The seventh, or rather the eighth, chapter of the second section of the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Nazir, begins with a discussion of a specific case involving two individuals who have taken a nazirite vow. The Mishnah presents a scenario where two nazirites are walking together, and a person approaches them, stating, "I saw one of you come into contact with a source of ritual impurity, but I do not know which one."
In such a situation, both individuals are obligated to observe the laws of a nazirite who has become impure. This means that after thirty days, they must both shave their heads. They collectively bring offerings: a set of offerings for ritual impurity, and a set of offerings for ritual purity. They then make a declaration: "If I am the impure one, the offering for impurity is mine, and the offering for purity is yours. Conversely, if I am the pure one, the offering for purity is mine, and the offering for impurity is yours."
Following this, they must count another thirty days. This is because the individual who was actually impure must complete the full thirty days of their nazirite vow in a state of purity. After this second thirty-day period, they again collectively bring one set of offerings for purity. They make a similar stipulation: "If I was already pure, I do not need this offering; the earlier offering for impurity was yours, and this offering for purity is yours. If you are the pure one, then the earlier offering for purity was mine, and the offering for impurity was yours, and this offering for purity is yours." This intricate process ensures that all halachic requirements are met despite the uncertainty.
The Gemara then raises a question regarding this Mishnah. It cites the general rule of "doubt of impurity in a private domain is considered impure." This rule, derived from the case of a sotah (a woman suspected of adultery), applies when there are only two individuals present and a doubt of impurity arises. In such a scenario, the law treats the situation stringently, considering it impure.
The Gemara's question is: In our Mishnah's case, there are three people involved—the two nazirites and the witness who saw the impurity. A situation involving three people is generally considered a "doubt of impurity in a public domain," where the ruling is usually lenient, deeming it pure. So why does the Mishnah treat it as impure, requiring both nazirites to bring offerings?
The Gemara answers that the witness was not physically present with the nazirites when the impurity occurred. He merely observed it from a distance. Therefore, the incident effectively took place in a private domain relative to the nazirites, even though a third party saw it from afar. The witness's statement, "I do not know which one," implies he never knew, rather than he knew and forgot, further supporting the idea that he was not close enough to discern. Thus, it remains a case of "doubt of impurity in a private domain," which is treated as impure.
Tosafot, however, raises a different question. If the rule of "doubt of impurity in a private domain is considered impure" is derived from a sotah, where only one woman is involved, how can it apply to two nazirites? In the sotah case, there's no doubt that the woman might be pure; the doubt is whether she is impure. But in the case of two nazirites, the witness explicitly stated that "one of you came into contact with impurity," meaning one is definitely impure and one is definitely pure. This differs from the sotah, where the possibility of purity is not explicitly stated for one of two individuals. Therefore, if the rule is derived from sotah, it should only apply to a single individual, not to two where one is certainly pure.
The Gemara's initial question was based on the assumption that if it were a public domain, both should be pure. Tosafot's question challenges the very premise of applying the sotah analogy to two individuals, regardless of public or private domain. Tosafot explains that the Gemara's question implies that if the rule is derived from sotah, then only one person can be considered impure. Since here we have two, and one is certainly pure, the rule should not apply to make both impure. The Gemara's question was, "Why should they both be pure?" if the rule of "doubt of impurity in a private domain is considered impure" applies. Tosafot's answer is that this particular opinion does not derive the rule of "doubt of impurity in a private domain is considered impure" from sotah but from another source that allows it to apply even when more than one person is involved.
Returning to the Mishnah, the Gemara notes that after the first thirty days, both nazirites shave their heads. This is permissible because one is shaving as a pure nazirite and the other as an impure nazirite, both of whom are required to shave. The problem arises with the second shaving, thirty days later, when they bring only one offering for purity. This implies both shave again. However, the one who was truly pure has already completed their nazirite vow and should not be allowed to shave again, as this would violate the prohibitions of "not shaving the corners of the head" and "not destroying the corners of the beard." A nazirite is permitted to shave their entire head only when fulfilling their vow.
The Gemara asks, "Perhaps the individual is not impure, and he is performing a forbidden shaving?" Shmuel provides an amazing answer: The Mishnah is referring to a woman or a minor, for whom the laws of "not shaving the corners of the head" and "not destroying the corners of the beard" do not apply. Therefore, they can both shave a second time without issue.
The Gemara then asks, "Why not establish the case as a grown man who shaves his entire head?" This question refers to an opinion that holds that shaving the entire head is not considered a violation of "not shaving the corners of the head," which only applies when one leaves the hair on top and shaves around the sides. The fact that the Mishnah does not offer this explanation implies that Shmuel holds that shaving the entire head is indeed considered a violation of "not shaving the corners of the head."
Rav Huna then makes a statement: "One who shaves a minor's head is liable." This is an interesting point because, while a minor is not obligated by the prohibition of "not shaving the corners of the head," the person who performs the act of shaving for the minor is liable. The Torah states, "You shall not shave," which applies to the action of shaving itself, regardless of whether the recipient is obligated.
Rava questions Rav Huna's ruling. He observes that in his time, it was customary for children to have their heads shaved, removing their sideburns. If it is forbidden for a man to shave a minor's head, then who is performing this act for the children? Someone must be committing a transgression. Rav Huna replies that his wife, Choba, shaves their children's heads. This implies a distinction: a man is liable for shaving a minor's head, but a woman is not.
Rava cannot accept this distinction. He returns home and tells his wife, "Will Choba bury her children?" This is a rhetorical question, expressing his incredulity and suggesting that if a man is forbidden, a woman should also be forbidden, and she should fear divine punishment for transgressing. The Gemara notes that as long as Rava was alive, Rav Huna's children did not reach adulthood, fulfilling Rava's ominous statement.
The Gemara then clarifies the disagreement between Rav Huna and Rava. Both rabbis agree that shaving the entire head is considered a violation of "not shaving the corners of the head." This is evident because Rav Huna would not allow a man to shave a minor's head, and Rava questioned why a woman would be permitted if a man is forbidden. The core of their dispute lies in whether a woman is included in the prohibition of "not shaving the corners of the head" at all.
According to Rav Huna, women are entirely exempt from this prohibition. They are not included in the category of individuals to whom the prohibition of "not shaving the corners of the head" applies, nor are they included in the prohibition of "not destroying the corners of the beard." Therefore, a woman can shave a minor's head, and even a grown man's head, without transgressing. The man who allows his head to be shaved might be liable, but the woman performing the act is not. This is Rav Huna's leniency. His stringency, however, is that a man is forbidden to shave a minor's head.
Rava, on the other hand, holds that a woman is included in the prohibition of "not shaving the corners of the head" if the person whose head she is shaving is obligated by the prohibition. The Torah's phrase, "You shall not shave," applies to both the one who shaves (the "shaver") and the one whose head is shaved (the "shaved"). If the "shaved" person is liable, then the "shaver" is also liable. Therefore, a woman cannot shave a grown man's head because a grown man is obligated. However, Rava's leniency is that since a minor is not obligated by the prohibition, a man can shave a minor's head without transgressing. This is because if the "shaved" person is not liable, the "shaver" is also not liable.
Thus, the difference between Rav Huna and Rava is a nuanced exchange of leniency and stringency. Rav Huna is lenient regarding women, allowing them to shave anyone's head, but stringent regarding men, prohibiting them from shaving a minor's head. Rava is stringent regarding women, prohibiting them from shaving a grown man's head, but lenient regarding men, allowing them to shave a minor's head. When Rava asked Rav Huna, "Will Choba bury her children?" he was not asking according to his own opinion, but rather challenging Rav Huna's distinction within Rav Huna's own framework. Rava argued that if a man is forbidden to shave a minor, there should be no difference for a woman, as the minor himself is not obligated. Rav Huna's response was that women are simply not included in the prohibition at all, which is why they can shave even a minor. This concludes the discussion of their respective views.