The Eddie B. Sitt Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli (Babylonian Talmud). Gemara Nedarim (Vows), daf ayin bet (folio 72). Today’s daf is being studied le'ilui nishmat mor zekeni (my grandfather), Rabbi Yosef ben Sarah, and le'ilui nishmat Avraham ben Ester, ruach Hashem tenichem be-Gan Eden (May Hashem’s spirit rest them in Eden), amen. Amen. Today’s daf is being studied li-refuah shelemah (for a complete recovery) for Shelomoh ben Miryam, Mosheh ben Dinah, Sarah Ruchamah bat Rachel, and Sarah bat Rachel. El na refa na lahem (Please, God, heal them), El na refa na lahem, El na refa, refuat ha-nefesh u-refuat ha-guf (healing of soul and body), refuatam kerovah lavo, ve-chen yehi ratzon (and so may it be Your will), ve-nomar amen.
We begin today’s daf on ayin alef amud bet (page 71b), and we are four lines from the bottom, four lines from the top. Iba'ya lehu, the Gemara asks a question: geirushin (divorce), ki-shetikah damya o ke-hakamah damya (Is it like silence or affirmation?). Now we discuss a person who was engaged and then got divorced. We want to understand what the divorce is considered regarding vows: is it considered a shetikah, as if he was just silent, or is it considered as if he was me-kim the neder?
So the Gemara says, “Le-mai nafka minah?” What’s the nafka minah—how you consider a divorce? Kegon she-nadrah, she made a neder, ve-shama ba'alah ve-geirshah, and he divorced her, ve-ahadrah be-yomeih, and then took her back that day. If you say it is like a shetikah, you have until the end of the day. Therefore, since he took her back during the same day, matzi mefer lah: he still has the ability to be mefer. His rights to nullify are still alive. But if you say it is like a hakamah, then once he gets divorced, it is as if he was me-kim the neder. He cannot be mefer lah. Once a person is me-kim the neder, even if he remarries her, it is too late. He was already me-kim the neder. So that is what we want to understand: how do you understand a divorce?
Now, what is the understanding here? Look at the Ran: “Iba'ya lehu geirushin ki-shetikah damya o ke-hakamah damya.” About seven lines from the bottom, it says, “Mishum de-kheivan de-yada arus de-vatar geirushin lo matzi mefer.” The logic is this: since the arus knows that once he makes a geirushin, he cannot make hafarah, obviously, after the geirushin she is out of his jurisdiction. “Ve-lo hefer kodem geirushin”—and he did not make hafarah before the geirushin—“ke-man de-okmeih le-nidra dami,” meaning that he was me-kim the neder. “Ki heichi de-amar de-mikheivan de-lo hefer be-yom shemuah ke-man de-okmeih dami”: just as if a person does not mefer on the day he heard the neder, it is considered hakamah, so too here.
Listen: if he wanted to be mefer, he would have been mefer while they were still married. He did not, right? And he knows that he cannot be mefer after he gets divorced. Therefore, when he divorces her, it must be as if he is saying, “Hakamah!”
So the Gemara asks, what is the nafka minah? “Kegon de-nadrah ve-shama ba'alah ve-geirshah,” right? Nadrah, she made a neder; shama ba'alah, he heard about it; and then what? He got divorced. “Hai ba'alah de-ka'amrei arus davka hu.” When we say ba'alah, “husband,” we must be talking specifically about a case of eirusin. Why? “De-i mi-nisuin afilu timtzei lomar de-geirushin ki-shetikah damya heichi matzi mefer? I be-she-chazar ve-niseit ein ha-ba'al mefer bi-kodmin.” Correct. If you bring marriage into the case, we know a rule about marriage: you cannot be mefer nedarim that were made before the marriage. So even if you want to consider the geirushin of the arusah like a shetikah, it does not matter if he marries her a second time, through nisuin, because he cannot rehash or nullify again things that were done before the nisuin.
“Ve-i de-ahadrah be-eirusin bilchud”—now, if he just took her back through eirusin alone—“keivan de-arus eino mefer ela be-shutafut.” We have a rule here: an arus can be mefer only in partnership with the father, right? “Ve-hacha leika av de-kheivan de-niseit shuv ein la-av.” Once she has been married, she no longer has a father in the picture. Let’s say she got married first. It goes the other way: let’s say she got married to the first guy, then that same guy divorced her, and then she became an arusah to him. It does not matter, because once she has already become a nesuah, the father is out of the picture. Once the father is out of the picture, he never comes back into it, even if she becomes an arusah afterward. And once the father is not in the picture, the husband cannot do anything either, because an arus can act only with the father’s help. Since he loses the shutafut of the father, he loses his own rights as well.
So all the Ran is pointing out is that the case is talking about arus throughout: they were engaged, divorced, and re-engaged. If you bring nisuin anywhere into this equation, you do not have a case. I’ll explain why again. If nisuin happened first, the father automatically loses his rights. The father does not have rights to make hafarat nedarim for a nesuah. Good. Now he gets divorced. Even if you want to consider it like a shetikah, that means he re-engages her and says, “All right, I can make a hafarah.” He cannot make a hafarah, because, bottom line, an arus can do so only together with the father. Since there was already nisuin, the father is gone, and therefore the husband is gone as well. And if you tell me he was an arus first and then became a nasui, that also does not help, because once he becomes a nasui, the husband cannot break nedarim that were made before his nisuin. Therefore, there is no nafka minah in that case either. All the Ran is saying is that the case is talking about eirusin all the way through.
Now look at the next Ran: “Ve-ahadrah be-yomeih.” What did he do? He married her the same day. He got engaged, divorced, and then got engaged again on the same day. “Lehachi nakat be-yomeih”: that is why it says he did it on the same day. If he took her back the next day, that would be obvious. “Peshita delo matzi mefer keivan she'avar yomo shel shemi'ah.” Once the day has passed after he heard it, that is automatically a kiyum. “Ve'af al pi de-sof yoma leita bi-rshuteih de-hai ba'al. Ve-ha de-amrinan ve-ahadrah lav davka de-hu hadin acher ela mishum de-shechicha nakat.” By the way, the case in the Gemara is that he took her back. It does not matter if he took her back or, for that matter, if somebody else took her back. The point is that if it was a shetikah, then the next husband—the last husband gets the nedarim, right?—would be able to make a hafarah if the first husband’s response is considered a shetikah. The Gemara simply speaks about the usual case, where the same guy takes her back. I guess that is because there was already a connection between them: they divorced, got angry, and then he took her back. But the same law applies if somebody else took her back. The same question applies. If you consider the first divorce a shetikah, then technically the neder is still able to be mefer. So when the second guy takes her, if it was a shetikah on the same day, he can make hafarah. The Gemara took a common case.
So that is really the Gemara’s question. The Gemara is going to try to bring proofs to answer it. We are focusing on one question: how do you consider a divorce? Is divorce considered a shetikah, as if he kept quiet and did nothing, so hafarah is still an option? Or do you say that once he gets divorced, it is like a hakamah? I want to explain again why it would be hakamah. The guy knew his options. While he was still engaged to her, if he wanted to be mefer the neder, he should have been mefer it. He also knew that once he got divorced, he obviously could not be mefer anymore. So implicitly, it is as if he is being me-kim. Since he did not exercise his hafarah rights and they got divorced, he knew she was out of his possession and jurisdiction. Therefore, it could be like hakamah. Those are the two sides.
The nafka minah is, if he gets re-engaged to her, what are his options? If you say it is like a shetikah, good: it is the same day. A shetikah does not make a difference until the end of the day, so he could still exercise his rights of hafarah. If you say it is a hakamah, it is too late. Now that second engagement has locked in the neder.
So the Gemara says, “Ta shema,” the first proof: “Eimatai amru meit ha-ba'al nitrokna reshut la'av?” When did we say that if the husband dies, the authority over nedarim is transferred to the father? We have learned this several times already. When the husband dies—we are talking about a na'arah ha-me'orasah, an engaged young woman, so the father and husband share authority—what did we say? When does the authority over nedarim go back to the father? “Bizman shelo shama ha-ba'al”: when the husband has not yet heard about the neder; or “o shama ve-hefer,” he heard about it and made hafarah. It does not matter: once he dies, his hafarah dies with him, and all the authority goes back to the father; or “o shama ve-shatak u-met bo bayom,” he heard it, remained silent, and died that day. Since he died that day, his shetikah did not make a hakamah, so the father still has rights.
Those are all the cases where authority goes back to the father. If you tell me that geirushin is considered a shetikah, “litni nami o shama ve-geirash”—the baraita should list that case too. List the case where the husband, the ba'al, the arus, heard the neder, got divorced, and then authority went back to the father. Just as you tell me that when he was silent and died that day, authority goes back to the father, if geirushin is like shetikah, include that case too. You are listing all the cases where authority goes back to the father. If shetikah is one of the cases that transfers authority, then so should geirushin. “Midelo tani hachi, shema minah geirushin ke-hakamah damu.” Since they did not list that case, we infer that geirushin is like hakamah. That is a proof: geirushin is not shetikah; it must be hakamah.
What is the law if the ba'al was me-kim the neder and then dies? Nothing transfers to the father, obviously, because he was already me-kim it. Once one of them is me-kim, it is finished; you cannot be mefer the neder at all. Therefore, since the baraita did not list geirushin as one of the examples of shetikah, it must be hakamah.
So the Gemara says, “Wait, eima seifa.” From the same source, this baraita, I will bring you an opposite proof from the seifa. What does it say in the seifa? “Aval im shama ve-kiyem”: let’s say the same guy, the ba'al who is eventually going to die, heard the neder and was me-kayem it; or “o shama ve-shatak u-met be-yom she-le'acharav,” he heard the neder and died the next day. That is also an example of hakamah, because he died the next day. What is the law? “Ein yachol lehafer.” It does not transfer back to the father, because once the ba'al made a legitimate hakamah—either by actually saying, “I am me-kayem,” or by remaining quiet for the whole day—that is considered hakamah. If you say geirushin is like hakamah, “litni,” the baraita should add that to the cases: “im shama ve-geirash,” another case of hakamah. But since it does not say that, “shema minah geirushin ke-shetikah damu.” So from the seifa, on the contrary, you infer that geirushin is like shetikah, because it was not listed among the things that are me-kayem. We have a contradiction between the implications: the reisha implies it is hakamah, while the seifa implies it is shetikah.
So the Gemara says, “Ella me-ha leika le-mishma minah”: you cannot infer anything from the baraita. For some reason, the baraita omitted geirushin altogether. If the reisha is davka—let’s say I tell you that geirushin is like hakamah—then the reason the reisha did not list geirushin is that it is really hakamah. That was the implication of the reisha, because it discussed all the cases where there is a shetikah, and therefore the father gets the rights. If you say the reisha is davka, then I will tell you that the seifa omitted it because of the reisha. Keep reading. If the seifa is davka, meaning it omitted geirushin specifically because it wants to teach that it is like hakamah, then the reisha left it out because of the seifa.
In other words, we do not know which part is davka. We do not know if the reisha is davka, since it left geirushin out of the reisha and also out of the seifa. So now I can infer: why did it leave it out of the reisha? Because that is the law. The reisha discusses cases considered shetikah, meaning when the husband is silent, does nothing, and it is still the same day. Authority goes back to the father. It did not mention geirushin because geirushin is hakamah. Very good. If you want to say that the reisha gives the real inference, that is why it did not mention it. But then why did it not mention it in the seifa, which discusses cases of hakamah? It wanted to be consistent: just as it did not mention it in the reisha, it did not mention it in the seifa. But if you say the seifa is davka, and it did not mention it because it is not hakamah, why did it not put it in the reisha? Again, because it wanted to be consistent. Since it did not mention it in the reisha, it did not mention it in the seifa. The point is, you do not know which one is davka. Therefore, you cannot infer anything from either case. The baraita is off the table; you cannot use it as a re'ayah for this question. It could be that the reisha is davka, or it could be that the seifa is davka. The Gemara is saying that one of them has to be the right way, so why did it not discuss the subject at all? Because it wanted to discuss cases it could address in both the reisha and the seifa. Geirushin could be mentioned in only one of them, because it applies to only one of them, so it did not mention it at all. The point is that you cannot infer anything from this source.
Now we go to the next proof. The Gemara says, “Ta shema,” another re'ayah. From where? “Nadrah,” she made a neder, “ve-hi arusah,” while she was in eirusin. So far, who has authority here? The father and the husband, jointly. “Ve-nitgarshah,” she got divorced, “ve-nitarseh bo bayom,” and she became engaged again the same day. “Afilu le-me'ah”—even 100 times. What is the law? “Aviha u-va'alah ha-acharon,” or even le-me'ah, the 100th, “mefirin nedareha.” What do you see here? “Shema minah geirushin ke-shetikah damu.” Very clear. When the first husband divorced her, it is considered like shetikah. How do I know? Because when the next guy marries her, he still has the right to be mefer with the father. If geirushin were like hakamah, could the last arus be mefer nedarim that the first arus was me-kim? Of course not. So this is a clear proof that it must be shetikah.
The Gemara says, “No proof. Hacha be-mai askinan? Be-shelo shama arus rishon.” The case is talking about where the first arus never heard about the neder. So there is nothing to discuss: he does not block it at all. The only case where you can start bringing proofs is if he heard about the neder, knew about it, and got divorced. Then how do you consider it? But if he did not hear that there was a neder, there is nothing to discuss.
The Gemara asks a very strong question: “I hachi, mai irya bo bayom?” If the first husband did not hear anything, why make such a big deal of telling me that he got divorced and she got married that same day? Bo bayom matters only if the first guy heard the neder. Then you need bo bayom so that his silence does not become hakamah. But if the arus did not hear about it, then even after 100 days, what is the difference? The clock has not started ticking. So why make a case of bo bayom?
The Gemara says, “Ke-shelo shama arus ve-shama ha-av.” The case is where the arus did not hear about it, but the father did. “De-bo bayom hu de-matzi mefer, aval mi-kan va-eilach lo matzi mefer.” The father has to be mefer on that day; from then on, he cannot. So the case is not really much of a chiddush anymore: the father heard about it, but the arus did not. What does that tell us? First, we have no re'ayah for our situation, because once the arus did not hear about it, you cannot discuss whether geirushin is considered shetikah or hakamah. He did not know about it, so take that proof off the table.
Now let’s explain the case for its own sake. The case is that the man made eirusin, then got divorced bo bayom. Why tell me about bo bayom and that she got engaged again to somebody else? Because the discussion is about the father’s side of the equation. The father heard about the neder the first time, so we are telling you that the father has only one day. If it were a different day and the father had not been mefer, it would already be considered a hakamah. We are discussing the father’s side: he had heard about it, and the bo bayom detail allows the father to still have hafarah until the end of that same day. If the day passed and the father did not make hafarah, the neder would already be mekuyam. Therefore, you have no re'ayah for the case we are trying to establish.
So the Gemara says, “Ta shema.” Another proof: “Nadrah bo bayom”—she made a neder that day. “Geirshah,” the arus divorced her; “ve-hechzirah bo bayom,” he took her back that same day. “Ein yachol lehafer.” Aha, clearly he cannot be mefer. What does that show? “Shema minah geirushin ke-hakamah damu.” You see it is like hakamah. The text explicitly says that he divorced her, knew about the neder, and took her back; now it is too late.
The Gemara says, “Amri hacha be-nisu'in askinan.” In this situation, do not learn that it was all eirusin. One of the marriages here was actually nisuin. That is why “ein yachol lehafer”: “mishum de-ein ha-ba'al mefer be-kodmin.” The man was an arus, she made a neder, he heard about it, and everything was fine. Then he divorced her. But he did not re-engage her; he remarried her. Once he remarries her, he cannot make hafarah because we have a rule: “ein ha-ba'al mefer be-kodmin.” Once she gets married, he has no right to be mefer be-kodmin. Therefore, this case cannot resolve our question. Even if geirushin were considered shetikah, he could not be mefer here because he is nasui, married. The marriage is what prevents him from making hafarah.
Let’s speak this out clearly, because somebody will ask: what do you mean that with nisuin he has less power than with eirusin? With eirusin he is allowed to be mefer nedarim that were made before the eirusin, but with nisuin he cannot be mefer nedarim that were made before the nisuin. There is a sevara, a logic. For nedarim made before the nisuin, the father had rights; they shared authority. Once nisuin happens, the father is removed. What is the rule? Once the father is removed, the husband is removed too. Once the father had rights and can no longer act, the husband also can no longer act. But with eirusin, they both had equal rights.
So it is not that she has less jurisdiction in general. For nedarim going forward, the husband has exclusive authority over them; the father has no rights at all. But for the old nedarim, the father had a hold on them, and now he is no longer there. The rule is that once you started with a shutafut and one of the partners is no longer there, the other partner cannot break it without the first partner. Therefore, those nedarim cannot be resolved. We have not proved our point. The Gemara leaves the question in abeyance. We do not know what geirushin is: hakamah or shetikah.
Let’s look at the le-inyan halachah. In the last Ran on the “u-le-inyan halachah,” it says: “Katav ha-Ramban zal, keivan di-be'ayan lo ifsheta, naktinan le-chumra.” We have to be machmir. “De-geirushin ke-hakamah damu.” It will be considered like a hakamah. Therefore, “ve-ha heicha de-nadra ve-shama ba'alah ve-geirshah ve-hechzirah be-yomo lo matzi mefer lah.” In the case where he was engaged, heard the neder, did not say anything, and just divorced her, we consider it like hakamah. The nafka minah is that when he re-engages her, he cannot be mefer, even though it is still bo bayom. It is considered like hakamah. That is the shitah of the Ramban. He uses the simple logic: we have a question and did not answer it, so we go le-chumra. When we do not answer a question about nedarim, we have to be machmir.
However, “aval ha-Rashba zal katav, nehi di-be'ayan lo ifsheta me-hanach matnyata de-matninan alah, ifsheta lan mi-meimra de-Shmuel.” You are right: we did not solve this dilemma in this sugya, but on daf ayin alef we already answered this question, at least according to Shmuel. “De-amar leih Ulla mena leih milta de-arus acharon mefer nedarim she-nir'u le-arus rishon?” That was Shmuel’s question on yesterday’s amud. How do we know the second arus can be mefer nedarim that the first arus knew about? What happened to the first arus? He divorced her, and she married somebody else. We said that those nedarim are taken up by the second ba'al. How do we know?
Yesterday we learned that he had a tradition from his rabbi: “De-chi tana be-matnitin bo bayom mishum shemi'at arus nakat lah ve-lo mishum shemi'at av.” When it said bo bayom in the Mishnah, in the case where she was engaged and then there was a divorce, bo bayom referred to the husband hearing the neder, not the father. If the father heard the neder and the husband did not, the husband has no right either. But Shmuel had a tradition from his rabbis that the case was talking about the first husband hearing the neder. He heard the neder and divorced her. That same day she went and married somebody else. What did Shmuel say? The second husband has the right to be mefer. What do you see? It must not be hakamah. It must be that the divorce is considered shetikah, because it gives the second husband rights.
He says, “Vecheivan de-Shmuel amar hachi lo shabkinan mai di-fshita le-Shmuel mishum mai de-istapka lehu be-Gemara.” The Ran says the Rashba puts it this way: we are not going to leave what was clear to Shmuel for what was uncertain to the Gemara. The Gemara here has a safek, but Shmuel did not have a safek, so I will go with Shmuel’s vadai. He knew the answer. He clearly said the second husband has rights. How did he understand the earlier case? As a woman who was engaged, whose arus knew about the neder. That is how Shmuel understood the case: the arus knew about the neder, divorced her, and then she married somebody else. Shmuel clearly said the second guy has rights, so you must see that divorce does not make hakamah; rather, it is considered shetikah.
So we have a fantastic machloket between the Rashba and the Ramban. The Ramban follows this sugya: there is no answer, so you have to go le-hachmir and say the geirushin is considered hakamah. The Rashba says, “No, I follow the sugya of Shmuel above. He knew the answer to this question. Although we have a safek in this Gemara, we are not going to leave the safek for what was clear to Shmuel.”
“Ah, ve-chi teima im kein mai ta'ama lo pashtinan be'aya mi-meimra de-Shmuel?” Why, then, do you not bring Shmuel as a proof? The whole sugya here is trying to understand the answer to the question. You tell me Shmuel already discussed it, so why does our sugya not bring Shmuel? The simple answer is: “Ika le-meimar di-mi-matnitin o mi-baraita ba'u le-mifsat ve-lo mi-meimra de-amora.” We want to prove it from a baraita or a Mishnah, a Tannaitic source. Shmuel is an Amora. This Gemara is saying that you cannot prove it to me from an earlier source, a tanna or a baraita or a Mishnah; I am not interested in an Amora’s statement for that purpose.
He says, “Ve-chavataih ha de-ba'inan lah be-perek Ein Bein Ha-Mudar.” We see a similar idea where the Gemara could have brought proofs from Amoraim but chose to bring proofs from Mishnayot and baraitot. Shmuel himself obviously had a tradition. He does not tell us where that tradition came from, but he had a tradition to understand the earlier case that way. Therefore, le-ma'aseh, there is a machloket among the rishonim.
The next Mishnah says: “Derech talmidei chachamim ad she-lo haytah bito yotza me-etzlo omer lah kol nedarim she-nadart be-toch beiti harei hen mufarim ve-chen ha-ba'al ad she-lo tikanes li-reshuto omer lah kol nedarim she-nadart ad she-lo tikanesi li-reshuti harei hen mufarim she-mishetikanes li-reshuto eino yachol lehafer.” The Mishnah tells us the way of talmidei chachamim: the father and also the arus. Once the girl gets married, the father loses his rights completely, and the ba'al also loses his rights over nedarim made beforehand. Those nedarim will remain, because nobody can be mefer them. So the custom of the talmidei chachamim was that before his daughter would get married, the father would make this declaration: “All the nedarim that you made under my jurisdiction, harei hen mufarim.” He would make a blanket statement, absolving all the nedarim she made under his jurisdiction. This is what talmidei chachamim would do.
The ba'al would do the same thing, because he knows that once he makes nisuin, he cannot act on the things done before the nisuin. He would say, together with the father, “Listen, all the nedarim made during this time, we are being mefer.” They both know that once she reaches the next stage of nisuin, they lose their rights. So they would be mefer everything at the time of the eirusin.
Look at the top line of the Ran: “Derech talmidei chachamim lefi she-na'arah me'orasah le-achar she-niseit, i efshar she-tehei hafarah le-nedareha.” For a na'arah me'orasah, after she gets married, there cannot be hafarah for her nedarim. What is the logic? The father cannot do it because she is in the husband’s jurisdiction. The husband cannot do it because he cannot do it alone; he has lost the father’s power over things that were done before. So, “darkan shel av u-va'al keshehen talmidei chachamim”: when both are talmidei chachamim, what do they do? “Lehafer nedareha kodem she-tinassei.” They make a blanket statement: “Whatever you have in play here, we are making a hafarah.”
Now the Gemara will ask: did they hear the neder or not? Is this just a blanket statement? Could you make hafarah for something that has not happened yet, that you do not know about? That is the Gemara’s subject.
Now the Gemara has a question: “Ba'ei Rami bar Chama.” Rami bar Chama has a she'eilah: “Ba'al, mahu she-yafer be-lo shemi'ah?” Can the husband—or, for that matter, the father—be mefer a neder without hearing it? The Ran explains: “Kegon shelo shama ve-lo yada klal im nadrah im lo.” You have no idea; you do not know whether she made a neder at all. “Mahu she-yafer al ha-safek?” Like our case in the Mishnah: can you just come along and say, “Listen, if there is a neder on you—I don’t know if there is one, I didn’t hear anything—you know what, I want to nullify it”? Could he do that?
What is the she'eilah based on? How do you learn the pasuk: “Ve-shama ishah,” davka or not davka? When the pasuk says “ve-shama ishah”—the husband will hear it—does that mean davka, that he actually has to hear it? Or is it not davka? Maybe the pasuk is just describing the normal case, where normally you make hafarah when you hear something, but the same law would apply even if he did not hear it.
The Gemara says, “Amar Rava ta shema.” He brings a re'ayah from our Mishnah: “Derech talmidei chachamim ad she-lo yatza bito me-etzlo omer lah kol nedarim she-nadart be-toch beiti harei hen mufarin. Ve-ha lo shama.” He did not hear the nedarim, right? He made a blanket statement: “Any nedarim you make during this time, I am making hafarah.” So what do you see? You do not have to hear the neder itself to make hafarah.
Look at the Ran. He says, “Amar Rava ta shema derech talmidei chachamim ve-ha lo shama di-medaktani kol nedarim.” That is the language of the Mishnah: “all the nedarim.” “Mashma de-lo shama, de-i sham'inhu havah leh le-meimar neder peloni u-floni.” Where is he bringing a proof? You could argue that the Mishnah is talking about where he heard the nedarim. No, because then the Mishnah would say, “This neder that I heard, and that neder that I heard, should be mufar.” But the fact that it says “all the nedarim” implies that the ones he heard and the ones he did not hear should all be mufar. So you see that you do not have to hear a neder to make hafarah. That is the Gemara’s re'ayah.
What does the Gemara answer? “Le-chisheyishma hu de-mefar.” He is saying, “When I hear about them, I will be mefer.” That really means he is doing nothing now. When he says, “Listen, any neder you make is mufar,” those are just words, because he has not heard the neder yet. What does he mean? “Listen, when I hear about it, I will be mefer.” So then the question is: when he hears about it, he will be mefer; why make this declaration if the declaration has no effect? The Gemara asks, “Im kein ki lo shama lamah leh le-meimar?” What is he saying, then? The Gemara is saying that he is telling his daughter, “When I hear about those nedarim, I will make hafarah.” But if hafarah does not work until he hears, what is he saying? When he hears it, he will make hafarah. Why give her this warning?
The Gemara says, “Ha ka mashma lan orcha de-tzurva me-rabanan le-ahdurei.” It is the way of talmidei chachamim to go back over things—to seek them out. What does that mean? The father does not want nedarim for his daughter, but he does not know every neder she made. He cannot make hafarah for ones he has not heard about. So what is he trying to do? He is trying to engage her in a conversation to draw out what she did. He says, “Hey, listen. When I hear about those nedarim, I’m telling you, I’ll make hafarah.” What does he gain by that, if he can do it when he hears them? Now he has opened up the subject. She might say, “Oh, the truth is, I made a neder the other day.” “Oh, okay.” That is just a way to find out, because he wants to break the nedarim before he loses his power. So you have no re'ayah from our Mishnah that it is talking about a case where he did not know about the neder. Really, you can break the nedarim only when you have heard about them.
Look at the Ran: “Orcha de-tzurva me-rabanan le-ahdurei.” Before that, he asks, “Im kein ki lo shama lamah leh le-meimar? Mah li lehafer al ha-safek hafarah she-einah mo'elet keivan she-sofo lachazor u-lehafer ke-sheyishma nidrah?” Exactly: what is he being mefer al ha-safek if it does not work anyway, since he will have to repeat it when he hears the neder? What is he doing? The Ran says, “Orcha de-tzurva me-rabanan le-ahdurei darko shel talmid chacham lachazor aleha ve-lomar lah kol nedarim she-nadart harei hen mufarim kedei le-hachnisah bi-devarim.” It is the way of a Torah scholar to go back over it and say, “All the nedarim you made are mufarim,” to draw her into a conversation. “She-mitokh kach hi notenet el libah ve-omeret neder peloni nadarti ve-hu mefer.” She will open up and say, “I made this neder,” and then the husband will make hafarah.
We will go back to this in a moment. Continue the Gemara. We have no re'ayah. “Ta shema, mi-seifa.” We will bring a re'ayah from the seifa of our Mishnah: “Ve-chen ha-ba'al.” In the case of the husband, “ad she-lo tikanes li-reshuto omer lah.” As long as she is still an arusah, the husband has the right to come along and say, “All the nedarim you have, I am being mefer.” Correct? He knows that once he makes nisuin, he loses the things done earlier. So what do you see? He makes a blanket statement before he has heard the nedarim. The same question we asked about the father now applies to the husband. The Gemara says, “Hacha nami de-amar lah le-chisheyishma'enah.” Same answer: “Listen, when I hear, then I will act.” He is not doing it now; he means to do it when he hears.
Look at the Ran. Let’s start where we stopped: “Ve-chi teima? Lamah lan le-dachukei nafshein behachi? Leima hachi de-amar lah le-chisheyishma'enah, kelomar de-kodem shemi'ah omer lah mufar lichi le-chisheyishma'enah, u-mahanei. De-hachi metartzinan le-kaman.” Why do we have to give the answer that he is doing this now to engage her in a conversation, but he will not actually be mefer? Give a simpler answer: he is making the hafarah now, but it will take effect when he hears it. Did we not just give that answer about the husband—“le-chisheyishma'enah,” meaning he is making the hafarah now, but it applies when he hears it? Just as we gave that answer for the ba'al, we could give it for the father.
The Ran says, “Yesh lomar lo dami.” It is not the same. When we give that answer later, “hanei milei be-omer le-ishto le-chisheyishma nami bi-rshuteih kayma.” At the time he will hear about the neder, he will still have authority over her. Let’s go one more ta shema, and then we will return to the Ran’s question.
“Ta shema: ha-omer le-ishto.” This is the case the Ran is talking about. A man tells his wife, “Kol nedarim she-tadori ad she-avo mi-mekom peloni”—all the nedarim you make until I return from such-and-such a place—“harei hen kayamin.” He wants to affirm them from now. “Lo amar kelum”: he has said nothing. But if he says, “Harei hen mufarin,” he is making hafarah. He has not heard the neder yet; she has not made it yet. He is just saying, “I’m going away for three weeks. Any neder you make in the meantime, from now until I return, I want to make hafarah for it.”
There is a machloket: “Rabbi Eliezer omer mufar.” Rabbi Eliezer says it works. “Ve-ha lo shama!” But he did not hear! “Hacha nami de-amar le-chisheyishma'enah.” He means, “Listen, obviously, since he has not heard it, the clock has not started. So I am telling you that when I hear about it, I want to make hafarah.” The Gemara asks, “Ve-lamah li me-hashta?” Why do it now? It has no effect. “Le-chisheyishma le-yifer lah.” When he hears about it, let him make hafarah. Why give this warning? “Kasavar dilma matridna hahi sha'ata.” He is concerned that maybe when he hears about it, he will be busy. He wants to say in advance, “On the day I hear that neder, I want to make hafarah.” Nothing happens now, because he has not heard about it yet. He wants to put it into motion because he is concerned that he may be busy that day. If he is busy, the day will pass and it will be considered hakamah. So he wants to start it now, just in case he gets busy later. But again, there is no re'ayah: you have to hear the neder.
Now let’s read the Ran. Start with “ve-ha lo shama.” Actually, look at the line before: “Harei mufarim, Rabbi Eliezer omer mufar, va-chachamim omrim eino mufar.” We do not have that in our girsa, but there is a machloket between Rabbi Eliezer and the chachamim. Rabbi Eliezer says you can be mefer in this way, and the chachamim say you cannot. Again, the man is going away and tells her, “All the nedarim you make until I come back, I am making hafarah.” Rabbi Eliezer says it is mufar; the chachamim say it is not mufar.
The Ran says, “Ve-ha lo shama, lav be-de-Rabbi Eliezer bilchud pashteh, ela afilu be-de-Rabbanan, de-ad kan lo peligi Rabbanan aleih de-Rabbi Eliezer ela mishum de-achti lo chaylei, u-chede-mehadrei lei inhu de-keivan de-lo ba'u le-chlal hekem, aval hacha le-chulei alma mehani af al gav de-lo shama.” That means everybody agrees that if he did not hear the neder, it is okay to be mefer. The Rabbanan argue here only because she has not even made a neder yet. “Al-ma de-shama ish aleha davka.” The Gemara’s answer is, “Hacha nami le-chisheyishma.” Here too, it is talking about where he means to act when he hears it. Then the question is, if that is what he means, why do it now? Let him do it when he hears. The Gemara answers that he may be busy.
There are different girsa'ot here. Before we get confused by them, the Gemara’s answer is that here too he meant “le-chisheyishma.”
The Gemara continues: “Ta shema,” another re'ayah. “Ha-omer le-apotropos,” a man tells his agent, “Kol nedarim she-tador ishti mi-kan ve-ad she-avo mi-mekom peloni hafer.” I am giving you the authority. I am going away; any neder my wife makes, you have the right to be mefer. “Ve-hefer lah”: the agent exercised his authority. “Yachol yehu mufarin?” Does it work? Can you appoint a shaliach to be mefer nedarim? “Talmud lomar, ishah yekimenu ve-ishah yeferenu.” He has to do it; the husband makes the hakamah and the husband makes the hafarah. These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyah.
Rabbi Yonatan says, “What are you talking about? Matzinu be-chol ha-Torah kulah shelucho shel adam kemoto.” Don’t we have a standing rule that whatever you can do, you can appoint a messenger to do? You can put your messenger in your place. So according to Rabbi Yonatan, you can let your messenger do it.
“Ve-afilu Rabbi Yoshiyah,” even Rabbi Yoshiyah says this only because “gzeirat ha-katuv hu ishah yekimenu ve-ishah yeferenu.” There is a special gzeirat ha-katuv for nedarim, so it does not work there. But everybody agrees with the concept of shelucho shel adam kemoto; without that gzeirat ha-katuv, it would work.
But the husband did not hear the neder. So what do you see? A husband can have hafarah even if he has not heard it. Where is that hafarah coming from? The husband is giving the shaliach the rights to do it. Even though the husband did not hear it, the hafarah is going to work. So obviously you do not have to hear it.
Look at the Ran: “Ve-ha lo shama, kelomar, ba'al, al-ma lo ba'ya shemi'ah.” You do not need shemi'ah. You might ask, as the Ran does, “Ve-chi teima le-olam eima lach de-ba'ya shemi'ah.” No, I will tell you that you need shemi'ah, “ve-shani hacha de-ika shemi'at apotropos.” The agent heard it, and since shelucho shel adam kemoto, it is as if the ba'al heard it. So you have no re'ayah in this case. Somebody heard it: the agent heard it, and he is like the husband.
Tosafot, in the name of Rabbeinu Yosef zal, answer that this is not so. If you say that shemi'ah is required, “mi ika midi de-ba'al lo matzi mefer ve-shaliach matzi mashvei?” It cannot work: you cannot make the shaliach stronger than the husband himself. He says, “De-im ita de-ba'ya shemi'ah, mi ika midi de-ba'al lo matzi mefer?” In this situation, would the ba'al be able to be mefer? No, because he did not hear it. Are you going to say that the shaliach has the right to be mefer? You cannot hold that. In this scenario, could the ba'al do this? Not because he is absent—that is a technicality—but because he has not heard it yet. If the ba'al cannot make it take effect in this situation, the shaliach cannot make it take effect either.
How do you know that principle? Tosafot proves it. He says, “De-im ita de-ba'ya shemi'ah mi ika midi de-ba'al lo matzi mefer ve-shaliach matzi mefer? De-mai ta'ama gufei okimna le-hach baraita de-Masechet Nazir de-Rabbi Eliezer de-amar mefer nidrei ishto kodem she-tidor de-yilef mi-Rabbanan? Heichi dami de-Rabbi Yonatan matzi nami ve-chol Torah kuleih shelucho shel adam kemoto? Ve-i mi ika midi de-ihu lo matzi mefer keivan de-achti lo nadrah ishto ve-shaliach matzi mefer?” We are saying that Rabbi Eliezer holds that you can be mefer before she makes the neder. So how can Rabbi Yonatan say that the shaliach can act by the whole Torah through shelucho shel adam kemoto? If there is a case where the husband cannot be mefer because his wife has not yet made the neder, but the shaliach can be mefer, then the shaliach is stronger than the husband. “Mishum hachi shafir muchach de-lo ba'ya shemi'ah.” If the agent heard it, what difference would it make? Since the husband cannot be mefer because he did not hear it, the shaliach cannot be mefer either. That is the basic sevara the Ran wants to use: when we say shelucho shel adam kemoto, the shaliach has to have equal power. In this case, the husband did not hear. It will not work for him, so how could it work for the shaliach?
The Gemara wants to prove from here that you do not have to have shemi'ah. It seems we have proved our point. The Gemara says, “No proof.” Why? “Hacha nami de-amar lei lechi sham'ana mefer lah.” Same story again. The man tells the apotropos, “I want you to be mefer all the nedarim,” because he is going away. We thought this showed that the husband did not hear about them, so you do not have to hear. No: he said, “I want you to be mefer them, but they will not be mufar until I hear about them.” The Gemara asks, “Lechi shemi'a le-yifer lah.” What are you appointing a shaliach for? If it does nothing, you can make hafarah when you hear the neder. He is concerned about the tirda factor. When she makes the neder and he hears it, he might be busy and forget to make hafarah. So he appoints the shaliach to make sure that, when it happens, it will be taken care of.
Look at the Ran: “Hacha nami de-amar lei lechi sham'ana,” meaning he tells the apotropos, “Kol nedarim she-tador ishto, ishti hafer ve-tachul hafaratah,” but the hafarah is pending. When does the hafarah take effect? “Lechi sham'ana,” when I hear it. The apotropos says the same thing to the wife: “Mufar lichi lechi shama ba'alech.” All the nedarim you make will be mufar when your husband hears about them. The shaliach has to use that language too. The point is to set it in motion now so the husband does not get busy later. But if the apotropos just says, “All your nedarim are mufar,” it does not work. He has to say clearly that they will be mufar when the husband hears. The apotropos is no more powerful than the husband himself, and the husband himself requires hearing.
Now let’s go back to the Ran. We have the sugya: the Gemara did not answer the question; it leaves us with a she'eilah, and we are moving on. We have to go back to the Ran and work through the girsa'ot he is dealing with. The basic structure is: re'ayah, rejected; re'ayah, rejected; and the Gemara leaves the matter as a she'eilah.
Let’s go back to the original Ran, where we started. The first re'ayah the Gemara tried to bring was from “the tamid from a from the Mishnah.” What was the case? A father knows that once this girl gets married, he loses his rights at the time of nisuin. So what does he do at the time of eirusin? He says, “All the nedarim you make under my authority, I want to be mefer.” The Gemara assumed he did not hear about them. So you see that it works. The Gemara says, “No, he meant when he hears about it.” So right now he is doing nothing. Why not wait until he hears about it? The Gemara’s answer was that it is the way of a father to draw it out, so she will say, “I made this neder and that neder,” and then they will be able to be mefer.
Let’s go back to the Ran: “Orcha de-tzurva me-rabanan le-ahdurei darko darko shel talmid chacham lachazor aleha ve-lomar lah, kol nedarim she-nadart harei hen mufarim, kedei le-hachnisah bi-devarim, she-be-tokh kach hi notenet el libah ve-omeret, neder peloni nadarti, ve-hu mefer.” Good.
“Ve-chi teima, lamah lanu le-dachukei nafshein behachi?” Why do we have to strain to give this kind of answer? Why not give the simpler answer that we give later: “De-amar lah, lechi sham'ana,” meaning, when I hear about it? Did we not use that answer throughout the Gemara? “Lechi sham'ana”: when I hear about it. “Kelomar, de-kodem shemi'ah omer lah mufar lichi lechi sham'ana. U-mehanei, de-hachi metartzinan le-kaman.” Why not say, as we do in the other answers, that it is mufar when I hear about it?
The Ran says, “Yesh lomar lo dami.” It is not the same. “De-le-kaman, ki metartzinan hachi, hanei milei be-omer le-ishto.” In one of the cases we discussed, he told his wife, “Listen, all the nedarim you make in the meantime, I will be mefer.” We asked, “What do you mean? He did not hear about them.” The answer was, “Lechi sham'ana,” when I hear about them. Why is he doing it? He is worried he will get busy. But in that case, “de-lechi sham'ana mi-birshuteih kayma”: even when he hears the nedarim, she is still in his jurisdiction, because they are married. That is why, in the case of a married woman, you can say “lechi sham'ana.” Even when he hears the neder, he still has authority over her.
But here, “de-lechi shama kevar yatze'ah mi-reshut ha-av, she-harei niseit.” What is the case with the father? At the time of eirusin, he has rights. He says, “All the nedarim you are going to make during eirusin, I’m knocking them out, lechi sham'ana.” But when will he hear about them? When she is married. Too late. Once she is married, she is out of his jurisdiction. So you cannot give the “lechi sham'ana” answer for the father, because the father’s status changes at the time of nisuin. “Ki amar lah lechi sham'ana mai havei, harei bi-she'at shemi'ah einah bi-rshuto.” When he hears it, she is no longer in his jurisdiction. That is why you could not give the “lechi sham'ana” answer for the father. With the husband, the husband never loses his jurisdiction; he is still married to her when he hears about it. So he can say, “When I hear about it, I’ll act.” When I hear about it, you are still mine; you are still married to me. Therefore, that answer works.
Next in the Ran: “Ta shema ve-chen ha-ba'al.” The Gemara’s next question was about the husband. He was trying to be mefer nedarim while she was engaged. What did he tell her? “All the nedarim you have, I’m going to be mefer,” because he knows that once he makes nisuin, he loses his rights. He did not hear them. Now look at the wording of this girsa: “Hacha nami lechi shama.” Here too, it is “when I hear.” According to this girsa, it is exactly the same answer as the first one: “Ve-ha ka mashma lan de-orcha de-tzurva me-rabanan le-ahdurei.” Just as the father wants to draw her into a conversation, so too the arus, who is also a talmid chacham, does not want any nedarim that he cannot absolve. He draws her into the conversation so she will say, “I made this neder and that neder.” The same answer applies to the father and the husband, word for word. That is one style of the Gemara.
Now look at the next one. “Ve-ika nuschei de-garsei hacha”: some girsa'ot have the husband’s case say “lechi sham'ana,” when I hear. The idea is that although the father cannot act after she hears about it, the same is true for the husband: after he hears about it, he cannot act, because the husband cannot be mefer be-kodmin.
Even so, although you cannot answer the father’s case by saying “lechi sham'ana,” you can answer the husband’s case that way. He can make the condition now, while she is still an arusah: “When I hear it.” What do you mean, when he hears it she will be a nesuah? The difference is that the father cannot do this because, at nisuin, she leaves his jurisdiction completely. But the husband, on the contrary, has her entering more deeply into his jurisdiction at nisuin. Why do we say the husband cannot be mefer be-kodmin? Because the father is no longer involved. Once the father is out, the husband no longer has the joint authority.
But here, the father made his chelek before she married. Now only the husband remains. The husband also joined his hafarah to the father’s hafarah before she married. The Gemara is making a big chiddush according to this girsa. It answers this way: in the father’s case, everything has to happen at the time of eirusin. He is only drawing her into the subject, as we said. When he finds out about it after she is nesuah, he is out; it is too late. But in the husband’s case, even if he hears about it at the time of nisuin, he has a right to act. So he can say to her at the time of eirusin, “Lechi shema'ana,” meaning, “When I hear about it,” even after the marriage.
But wait: at the time of nisuin, you cannot be mefer be-kodmin. Why can he do it in this case? The father cannot do it at the time of nisuin because he is completely out of his jurisdiction. But for the husband, nisuin brings her further into his jurisdiction. The reason the husband cannot be mefer be-kodmin is that once the father is out, the husband loses the joint authority. Here, the father was not out when he made his hafarah: at the time of eirusin, the father did his part. The husband says, “When I hear about it.” So the father’s hafarah was already in place at the time of eirusin, and the husband hears about it at the time of nisuin. Since she is still technically in his jurisdiction, the husband can be mefer nedarim from before, as long as he stipulated at the time of eirusin—which he did, with “lechi shema'ana.” It is as if he set it in motion at eirusin, with the father’s hafarah already working, and said, “When I hear about it, I will be mefer, even later.”
So according to this girsa, the Gemara answers the husband’s case with “lechi shema'ana.” We have two girsa'ot. The first says exactly the same answer for both cases: everything has to happen at the time of eirusin; there is no difference between the father and the arus. Once there is nisuin, they both lose their rights, so everything has to be in motion at the time of eirusin, and he has to hear about it then. The second answer says no: there is a difference between the father and the arus. The father has to hear everything at the time of eirusin. Why does he say it now if it will not help until he hears? He wants to draw her into the conversation so she will reveal the neder and he can be mefer. But the husband can be talking about “lechi shema'ana” after the marriage, because he will still have rights at that point.
Those are the two girsa'ot the Ran is dealing with. Either the same answer applies to the father and the ba'al, or the answer for the father is that he repeats it to seek out the information, while the answer for the husband is “lechi shema'ana.” That is all.
Now we have to go to one more piece of the Ran, on the first amud. Ayin-gimmel? Yes, ayin-gimmel. What was the last re'ayah? The case of the shaliach. A man comes along and tells the shaliach, “Go make hafarah for my wife’s nedarim. Any neder she makes while I’m away, handle it.” We said it is a machloket between Rabbi Yoshiyah and Rabbi Yonatan. Rabbi Yonatan says, “I agree with the concept shelucho shel adam kemoto, but not by nedarim.” Rabbi Yoshiyah… But the bottom line is that they agree that the husband does not have to hear the neder. The husband did not hear it. So what do you see? You do not have to hear the neder.
The Gemara says, “No, no, no. He is telling the shaliach, ‘Handle it, make hafarah, but it is not mufar until I hear about it.’” What is he doing, then? When he hears about it, he will make hafarah. He is worried he might get busy, so he wants to set it in motion now. Look at the Gemara. The Ran says, “Ve-chi shama lefer lah, de-keivan de-sof sof lo chalah hafarah ad de-shama ba'al, hahi sha'ata lefer lah.” If the hafarah does not take effect until the ba'al hears, he can make it at that time. What is he doing with the shaliach? “Savar, dilma matridna,” he thinks, “I might forget to make hafarat nedareha.” So he sets it in motion through the shaliach. What does the shaliach tell her? “I am being mefer when the husband finds out about it.”
Now look at the Ran’s question: “Ve-hatam be-Masechet Nazir parchinan, le-mai de-mokminan hatam ha matnita ke-Rabbi Eliezer, de-amar she-ha-ba'al yachol lehafer nidrei ishto af al pi she-lo chalu.” According to what we are learning, this follows Rabbi Eliezer, who says that the ba'al can be mefer his wife’s nedarim even before they take effect. Why, then, does he need to appoint an apotropos? Let him do it himself when he leaves. Rabbi Eliezer says that he can be mefer nedarim before they happen. So why does he have to tell the shaliach? Before leaving his wife, he could just say, “Any nedarim you make until I come back, I will be mefer.” The Ran answers: he is concerned that before he leaves, he may get involved in something and forget to do it. So he appoints a shaliach to take care of it.
But, the Ran asks, “Ve-lefer lah ihu hashta.” Do it now. When he remembers or finds out about it, he can do it at that moment. What are you worried about? You are worried that he will forget to set it in motion before he leaves. When he hears about it, he will make hafarah then. The Ran answers, “Ve-yesh lomar, de-lo nicha lei lehafer nedarim she-tidor be-odah etzlo, de-dilma nadrah midi de-nicha lei, de-titztar beh.” He does not want to break nedarim she makes while he is still with her, because maybe she will vow something that he wants her to have to deal with.
Let me review. The Ran’s question is basically: what do you need the shaliach for? If we are following Rabbi Eliezer in Masechet Nazir, he held that you are allowed to be mefer a neder before the neder is even made, for a later date when it will be made. So let the husband, before he leaves, without a shaliach, tell his wife, “Any neder you make while I’m gone, when I eventually hear about it, I’m being mefer.” The Ran says we could be worried that he will be caught up in the moment of leaving and will not do it. All right, let him do it two weeks before he leaves. He has time; he is not flustered. He can say, “Any neder you make, when I hear about it, I will be mefer.”
The Ran says that is not good, because during those two weeks there might be nedarim she makes that he wants. So he does not want to leave himself that two-week window. There is still another option: two weeks before, he can say, “Whatever neder you make from when I leave”—protecting himself in that two-week window—“when I hear about it, it will be mufar.” The Ran answers that there is still a benefit to appointing a shaliach: the retraction factor. When he does it himself and says, “Any neder is mufar when I hear about it,” he cannot retract it. He set it in motion himself. Once he hears about that neder, it is over. Let’s say he changes his mind: too late. But if he appointed a shaliach, he can change his mind and say, “I don’t want to be mefer my wife’s nedarim now.” Since he did not do it himself, he can tell the shaliach, “I’m revoking my shelichut.” Once he revokes the shelichut, the shaliach loses his authority. That is why the case has to involve shelichut.
Le-ma'aseh, this sugya did not resolve the question. The Ran concludes—let’s read to where we are: “Ve-yesh lomar de-lo nicha lei lehafer nedarim she-tidor be-odah etzlo,” he does not want to break nedarim she makes while he is with her, “de-dilma nadrah midi de-nicha lei de-titztar beh,” because maybe he wants to me-kayem such a neder. But there is still the question: why not let him do it now, for any neder she makes when he leaves?
“Ve-zeh leshono: ve-anu tzerichei iyun, de-i efshar de-ba'al chayish dilma ba'ei le-mehedar be-hafarah zo.” Perhaps the ba'al is concerned that he will want to retract this hafarah. “Ve-i mefer hu me-hashta,” if he makes the hafarah now, “lo matzi hadar beh.” He cannot retract, because once he sets it in motion himself, it is locked in. “Ve-chi memaneh apotropos kol sha'ah ve-sha'ah be-yado hi.” But when he appoints an apotropos, it remains in his hands at every moment, “de-i ba'ei le-mehedar bi-shelichuteih de-shaliach matzi hadar”: if he wants to retract the shaliach’s appointment, he can.
The Ran concludes: “Ve-af be'aya af al gav de-lo mifashta hacha, mifashta mi-be'aya de-besamuch.” Even though we did not resolve the question here, we will resolve it later: “de-ba'al mefer be-lo shemi'ah.” The husband can indeed make hafarah without hearing it. Baruch Hashem le'olam amen ve-amen.