. We have a Baraita: "A man who takes his sister, the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother." From the verse, I only know either she is a half-sister, either paternal or maternal. How do I know if she is a full sister? The verse states, "He went with his sister." You have a special extra verse that says, "He went with his sister." That is coming to include even a full sister. Do not say, "I have a logical inference." What do I need a verse for? It is a logical inference. If I am liable for a half-sister, certainly I am liable for a full sister. What do you need a verse for? Whatever here, you cannot give a punishment from a logical inference. A logical inference says, "Good." So I learned now the punishment for going with a full sister. You need a warning also in the Torah. Before the Torah punishes, the Torah has to offer a warning. The verse states, "The nakedness of your sister, the daughter of your father or the daughter of your mother." I know only a half-sister, either paternal or maternal. How do I know a full sister? There is a warning. The verse states, "The nakedness of your father's wife's daughter, born to your father, she is your sister." Extra verse. The daughter of your father's wife, which is your sister, that is already a warning that you cannot go. We have two verses, one verse to punish and of course one verse that warns against. So they will not punish unless it gives you a warning verse. So they are going to answer the same question: "Do not say, 'I have a logical inference.'" What do we need a warning verse for? Make a logical inference: "If he was warned about his maternal sister, who is not his paternal sister, and his paternal sister, who is not his maternal sister, certainly he is warned about a full sister." What are you warning for? The answer is that you are not warned from a logical inference. They are not an innovation of the Torah. You cannot give a warning from a logical inference, just like you cannot punish from a logical inference.
Now the Gemara goes on to a new point. We said in our Mishnah, "You do not give the punishment of conspiring witnesses until final judgment, until sentencing." And where do the Rabbis learn that from? "A soul for a soul." Only until they actually convict them to the death penalty. Once he has a conviction, then already we kill the conspiring witnesses. But that is only by a death penalty. How do we know this applies even by lashes? Which means, "a soul for a soul," that is only a death penalty. How do you know that the law of conspiring witnesses applies by lashes only after sentencing? If you remember, it said the word "wicked" by capital punishment, and it says the word "wicked" by lashes. So we have a Gezeirah Shavah. A verbal analogy that comes and tells me what? It comes and tells me that sentencing also applies to one liable for lashes. You want the verses? Yes, it says "wicked" by capital punishment, and it says "wicked" by lashes. So just like by "wicked" by capital punishment, it is after sentencing, so "wicked" by lashes also teaches after sentencing. It gives us about comparing the laws of death penalty to the laws of lashes. "Wicked, wicked." So when I ask the next question, the Gemara says, "How do I know we had a case in the first Mishnah, and then in the second, 'liable for exile'?" How do we know what do we do to the witness in that case? We give them lashes. How do we know that is only after they were sentenced to exile? How do we know those lashes? You only can learn, and in a case where they are trying to give him lashes, so we learn, and that is only after sentencing. So too, "wicked" by lashes. But how do you know when a case where you are giving him lashes for something that he did not try to make him do? Exile, he is liable for exile. What is the law? You give them lashes. How do we know that? It also has to be only after sentencing. We have another verbal analogy. It says the word "murderer" by a death penalty. It says the word "murderer" by exile. Just like by death penalty, it is after sentencing, so too after exile, it is after sentencing. Why? It says just like by death penalty, you only make liable after sentencing, so also by exile, it is only after sentencing.
A Baraita states: "I should not be consoled. I should not see the consolation of Jerusalem." Some say, but he swore, he says, "My children should die and I should not have consolation," if what? He says, "I killed a conspiring witness in order to show that the Sadducees are wrong." They hold that what? That the conspiring witnesses do not get killed until the man is actually killed. He said, "I went out of my way and I killed a conspiring witness before the man was killed, and my intention was to show the Sadducees that they are wrong." Meaning he was firm, the Rabbi. He says, "My intention when I killed that conspiring witness was to show we do not go like the Sadducees. I specifically killed him before he was actually executed." He did the right thing. So Shimon ben Shetach says, "Sorry, I should not have..." If not, "You killed an innocent man." You only killed one. The law is that you do not give them the punishment of invalidation until both witnesses became invalidated. In Yehudah ben Tabbai's case, only one of the two witnesses became invalidated. So he told him he was trying to go after the Sadducees; he killed an innocent man. They were not allowed to kill the man immediately. He told Yehudah ben Tabbai that there is no way he saw, that there is no way he saw. Yehudah ben Tabbai accepted upon himself, "I am not going to say any more laws. I am not going to make any more rulings unless I get the okay from the court." Which means he was subservient to the Rabbi. Every day he would go to the cemetery and he would cry over the grave of the man that he killed, and his voice was heard from outside the cemetery. They thought it was the victim that was killed that was screaming. People were saying, "Listen, you hear the man still screaming in the cemetery? He is dead." And they heard a voice coming out of the cemetery. They thought it was the voice of the murdered man that got killed. He came back to the city. He said, "No, that is my voice crying to the victim to forgive me." And he says, "I will prove it to you that is my voice." He says, "Tomorrow or whenever I die, the voice will stop. So you will see that it is my voice." Right? That was his proof that he wanted to show it to other people. The Gemara says, "Listen, we believe you that it was your voice, but if that is your proof, that is no proof." Why? Rav Huna bar Rav Ada bar Rav Ashi says, "Perhaps it was really the victim that was doing the crying, and when Yehudah ben Tabbai died, he took him to court in Heaven, the victim. And he was, he finished with him in Heaven." Or, "After Yehudah ben Tabbai appeased him in Heaven, that is why he stopped crying." You have no proof. Just because when you died, you stopped hearing the voice could be because it was handled in Heaven. That is no proof. We believe you that it was you, but if that is your proof, that is not a proof. Okay. Blessed is God. Amen.