We are four lines from the bottom of the page, in the discussion of “this and this are causes.” The case involves two items: one permitted and one forbidden. When they are combined, they produce a third item. The question is whether the third item is forbidden because it was produced, at least in part, by the forbidden item. This is the principle of “this and this are causes.”
On yesterday’s page, we concluded that according to Rabbi Yosef, this principle is forbidden. We learned this from a case in the Mishnah: one may not plant beneath a tree used for idolatry. Rabbi Yosef explained that the leaves of the tree fall onto the ground and help fertilize it. Even though the leaves alone do not provide all the fertilization, they contribute to it together with the soil. Rabbi Yosef therefore holds that when two causes combine, the result is forbidden.
The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yosef indeed hold that when two causes combine, the result is forbidden? We learned in the Mishnah in Orlah that Rabbi Yosef says that one may plant a branch taken from a tree subject to the laws of forbidden first-year produce. The Torah teaches that during the first three years, the fruit of a tree is forbidden. The branches themselves, however, are not forbidden. Therefore, if someone plants a branch from such a tree, there is no problem.
One may not plant a nut from such a tree, because the nut itself is the fruit. If someone plants that nut, he derives benefit from it, since new growth will emerge from it, and that growth is forbidden. But if one takes a branch from a tree subject to these laws and plants it in the ground, or grafts it onto a tree that is not subject to them, the new growth is permitted.
What is the difference between the two cases? In one case, a branch is taken from the tree and covered with earth while it remains connected to the original tree; this is called layering. In the other case, a branch is taken from the tree and grafted onto a different tree that is not subject to the first three years; this is grafting. In both cases, the Mishnah says that the new growth is permitted.
Why is it permitted? In the case of grafting, there are two contributing sources: the branch from the tree subject to the prohibition and the older, permitted tree. The resulting fruit is produced by both of them. Thus, the Mishnah appears to teach that when two causes combine, the result is permitted.
The case of layering is more complicated, because it is not initially a combination of two trees. It is the same tree: a branch from the tree is placed into the ground while remaining attached to the original tree. The commentators explain that the Mishnah is referring to the point at which the branch has first been nourished by the original tree and then develops roots of its own. Once it begins drawing nourishment independently, it is a new tree that is less than three years old. The resulting produce has therefore been nourished first by the older tree and later by the new tree. It is a product of two causes, and Rabbi Yosef nevertheless says that it is permitted.
We also learned a baraita in support of Rabbi Yosef. If someone plants or layers a branch from a tree subject to the first-three-year prohibition, or grafts it onto an older tree, the fruit may be eaten immediately, even though the three years have not passed. The reason is that the fruit is produced jointly by the permitted and forbidden sources. When two causes combine, the result is permitted.
We therefore have a difficulty. On yesterday’s page, Rabbi Yosef appeared to hold that when two causes combine, the result is forbidden. Yet the Mishnah in Orlah clearly indicates that he holds that it is permitted.
Perhaps one could answer that the laws of other prohibitions are more lenient, whereas the laws of idolatry are stricter. Maybe Rabbi Yosef permits a product created by two causes in the case of the first-three-year prohibition, but forbids it in the case of idolatry.
The Gemara rejects this distinction. We learned of a field that was fertilized with material connected to idolatry and of an animal that was fattened with food connected to idolatry. One teaching says that the field must be left fallow until the benefit derived from the idolatrous material has dissipated, and that the animal must be kept until the fat produced by that food has dissipated. According to that teaching, when two causes combine, the result is forbidden.
Another teaching, however, permits the field to be planted and the animal to be slaughtered. The field was not fertilized exclusively with material from idolatry, and the animal did not eat only food connected to idolatry. In each case, the permitted and forbidden sources combined. This teaching therefore appears to hold that when two causes combine, the result is permitted.
The Gemara initially proposes that this is a dispute between Rabbi Yosef and the Sages. Rabbi Yosef, who permits the fruit of a grafted tree in the case of Orlah, would also permit the field and the animal. The Sages, who were strict in the earlier case involving idolatry, would prohibit them.
In the earlier Mishnah, the Sages did not permit one to grind an idolatrous object and scatter it into the wind, because they were concerned that it might fertilize a field. If they prohibit even that indirect benefit, they would certainly prohibit a field fertilized with material connected to idolatry or an animal fattened with such food.
If this is correct, then Rabbi Yosef would hold that even in the context of idolatry, when two causes combine, the result is permitted. We would then return to our original difficulty: why did Rabbi Yosef explain that one may not plant beneath a tree used for idolatry? The leaves fall and fertilize the ground, but the ground is also nourished by other sources. Why should this be prohibited?
The Gemara answers that the teaching permitting the field and the animal does not necessarily represent Rabbi Yosef. It may reflect a different dispute, between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages. The Gemara therefore asks where that dispute can be found.
There is another Mishnah in Orlah involving yeast. Suppose permitted yeast and yeast from a prohibited source fall into dough, and neither one alone contains enough to cause the dough to become leavened. Together, however, they cause the dough to become leavened. Rabbi Eliezer says that we determine the ruling according to whichever yeast fell in last. If the prohibited yeast fell in last, the dough is forbidden; if the permitted yeast fell in last, the dough is permitted.
The Sages say that the dough is permitted, because the two types of yeast combined to produce the result. They hold that when two causes combine, the result is permitted.
Abaye explains that the Sages’ ruling applies only if the prohibited yeast was removed before the permitted yeast fell in. In that case, the prohibited yeast began the process, but it was no longer present when the permitted yeast completed it. The dough ultimately contains only the permitted yeast, and it is therefore permitted.
If the prohibited yeast was not removed, then both types of yeast remain present at the same time. In that case, the result is produced by the permitted and prohibited yeast together. According to this explanation, the Sages would hold that when two causes combine, the result is permitted, whereas Rabbi Eliezer would hold that it is forbidden.
The Gemara suggests that the case of Orlah could also reflect this dispute. When the Mishnah permits fruit produced by grafting an older tree with a younger tree, it could be expressing the view of the Sages, who permit a product created by two causes. Rabbi Eliezer, by contrast, would prohibit it.
If so, the dispute concerning the field and the animal that benefited from idolatry could be the same dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages. We would have no proof that the view permitting the field and the animal belongs to Rabbi Yosef. The view permitting them might be the view of the Sages in the case of the yeast.
The Gemara then challenges this analysis. Who says that the case of the yeast is referring to a situation in which the prohibited yeast was removed before the permitted yeast fell in? Perhaps the ruling follows a different principle: we always determine the status according to the last item that enters. The last item is considered the operative cause, regardless of what entered first.
According to that interpretation, the prohibited yeast could remain in the dough. If the permitted yeast enters last, the dough is permitted because the last item is the determining cause. If both types of yeast enter simultaneously, however, the Sages could still hold that when two causes combine, the result is permitted.
Who, then, says that Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is based on the principle that two causes combine to produce a forbidden result? Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer agrees that when two causes enter simultaneously, the result is permitted. He merely holds that the last item to enter is the decisive cause. Consequently, we still cannot prove that the dispute concerning the field and the animal is the same as the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages.
The Gemara therefore looks for another dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages. It finds one in the Mishnah concerning wood taken from a tree used for idolatry.
If someone takes wood from such a tree and uses it to heat an oven, the ruling depends on the type of oven. If it is a new oven, meaning that it has never yet been heated, the first heating strengthens and completes the oven. Since the oven was completed through the forbidden wood, the oven must be broken.
If it is an old oven, one waits until it cools. Once the oven has cooled, one may use it again, because one is no longer benefiting from the heat generated by the forbidden wood.
If someone baked bread with the forbidden wood, the bread is forbidden for benefit. This is despite the fact that other, permitted wood was also used in the oven. The bread was produced by a combination of forbidden and permitted sources, and the Mishnah appears to teach that when two causes combine, the result is forbidden.
If the bread becomes mixed with other bread, Rabbi Eliezer says that one should take the value of the forbidden bread and throw that amount into the Dead Sea. The idea is that one removes the benefit associated with the forbidden bread by disposing of its value, after which the bread may be used.
The Sages respond that there is no redemption for an item associated with idolatry. One cannot take money corresponding to the value of the bread and throw it into the Dead Sea in order to permit the bread.
What do we see from here? As long as the value of the forbidden wood has not been removed in an acceptable manner, the bread remains forbidden for benefit, even though permitted wood also contributed to its production. This appears to be another case in which the forbidden contribution causes the entire product to be forbidden.
We can now suggest that the teaching concerning the field fertilized by idolatry and the animal fattened with food connected to idolatry follows the view of Rabbi Eliezer. The teaching that permits them would follow the Sages, while the Mishnah concerning the oven and the bread would follow Rabbi Eliezer.
However, the Gemara asks where the Sages in this matter can be found. Perhaps they are the Sages who permitted the dough produced by the combination of permitted and prohibited yeast. But that does not prove that they would also permit a product produced by two causes in the context of idolatry. We know only that they are lenient in the case of yeast associated with the laws of ritual offerings. We do not yet know that they would apply the same principle to idolatry.
We therefore return to the original question. Yesterday’s page indicated that Rabbi Yosef holds that when two causes combine, the result is forbidden. Yet the Mishnah in Orlah clearly teaches that when an older tree and a younger tree combine, the fruit is permitted. Furthermore, the case of the field and the animal indicates that the same principle may apply even to idolatry. Rabbi Yosef therefore does not appear to distinguish between Orlah and idolatry.
Why, then, did Rabbi Yosef explain the Mishnah as prohibiting planting beneath a tree used for idolatry because the leaves fertilize the ground?
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosef was not expressing his own position in that explanation. He was explaining the Mishnah according to the position of the Sages. Rabbi Yosef himself holds that one may plant beneath the tree. He is not concerned that the leaves fall and fertilize the ground, because when the leaves and the soil combine, the result is permitted.
Rabbi Yosef is saying to the Sages: According to my position, there is no problem planting beneath the tree. The leaves may fall onto the ground and fertilize it, but that is merely one contributing factor, and when two causes combine, the result is permitted.
According to your position, however, you should prohibit planting beneath the tree even during the winter. The Mishnah prohibits planting beneath the tree during the summer, when one also benefits from its shade, but it permits planting there during the winter. According to the Sages, if a contribution by the forbidden tree is enough to prohibit the result, why should the winter case be permitted merely because the shade is not beneficial?
The Sages answer that the benefit of the fertilizer is offset by the loss caused by the shade. In the summer, a person benefits from the shade of the tree but loses the benefit of the fertilization, because the shade prevents the ground from receiving the full benefit of the sun. The benefit and the loss balance each other. Since there is no net benefit, the planting is permitted.
This yields a novel interpretation of the Mishnah. Rabbi Yosef himself holds that when two causes combine, the result is permitted. When he says that one may not plant beneath a tree used for idolatry, he is presenting the position of the Sages. According to Rabbi Yosef, one may plant there even when the leaves fertilize the ground. According to the Sages, who hold that such a combination is forbidden, the case should also be prohibited in the winter; they respond that the benefit from the fertilizer is offset by the loss caused by the shade.
There was a certain field that had been fertilized through material connected to idolatry. Rav Amram asked Rabbi Yosef about the vegetables that grew there. Rabbi Yosef ruled that they were permitted, because when two causes combine, the result is permitted even in the context of idolatry.
We now turn the page and begin the new Mishnah, although we have already encountered this Mishnah earlier.
If someone takes wood from a tree used for idolatry, the wood is forbidden for benefit. If he uses it to heat an oven, then in the case of a new oven, the oven must be broken, because the first heating completes and strengthens the oven through the forbidden wood. If it is an old oven, one waits until it cools so that one will not benefit from the heat produced by the forbidden wood.
If someone bakes bread using the forbidden wood, the bread is forbidden for benefit. If it becomes mixed with other bread, Rabbi Eliezer says that one should take the value of the forbidden bread and throw it into the Dead Sea. The Sages respond that there is no redemption for an item associated with idolatry.
The Mishnah continues with a similar case. If someone takes a piece of wood from a tree used for idolatry and uses it as a tool for weaving, the tool is forbidden for benefit. If he uses it to weave a garment, the garment is forbidden for benefit. Again, this is despite the fact that the garment was produced through other tools and materials as well. The Mishnah is teaching that when the forbidden and permitted sources combine, the result is forbidden.
If the garment becomes mixed with other garments, and those garments become mixed with still others, all of them are forbidden for benefit. Rabbi Eliezer again says that one should take the value of the forbidden garment and throw it into the Dead Sea. The Sages again respond that there is no redemption for an item associated with idolatry.
When the Mishnah speaks about throwing the value into the Dead Sea, it does not mean that this is a formal redemption. The purpose is to ensure that one does not benefit from the forbidden item. The bread or garment remains in one’s possession, but one disposes of an amount equal to its value so that one does not derive benefit from the forbidden contribution. The Mishnah describes this as resembling redemption, but the Sages do not accept the procedure as a valid redemption for idolatry.
There is a further dispute concerning what one may do with the bread after disposing of its value. Some maintain that one may derive benefit from the bread, but may not actually eat it. Others maintain that the disposal of the value does not permit any use of the bread itself. This is another dispute concerning the extent to which removing the value permits the product.
The Gemara compares the first case of the Mishnah, involving bread, with the second case, involving a garment. Why are both cases necessary?
If the Mishnah had taught only the case of bread, one might have thought that Rabbi Eliezer permits the procedure of disposing of the value because, when the bread is baked, the forbidden wood is burned. The wood contributes to the baking, but by the end of the process it no longer exists. Since the forbidden source has been consumed, perhaps removing its value permits the bread.
In the case of the weaving tool, however, the wood remains present throughout the process. One might therefore have thought that Rabbi Eliezer would not permit the procedure of disposing of the value for a garment.
Conversely, if the Mishnah had taught only the case of the garment, one might have thought that Rabbi Eliezer rejects the procedure because the forbidden item remains in existence. In the case of bread, however, the wood is destroyed during the baking, and perhaps disposing of its value would permit the bread. The Mishnah therefore teaches both cases.
The Gemara adds another qualification. When did we say that one may dispose of the value and then derive benefit from the product? This applies only when the forbidden item itself is no longer visibly present. In the case of the bread, one does not see the forbidden wood in the bread. In the case of the garment, one does not see the weaving tool in the garment. The forbidden item contributed to the production, but it is not present in the finished product.
If, however, a barrel of wine associated with idolatry becomes mixed with other permitted barrels, one may not necessarily dispose of the value of the forbidden barrel and thereby permit the entire mixture. In that case, the forbidden wine itself is still present inside one of the barrels. It is not merely an absent contribution to the production of another object.
What is the case involving the barrels? Suppose there are fifty barrels, one of which contains wine associated with idolatry. All the barrels are forbidden for benefit, and one may not simply take the value of one barrel and throw it into the Dead Sea in order to permit the rest.
There is, however, another option. One may sell all the barrels to a non-Jew for the value of forty-nine barrels, effectively excluding the value of the forbidden barrel from the sale. In that way, one does not derive benefit from the forbidden barrel. The question is whether one may instead dispose of the value of the forbidden barrel and then use the barrels oneself.
If the forbidden barrel is worth, for example, twenty dollars, one might think that taking twenty dollars and throwing it into the Dead Sea would remove the benefit of the forbidden wine. One could then use the other barrels, give the wine to one’s workers, use it for other purposes, or sell the barrels individually. The Gemara asks whether such a disposal of value works when the forbidden item remains present in one of the barrels.
The Gemara initially says that it does not. The concept of disposing of the value applies only in the Mishnah, where the forbidden wood is no longer present in the bread or garment. It does not apply when one of the actual barrels still contains the forbidden wine.
Rav Chisda says that disposing of the value does work. His view is consistent with his ruling in an actual case: some barrels became mixed, and he instructed the owner to take four zuz, the value of the wine associated with idolatry, and throw them into a river. After that, the barrels were permitted.
There is an interesting discussion in Tosafot, which quotes the Jerusalem Talmud. Tosafot asks about the garment in the Mishnah. The garment was made using a tool associated with idolatry. Why can one not sell the garment to a non-Jew for its value minus the value of the forbidden tool, just as one may sell the barrels to a non-Jew for the value of forty-nine barrels?
The Jerusalem Talmud answers that the cases are different. With wine, one may sell the barrels to a non-Jew because Jews do not generally purchase wine from non-Jews. There is therefore no concern that the wine will return to Jewish ownership and that a Jew will ultimately derive benefit from it.
Garments are different, because Jews do purchase garments from non-Jews. Even if the garment is sold to a non-Jew after deducting the value of the forbidden tool, the non-Jew may later resell it to a Jew and derive benefit from the forbidden contribution. For that reason, the option of selling the garment to a non-Jew is not provided.
Tosafot points out that bread would follow the same rule as garments. One may not simply sell bread produced through a forbidden contribution to a non-Jew, because Jews purchase bread from non-Jews and the bread could return to Jewish ownership. The reason the sale is permitted in the case of wine is specifically that wine is not ordinarily purchased from non-Jews.
We now come to the final Mishnah of the chapter, which discusses how an idolatrous tree can be nullified. If a non-Jew cuts dry branches from the tree, cuts moist branches, or removes a stick from it, he has demonstrated that the tree is no longer sacred to him. By cutting away part of the tree, he has nullified its status.
If he sands or trims the tree for its beauty, however, the tree remains forbidden. In that case, he is improving the tree because he values it. If he sands it for some other purpose and not for the tree’s beauty, the tree is permitted, because his action demonstrates that he no longer regards it as sacred.
The Gemara discusses the shavings. If a non-Jew sands the tree for its own benefit, the tree remains forbidden, but what is the status of the pieces that were removed? Rav Huna says that the shavings are forbidden because they have not been nullified. Others say that although the tree remains forbidden, the shavings are permitted, because the non-Jew has removed and discarded them. The non-Jew may have worshiped the tree, but he does not worship the pieces that he has cut away.
A baraita supports the view that the shavings are permitted. If a non-Jew cuts or sands an idolatrous tree for his own purposes, the tree is permitted if his action constitutes nullification, and the shavings are permitted because they have been removed from the tree. If he does this for the sake of beautifying the tree, the tree remains forbidden, but the shavings are still permitted, because he discards them rather than treating them as sacred.
If a Jew cuts or sands the tree, however, the action does not nullify it. A Jew cannot nullify an object associated with idolatry; only a non-Jew’s act of rejection can do so. Therefore, when a Jew removes pieces from the tree, both the tree and the pieces remain forbidden.
The Gemara then discusses branches that break off on their own. Suppose a branch falls from the tree without anyone cutting it. Rav says that each piece must be individually nullified. Since no person broke it off, the breaking is not considered an act of nullification. The pieces may still be worshiped, and each separate piece therefore requires nullification.
Shmuel says that an object associated with idolatry is forbidden only in its ordinary form, in the way it normally grows. While the tree remains standing and intact, it requires nullification. Once branches fall off, however, even if they fall off on their own, the pieces are no longer in their ordinary form and are automatically nullified.
What is the disagreement between Rav and Shmuel? Rav says that even if the branches break off by themselves, the non-Jews may continue to worship the pieces. Therefore, each piece requires nullification. Shmuel says that once the branches fall, the non-Jews no longer worship them, because their falling demonstrates that the idolatrous object could not protect itself. If it could not protect itself, they will certainly not rely on it for protection. The pieces are therefore automatically permitted.
The Gemara offers another way to understand the dispute. Perhaps everyone agrees that when branches break off, the broken pieces are still potentially worshiped and require nullification. The dispute concerns a further stage, when those pieces break into smaller pieces. These smaller pieces can be reassembled by an ordinary person, not necessarily by an expert.
On the one hand, the pieces are very small and resemble fragments of broken wood. That would suggest that they are no longer considered part of the idolatrous object. On the other hand, they can easily be reassembled, and a regular person can repair them. Since the object can still be restored, perhaps the breaking does not constitute nullification.
The general principle is that an object requires nullification while it remains in its normal state and while ordinary changes associated with it are taking place. For example, if a tree remains standing and its leaves fall each year, the falling of the leaves is part of the ordinary life of the tree. Those leaves still require nullification, because this is the normal way a tree grows and sheds its leaves.
When the main object remains intact and ordinary events are occurring to it, such as the annual shedding of leaves, the object and the leaves remain associated with it. The leaves are considered normal parts of the tree’s growth.
But when the object breaks in an abnormal way, falls apart, and separates into pieces that are no longer part of its normal form, the situation is different. The non-Jews may say that the idolatrous object could not protect itself. It certainly cannot be expected to protect them. In that case, the broken pieces may be considered nullified.
The commentators explain that the leaves of an idolatrous tree that fall during the winter remain forbidden for benefit. They are treated as ordinary parts of the tree’s growth, even after they fall and begin to decompose. Since this is the normal way of a tree, the leaves remain forbidden.
In the case of an object made from components that breaks into many small pieces, however, it is not normal for the object to break in that manner. Therefore, if it breaks into such pieces, the breaking may constitute nullification, and the pieces may be permitted.
May we complete the study of this chapter and continue to advance in our learning.