The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Gittin, has been sponsored by our good friend and loyal student of the Daf Yomi, Mr. Haim Midana, and his dear wife. May God protect them and grant them life. He dedicated this tractate according to the principle taught by our Rabbis: when a person studies a subject, that study can prevent the matter from occurring. We therefore study Massechet Gittin so that it will remain a matter of learning and never come to fruition in actuality. May Haim and his dear wife, together with all of Klal Yisrael, be blessed with peace in the home, success, and prosperity in all their endeavors. Amen.
We begin four lines from the bottom of the page. We learned in the Mishnah the following case: a Canaanite slave was taken captive by gentiles, and someone came and redeemed him. According to Rava’s explanation in the Gemara, the case is one in which, after the original owner’s slave was taken captive, the owner gave up hope of ever recovering him. This is called despair of recovery.
According to Rava, since the owner gave up hope, the slave becomes free. However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is also cited in the Mishnah, says that in every case the original owner recovers the slave. The Mishnah gives a reason for this ruling.
The Gemara now explains Rava’s understanding of the Mishnah. When the second person redeems the slave, he may do so for one of two reasons: either he redeems him in order to grant him freedom, or he redeems him so that the slave will remain a slave. According to Rava’s understanding of the first opinion in the Mishnah, if the second person redeems him for the purpose of slavery, the slave becomes the property of the second person. The original owner had already given up hope, and the second person redeemed the slave from the gentile captor.
The Gemara asks: how can the second person acquire the slave? The gentile captor did not acquire the slave in the ordinary sense, because a gentile cannot acquire the body of a Jew as a slave. If the captor did not acquire him, how can the person who redeems him acquire him from the captor?
The Gemara answers that a gentile does have an acquisition in a Jewish slave with respect to the slave’s labor. A gentile may not own the person himself, but he can own the slave’s labor. Thus, the gentile owns the slave for his work, and the person who redeems him can acquire that right to the slave’s labor from the captor.
The Gemara then asks how we know that a gentile can acquire another gentile for his labor. A Jew who acquires a gentile slave acquires the slave’s actual body. A gentile, however, cannot acquire a Jew’s body, nor can a gentile acquire even another gentile’s body in the same manner. Perhaps, then, a gentile cannot acquire another gentile even with respect to labor.
The Gemara clarifies that the question is not whether a gentile can acquire another gentile’s body. He cannot. The question is whether a gentile can acquire another gentile for the latter’s labor. The Gemara derives this through a logical inference: a gentile can acquire a Jew for his labor. Acquiring a Jew is more difficult, since a Jew can never become the actual slave of a gentile, yet the gentile can acquire the Jew’s labor. Certainly, then, a gentile can acquire another gentile for his labor.
The Gemara challenges this proof. Perhaps a gentile cannot acquire a Jew even for labor. Normally, when a slave goes free, he requires a document of release. A gentile cannot acquire a Jew in such a way that the Jew would require a document from him in order to become free. Similarly, if a gentile purchases a Canaanite slave, the gentile does not acquire the slave’s body. If the slave runs away, he is free and may marry whomever he wishes. The gentile therefore does not truly own him.
Nevertheless, a Canaanite slave can acquire a Jew for the Jew’s labor. The Gemara continues by asking whether the acquisition of another gentile might work only through money, since gentiles acquire property through money. Perhaps acquisition through possession, meaning through the slave’s performing an act of service, would not work for a gentile.
For example, when a slave removes his master’s shoes, that act of service is considered possession. A Jew can acquire a field through such possession, and slaves are compared to fields. Since a Jew acquires a field through possession, he can acquire a slave through possession as well. Gentiles, however, do not acquire fields through possession; they acquire them through money. Perhaps, then, gentiles can acquire one another only through money.
The Gemara answers through the statement of Rav Pappa: Ammon and Moab were in the possession of Sihon. The Torah commands us not to wage war against Ammon and Moab. However, Sihon conquered Ammon and Moab. Once Sihon had conquered them, they were no longer considered Ammon and Moab in this respect, and the Jewish people were able to conquer Sihon and thereby receive control over those lands.
How did Sihon acquire Ammon and Moab? He did so through possession, not through a monetary transaction. Thus, a gentile can acquire another gentile through possession. The Gemara concludes that we have established that a gentile can acquire another gentile through possession, and now asks how we know that a gentile can acquire a Jew through possession.
The Gemara derives this from the king of Canaan, who conquered the Jewish people. The verse says that the Jewish people were taken captive. The fact that they were taken captive means that the gentiles acquired at least the Jews’ labor. They did not pay money for them, so the acquisition occurred through possession. We therefore see that a gentile can acquire a Jew through possession, acquiring the Jew’s labor.
Let us review the discussion. According to Rava, the case is one in which the slave was taken captive and the original owner gave up hope. A second person then came and redeemed the slave for the purpose of slavery. The Gemara asks how the second person acquired the slave. He acquired him from the captor, because although the gentile cannot acquire the Jew’s body, he can acquire the Jew’s labor. The second person acquires that labor from the gentile captor. He then immerses the slave in the immersion required when a person enters servitude, and the slave becomes his.
The Gemara has explained the mechanics of these acquisitions. A Jew can acquire a gentile in such a way that the Jew owns the gentile’s body. A gentile can acquire another gentile, and he can even acquire a Jew, but only with respect to the Jew’s labor. We learned that a gentile can acquire another gentile through possession from the fact that Sihon conquered Ammon and Moab, without a monetary transaction. We also learned that a gentile can acquire a Jew through possession from the war of the king of Canaan against the Jewish people. In each case, the acquisition means that the person must work for the captor.
The Gemara then presents a statement of Rabbi Yohanan: a slave who escaped from captivity goes free. The owner is forced to give him a document of release. The Gemara analyzes this ruling. Since the slave had been taken captive, the owner had already given up hope of recovering him, so the monetary connection between the owner and the slave was lost. Nevertheless, the slave still retained the status of a slave with respect to the prohibition against marrying a Jewish woman. Since he was neither a full slave nor a free Jew, he was in a state of limbo. The Rabbis therefore force the owner to give him a document of release so that he can marry.
The Gemara then brings a teaching from the Mishnah. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that whenever someone redeems a slave from captivity, the slave returns to the original owner. As a general rule, whenever the Mishnah records the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the halachah follows him, except in three cases. Those cases are known by the mnemonic Sidon, guarantor, and another case involving divorce. We do not need to analyze those exceptions now; the point is that, apart from those three cases, the halachah generally follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel when his opinion appears in the Mishnah.
Since Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the redeemed slave always returns to the original owner, the Gemara initially understands that the Mishnah is discussing a case in which the original owner did not give up hope. Since he did not give up hope, the slave remains his. This can be reconciled with Rabbi Yohanan’s statement that the owner is forced to give the slave a document of release when the slave escapes from captivity: in Rabbi Yohanan’s case, the owner did give up hope. The monetary connection was therefore lost, but the slave still required a document of release because he remained prohibited from marrying a Jewish woman.
Thus, the Mishnah and Rabbi Yohanan are not contradictory. The Mishnah says that the slave returns to the original owner because the owner had not given up hope. Rabbi Yohanan speaks of a case in which the owner did give up hope when the slave was taken captive. The owner then loses the monetary connection, but must still provide a document of release so that the slave can marry.
However, according to Rava’s understanding of the Mishnah, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that even if the original owner gave up hope, the slave returns to him. This creates a difficulty. Rabbi Yohanan said that once the owner gives up hope, the owner is forced to provide a document of release. Yet the halachah follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that even after the owner gives up hope, the slave returns to the original owner. Which ruling should we follow?
The Gemara explains the reason for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s ruling. One might ask: if the original owner gave up hope, why should he receive the slave back? The answer is that if a slave knew that being taken captive would automatically lead to freedom once the owner gave up hope, the slave might deliberately place himself in captivity. He would reason that the owner would then give up hope, and either the slave would escape or someone would redeem him, thereby setting him free.
To prevent this, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teaches that a slave who is taken captive never goes free merely because the owner gives up hope. He always returns to the original owner. This removes the incentive for the slave to throw himself into captivity.
One could challenge this explanation by saying that the concern applies only to a slave who has the idea of deliberately placing himself in captivity. In Rabbi Yohanan’s case, however, the slave was taken captive and then escaped. He risked his life by running away, because the captors could have killed him. The Gemara therefore says that we do not suspect such a person of having deliberately entered captivity in order to become free. If he was willing to risk his life to escape, he clearly did not want to be in captivity.
Accordingly, there are two cases. In the ordinary case, where a slave is taken captive, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that even if the owner gives up hope, the slave returns to the original owner. This is because of the concern that slaves might deliberately place themselves in captivity. In the case described by Rabbi Yohanan, however, the slave escaped from captivity at great personal risk. In that case, even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would agree that if the original owner gave up hope, the owner loses the monetary connection and must provide a document of release so that the slave can marry.
The Gemara now brings another incident. A maidservant was taken captive by gentiles. Jews redeemed her for the purpose of keeping her as a slave and sent her back to Shmuel. They wrote to Shmuel that everyone follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that even if the slave had been redeemed for the purpose of freedom, she would still return to the original owner. That was why they were returning her to him.
They added that even if one follows the Rabbis, who say that when a slave is redeemed for the purpose of freedom the slave becomes free, that would not apply here. They had redeemed her for the purpose of slavery, not for the purpose of freedom. They assumed that Shmuel had not given up hope, and therefore they said that they were returning her to him as a favor.
The Gemara clarifies that Shmuel had in fact given up hope. The monetary connection had therefore been severed, and she no longer belonged to him. The novelty in the case is that, according to Shmuel, she was free even without requiring him to give her a document of release.
Shmuel followed his own principle: if a person declares his slave ownerless, the slave becomes free on every level. Not only does the monetary ownership end, but the slave also loses the status that prevents him from marrying a full-fledged Jewish woman. Shmuel held that one process can accomplish both forms of freedom.
The Gemara derives this from the verse concerning the Passover offering: “Every person’s slave who was purchased for money.” The slave is called “the slave of a man.” What does that expression teach? A slave is considered a slave when there is a person who exercises control over him, meaning that the slave must work for someone. If no person exercises control over him, he is not considered a slave.
For example, if the owner makes the slave ownerless, the slave is no longer under anyone’s control. He is therefore not called a slave and has the status of a full-fledged Jew, even without receiving a document of release. As long as a person controls him and he is obligated to work for that person, he is called a slave. Once the monetary control is removed, he is no longer considered a slave.
The Gemara brings another incident. A maidservant was taken captive, and a man from Tarmod redeemed her. He wanted to marry her, but there was a problem. Although she was Jewish, she did not yet have the status of a full-fledged Jewish woman. The Rabbis sent a message to her owner through Rav Zutra: if he wanted to act properly, he should send her a document of release.
The Gemara asks what this advice would accomplish. If the gentile wanted to marry her, freeing her would make her a full-fledged Jew, which would seemingly make the situation even more problematic. The Gemara therefore asks: if the Jews had the ability to redeem her, why did they tell the owner to free her? Why not tell him to pay the ransom and bring his slave back? By freeing her, he would lose her.
Perhaps they did not want to redeem her, or perhaps the case is one in which they were unable to redeem her. If the gentile was not willing to release her for money, how would sending a document of release help? She would still be marrying the gentile.
The Gemara answers that they really did have the ability to redeem her: they had the money, and the gentile was willing to accept a ransom. Once the owner sent her a document of release, the people would collect the money and redeem her. There is a disagreement among the Rabbis as to whether redeeming a slave is a mitzvah, or whether the mitzvah of redeeming captives applies only to a full-fledged Jew. The concern in this case was that the gentile was willing to accept a ransom, but the people were unwilling to provide it because they believed that there was no mitzvah to redeem a maidservant.
The Rabbis therefore told the owner to free her. Once she had the status of a full-fledged Jewish woman, the people would contribute the money to redeem her. The advice was given so that she would ultimately receive her freedom.
The Gemara offers another explanation. Perhaps the gentile was not interested in accepting a ransom. What, then, would a document of release accomplish? Once she became a full-fledged Jewish woman, the gentile might be embarrassed to marry her because everyone would know that she had previously been a maidservant. Until she received her document of release, no one knew that she had been a maidservant, and the marriage could remain private.
The Gemara challenges this explanation. Is a gentile really embarrassed to do such a thing? Mar Haviva said that a gentile prefers the animals of a Jew even more than his own wife. If a gentile desires a Jewish animal, certainly he would not be deterred from marrying a maidservant who is partly Jewish.
The Gemara answers that this is true when the gentile can do so privately, without anyone knowing that she had formerly been a maidservant. Once she receives her document of release, everyone will know that she was a maidservant. People will say that he is marrying a former maidservant, and that public embarrassment may discourage him. Thus, sending the document could serve as a way to dissuade the gentile from marrying her.
There was another problem: people were committing sins with this maidservant. If not for the principle taught by Shmuel that one may not free a slave, the Rabbis would have forced the owner to free her. Once she became free, she would have the status of a full-fledged Jewish woman, and the people would no longer treat her in that manner. Their conduct was connected to her status as a maidservant.
Nevertheless, since freeing a slave is prohibited, the Rabbis did not free her. They said that if not for the prohibition against freeing slaves, they would make an exception in this case because people were committing sins with her.
Rav Yehudah, however, says that in this case she should be freed. One may violate the ordinary prohibition against freeing a slave in order to prevent people from committing other sins. The Gemara cites a similar case involving a woman who was half-free and half-slave. She had two owners: one owner freed his half of her, while the other owner retained his half.
That woman was trapped. She could not marry a free man because she was still half-slave, and she could not marry a slave because she was half-free. The Rabbis therefore forced the remaining owner to free her completely. They did so because people were mistreating her, and the woman had no possibility of marrying anyone. This demonstrates that the Rabbis can free a slave when necessary to prevent sin.
Abaye asks why the same reasoning should not apply to the maidservant who had been redeemed from captivity. In the case of the woman who was half-free and half-slave, the Rabbis freed her. In this case, however, they said that it was prohibited to free the maidservant.
The Gemara answers that the cases are not comparable. The half-free, half-slave woman was suitable neither for marriage to a slave nor for marriage to a free man. She was completely trapped, and people were committing sins with her. Therefore, the Rabbis freed her.
In the case of the maidservant, however, there was another solution. One could arrange for a male slave to be placed with her, and he would protect her from other people. Since she could be married to a slave, there was no need to violate the prohibition against freeing her. The rule allowing freedom in the half-free, half-slave case applies because that woman had no other option.
The Gemara then discusses the prohibition against freeing a slave. A slave is required to work forever. There was once a man who came to the synagogue, where only nine free Jewish men were present. In order to complete the quorum, he freed his slave. Once the slave was freed, he became fully Jewish and could be counted toward the quorum.
This seems to show that it is permitted to free a slave. The Gemara answers that a mitzvah is different. For a public mitzvah, such as completing a quorum and enabling the congregation to recite matters that require a quorum, it is permitted. The prohibition applies when a person frees a slave for no reason. When freedom is necessary to accomplish a public mitzvah, it is permitted.
The Ramban explains the reason for the prohibition. A person is not permitted to give a gentile a free gift. By freeing a slave, one gives the slave a free gift. However, if the gift is given in order to benefit oneself, it is permitted. Sometimes a person gives a gentile a gift so that the gentile will do something beneficial in return.
In the case of the man who freed his slave for the quorum, he did not free the slave for the slave’s benefit. He did so for his own benefit, so that the congregation could complete the quorum. According to the Ramban, there is therefore no problem. In addition, the matter involved a public mitzvah.
The Gemara cites a teaching concerning the verse, “You shall work with them forever.” The school of Ishmael understands this as optional: if a person wishes to retain the slave, he may do so, but he is not obligated to retain him forever. Rabbi Akiva understands the verse as mandatory, meaning that one is required to keep the slave forever.
We can now return to the story of the man who freed his slave in order to complete the quorum. Perhaps he freed the slave because he followed the opinion of the school of Ishmael, which holds that retaining a slave is optional. According to that view, there would be no prohibition against freeing him.
However, that explanation is impossible, because the man was Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Eliezer explicitly holds that it is prohibited to free a slave. Therefore, the only reason he freed his slave was the need for a public mitzvah.
Rav then teaches that a person loses his wealth on account of three matters. The first is freeing his slaves, since a person is not supposed to free a slave. The second is inspecting his property on Shabbat. A person might walk through his fields or properties on Shabbat, notice a breach in a fence, and begin thinking about how he will repair it after Shabbat. The third is extending a meal on Shabbat at the time when the Torah scholar is delivering a sermon.
In earlier times, there was a designated time in the synagogue when everyone attended the Torah lesson. Some people would prolong their Shabbat meal and remain at the table instead of attending the lesson. This would cause them to lose their livelihood. The point is not that one should not eat; one should eat earlier or later, but not at the time when the Torah scholar is delivering the sermon.
There were two families in Jerusalem. One held its Shabbat meal during the time of the sermon, while the other held its meal on the eve of Shabbat. Both families were uprooted. We understand why the first family was uprooted: they ate during the sermon instead of attending the lesson.
What was wrong with the second family, which ate its meal on the eve of Shabbat? One explanation is that they ate a large meal on Friday afternoon before Shabbat. They therefore entered Shabbat without an appetite and did not eat the Friday-night meal properly. That was considered disrespectful to Shabbat, because they had eaten the main meal before Shabbat began.
Another explanation, cited by Rashi, is that “the eve of Shabbat” refers to Friday night. What was wrong with making the meal on Friday night? The main meal of Shabbat is the daytime meal. These families made their primary meal on Friday night, and their Shabbat daytime meal was not on the same level. Because they reversed the proper emphasis of the Shabbat meals, they were punished.
The Maharsha explains why these matters cause a person to lose his livelihood. Regarding a person who frees his slave, the explanation is straightforward: by freeing the slave, he loses a worker and therefore loses an asset.
Regarding the person who inspects his fields on Shabbat, the Gemara tells of a pious person who noticed a breach in his fence on Shabbat but refused even to think about repairing it until after Shabbat. A miracle occurred, and the fence repaired itself. This teaches that when a person refrains from thinking about his business on Shabbat, he may receive blessing. The opposite is also true: when a person thinks about his business on Shabbat, he may lose blessing during the week.
Regarding those who ate during the time of the sermon, the early pious ones made Torah their primary occupation and their livelihood secondary. They studied for many hours and worked only a little, yet blessing rested on their work. A person who chooses his meal over Torah demonstrates that Torah is not his primary concern. During the week, he is shown that Torah is not primary for him, and the blessing in his business is diminished.
The Gemara continues with the laws of freeing a slave. Rav said that when a person consecrates his Canaanite slave, the slave goes free. Why does the slave become free? A person cannot consecrate the slave’s actual body in the same way that one consecrates an animal for use as an offering. An animal can become sanctified in its body, but this does not apply to a slave.
Therefore, when a person says that he is consecrating his slave, he must mean that he is consecrating the slave’s monetary value. If the slave is worth one thousand dollars, the owner intends to give that value to the Temple treasury. But the owner did not explicitly say that he was consecrating the slave’s value.
Rav therefore explains that he must have intended the expression to mean that the slave should become part of the holy nation. When a slave is freed, he becomes a full-fledged Jew and becomes obligated in the mitzvot. The owner’s statement therefore means that the slave should become part of the holy nation.
Rashi explains that the Jewish people are called a holy nation, as the verse says, “You are a holy nation.” This is different from consecrating a non-kosher animal. An animal cannot become part of a holy nation. With an animal, when a person consecrates it without specifying its purpose, he must mean that he is consecrating its value, even if he did not say the word “value.” The animal can be sold, and the money can be given to the Temple treasury.
With a slave, however, it is possible to understand the statement as referring to the slave’s body becoming part of the holy nation. Since the owner did not say that he was consecrating the slave’s value, Rav understands him to mean that the slave should become a full-fledged Jew.
Rav Yosef said in the name of Rav that if a person makes his slave ownerless, the slave goes free. The Gemara compares the two statements. According to the one who says that consecrating a slave frees him, certainly declaring him ownerless frees him. However, according to the one who says that declaring a slave ownerless frees him, it does not necessarily follow that consecrating him frees him. Perhaps, when a person consecrates the slave, he intends only to consecrate the slave’s monetary value.
The Gemara raises a further question: when a person declares his slave ownerless, does the slave require a document of release? A slave has two aspects. First, there is the monetary aspect: he belongs to the owner and must work for him. When the owner declares him ownerless, the slave’s monetary value is released, and he no longer has to work for the owner.
Second, there is the legal restriction on the slave. As long as he is a slave, he may not marry a Jewish woman. The question is whether declaring the slave ownerless removes only the monetary ownership, or whether it also removes the legal restriction. Perhaps the slave still requires a document of release in order to marry a Jewish woman.
The Gemara answers that whether a person consecrates his slave or declares him ownerless, Rav says that the slave goes free, but he still requires a document of release. Declaring him ownerless removes the monetary aspect, but the legal restriction remains. He is no longer owned by the master, yet he cannot marry a Jewish woman until he receives the document of release.
Rav then brings a challenge to this ruling. A person consecrated all his property, and among his property were slaves. The administrators of the consecrated property are not permitted to free the slaves. If consecrating a slave automatically made him free, why would the administrators be unable to free him? The case indicates that consecration applies only to the slave’s monetary value.
The administrators may sell the slave, and the money from the sale goes to the Temple treasury. If the person who purchased the slave wishes to free him, he may do so. Rabbi says that the slave himself may also redeem himself. If someone gives money to the slave in a manner that does not belong to the master, the slave can use that money to purchase his own freedom from the administrators.
Everything that a slave acquires normally belongs to his master. In this case, however, the money given to the slave does not belong to the master. The slave can therefore give that money to the administrators, who sell him to himself. The money goes to the consecrated property, and the slave is released from the monetary ownership.
Whether one follows the Rabbis or Rabbi, the implication is that when a person consecrates a slave, the consecration applies to the monetary value. It does not automatically free the slave in the manner Rav described earlier, when he said that consecrating a slave causes the slave to go free.
The Gemara responds that Rav himself has the status of a Tanna and is able to disagree with a Tannaitic teaching. Therefore, one cannot challenge Rav from this teaching.
The Gemara brings another challenge from the verse concerning a forbidden consecration: “Every forbidden thing.” The verse discusses the ability to consecrate property, and the obvious meaning is that one consecrates the monetary value of the object, not that the object automatically becomes free. This appears to contradict Rav.
The Gemara answers that the verse is speaking about a person who explicitly says that he is consecrating the object for its value. Since the wording clearly refers to the value, the case cannot challenge Rav’s statement.
The Gemara returns to the case of the administrators. Perhaps that case, too, involves a person who explicitly consecrated the slaves for their monetary value. If so, it presents no difficulty for Rav, because Rav’s ruling concerns a person who consecrated the slave without specifying that he was consecrating the value.
Rabbi Elazar rejects this answer. If the case explicitly involved only the monetary value, what is the novelty in saying that the administrators are not permitted to free the slave? Of course they cannot free him; they received only the monetary value. Why does the teaching need to state that they cannot free him?
Furthermore, the teaching says that the administrators may sell the slave, and that Rabbi permits the slave himself to redeem himself. If the case involved only the slave’s monetary value, why would the purchaser have the ability to free him? Why would the slave be able to purchase himself? These statements indicate that the case cannot be limited to an explicit consecration of the slave’s value.
The Gemara therefore concludes that the case must involve a person who simply said that he was consecrating the slave. One might have thought that such a statement automatically frees the slave, which is why the teaching explains that the administrators may not free him. The consecration does apply to the monetary value, but because the owner did not explicitly say “for the value,” we might have thought that the slave himself became free. The teaching clarifies that the administrators may sell him, while the purchaser or the slave himself may subsequently arrange for his freedom.
We therefore have a fundamental disagreement among the Tannaim regarding the meaning of an unspecified statement consecrating a slave. According to Rav’s position, when a person consecrates his slave without qualification, the slave goes free and becomes a full-fledged Jew. According to the teaching concerning the administrators of consecrated property, the statement applies to the slave’s monetary value, and the slave does not automatically become free.
That is the conclusion of the discussion.