The Elliot B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Tractate Nasir, has been dedicated by our good friends Haimi and Dina Dana, may God protect them and grant them life, success, and blessing. May all their children grow according to our holy Torah and succeed in Torah study, observance of the commandments, marriage, and good deeds. In particular, may there be a complete recovery for Moshe ben Dina and Penina bat Esther, with healing of both soul and body, through the merit of the Messiah. Amen.
Today’s page is page 61, folio 1. We are three lines from the top of the page. We are discussing a case in the Mishnah in which a person actually has to shave four times as part of one process. For example, the person was a Nazirite and was also in doubt as to whether he had the status of someone afflicted with a skin disease, as well as in doubt as to whether he had become ritually impure through contact with a corpse.
In that case, he must shave after thirty days, after sixty days, after ninety days, and after 120 days, in order to resolve the doubt in each situation. One of those doubts—the third shaving, as we explained—was whether he had become an impure Nazirite. We know that an impure Nazirite must shave his head before beginning the period of pure Nazirite status. That is the regular procedure: a person is a Nazirite, becomes impure, loses the days he has counted, shaves, and then begins his Nazirite period again.
The question of the Gemara is as follows. We already learned that a person afflicted with a skin disease must shave with a razor. We also learned that an ordinary Nazirite shaves with a razor. But what is the status of the shaving of an impure Nazirite? Is the purpose merely to remove the hair so that he can begin his Nazirite period again? If so, it may not matter how he removes the hair; he could even use a depilatory cream. Or is shaving itself a commandment, in which case it must be done with a razor?
The Gemara presents the question in the context of our case involving the four shavings, although, as the Rosh says, it could have asked the question in the ordinary context of an impure Nazirite. When the Torah requires an impure Nazirite to shave, does he need a razor, or may his hair be removed in any manner?
The Gemara asks: These four shavings that you mentioned—are they all commandments, meaning that each must be performed with a razor, or are they merely intended to remove the hair of impurity so that the person can begin counting again?
What practical difference does this make? It makes a difference if he wants to use a depilatory. A depilatory is a cream that is applied to the hair and removes it, similar to the products commonly used by women. If the shaving is a commandment, the depilatory is ineffective for this purpose, because a razor is required. If the purpose is merely to remove the hair, however, a depilatory would suffice.
The Gemara then raises an objection from the wording of the Mishnah. The Mishnah says that he shaves four times. By grouping all four shavings together, it indicates that they share the same law. We already know that three of the four shavings are performed with a razor. Since the Mishnah places all four together, the shaving of impurity must also have the same status. If the purpose were merely to remove the hair so that he could begin counting again, three shavings would have been sufficient. From here we infer that the shaving is a commandment. The four shavings are treated equally, and the shaving of an impure Nazirite must also be performed with a razor.
This conclusion applies to the ordinary case of a Nazirite as well. When a regular Nazirite shaves, the shaving is a commandment and must be performed with a razor. It is not merely a technical way of removing the hair of impurity so that the person can start over.
This concludes that chapter, and we now begin the ninth chapter of Tractate Nazir, with the following Mishnah: “Cutheans have no Nazirite status.” The commentators immediately explain that, for these purposes, Cutheans have the status of gentiles. A particular sect converted, but their conversion was not considered legitimate. Some say that they converted out of fear and not for the sake of Heaven. Therefore, they have the legal status of gentiles.
“Cutheans have no Nazirite status.” This means that even if a Cuthean accepts Nazirite status upon himself, the laws of Nazirite status do not apply to him. He is not prohibited from wine, he does not become impure through contact with the dead, and the other laws of Nazirite status do not apply to him. The commentators further explain that he does not bring the offerings associated with Nazirite status. He is entirely outside the laws of Nazirite status.
“Women and slaves, however, have Nazirite status.” A slave here means a Canaanite slave. As we learned previously in the Gemara, a woman can accept Nazirite status upon herself. We also learn that a Canaanite slave can do so.
The Gemara derives this from verses. There is one stringency that applies to women but not to Canaanite slaves: the master can compel his slave to violate his Nazirite status, but a husband cannot compel his wife to do so.
What does this mean? If a slave accepts Nazirite status and the master hears about it, the master can nullify it on the day that he hears about it. But once that day has passed, or if he remained silent, the Nazirite status takes effect. The master can no longer come later and say, “I want you to drink wine.” The husband, by contrast, cannot come later and compel his wife to drink wine. In this respect, there is a stringency regarding women’s Nazirite status compared with that of slaves. The Gemara will explain the precise limits of the master’s authority as it proceeds.
The Gemara begins by asking: From where do we know this? Whenever the Gemara asks this question, it is seeking the biblical source for the law.
The Gemara cites the verse, “Speak to the Children of Israel.” The passage concerning the acceptance of Nazirite status says: “A man or a woman who makes a vow to accept Nazirite status, to abstain for the sake of God.” Since the passage begins, “Speak to the Children of Israel,” the Gemara expounds: “The Children of Israel,” but not gentiles. The phrase “and you shall say to them” comes to include slaves. Thus, “the Children of Israel” excludes gentiles, while “and you shall say to them” includes a Canaanite slave.
The Gemara asks: Why is the additional verse needed to include slaves? We have a general principle that every commandment to which a woman is obligated also applies to a Canaanite slave. Since women are obligated in the laws of Nazirite status, slaves should be included automatically.
The Gemara answers that the verse concerning vows says that a person binds himself with a prohibition. The wording implies that the person is in control of himself—that he belongs to himself. This would seem to exclude a Canaanite slave, whose person belongs to his master.
Since the laws of vows and Nazirite status are compared with one another—the words for “vow” and “Nazirite status” appear together in the same verse—we might have thought that the same principle applies to Nazirite status. Perhaps only someone who has control over himself can accept Nazirite status. The verse therefore teaches that a Canaanite slave is nevertheless included in the passage concerning Nazirite status.
The Gemara then asks why gentiles should be excluded from the laws of Nazirite status. Nazirite status is a form of vow, and gentiles are connected to vows and voluntary offerings. Gentiles may bring vows and freewill offerings. It would therefore be logical to think that they should also be included in the laws of Nazirite status and should be able to bring the associated offerings.
The Gemara answers from the wording “the Children of Israel.” The Children of Israel are included in the laws of Nazirite status, but gentiles are not. The phrase “and you shall say to them” includes Canaanite slaves.
The Gemara then returns to analyze this derivation. If “the Children of Israel” excludes gentiles, is that a general rule? Whenever a passage says “the Children of Israel,” does it always exclude gentiles?
The Gemara raises the laws of valuations as a challenge. The Torah says, “Speak to the Children of Israel,” in connection with the law of a valuation. A person can declare the monetary value prescribed by the Torah for himself or another person and donate that amount to the Temple. A gentile cannot declare, “My valuation is upon me,” in the ordinary manner. Nevertheless, the laws of valuations do apply in one respect: a Jew can accept upon himself the valuation of a gentile and donate that amount to the Temple.
Thus, although the verse says “the Children of Israel,” gentiles are not entirely excluded. The word “person” comes to include them in part. Why, then, should we not say the same thing regarding Nazirite status? The passage says “the Children of Israel” and also uses the word “person.” Perhaps “the Children of Israel” teaches that Jews bring the offering at the conclusion of the Nazirite process, while gentiles do not bring the offering. The word “person” would then teach that gentiles are nevertheless connected to the other aspects of Nazirite status, such as the prohibitions against wine and impurity. How do we know that gentiles are excluded entirely?
The Gemara answers that Nazirite status is different. One of the laws of Nazirite status is that a person may not become impure even through contact with his own parents. The verse states that a Nazirite may not become impure “for his father or for his mother.” This indicates that the law applies to someone who has a father within the relevant legal framework. A gentile does not have a father in that sense.
The Gemara asks what this means. Perhaps “father” refers to inheritance. When the Torah speaks of a father in a legal context, perhaps it means someone who can inherit property from his father and bequeath it to his children. A gentile, we might have thought, does not have the same laws of inheritance. Since he does not have a father in this sense, he would be excluded from Nazirite status.
That cannot be the explanation, because gentiles do inherit from their fathers. Rabbi Yohanan says that a gentile inherits from his father by Torah law. The proof is the verse concerning Esau: “I have given Mount Seir as an inheritance to Esau.” The descendants of Esau received the land as an inheritance, demonstrating that inheritance exists among gentiles as well. Therefore, the exclusion of gentiles from Nazirite status cannot be based simply on the absence of inheritance.
The Gemara returns to the verse concerning a father. Perhaps “for his father” refers to the commandment of honoring one’s father. A gentile is not included in the commandment of honoring a father in the same manner as a Jew. The verse would then mean that the Nazirite may not become impure for someone whom he is obligated to honor as a father. The Gemara rejects this as well. The verse does not explicitly say “honor your father”; it merely says “for his father.” How can we read the commandment of honoring a father into the verse?
The Tosafot raise a related question. When the Gemara initially considered the possibility that “father” refers to inheritance, it did not ask why the verse does not explicitly mention inheritance. The reason is that a father is naturally associated with inheritance, so that interpretation is not entirely outside the plain meaning of the word. But when the Gemara suggests that “father” refers to honoring one’s father, that is a greater interpretive extension. When the word “father” appears by itself, honoring one’s father is not necessarily the first meaning that comes to mind.
The Gemara therefore offers another explanation: the verse says, “For his father or for his mother,” and the laws of impurity apply only to someone who is subject to ritual impurity. A gentile is not subject to ritual impurity in the same manner. If a gentile touches a corpse, he does not become a primary source of impurity in order to transmit impurity to people and vessels. Since he is not included in the laws of impurity, he is not included in the laws of Nazirite status.
The Gemara challenges this answer. That principle itself must be established. From where do we know that a gentile is not subject to ritual impurity? These laws also require a source from the Torah; they cannot simply be assumed.
The Gemara cites the verse concerning a person who enters the Temple while impure: “Any person who becomes impure and does not purify himself.” The word used for “congregation” in this passage refers specifically to the congregation of Israel. Someone who is part of the congregation is subject to the laws of entering the Temple in a state of impurity. A gentile, however, is not included in the congregation of Israel. Therefore, he is not subject to this form of ritual impurity.
The Gemara asks: How do we know that the exclusion applies to becoming impure, rather than only to the punishment of excision for entering the Temple while impure? Perhaps a gentile does become impure, but is not liable for excision if he enters the Temple.
The Gemara brings another verse: “The pure person shall sprinkle upon the impure person.” This teaches that anyone who is subject to purification is also subject to impurity, while anyone who is not subject to purification is not subject to impurity. A gentile is not included in the laws of the sprinkling of the water prepared from the red heifer, nor does he undergo the corresponding purification process. Since he is not subject to purification, he is not subject to impurity.
The Gemara challenges this derivation as well. Perhaps a gentile is subject to impurity but not to purification. How do we know that the two are connected?
The Gemara answers from another verse: “A person who becomes impure and does not purify himself.” The verse could have said simply, “who does not become pure.” Why does it say, “does not purify himself”? The additional wording teaches that impurity and purification are linked. Someone who has the potential to purify himself is subject to impurity; someone who has no potential to purify himself is not subject to impurity.
Thus, the argument proceeds as follows. “The Children of Israel” teaches that Jews have Nazirite status, while gentiles do not. One might have argued that gentiles are excluded only from bringing the offering at the end of the Nazirite period but are still subject to the prohibitions against wine and impurity. The verse concerning the father of the Nazirite teaches that only someone subject to the laws of impurity is included in this passage. A gentile is not subject to impurity, and therefore is not subject to Nazirite status at all.
The Gemara then returns to the earlier argument. We had said that the exclusion might be connected to the absence of a father. The Gemara asks: What do you mean that a gentile has no father? Perhaps he has no father in relation to inheritance.
Rabbi Aha bar Yaakov answers that Nazirite status is different. The Torah speaks about inheritance in connection with a Canaanite slave: “You shall bequeath them to your children after you.” A Canaanite slave has a particular legal status in the laws of inheritance. A Jewish master can bequeath such a slave to his children.
The Gemara formulates the principle as follows: Anyone who has a recognized inheritance in this area is subject to impurity; anyone who does not have such an inheritance is not subject to impurity. A gentile is not able to bequeath a Canaanite slave to his children in the same manner as a Jewish master. Therefore, he is not considered a father for this purpose and is excluded from Nazirite status.
This does not mean that a gentile does not inherit any property. We already saw that Esau inherited Mount Seir. Rather, the particular inheritance discussed by the Torah in this passage is the inheritance of a Canaanite slave. A gentile may acquire a slave, but he does not possess the slave’s body in the same legal manner as a Jewish master. Consequently, he cannot bequeath that slave to his children in the manner described by the Torah.
The Tosafot explain that Rabbi Aha bar Yaakov is answering the earlier derivation concerning the word “father.” The requirement is not that a person have a father with respect to every possible law of inheritance. It is that he be connected to the particular inheritance explicitly described in the Torah. The inheritance of Canaanite slaves is explicitly written in the verse, and a gentile is not included in that law because he does not possess full ownership of the slave’s body.
Even though gentiles can purchase slaves, they do not acquire the body of the slave in the same way. This is reflected in the principle discussed in Tractate Gittin: you may purchase slaves from gentiles, but they cannot purchase slaves from you in the same manner, and they cannot acquire the full legal ownership of one another. Therefore, a gentile is not considered a father with respect to this specific inheritance.
The Gemara then returns to the question raised earlier concerning the words “the Children of Israel.” Why should we understand those words as excluding gentiles entirely? Perhaps, as in the laws of valuations, gentiles are only partially excluded.
Rava offers an explanation. In the laws of valuations, “the Children of Israel” teaches that Jews assign valuations and may also be subject to valuations, whereas gentiles do not assign a valuation for themselves. The word “person” then comes to include gentiles in the limited case in which a Jew accepts a gentile’s valuation upon himself.
That cannot be applied to Nazirite status. In the laws of Nazirite status, “the Children of Israel” teaches that Jews accept Nazirite status and bring the associated offering, whereas gentiles do not accept Nazirite status and do not bring the offering. The word “person” cannot be used to include them in the prohibitions against wine and impurity, because they are excluded from the entire passage.
The Gemara challenges this and says that the word “the Children of Israel” may not be needed to exclude gentiles from the offering. Another verse already teaches that gentiles may bring vows and freewill offerings, and the specific wording of that verse teaches that the offerings of gentiles are limited to burnt offerings. The phrase “burnt offering” excludes the offerings associated with Nazirite status.
If so, the offering of a gentile Nazirite has already been excluded by another derivation. The words “the Children of Israel” would not be needed to exclude gentiles from the offering. Perhaps those words teach only that gentiles are excluded from one aspect of Nazirite status, while the word “person” includes them in the other aspects, such as the prohibitions against wine and impurity.
The Gemara rejects this possibility. The derivation from “burnt offering” is not sufficient by itself to exclude gentiles from the Nazirite offering. Only when it is combined with the derivation from “the Children of Israel” do we learn that gentiles are entirely outside the laws of Nazirite status. The two derivations work together: “the Children of Israel” excludes gentiles from Nazirite status, and “burnt offering” teaches that they are not included in the offerings associated with that status.
The Gemara considers another possibility. Perhaps “the Children of Israel” excludes gentiles from the category of lifelong Nazirite status, but the word “person” includes them in ordinary Nazirite status. The Gemara rejects this as well. There is no basis for distinguishing between lifelong Nazirite status and ordinary Nazirite status in this manner. The wording of the passage is not speaking about two different degrees of Nazirite status.
Perhaps “the Children of Israel” excludes gentiles only from the law that a father can impose Nazirite status upon his son. A Jewish father can make his young son a Nazirite, while a gentile father cannot do so. The word “person” would then teach that a gentile can accept ordinary Nazirite status upon himself.
The Gemara rejects that interpretation because the law allowing a father to impose Nazirite status upon his son is a received law transmitted from Moses at Sinai. It does not require a separate verse. Therefore, “the Children of Israel” cannot be coming to teach that only a Jewish father can impose Nazirite status upon his son. That law is already known. The verse must be teaching that gentiles are excluded from Nazirite status generally.
The Gemara considers yet another possibility. Perhaps “the Children of Israel” teaches that Jews may use the funds designated by their father for his Nazirite offerings. If a father accepted Nazirite status, set aside money for his offerings, and then died, his son may become a Nazirite and use that money for his own offerings. Perhaps the verse teaches that this law applies to Jews, but not to gentiles. The word “person” would then teach that gentiles may accept ordinary Nazirite status themselves.
This approach encounters the same difficulty. If gentiles are already excluded from the Nazirite offerings by the derivation from “burnt offering,” why would we need “the Children of Israel” to exclude them from using their father’s designated funds? The answer is that the derivation from “burnt offering” alone would not necessarily exclude gentiles from every aspect of the offering laws. The full exclusion from the Nazirite offerings results from the combination of the two derivations.
This entire discussion is designed to determine whether the words “the Children of Israel” exclude gentiles entirely or only from a limited aspect of Nazirite status. The Gemara repeatedly examines possible ways to preserve some connection between gentiles and Nazirite status, as we found in the laws of valuations. Each proposed distinction is rejected, until the conclusion is that gentiles are not included in the laws of Nazirite status at all.
At the end of the discussion, one further difficulty is raised. We had said that a gentile is excluded because he is not connected to the particular law of inheritance involving a Canaanite slave. But a Canaanite slave himself also cannot bequeath a Canaanite slave to his children. Anything given to a Canaanite slave ordinarily belongs to his master. If the slave receives something that the master has no rights to, the slave owns it, but he still cannot bequeath a Canaanite slave to his son in the same manner.
If the ability to bequeath a Canaanite slave is what makes someone a father for purposes of Nazirite status, it would seem that a Canaanite slave should also be excluded. Yet the Mishnah explicitly says that slaves do have Nazirite status.
That objection shows that this particular line of reasoning cannot be the complete explanation. A Canaanite slave is included in the laws of Nazirite status even though he cannot bequeath a Canaanite slave to his children. The Gemara must therefore distinguish between the status of a Canaanite slave and that of a gentile, and the discussion continues from there.
One correction should be made regarding the earlier discussion on page 61, folio 2. When the Gemara said that the reason a gentile is not included in Nazirite status is that he is not subject to the relevant law of inheritance, the reference was specifically to the inability of a gentile to bequeath a Canaanite slave to his children. The Torah describes this inheritance in connection with a Jewish master. A Jew can bequeath a Canaanite slave to his children, but a gentile cannot, because he does not acquire the body of the slave in the same way.
Accordingly, the Gemara’s reasoning was that someone who is not included in this particular law of inheritance is not considered a father for the purpose of the verse concerning the Nazirite’s father, and therefore is not included in the laws of Nazirite status. The Gemara then challenges this reasoning from the case of a Canaanite slave, because a Canaanite slave likewise cannot bequeath a Canaanite slave to his child. Since the Mishnah nevertheless gives a Canaanite slave Nazirite status, that reasoning cannot stand without further qualification.