The Eddie B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud, Zevahim, has been dedicated by our good friend and student of the daily learning session, Binyamin HaKohen, Bani Cohen, whom we call Bani C. May he have success and prosperity. Since he is a Kohen, may he merit, with God’s help, to serve in the Temple when Mashiach comes, together with the other Kohanim. It is especially appropriate that he dedicated this tractate, which discusses the service of the Kohanim in the Temple and the offerings.
We are continuing to discuss the hides of the offerings. Yesterday’s page taught that, in certain circumstances, the hides belong to the Kohanim. The rule is that any offering that became invalid before it was skinned is burned together with its hide. Since it became invalid before the skinning, the entire animal is burned. If it became invalid after it was skinned, however, the hide goes to the Kohanim. This is an interesting point: even though the offering became invalid, if it had already been skinned, the Kohanim receive the hide.
Rabbi Hanina, the Deputy High Priest, said, “In all my days, I never saw a hide being taken to the place of burning.” We will see what he meant by this. It cannot mean that he never saw the hide of an offering that had to be burned, because there are offerings whose flesh and hide are certainly burned. Rather, he meant that he never saw the hide of an offering being taken to the place of burning in the particular case under discussion.
Rabbi Akiva said that we learn from Rabbi Hanina’s statement that if they skinned a firstborn animal and then discovered that it was a tereifah, its hide is nevertheless given to the Kohanim. The animal had been a tereifah from the beginning, but that fact was discovered only afterward. Rabbi Hanina was saying that he never saw the hide being taken to the place of burning even in such a case.
The Sages disagreed with Rabbi Hanina. They said, “The fact that we have not seen something is not proof.” This is the familiar principle, “We have not seen it” is not a proof. Rabbi Hanina said that he had never seen such a hide being burned, but the Sages responded that this does not establish the law. The hide may still be required to be burned.
The Gemara now analyzes the Mishnah in relation to the previous Mishnah. The previous Mishnah stated that whenever the altar does not receive the flesh, the Kohanim do not receive the hide. The hide given to the Kohanim depends on the flesh being accepted by the altar. If the flesh goes on the altar, the Kohanim receive the hide.
This seems to create a contradiction. The earlier Mishnah implies that if the flesh is invalid, the Kohanim do not receive the hide. The Mishnah under discussion, however, states that if the animal was skinned and only afterward became invalid, the hide goes to the Kohanim. What is the basis of the difference?
The Gemara initially explains that the earlier Mishnah follows the view of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon. According to them, the sprinkling of the blood does not independently permit the hide. The sprinkling permits the hide only when it also permits the flesh. If the flesh is already invalid, the sprinkling cannot permit the flesh, and therefore it cannot permit the hide either. The hide does not become permitted merely because the blood was sprinkled.
According to this understanding, if the animal was slaughtered, skinned, and the flesh then became invalid, sprinkling the blood cannot permit the flesh. Since the sprinkling cannot permit the flesh, it cannot permit the hide either, and the Kohanim do not receive it. The sprinkling permits the hide only as part of the same process by which it permits the flesh.
The Mishnah under discussion, however, appears to say that if the offering became invalid after the skinning, the hide goes to the Kohanim. That would imply that the sprinkling of the blood can permit the hide even when it cannot permit the flesh. The Gemara therefore asks: Who is the author of the Mishnah? Is it following Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, or is it following Rabbi?
Abaye offers one way to reconcile the Mishnayot. The final part of the Mishnah follows Rabbi, and the opening part can also be understood according to Rabbi. Rabbi agrees that, generally speaking, the skinning was performed only after the sprinkling of the blood. The normal procedure was to slaughter the animal, collect and sprinkle the blood, and only afterward skin the animal. It was not normally done in the reverse order, because one should not create an interruption between the slaughter and the sprinkling of the blood.
Therefore, when the earlier Mishnah says that if the altar does not receive the flesh the Kohanim do not receive the hide, it is speaking about the normal procedure. The animal had not yet been skinned when the flesh became invalid. Since the hide was still attached to the flesh, and the flesh was not accepted by the altar, the hide does not go to the Kohanim.
The Mishnah under discussion is speaking about an unusual case in which the animal was skinned before the sprinkling. If the flesh became invalid after the skinning, Rabbi holds that the subsequent sprinkling can permit the hide on its own. Thus, the two parts of the Mishnah can both follow Rabbi: the first part deals with the normal case, in which the hide is still attached to the flesh, while the second part deals with the unusual case in which the hide has already been separated.
Rabbi’s position is therefore as follows. The blood can permit the hide even when it cannot permit the flesh. Nevertheless, this applies primarily in a case in which the hide has already been separated. When the hide is still attached to the flesh, the hide follows the status of the flesh. If the flesh is invalid, the hide is invalid as well.
Rava offers a second way to reconcile the Mishnayot, by explaining that both parts follow Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon. According to their view, the important distinction is not literally before skinning and after skinning, but whether the offering had reached the point at which it was fit to be skinned.
When is an offering fit to be skinned? Normally, after the sprinkling of the blood. Thus, “before skinning” can mean before the offering became fit for skinning, namely before the sprinkling, while “after skinning” can mean after it became fit for skinning, namely after the sprinkling.
If the offering became invalid before it was fit to be skinned, the sprinkling cannot permit the hide, because at that point it cannot permit the flesh. If it became invalid only after it had become fit to be skinned, there had already been a moment when the flesh was fit for the altar. The sprinkling had permitted the flesh and the hide together, and the fact that the offering subsequently became invalid does not undo the hide’s status. The hide goes to the Kohanim.
Thus, according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, the practical distinction is really before or after the sprinkling. If the offering became invalid before the sprinkling, the hide is not given to the Kohanim. If the sprinkling took place while the flesh was still fit, the sprinkling permitted the hide, even if the offering became invalid afterward.
The Gemara then asks where these two approaches are found explicitly. A teaching states that Rabbi says, “The blood permits the hide even on its own,” while the other view says that the hide follows the flesh when the two are still attached.
Rabbi’s principle is that the blood permits the hide independently. If the hide has already been separated and the flesh then becomes invalid, the blood can still permit the hide. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, however, say that when the hide is attached to the flesh, it follows the flesh. If the flesh is invalid, the hide is invalid; if the flesh is valid, the hide is valid.
This produces both leniencies and stringencies on each side. Rabbi is more lenient when the hide has already been separated: even if the flesh later becomes invalid, the sprinkling can still permit the hide. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon are more lenient when the flesh was valid at the time of the sprinkling: if the offering became invalid afterward, the hide remains permitted. On the other hand, when the hide is still attached, Rabbi is stringent, because the hide follows the flesh even after the sprinkling, while Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon are stringent when the hide has already been separated and the flesh is invalid.
The Gemara next connects this dispute to another dispute concerning the verse that refers to bringing the offering with its blood and flesh. Rabbi Yehoshua explains that the offering requires both blood and flesh. If there is no blood, there is no flesh that can be placed on the altar. Conversely, if there is no flesh, the blood should not be sprinkled.
For example, if the blood became invalid and sprinkling is impossible, the flesh cannot be placed on the altar. Conversely, if the flesh was lost or became invalid, one should not sprinkle the blood merely in order to permit the hide. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, the blood must accomplish something for the flesh; it cannot be sprinkled solely to permit the hide.
Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and says that the blood can be effective even when there is no flesh. The blood can permit the hide even when it cannot permit the flesh. This view appears to correspond to Rabbi’s principle that the blood permits the hide independently.
The Gemara asks whether Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon correspond to Rabbi Yehoshua. Perhaps the entire dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon depends on the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the blood can permit the hide even without flesh. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, the blood cannot be sprinkled when there is no flesh.
There is, however, a distinction between the ideal procedure and what was done after the fact. Rabbi Yehoshua may be saying only that, ideally, one should not sprinkle the blood when there is no flesh. Before the sprinkling, the Kohanim have not yet acquired anything, so there is no loss to them if the blood is not sprinkled. Since the blood must be accompanied by flesh, one should not perform the sprinkling in the first place.
After the fact, however, if the blood was sprinkled, Rabbi Yehoshua may agree that the hide goes to the Kohanim. Once the blood has been sprinkled, refusing to give the hide to the Kohanim would cause them a loss. This may be comparable to the case in which the flesh was present but had become invalid: although Rabbi Yehoshua says that one should not sprinkle initially, if the blood was sprinkled, the offering is valid after the fact.
Accordingly, Rabbi does not necessarily have to disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua. Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement may concern what one should do initially, when there is no flesh and the Kohanim have not yet acquired anything. Rabbi, however, is discussing a case in which the sprinkling was already performed, and the question is whether the hide should then be given to the Kohanim. In that case, even Rabbi Yehoshua may agree that the hide is given to them.
The same distinction can be made when the flesh became invalid. Initially, one should not sprinkle the blood if the flesh cannot be accepted by the altar. But if the blood was sprinkled after the flesh became invalid, the Kohanim should not lose the hide when the hide is otherwise permitted by the sprinkling.
The Gemara then returns to Rabbi Hanina’s statement that he never saw a hide being taken to the place of burning. This cannot mean that he never saw the hides of offerings that are required to be burned. There are offerings brought inside the Temple whose flesh is not eaten by the Kohanim. A portion is placed on the altar, and the remainder is taken outside and burned together with the hide.
These include the bull offered by the anointed priest, the bull offered for a communal transgression, and the goat of Yom Kippur, as well as other offerings designated for burning. Their flesh and hides are taken outside the Temple area and burned. Therefore, Rabbi Hanina certainly saw hides being burned in cases where the Torah explicitly requires the offering to be burned.
His statement must refer to a different case. He meant that he never saw the hide of an offering burned after the animal had already been skinned, because the normal procedure was to sprinkle the blood before the skinning. Once the sprinkling had been performed, the hide had acquired its permitted status. Even if the animal was later discovered to have been a tereifah, the hide would still go to the Kohanim.
If the offering became invalid while the hide was still attached, that is a different case. The hide follows the flesh, and the entire animal is burned. Rabbi Hanina was not saying that he never saw this. He was saying that he never saw a hide being burned after the animal had already been properly skinned and after the offering had reached the stage at which the sprinkling had permitted the hide.
Rabbi Akiva said that we learn from Rabbi Hanina that even when a firstborn animal was found afterward to have been a tereifah, its hide is given to the Kohanim. The Gemara asks what Rabbi Akiva’s innovation is. If the animal had been skinned and the blood had been sprinkled, it is understandable that the hide goes to the Kohanim.
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Akiva’s innovation applies even when the animal’s defect was discovered outside the Temple. A firstborn animal with a permanent blemish is slaughtered outside the Temple area and eaten by its owner. There is no sprinkling of blood on the altar in that case. Nevertheless, the slaughter permits the animal for eating, and the hide belongs to the Kohanim.
Thus, in the case of a firstborn animal with a permanent blemish, the slaughter outside the Temple functions in a sense like the sprinkling of the blood. Once the slaughter has permitted the animal for consumption, the hide is given to the Kohanim. Even if the animal is subsequently discovered to have been a tereifah, the hide remains theirs, because the permitting act had already taken place.
Rabbi Akiva’s innovation is that this applies even when there was no sprinkling at all. The slaughter of the firstborn animal with a permanent blemish is sufficient to establish the hide’s status. However, the Gemara limits this to a case in which the person examining the animal was an expert. If the animal was examined by someone who was not an expert and a defect was subsequently discovered, the same conclusion may not follow.
The Gemara concludes that the law follows the Sages in their disagreement with Rabbi Hanina, the Deputy High Priest. Rabbi Hanina held that even if the animal was retroactively discovered to have been a tereifah from the beginning, the hide goes to the Kohanim. The Sages hold that if the animal was already a tereifah from the outset, the hide does not go to the Kohanim. Although the proper procedures may have been performed, the offering was invalid from the beginning.
The Gemara now begins the next Mishnah. There are offerings whose flesh is burned outside the Temple area. The bull of the anointed priest, the bull brought for a communal sin, and the goats that are burned are taken outside the three camps and burned in the designated place.
When these offerings are burned according to the proper procedure, those who participate in carrying and burning them become impure through their clothing. The verse states that the people who burn the offering must wash their clothing. The Mishnah discusses when this impurity begins.
There were several places where invalid sacrificial meat was burned. One place was within the Temple courtyard. Offerings that became invalid before the sprinkling, and certain flesh that became invalid while it was still in the courtyard, were burned there. Another place was on the Temple Mount, outside the courtyard. A third place was outside all three camps, where offerings designated from the outset for burning were taken.
The precise place depended on the offering and on when it became invalid. If the offering became invalid before the sprinkling, it had not yet acquired the status that would allow it to be removed from the courtyard, and it was burned within the courtyard. If it became invalid after the sprinkling, it had already reached the stage at which it would ordinarily be taken outside, and it was burned outside the courtyard.
The Mishnah says that the offerings were carried out on poles. Several people carried the animal, and the people who had already left the courtyard became impure through their clothing. The question is whether the people who remained inside the courtyard became impure at that point, or only when they themselves left the courtyard.
The first view is that the impurity begins when the people carrying the offering leave the courtyard. Those who remained inside do not become impure until they also leave. Rabbi Shimon says that the impurity begins only once the offering has been burned to the point that the fire has seized most of it. Once most of the flesh has been consumed, the process is considered complete, and the impurity of the clothing ends.
According to Rabbi Shimon, once the fire has seized most of the flesh, someone who comes afterward to assist with the burning does not become impure through his clothing. The required burning has essentially been completed. Before that stage, anyone who participates in the burning becomes impure, but afterward the process is over.
The Gemara analyzes the term describing the burning and asks where the designated place was located. The answer is that there was a place on the Temple Mount called the place of burning. The word used for that place can also refer more broadly to the Temple or the Temple Mount. One view understands it as referring specifically to a place on the Temple Mount; another understands the term more broadly, as referring to the entire Temple area.
There were therefore three possible places of burning: one in the courtyard, one on the Temple Mount outside the courtyard, and one outside the three camps. The offering was burned in the location appropriate to its status. If it became invalid before the sprinkling, it was burned in the courtyard. If it became invalid after the sprinkling and had to be removed from the courtyard, it was burned on the Temple Mount. Offerings that were designated from the outset to be burned were taken outside all three camps.
The Gemara then asks whether the law of remaining overnight applies to these offerings. Normally, sacrificial meat that remains overnight becomes invalid. Perhaps that law applies only to meat intended to be eaten. The meat of these offerings is not eaten; it is burned outside. Maybe the prohibition of remaining overnight does not apply to it.
Abaye answers by citing the law of piggul. If a person intended to eat the meat of an offering beyond the permitted time, that intention does not create piggul when the offering is not intended to be eaten. This might suggest that the law of remaining overnight likewise does not apply to offerings that are burned. However, the Gemara responds that the two laws do not necessarily follow one another. The fact that piggul does not apply does not prove that the law of remaining overnight does not apply.
The Gemara then cites the law of sacrilege. The flesh of these offerings is subject to the laws of sacrilege from the time it becomes sanctified until it is completely burned. The Gemara asks whether this proves that the law of remaining overnight applies to the portion burned outside, since both laws continue until the flesh is consumed.
The answer is that there is no proof. The law of sacrilege may apply to all the flesh, including the portion burned outside, while the law of remaining overnight may apply only to the portion that belongs on the altar. Perhaps the two laws do not have the same scope.
The Gemara cites a teaching that these offerings were taken outside and burned in a special place. It asks how they became invalid. Perhaps they became invalid because they remained overnight. If so, this would prove that the law of remaining overnight applies to them.
The Gemara rejects this proof as well. They may have become invalid for another reason, such as being removed from the courtyard before the appropriate time. Since the offering was taken outside prematurely, it became invalid, and it was then burned in the designated place. We cannot assume that the case involved remaining overnight.
This leads to a broader question concerning the removal of sacrificial meat from the courtyard. In the case of ordinary offerings of lesser sanctity, removing the meat from the courtyard before the sprinkling can make it invalid, because it was not yet permitted to leave. But perhaps the same rule does not apply to offerings that are destined to be burned outside. These offerings are ultimately required to leave the courtyard, so perhaps removing them early does not invalidate them.
The Gemara asks whether, in such a case, the requirement is to wait until the proper time for removal, or whether the fact that the offering is eventually required to leave means that removing it earlier is acceptable. This question remains unresolved in the discussion at that point.
The Gemara then raises another question involving the majority of the animal. Suppose most of the animal has left the courtyard, but a small part remains inside. Is the status determined by the majority of the animal, or does the small portion remain significant because it is part of a limb?
For example, imagine that most of the animal has already left, and the limb that caused the majority to leave is itself only partially outside. Should we combine the majority of that limb with the rest of the animal and say that the animal has left, or should the minority of that limb be considered attached to the part of the animal remaining inside?
The practical question is whether the animal is considered to have left the courtyard and whether the people carrying it become impure through their clothing. The Gemara initially suggests that perhaps the majority of the animal determines the law. Alternatively, perhaps the majority of the limb is considered together with the limb itself, and the minority remaining inside prevents the animal from being considered completely outside.
The Gemara then refines the question. It is obvious that the majority of the animal is significant. The more difficult case is when exactly half of the animal has left and half remains inside, with the point of balance created by a limb whose majority is outside while a minority of that limb remains inside.
Do we attach the minority of the limb to the majority of that limb and say that the limb is outside, thereby making a majority of the animal outside? Or do we attach the minority of the limb to the rest of the animal, since the minority is physically located inside, and conclude that the animal remains evenly divided?
The Gemara presents the same type of question regarding the people carrying the offering. Five people are carrying the animal, three have already left the courtyard, and two remain inside. Do we follow the majority of the people carrying the animal and consider the remaining two as part of the group that has left, or do we judge each person according to his own location?
If we follow each person’s individual location, the two people inside remain inside and do not yet become impure through their clothing. If we follow the majority of the group, the three outside may establish that the entire group has effectively left, and the two remaining inside may also acquire the status associated with those outside.
The Gemara emphasizes that this is not a simple case of one person against one person. It is specifically a case of three people outside and two people inside, where the question is whether the majority of the carriers determines the status of the entire group or whether each person is judged independently according to his position.
These are the concluding questions of the passage: whether the status follows the majority of the animal, the majority of a limb, the majority of the carriers, or the individual location of each person. The discussion leaves us with the need to distinguish carefully between the object being carried, the individual limbs of that object, and the people participating in the carrying.