The Eddie B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli discusses the case of a non-Jew who does not worship another person’s idolatry. In that case, he can come and nullify it. A Jew, however, cannot nullify the idolatry of a non-Jewish idolater. A Jew also cannot nullify the idolatry of another Jew.
Regarding idolatry belonging to a Jew who worships it, the only thing that can be done is to destroy it. It cannot be nullified, neither by a non-Jew nor by anyone else. The discussion distinguishes between two parts of idolatry: the idol itself and the accessories that serve the idol. If someone nullifies the idol, all of its accessories also become permitted because they are subordinate to the idol. If someone nullifies only the accessories, the accessories become permitted, but the idol itself remains forbidden.
The Gemara then says that the teaching in the Mishnah follows the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Rabbi. Rabbi Shimon says that Rabbi taught them, when he was younger, that a non-Jew can nullify the idolatry of another non-Jew, even when it belongs to a Jew. In other words, Rabbi had originally taught that a non-Jew could nullify not only his own idolatry, but even the idolatry of a Jew.
Now, however, Rabbi’s teaching appears to be different. The current teaching says that a non-Jew can nullify the idolatry of another non-Jew, but that a Jew cannot nullify the idolatry of a non-Jew. Rabbi Shimon did not want to tell Rabbi explicitly that he had forgotten his earlier teaching. Instead, he reminded him indirectly: “Rabbi, when you were younger, you taught us this.”
Rabbi responded that the earlier teaching referred specifically to a case in which the Jew and the non-Jew had a partnership in the idolatry. Rabbi had originally ruled that when a non-Jew and a Jew jointly owned the idolatry, the non-Jew could come and nullify it, and the idolatry would become permitted. Later, when Rabbi recorded the teaching in the Mishnah, he changed his mind and ruled that only a non-Jew can nullify the idolatry of his own fellow non-Jew or of another non-Jew, but not even idolatry held in partnership with a Jew.
The Gemara asks what Rabbi had thought when he was younger and what he thought later. What was the original reasoning, and what caused him to change his mind?
When Rabbi was younger, he reasoned that the Jew was worshipping the idolatry only because the non-Jew was doing so. The Jew was merely following the non-Jew. Therefore, once the non-Jew nullified the idolatry, the Jew’s connection to it would also be nullified.
Later, Rabbi reasoned that the Jew might be worshipping the idolatry independently, on his own initiative. If so, the non-Jew’s nullification would not affect the Jew’s portion. That is the first explanation of Rabbi’s change of mind.
Some people place this statement of Rav Hillel in the name of Rav Ales at the end of the Mishnah. The end of the Mishnah says explicitly that a Jew cannot nullify the idolatry. But that seems obvious. If a Jew cannot nullify idolatry belonging to a non-Jew, why would the Mishnah need to teach it? A Jew cannot nullify idolatry at all.
Rav Hillel answers that the final clause is discussing a case in which the Jew and the non-Jew are partners. The Jew cannot nullify his portion, even though the non-Jew is also a partner. The Mishnah is therefore teaching that the Jew’s portion cannot be nullified.
Another version places this teaching of Rav Hillel and Rav Ales on the following external teaching: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says that the idolatry of a Jew can never be nullified. The extra word “never” teaches that there is no nullification under any circumstances.
Rav Hillel explains that this teaching refers to a case in which a Jew and a non-Jew are partners. It teaches that even in a partnership, the Jew’s portion cannot be nullified, because the Jew may be worshipping the idolatry independently. Even if the non-Jew comes and nullifies his own portion, the Jew’s portion remains forbidden.
The Gemara then turns to the next teaching: How can idolatry be nullified? If a non-Jew removes the tip of its ear, the tip of its nose, or the end of its finger, the idolatry is nullified, even though he did not cause a significant loss. Similarly, if he spits before it, urinates before it, drags it through the mud, or throws excrement in front of it, the idolatry is not nullified.
If he sells the idolatry or mortgages it against a loan, Rabbi says that it is nullified, while the Sages say that it is not nullified. This is a dispute regarding whether selling or mortgaging the idol demonstrates that the non-Jew has rejected it.
Rashi explains that when a non-Jew spits in front of the idol, urinates before it, or treats it in one of the other degrading ways, the idol is not nullified because the non-Jew may merely be angry at it temporarily. He may have had a bad experience and may later return to worshipping it.
If a Jew did this, there would be no nullification at all. The novelty of the Mishnah is that even when a non-Jew becomes angry with his idol, the anger may be temporary. He may return to it and worship it again.
The Gemara asks about the case in which the non-Jew takes a hammer and strikes the idol. The Mishnah says that the idol is nullified even though no piece was removed. How does this constitute nullification if there was no actual loss?
The answer is that striking the face deforms it. Even though no part is missing, the face has been damaged, and that is sufficient to demonstrate that the non-Jew no longer values the idol.
But why does spitting in front of the idol or urinating before it not have the same effect? The source is a verse in Isaiah. The idolater becomes angry with his god because he is starving and has no food. He curses his king, turns toward his god, and then becomes angry because the idolatry has not helped him. Yet afterward, he returns to the land and goes back to his idolatry.
The verse is describing a temporary situation. The idolater is angry at the idol, but he does not truly reject it. He may return to worship it. Therefore, spitting, urinating, dragging it through the mud, or throwing excrement before it does not constitute nullification.
The Gemara then discusses the final case in the Mishnah: selling or mortgaging the idolatry. Rabbi says that selling it nullifies it, while the Sages say that it does not. Several variables must be clarified. To whom was it sold—to a Jew or to a non-Jew? And why should the sale demonstrate nullification, or why should it fail to do so?
One approach is that the dispute concerns a sale to a non-Jew. If the non-Jew is interested in buying the item as metal, the seller may be selling it as scrap metal rather than as an object of worship. A non-Jew who purchases it for its metal may not be interested in worshipping it. According to this explanation, if it was sold to any non-Jew who wanted the item, Rabbi says that it was nullified, while the Sages say that it was not.
If it was sold to a Jew, however, everyone might agree that it was nullified. The Jew does not worship the idolatry, so selling it to him demonstrates that the original owner has rejected it.
But even this reasoning requires examination. A Jew may be a businessman. He may purchase the idol and then resell it to a non-Jew who will worship it. One could therefore argue that selling it to a Jew does not necessarily demonstrate nullification, because the Jew may simply be an intermediary.
We therefore have two possible ways to understand the dispute. According to the first, the dispute is about selling the idolatry to a non-Jew. If it is sold to a Jew, everyone agrees that it is nullified. According to the second, the dispute is about selling it to a Jew. If it is sold to a non-Jew, perhaps everyone agrees that it is not nullified, because the non-Jew may worship it.
The Gemara asks: According to the second explanation, is the dispute limited to a sale to a Jew, or is there also a dispute when it is sold to a non-Jew? Perhaps when it is sold to a non-Jew, everyone agrees that it is not nullified. Alternatively, perhaps there is a dispute in both cases.
The Gemara brings a clear external teaching. Rabbi says, “My words appear to be correct when the idol was sold to be destroyed, while my colleagues’ words appear to be correct when it was sold to be worshipped.”
What does it mean that it was sold “to be destroyed” or “to be worshipped”? If it was sold to be destroyed, everyone should agree that it is nullified. If it was sold to be worshipped, everyone should agree that it is not nullified. Why, then, would there be a dispute?
The Gemara explains that someone who is destined to destroy it refers to a Jew. Rabbi is saying that his own view—that the idol is nullified—applies when it is sold to someone who will destroy it, namely, a Jew. His colleagues, who say that the idol is not nullified, are discussing a case in which it was sold to someone who will worship it, namely, a non-Jew.
According to this explanation, the dispute concerns both possibilities. Rabbi says that when the idol is sold to a Jew, who is destined to destroy it, it is nullified. The Sages say that even then it is not nullified. When it is sold to a non-Jew, who is destined to worship it, the Sages certainly say that it is not nullified, while Rabbi’s position must be understood through the same dispute.
The Gemara then discusses a case involving scrap metal. Suppose a Jew acquired a pile of metal but had not yet paid for it. If the Jew discovers that one of the pieces is idolatry, he must return it, because once the Jew acquires it, he cannot nullify it. If he has not yet paid, he should return it.
This case raises a difficulty. If the dispute concerns selling the idol to a Jew, then according to Rabbi’s view, the sale should constitute nullification. Why would the Jew have to throw the idol into the Dead Sea? Rabbi says that selling it to a Jew is sufficient nullification.
The Gemara answers that this case is different. The seller did not know that the pile contained a piece of idolatry. When a person knowingly sells an idol to a Jew, the sale may demonstrate that he has rejected it. But when he sells a pile of scrap metal without knowing that an idol is mixed into it, the sale does not indicate that he intended to nullify that particular object.
Once the Jew discovers the idol, he never intended to acquire it. The pile was sold as scrap metal, and the seller did not even know that the idol was there. Therefore, this sale is not evidence of nullification, and the object must be destroyed.
The Gemara then discusses several additional cases. A non-Jew borrowed money against the idolatry. A building collapsed on it. It was stolen by robbers. Or its owners abandoned it when they left for an overseas country. In all these cases, the question is whether the idolatry was nullified.
The teaching says that if the owners intended to return, the idolatry remains forbidden. The comparison is made to the war of Joshua, when the Amorites went out to fight against Joshua but did not return from the war because they died there.
The Gemara asks what this comparison means. If the Amorites intended to return from the war, but none of them returned, how can they serve as an example of people who leave temporarily and intend to come back?
The Gemara explains that when a non-Jew leaves his idolatry behind while intending to return, it has the status of the idolatry left behind by the Amorites during the war of Joshua. The Amorites left intending to come back, so they did not nullify their idolatry before leaving. When the Jewish people conquered the land, they could not benefit from those idols, because the non-Jews had not nullified them, and a Jew cannot nullify the idolatry of a non-Jew.
The Gemara then asks why it was necessary to provide this analogy. Why not simply say that when a non-Jew travels overseas and intends to return, the idolatry remains forbidden? Why compare the case to the idolatry of the Amorites during the war of Joshua?
The Gemara answers that the comparison teaches an additional point. Suppose a Jew took a brick and set it up in order to worship it, but he never actually worshipped it. A non-Jew then came and worshipped it. Ordinarily, a non-Jew cannot render forbidden an object that belongs to a Jew. Yet in this case, the non-Jew’s worship does render it forbidden.
The Jew’s act of setting up the brick revealed his intention to worship it. Although he had not yet bowed to it, he had designated it for idolatry. When the non-Jew came and worshipped it, it was as though he acted as the Jew’s agent. The Jew had already demonstrated his connection to idolatry, so the non-Jew’s act could render the brick forbidden.
The source for this principle is the law concerning the trees of the Asherah when the Jewish people entered the Land of Israel. The Torah commands that the Jewish people destroy those trees. The land belonged to the Jewish people and had already been given to Abraham as an inheritance. If the land belonged to the Jews, how could the non-Jews render the trees forbidden? A non-Jew cannot render forbidden something that does not belong to him.
Perhaps the trees had been worshipped before the land was given to Abraham, when the non-Jews still had possession of the region. But even then, the question remains: once the Jewish people entered the land, they should have been able to nullify the idolatry.
The Gemara answers that the Jewish people had previously demonstrated an affinity for idolatry when they worshipped the Golden Calf. Once they showed that idolatry was significant to them, the worship of the Asherah trees by the non-Jews was treated as though the Jews themselves had authorized it. The non-Jews were acting as the Jews’ agents, and the trees therefore became forbidden.
The same principle applies to the brick. The Jew set it up for worship but had not yet worshipped it. By doing so, he revealed his intention. When the non-Jew came and bowed to it, the non-Jew was treated as the Jew’s agent, and the brick became forbidden.
The Gemara challenges this reasoning. Just because the Jewish people worshipped the Golden Calf, why should that prove that they wanted to worship an Asherah tree? Perhaps they had an affinity only for the Golden Calf and not for every form of idolatry.
The answer is based on the verse that says, “This is your god, Israel,” using language that indicates plurality. The verse teaches that the Jewish people were not interested in only one form of idolatry. The Golden Calf was merely one of many possible forms, and their actions demonstrated an affinity for idolatry in general.
The Gemara raises another possibility. Perhaps only the trees that the non-Jews worshipped at the time of the Golden Calf became forbidden, because at that time the Jews had demonstrated their connection to idolatry. After the Jewish people repented for the Golden Calf, perhaps trees that the non-Jews worshipped afterward should not become forbidden.
The Gemara answers that there is no way to identify which trees were worshipped before the Golden Calf and which were worshipped afterward. Since it is impossible to distinguish between them, all of the trees became forbidden. We learn from this discussion that the reason the Asherah trees in the Land of Israel became forbidden was the Jewish people’s worship of the Golden Calf. Without that act, the non-Jews could not have rendered the trees forbidden, because the trees belonged to the Jewish people.
The Gemara then discusses an idol that its owners abandoned during peacetime. Such an idol is permitted, because there was no reason that the owners could not have taken it with them. The fact that they left it behind during peacetime indicates that they abandoned it.
If they abandoned it during wartime, however, it remains forbidden. During wartime, the owners may have been forced to flee and may simply have been unable to take the idol with them. Their failure to take it does not demonstrate that they rejected it.
Rashi discusses the pedestals used for idolatry. These were stone structures placed along the road so that when a king passed by, the idol could be placed upon the pedestal and displayed to him. The king would bow to the idol, and the pedestal would therefore appear to be an accessory serving the idolatry. Why, then, should such a pedestal be permitted?
The Gemara explains that the pedestal was not permanently designated for idolatry. It was placed on a road where the king was expected to pass, but the king might never take that route. The idol might never be placed upon it, and the king might never worship it. Since its use was temporary and uncertain, the pedestal was not permanently established for idolatry and remained permitted.
The Gemara compares this to the Tower of Babel. Nimrod built the Tower of Babel, and when the people were scattered and could no longer communicate, they abandoned the structure. Since it was abandoned during a time of peace and the people did not return to it, it was considered nullified.
The Gemara objects that the people did not leave willingly. God scattered them, and they were unable to return. Their departure was therefore comparable to being forced away during wartime.
The answer is that although they were scattered, they had no opportunity to return. Their situation is nevertheless treated as abandonment, because the structure was left behind and was never again used for the idolatrous purpose for which it had been built.
The Gemara returns to the pedestals. Why are they permitted merely because they were displayed before kings? The answer is that the display was temporary and dependent on circumstances. The king might give the owners money, but there was no guarantee that he would ever pass by or worship the idol. Since the pedestal was not definitively designated for idolatry, it remained permitted.
Rav Hiyya once came and found a person sitting on one of these pedestals. Rav Hiyya asked what he was doing. How could he sit on it if it had been used to serve idolatry?
Rav Hiyya held that a pedestal becomes permitted once it is damaged. Even regarding an actual idol, there is an opinion that when the idol breaks, its pieces are no longer worshipped. The same reasoning might apply to a damaged pedestal: once it is broken, it is no longer being used for its original purpose.
Rav Hiyya’s colleagues told him that the pedestal was forbidden. The fact that it had cracked did not necessarily demonstrate that the non-Jew had rejected it. A non-Jew may consider it degrading to worship a broken idol, but he may not consider it degrading to use a damaged pedestal. The pedestal itself is merely an accessory, and its damaged condition does not prove that it was nullified.
When Rav Hiyya heard this, he accepted their ruling and said, “Who will give me the dust of Rabbi Shmuel’s grave?” He meant that he valued Rabbi Shmuel so greatly that he wished to place the dust of his grave upon his eyes, as an expression of the honor he had for him.
The Gemara then notes that Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish said the opposite. They both taught that a damaged pedestal is permitted. They even said that according to the opinion that a non-Jew continues to worship a broken idol, that principle does not necessarily apply to a pedestal. A non-Jew may continue to worship an idol even after it breaks, because the idol itself remains the object of worship. But an accessory that breaks is no longer useful for its purpose.
Once the pedestal breaks, the non-Jews say that they need to replace it and obtain a new one. They reveal through their actions that they no longer regard the damaged pedestal as useful for serving the idolatry. Therefore, it becomes permitted.
The Gemara brings an explicit teaching to support this view: “A damaged pedestal is permitted.” In contrast, “a damaged altar” remains forbidden until most of it has been destroyed. The altar was used to bring offerings to idolatry, and it remains significant until the majority of it is broken.
The Gemara asks how to distinguish between a pedestal and an altar. Rav Yaakov bar Idi says in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that a pedestal is made from one stone, whereas an altar is made from several stones. Therefore, when a pedestal is damaged, it becomes permitted. An altar does not become permitted until most of its stones have been destroyed.
How do we know that an altar used for idolatry was made of several stones? A verse in Isaiah refers to stones in the plural and compares the destruction of the idolatrous altar to stones being reduced to chalk. The language indicates that the altar consisted of multiple stones. Therefore, the majority of the stones must be destroyed before the altar is considered nullified.