The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Gittin, has been sponsored by our good friend and loyal student of Daf Yomi, Mr. Haim Idana, and his dear wife. May God protect them and keep them in good health. He dedicated this tractate according to the principle taught by our Rabbis: when a person studies a subject, that study can avert the corresponding event from occurring. We therefore want to study Masechet Gittin so that it will remain in the realm of learning and never come to fruition in actuality. May he, his dear wife, and all of the Jewish people be blessed with peace in the home, success, and prosperity in all their endeavors. Amen.
We are going to begin three or four lines from the bottom, but first let us review the exact subject in which we have been involved. We began with the case in which a person tells his slave, in a document, “You belong to yourself,” which is another way of saying that he is freeing the slave, and, in the same document, says, “My assets will also belong to you.” These are two separate statements.
The slave brings his document of emancipation, and we said that he must declare, “It was written in my presence” and “It was signed in my presence,” just as a woman who brings her bill of divorce from overseas must make those declarations. What does that accomplish? It permits the document to be verified. It establishes the document’s authenticity, so that if the owner later comes and challenges its validity, the declarations verify the signatures and also verify that the document was written with the proper intention. One of the laws of a bill of divorce, and likewise of a document freeing a slave, is that it must be written with the proper intention: for the master who is freeing the slave and for the slave who is being freed.
The Gemara then states: For which of the two statements is the slave believed? The slave is believed regarding his own freedom, because the Rabbis were lenient and trusted one witness to verify a document for his own benefit. The Gemara will explain this leniency later. Ordinarily, a document is established through two witnesses, but in order for a Canaanite slave to obtain his freedom, the Rabbis allowed the slave himself to be believed.
Regarding the assets, however, the regular law of validating monetary documents applies. Establishing a monetary document requires two witnesses, so the slave is not believed regarding the property. Everyone accepted this distinction.
The Gemara then raised a more complicated question. When there are two separate statements, there is no difficulty: we can say that the declaration “It was written in my presence” is effective with respect to one statement but not with respect to the other. But what happens when everything is contained in one statement? The Gemara asks: What if the owner says, “All my assets belong to you”? All of his assets include the slave himself, because the slave is also considered one of the owner’s assets. Thus, in this single statement, the owner is saying both that all the assets should go to the slave and that the slave himself should go free.
The question is a famous one throughout the Talmud: Can we divide the statement? In other words, can we say that the declaration is effective with respect to the slave himself, who is included among the assets, but not with respect to the other assets? Rav answered that we do divide the statement. With respect to the slave himself, the declaration “It was written in my presence” is effective, and the slave goes free; with respect to the other assets, the declaration is not sufficient, and he does not acquire them.
The Gemara then asks: Whom is Rav following? Where do we find a Tannaitic opinion elsewhere in the Talmud that adopts the principle that a statement can be divided in this way?
We begin with the answer. The Gemara says to Rav: Whom are you following? You must be following the opinion that allows a document to be divided into separate parts, so that each part can be judged independently. If a person writes that all his assets are to belong to his slave, and nothing is held back, the slave certainly goes free because he is included among the assets. There is no dispute in that case.
But what if the owner holds back a particular asset? For example, what if he says, “All my assets belong to you, except for this field”? The question is whether the slave himself goes free. According to Rabbi Meir, he does not. Since the owner held back part of the property, we can say that he was also holding back something from the slave himself. The words indicating that the slave should go free may have been intended merely to placate him—to make him feel good by saying, “I am giving you everything”—but the owner was not actually planning to give him anything. On the contrary, the fact that he retained part of the property indicates that he was retaining something from the slave as well.
In that case, the slave does not go free. Once he does not go free, he acquires none of the property either. This is a complete loss for him: he loses his freedom and receives none of the assets. The basic rule is that a person cannot give the slave property while retaining ownership of the slave, because whatever the slave acquires will ultimately belong to the master.
Why, then, would the master write such a document? The answer is that he may have written it merely to make the slave feel that he was loved and that everything was being given to him, even though, in terms of the law, the document accomplishes nothing. It may make the slave feel good for a while, but halachically it has no effect.
According to Rabbi Meir, it appears that the reason this document does not work is that we do not divide the statement. With documents, he holds that it is all or nothing. In the first case, where everything was given, the slave goes free and all the assets go to him. In the second case, where something was held back, nothing takes effect.
Rabbi Shimon, however, says that the slave always goes free. Even if the master held back a particular property, the slave remains free. We can say that the master retained that property and leave the slave’s freedom intact.
Rashi explains the words “he is always free.” The word “always” teaches that this is true not only when the owner explicitly says, “All my assets belong to you except for this particular field.” In that case, everything goes to the slave, including his freedom, except for the specified field. That is not necessarily a case of dividing the statement, because everything that the owner intended to give is transferred, and only the specified field was excluded.
The principle is demonstrated in a case where the owner says, “All my assets belong to you, except for two acres of land,” without specifying where those two acres are. Since the owner did not identify the property he was retaining, we cannot determine which land is excluded. That land does not go to the slave, but the slave himself goes free because he is not land. This is a classic case of dividing the statement: “All my assets” is effective with respect to the slave, but not with respect to the unspecified land.
Thus, Rav is following Rabbi Shimon with respect to the principle that a statement can be divided. The proof comes from the word “always” in the Mishnah. The wording indicates that the slave goes free even in a case where the owner says, “Everything is yours except for two acres,” although the identity of those two acres is unclear. The land does not go to the slave, but the slave himself goes free.
The Gemara then cites Rav Yosef in the name of Rav Nachman: Even though Rav Yosef praised the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, Rav Nachman nevertheless ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir in this matter. Rav Yosef praised Rabbi Shimon’s teaching, but that does not mean that he adopted it as the final law.
The Gemara asks: If Rav Nachman followed Rabbi Meir, how could he have praised Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara brings a teaching that when Rav Yosef presented Rabbi Shimon’s explanation, Rav Yosef said that one should kiss the lips of the person who produces such beautiful and precise teachings. He praised the quality of the reasoning, but he still ruled according to Rabbi Meir.
The Gemara then raises a difficulty. If Rav Nachman followed Rabbi Meir, it should mean that he did not accept the principle that a statement can be divided. Yet elsewhere Rav Nachman appears to accept that principle.
Rav Nachman said the following regarding a person who is dangerously ill. The Rabbis granted special leniencies to a person on his deathbed. He may distribute his assets verbally without writing a document, because the Rabbis were concerned that if he thought his words would not be fulfilled, he might become distressed and die. Therefore, whatever a person on his deathbed says is treated as though it had been written and delivered.
Now consider a person on his deathbed who writes, “All my assets belong to my slave.” In that statement, he includes the slave himself, so the slave becomes free. The person then recovers. What is the law? Since the gift was made by a person on his deathbed, and the special law of such a gift applies only because he was expected to die, the donor may retract the gifts of property after he recovers. The slave, however, remains free.
The slave does not return to slavery. Once people have begun treating him as a free person, he has entered the status of a free man. He may be permitted to marry among the Jewish people, and it would be impossible to put him back into slave clothing and announce that he has become a slave again. The owner may recover the property, but the slave remains free.
Here, too, the statement has been divided. The declaration is effective with respect to the slave’s freedom but not with respect to the assets. The slave’s freedom is accepted, while the transfer of the property can be retracted. This seems to show that Rav Nachman did accept the principle that a statement can be divided.
Rav Ashi resolves the difficulty. The reason Rabbi Meir ruled that the slave does not go free when the owner retains part of the property is not that Rabbi Meir rejected the principle of dividing a statement in every circumstance. Rather, a slave’s freedom must be complete. The document freeing a slave must constitute a total separation between the master and the slave.
This requirement is learned from the laws of a woman’s bill of divorce, where the Torah uses language indicating a complete severance. Through the comparison between the two types of documents, we learn that the document freeing a slave must also create a complete break. If the master retains something in a way that indicates that he is retaining part of the original relationship, the slave is not fully freed.
Moreover, the Torah compares slaves to land with respect to certain laws, and a Canaanite slave has the legal status of property. Therefore, when the owner says, “All my assets belong to you except for a certain portion,” and he is holding back part of the property, it is possible that he is also holding back part of the slave himself. In that case, Rabbi Meir can say that the slave is not free because the separation is not complete, while still accepting the general principle that a statement can be divided.
Accordingly, Rav Nachman is consistent. He follows Rabbi Meir regarding the requirement of a complete separation, but he can follow Rabbi Shimon regarding the general principle that a statement can be divided. In the case where the owner said, “All my assets belong to you,” without retaining anything, even Rabbi Meir agrees that the slave goes free. The only issue is whether the slave can acquire the property through the declaration made in his presence, since he is only one witness.
In the case of the person on his deathbed, the separation from the slave was complete. The only issue was that the donor could retract the property after recovering. The slave remained free. Likewise, in Rav’s case, where the owner said, “All my assets belong to you,” it was a complete separation with respect to the slave. The slave was free, even though he could not acquire the other assets without proper validation of the document.
That concludes the discussion of the principle that a statement can be divided. We now return to the Mishnah. We learned that a person who brings a woman’s bill of divorce from the Land of Israel to the Land of Israel does not have to declare, “It was written in my presence” and “It was signed in my presence,” because the people of the Land of Israel were considered experts regarding the requirement that the document be written with the proper intention. In addition, there was regular travel within the Land of Israel, so there was no concern that witnesses would be unavailable to verify the signatures.
The Mishnah then says that if someone challenges the document, it must be validated through its signatures. Either the original witnesses must appear and testify that the signatures are theirs, or two other witnesses must testify that they recognize the signatures.
The Gemara asks who is challenging the document. It cannot be one person, because one person’s challenge is not sufficient to invalidate the document. It also cannot be two ordinary people, because then there would be two witnesses challenging the document and two witnesses validating it. That would be two against two, and the woman would remain in her original status as a married woman. The Gemara therefore needs a case in which the challenge is accepted and the document must nevertheless be validated.
The answer is that the husband himself is challenging the document. He is one person, but the husband is believed to challenge the bill of divorce. Therefore, the document must be validated. The plural wording of the Mishnah is somewhat difficult, since it appears to refer to multiple challengers. Sometimes, however, the language of the Mishnah uses a plural expression even when one person is meant. Rashi was bothered by this and explains that the husband is the person challenging the document.
The Mishnah then discusses a person who brings a bill of divorce from overseas and cannot declare, “It was written in my presence” and “It was signed in my presence.” The Gemara examines why he cannot make the declaration. It is not referring to a case in which he was not present when the document was written and signed, because the Mishnah would not describe that as a person who is unable to make the declaration. Perhaps he is unable to speak. The Gemara therefore asks whether a mute person can serve as the messenger who brings the document.
The issue is that a messenger must have the knowledge necessary to make the declaration. If he cannot speak, he cannot testify verbally that the document was written and signed in his presence. The Gemara discusses a case in which a person was given the document while he was a minor and became an adult before delivering it. If he received it as a minor and then became an adult, he may not be able to make the declaration, and the document must instead be validated through its signatures.
From this discussion, we learn that the messenger may make the declaration after delivering the document. One might have thought that the declaration must be made before the delivery or at the moment of delivery. The case teaches that the document could have been delivered first and the declaration made afterward, except that the messenger became an adult only later. The requirement is therefore not limited to the moment before delivery.
The Gemara then lists several similarities between a woman’s bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave. Both documents require the messenger who brings them from overseas to declare that they were written and signed in his presence. The reasons are the same. First, there is a concern that the document may not have been written with the proper intention. The declaration allows the messenger to testify that it was written with the proper intention. Second, there is a concern that the signatures may not be verifiable. The declaration establishes the signatures.
These concerns apply to a document freeing a slave as well. It must be written with the proper intention for the master and the slave, and the signatures must be established. The additional novelty is that the Rabbis trusted one messenger in this case, even though monetary documents normally require two witnesses for validation.
Why were they lenient regarding a slave? One reason is that as long as the slave remains a slave, he is prevented from marrying. He cannot marry a Jewish woman because he may still be a slave, and he cannot marry a slave woman because he may already be free. He is trapped in an uncertain status. Therefore, in order to allow him to obtain his freedom and marry, the Rabbis were lenient and trusted even one witness to validate the document.
The Gemara then discusses a document bearing the signature of a Samaritan. The Samaritans were brought by the king of Assyria from a place called Kuta and settled in the area of Samaria after the Ten Tribes were exiled. The animals were attacking them, and they were brought to inhabit the land. They eventually converted, although there is a dispute as to whether their conversion was valid. One opinion says that they were converts motivated by fear of the lions, while another opinion considers them genuine converts.
The discussion here follows the opinion that they were genuine converts. Even so, they were considered unreliable, and the Gemara says that a document bearing a Samaritan signature is invalid, except for a woman’s bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave. The Gemara will explain why the Rabbis were lenient in these two cases.
A further similarity is that documents produced in the courts of idolaters are valid with respect to monetary matters, even though they are signed by non-Jews. The principle is that the law of the land is binding. Thus, if a monetary document is drafted in a secular court and signed by non-Jewish witnesses, it can be valid even when the lender and borrower are Jews.
A bill of divorce produced in such a court, however, is invalid. Non-Jews are not included in the laws governing Jewish divorce. They are not subject to the laws of Jewish marriage and divorce, and therefore their signatures cannot establish a Jewish bill of divorce.
This follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the signatures are what establish the validity of a bill of divorce. Since the non-Jewish witnesses are not included in the laws of Jewish divorce, their signatures cannot establish the document. According to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that the document is established through the witnesses who observe its delivery, one might argue that the signatures should not matter. Nevertheless, the Gemara’s statement is understood according to Rabbi Meir.
Non-Jews are included in the laws governing monetary matters. One of the commandments given to the descendants of Noah is the obligation to establish a system of courts and laws. Therefore, non-Jewish signatures can be effective for monetary documents. They cannot, however, establish a document freeing a slave, because the laws of a slave’s emancipation follow the laws of a bill of divorce.
The Gemara then presents another similarity according to Rabbi Meir. If a person tells his messenger, “Give this bill of divorce to my wife and give this document of emancipation to my slave,” and the master changes his mind before the documents reach the woman or the slave, he may retract in either case.
Rashi explains that Rabbi Meir considers it a detriment for a woman to receive a bill of divorce. It is generally more beneficial for her to remain married, because while she is married she receives support and other benefits. Once she is divorced, she no longer receives that support. Similarly, it can be considered a detriment for a slave to receive his freedom, because while he is a slave he receives sustenance and other benefits from the master.
The basic principle is that one may not cause a detriment to another person without that person’s knowledge. By contrast, a person can acquire a benefit on behalf of another without that person’s knowledge. If someone gives me one thousand dollars and asks me to acquire it for another person, I can acquire the money on that person’s behalf because owning one thousand dollars is a benefit. But if the transaction is a detriment, I cannot act as the person’s agent without authorization.
According to Rabbi Meir, until the document reaches the woman or the slave, the sender may retract. The messenger was not appointed by the recipient, and the recipient did not appoint a messenger to accept the document. The husband or master therefore retains the ability to change his mind.
The Rabbis disagree. According to the Rabbis, it is a benefit for the slave to receive his freedom, and one may acquire a benefit on behalf of a person even without that person’s knowledge. Once the messenger receives the document on behalf of the slave, the master can no longer retract. The slave himself did not appoint the messenger, but the Rabbis assume that he wants to be free, and therefore the messenger can acquire the document for him.
There is an important distinction, however. Even according to the Rabbis, the slave is not free until the document reaches him. The master can no longer retract once the messenger has acquired the document for the slave, because it is considered a benefit that has already been acquired on his behalf. Nevertheless, the actual emancipation is not complete until the slave receives the document.
The same distinction applies to a woman. Even if a messenger acquires a bill of divorce on her behalf because it is considered a benefit, she is not divorced until the document reaches her. If the husband dies in the interim, the bill of divorce is not effective. It was beneficial for her, and the husband could no longer retract, but the divorce itself had not yet taken place.
The Gemara then asks why the list of similarities does not include a case in which a person commands, “Take this money and give it to so-and-so,” and the person dies before the money is delivered. The answer is that the list is discussing matters unique to bills of divorce and documents freeing slaves. It is not listing laws that apply to these documents as well as to ordinary monetary documents.
The case of a person on his deathbed is discussed in this connection. When such a person says, “Give this money to so-and-so,” his verbal statement is treated as though it had been written and delivered, because of the special leniency granted to a person on his deathbed. If he dies, the money is considered to have been transferred, and the heirs cannot reclaim it.
By contrast, where a normal document has not been delivered before the owner dies, the document is not effective after death. The law that a bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave cannot take effect after the death of the person who sent them is therefore also relevant to ordinary documents, which is why it was not counted as a similarity unique to these two documents.
The Gemara then raises another possible similarity: both a bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave must be written with the proper intention. Rav answers that this point was already included in the Mishnah. When the Mishnah says that these two documents are alike with respect to being brought from one place to another, it includes the requirement that the messenger testify that they were written with the proper intention.
Rava, however, explains the reason for the declaration differently. According to Rava, the declaration is required for the technical purpose of establishing the signatures. The Gemara therefore asks where, according to Rava, the similarity regarding proper intention is mentioned.
The answer is that the list is counting only similarities that are rabbinic enactments. The requirement of proper intention is a Torah requirement, and the requirement that a document not be written while attached to the ground is also a Torah-level disqualification. The list is not counting Torah-level laws as similarities. It is counting additional rabbinic enactments that apply in the same way to both documents.
The Gemara then asks: If the declaration by the messenger is a rabbinic requirement, why does the Mishnah say that a person who brings a document from one place to another must make the declaration? The answer is that this is precisely the rabbinic enactment being described. The Rabbis required the messenger to say that the document was written and signed in his presence because of the concerns about proper intention and the verification of signatures.
The Gemara further discusses the status of a Samaritan signature. A Samaritan signature is generally invalid on a document because the Rabbis did not consider Samaritans reliable for this purpose, but they were lenient regarding a woman’s bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave. That is another rabbinic enactment.
The Gemara then returns to documents produced in non-Jewish courts. At first glance, this appears to be a Torah-level distinction: a non-Jew cannot write a bill of divorce because he is not included in the laws of Jewish divorce. The Gemara responds that this depends on the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that the document is established by the witnesses who observe its delivery.
According to Rabbi Eliezer, the non-Jewish signatures are not required by Torah law. The document was written by a Jewish scribe, and the actual delivery can be witnessed by valid Jewish witnesses. Nevertheless, the Rabbis invalidated a bill of divorce bearing the signatures of non-Jews because of the concern that people might rely on those invalid witnesses and use the document without valid witnesses observing its delivery.
Rabbi Eliezer compares this to a document signed by witnesses who are otherwise disqualified, such as two brothers. Although the signatures are not what establish the document according to Rabbi Eliezer, the Rabbis were concerned that people might rely on the invalid signatures and assume that the document was valid without proper witnesses to the delivery. This is a document that is invalid because it is flawed from within.
Thus, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the invalidity of a bill of divorce signed by non-Jews is rabbinic, not biblical. That is why the case can be included among the rabbinic similarities between bills of divorce and documents freeing slaves. According to Rabbi Meir, however, the signatures establish the bill of divorce, and non-Jewish signatures would create a Torah-level invalidity. Therefore, the similarity regarding non-Jewish signatures is counted only according to the opinion that follows Rabbi Eliezer.
Rashi explains that according to Rabbi Eliezer, the Torah’s requirement that the document be written with the proper intention applies to the writing of the document, not to the signatures. The document must therefore be written by a Jewish scribe with the proper intention, but signatures are not necessary for the Torah-level validity of the bill of divorce. The Rabbis nevertheless invalidated a document bearing non-Jewish signatures because of the possibility that people would rely on those signatures instead of arranging proper witnesses for the delivery.
Tosafot explains that when the teaching says that there are four similarities according to Rabbi Meir, it does not mean that Rabbi Meir himself can count all four. The case involving documents produced in non-Jewish courts is a Torah-level case according to Rabbi Meir and is therefore not included in the list of rabbinic similarities.
Rather, the teaching means that a Tanna who accepts Rabbi Meir’s reasoning regarding whether receiving the document is a benefit or a detriment can also accept Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning regarding the role of the witnesses. Such a person can count four similarities: the treatment of a Samaritan signature, documents produced in non-Jewish courts, the fact that receipt of the document is considered a detriment until it reaches the recipient, and the additional rabbinic similarity under discussion.
The Gemara then discusses another apparent similarity involving witnesses who cannot write. The witnesses may not know how to sign their names. The Gemara says that one may carve the outlines of their names into the document, after which the witnesses fill in the carved spaces with ink. According to another explanation, a stencil is prepared, and the witnesses trace over it so that their signatures appear on the document. In either case, the Gemara treats this as a valid method of signing.
The Rashban disagrees regarding documents freeing slaves and ordinary documents. He says that this method is permitted for a woman’s bill of divorce, but with respect to a document freeing a slave and other documents, the witnesses must know how to read and write and must sign normally. Thus, according to the Rashban, there is another distinction between a woman’s bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave.
The first opinion in the teaching did not distinguish between them and said that all documents are treated alike. This explains why, according to the Rabbis, the Gemara lists three similarities rather than four: the Rabbis do not accept the distinction made by the Rashban and therefore do not count this as an additional similarity.
The language of the teaching is difficult in another way. It says that if the witnesses know how to read and write, they sign. But the discussion was about writing, not reading. Why does the teaching mention reading?
The Gemara explains that the text is incomplete and must be read as discussing two separate cases. If the witnesses do not know how to read, someone reads the document to them, and they can then sign. If they do not know how to write their names, the outlines of their names are carved or prepared as a stencil, and they fill them in with ink. The novelty is that witnesses who cannot read can still sign after the document has been read to them, and witnesses who cannot write can sign through the prepared outlines.
The Gemara then returns to the rule that a document sent through a messenger does not take effect after the death of the sender. If the husband sends a messenger with a bill of divorce and dies before it reaches the woman, the document cannot be delivered after his death. Likewise, if a master sends a document freeing his slave and dies before the document reaches the slave, the slave is not freed through that document.
Rashi explains that this is true even according to the Rabbis, who say that it is a benefit for a slave to be freed. Although one can acquire a benefit for another person without his knowledge, the slave is not free until he actually receives the document.
Similarly, if a woman appoints a messenger to receive her bill of divorce, the messenger’s receipt is a benefit for her, and the husband can no longer retract once the messenger has received the document. Nevertheless, the woman is not divorced until the document reaches her. If the husband dies before that point, there is no divorce.
The same applies to the slave. Once the master dies, ownership of the slave passes to the heirs. The slave is no longer under the authority of the deceased master, and the deceased master’s messenger cannot free him. The slave is treated as property that has passed to the heirs, so the document is no longer effective.
The Gemara then returns to the special case of the person on his deathbed who says, “Give this money to so-and-so.” Why is that not included in the list? Rashi explains that a gift made by a person on his deathbed is treated not only as though it had been written, but also as though it had already been delivered. The Rabbis established this rule so that the person would not become distressed by the fear that his instructions would not be carried out.
Therefore, if the person on his deathbed says, “Give this money to so-and-so,” the recipient is considered to have acquired it immediately. Even if the donor dies afterward, the heirs cannot reclaim the money. This is different from an ordinary bill of divorce or document freeing a slave, where the document must actually reach the recipient before it takes effect.
The Gemara answers that the list is counting only laws that are unique to bills of divorce and documents freeing slaves. It is not counting matters that apply to these documents and also to ordinary monetary documents. Since the rule governing the gift of a person on his deathbed applies to other documents as well, it is not included in the list of similarities.
In support of this, the Gemara relates that a certain scholar was sent to ask a ruling in the name of Rav Avahu. The instruction was: “Write the document and give it to so-and-so.” In that case, if the person who issued the instruction died before the document was written and delivered, the document was not effective. The fact that the instruction specifically said “write” indicates that the person wanted the transfer to take place through a document, not through the special law governing verbal gifts by a person on his deathbed. Since the document was not completed and delivered before death, the property remained with the heirs.
This demonstrates that the rule regarding death applies to ordinary monetary documents as well. It is therefore not counted as a similarity unique to a woman’s bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave.
We can now summarize the structure of the discussion. The Gemara is looking for laws that are shared by a woman’s bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave. According to the Rabbis, it counts the rabbinic requirement that a messenger declare that the document was written and signed in his presence; the special leniency regarding a Samaritan signature; the invalidity of a document produced in a non-Jewish court, according to the appropriate opinion; and the rule concerning whether the sender can retract before the document reaches the recipient.
According to Rabbi Meir, the calculation is different because he views the signatures as establishing the bill of divorce. The case of non-Jewish signatures would then be invalid on a Torah level and would not be counted among the rabbinic similarities. The fourth similarity is instead derived from Rabbi Meir’s view that receiving the document is a detriment, so that the sender can retract until the recipient receives it.
According to the opinion that accepts Rabbi Meir’s reasoning regarding the detriment of receiving the document but follows Rabbi Eliezer regarding the role of the witnesses, four similarities can be counted. The number therefore depends on which opinions are combined and whether the particular case is being counted as a Torah-level or rabbinic-level law.
That is the Gemara’s analysis of the similarities between a woman’s bill of divorce and a document freeing a slave. The discussion has taken us through the principle that a statement can be divided, the requirement of a complete separation in freeing a slave, the special rules governing a person on his deathbed, the validation of documents, the role of the witnesses, and the different levels of invalidity that apply to the various documents.