Let us begin with the baraita. We will return to this later, on page 81. The blood of a sin offering has to be sprinkled outside; if it is brought inside, that is not acceptable. The question is whether the same applies when the blood of a guilt offering is brought inside. There is a three-way dispute about this.
The first opinion says that the blood of a guilt offering is disqualified. The other opinion says that only the blood of a sin offering is disqualified. The Torah juxtaposes the sin offering and the guilt offering, and the first rabbi understands that juxtaposition in the most straightforward way: just as the blood of a sin offering becomes disqualified when it enters inside, so too does the blood of a guilt offering.
The Rabbis ask: What is the reason for making this analogy? They answer that the verse says, “It is a sin offering,” and the wording excludes other offerings. You cannot say that if the blood of a guilt offering enters the Sanctuary it is automatically disqualified, because we have a tradition derived from a burnt offering.
A burnt offering is entirely consumed. Nevertheless, if its blood enters inside, the offering remains valid. One might therefore reason as follows: A guilt offering is not entirely consumed, so perhaps the Torah is less strict about it. If the blood of a burnt offering remains valid when brought inside, the blood of a guilt offering should certainly remain valid.
The Gemara rejects this proof. What is the basis for comparing a guilt offering to a burnt offering? A burnt offering does not atone, whereas a guilt offering does atone. Perhaps the fact that a guilt offering provides atonement makes it more stringent. The Gemara then suggests bringing a sin offering brought by a poor person as a proof, since that offering does not provide atonement in the same way.
Rava objects: Why bring a proof from a poor person’s offering? That is a different category. Why not remain within the ordinary category of animal offerings and bring a proof from a bird sin offering? A bird sin offering does provide atonement, and yet, according to the discussion, if its blood is brought inside, it remains valid.
The Gemara answers that a bird sin offering is itself not an uncomplicated proof. There is a dispute about the result when its blood is brought inside, and one does not want to build a proof on a controversial case. The discussion therefore looks for offerings about which the underlying principle is universal.
The Gemara then suggests breaking the analogy in another way: perhaps the leniency of the poor person’s offering is because it is not an animal sacrifice at all; it is a flour offering. What is the equivalent of blood in a flour offering? The handful that is removed from the offering and placed on the altar.
That was Ezra’s excellent question: Where is there blood in a flour offering? The answer is that the handful removed from the flour offering serves as the comparable element. I appreciate that you whispered the question instead of confronting me with it. Someone joked that he had laryngitis and was taking one for the team, but the question remains a serious one.
The Gemara responds: If the leniency is because a flour offering is not an animal sacrifice, then consider a burnt offering. A burnt offering is an animal sacrifice, yet its blood remains valid when brought inside. Thus, the proof from a flour offering does not establish that the leniency is limited to non-animal offerings.
At this point, the argument becomes circular. The leniencies of a burnt offering are not the same as the leniencies of a poor person’s flour offering, and the leniencies of the flour offering are not the same as those of the burnt offering. Since neither one possesses all the characteristics of the other, the result cannot be attributed to one particular leniency. It must be based on something they share.
What do they share? They are both offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, if the blood of an offering of lesser sanctity enters inside, it remains valid. If so, the same should apply to a guilt offering. A guilt offering is also an offering of lesser sanctity, so if its blood enters inside, it should remain valid.
Rava rejects this as well. Perhaps the shared feature is not simply that they are offerings of lesser sanctity, but that they do not have a fixed value. A burnt offering and a poor person’s offering do not have a fixed minimum price. A guilt offering, however, has a defined value: it must be worth two sela. Since it has a fixed value, perhaps it is more stringent, and its blood becomes disqualified when it enters inside.
Therefore, the earlier arguments do not establish the ruling. The Rabbis maintain that the blood of a guilt offering is valid when brought inside, while the stricter opinion compares the guilt offering to the sin offering and disqualifies it.
Rabbi Akiva derives the stricter position from the expression “its blood.” The verse is referring specifically to the blood of the sin offering, not to the blood of other offerings. Rabbi Eliezer, however, does not expound the expression in that way. For him, the juxtaposition of the sin offering and the guilt offering teaches that the two are alike in this regard.
Rabbi Akiva uses the expression “its blood” for a different exclusion: it excludes the meat. If the meat of the sin offering enters inside, it does not become disqualified in the same manner as the blood. Rabbi Eliezer does not derive that exclusion from the wording “its blood.”
Now let us return to an earlier matter. According to the Rabbis, who say that a guilt offering slaughtered with an improper intention remains valid, we can understand the connection between the flour offering and the guilt offering. The general rule is that offerings slaughtered not for their own designated purpose remain valid, although they do not fulfill the obligation of their owners.
Rabbi Shimon explains the verse concerning a flour offering: “It is most holy, like a sin offering and like a guilt offering.” A flour offering brought by a sinner is compared to a sin offering. Just as a sin offering slaughtered with an improper intention is invalid, so too is the handful removed from such a flour offering invalid if it was performed with an improper intention.
A voluntary flour offering, however, is compared to a guilt offering. Just as a guilt offering slaughtered with an improper intention remains valid, so too does the handful of a voluntary flour offering remain valid when removed with an improper intention. This is the connection between the flour offering and the guilt offering.
According to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that a guilt offering slaughtered with an improper intention is invalid, what is the connection between the flour offering and the guilt offering? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Shimon has another teaching concerning the same verse.
We learned in Menachot that if the handful was removed without a sanctified vessel, the offering is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says that it remains valid. Rabbi Shimon explains that the verse teaches that a flour offering can sometimes be treated like a sin offering and sometimes like a guilt offering.
If one performs the service by hand, the flour offering is treated like a sin offering, which is performed with the right hand. If one performs the service using a sanctified vessel, the flour offering is treated like a guilt offering, which is associated with the left hand. Thus, Rabbi Shimon uses the same verse to teach two different matters: the comparison between the flour offering and the sin offering, and the comparison between the flour offering and the guilt offering.
The Gemara asks how Rabbi Shimon can derive both teachings from the same verse. It answers that the verse is written in a way that allows both meanings to be derived. The primary teaching is that the flour offering is compared to both a sin offering and a guilt offering with respect to whether the service is performed by hand or in a vessel.
The comparison to a sin offering for the rule concerning improper intention is derived from the wording “it is a sin offering.” The unusual wording teaches that a flour offering brought by a sinner is treated like a sin offering with respect to improper intention. Rabbi Eliezer understands the expression differently: it teaches that just as a sin offering slaughtered with an improper intention is invalid, so too is the relevant flour offering invalid.
The Rabbis, who say that a guilt offering slaughtered with an improper intention remains valid, derive a different lesson from the comparison of a sin offering and a guilt offering. Just as a sin offering requires the laying of hands, so too does a guilt offering require the laying of hands.
Now we come to the dispute concerning an animal slaughtered with the intention that it be a Passover offering or a sin offering. The general rule is that offerings slaughtered with an improper intention remain valid. Yosef ben Honi says that there is an exception: if an offering is slaughtered with the intention that it be a Passover offering or a sin offering, it is invalid.
This is not a distinction between a Passover offering and a sin offering. According to Yosef ben Honi, both are exceptions to the general rule. Rabbi Eliezer agrees with him: an offering slaughtered throughout the year with the intention that it be a sin offering is invalid, and an offering slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan with the intention that it be a Passover offering is also invalid.
Rabba says that the cases are not identical. The practical difference concerns another offering slaughtered with the intention that it be a sin offering. Yosef ben Honi would invalidate it, whereas Rabbi Eliezer may agree only in the cases of an offering slaughtered as a Passover offering or as a sin offering.
A baraita teaches that if a Passover offering became too old to be used as a Passover offering, it automatically becomes a peace offering. If another offering is slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan with the intention that it be a Passover offering, it is invalid. From here, one might understand that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Honi concerning an offering slaughtered with the intention that it be a Passover offering.
Rabbi Yehoshua challenges Rabbi Eliezer with a logical argument. Throughout the year, if a Passover offering is slaughtered with the intention that it be a peace offering, it is valid. The reason is that throughout the year it is not yet the time for the Passover offering. If an offering that is not a Passover offering is slaughtered with the intention that it be a Passover offering, however, it is invalid. Since a Passover offering is valid when slaughtered with the intention of being a peace offering during the year, then on Passover itself, when it is actually the proper time for the Passover offering, it should certainly be valid.
Rabbi Eliezer responds that the logic can be reversed. During the year, if an offering is slaughtered with the intention that it be a Passover offering, it is invalid, while a Passover offering slaughtered with the intention that it be a peace offering is valid. One cannot therefore derive the rule for Passover itself from what occurs during the rest of the year.
On Passover itself, the Passover offering is more stringent than a peace offering. If one slaughters a peace offering with the intention that it be a Passover offering, it is invalid. If one slaughters a Passover offering with the intention that it be a peace offering, it is valid according to Rabbi Yehoshua. Rabbi Eliezer argues that this would make the peace offering more stringent than the Passover offering, even though the Passover offering is the more stringent sacrifice.
Rabbi Eliezer therefore offers a different proof. We find that the remainder of a Passover offering becomes a peace offering, but the remainder of a peace offering does not become a Passover offering. If money was designated for a peace offering and remained unused, it cannot be used to purchase a Passover offering. The reverse is true of money left over from a Passover offering: it can be used for a peace offering.
From this we see that the remainder of a Passover offering can become a peace offering, but the remainder of a peace offering cannot become a Passover offering. Nevertheless, if the Passover offering is slaughtered at the proper time with the intention that it be a peace offering, it is invalid. How much more so should a peace offering slaughtered at the proper time with the intention that it be a Passover offering be invalid.
Rabbi Yehoshua rejects the analogy. We find a similar pattern with the remainder of a sin offering and a burnt offering. The remainder of a sin offering can be used for a burnt offering, but the remainder of a burnt offering cannot be used for a sin offering. Yet if a sin offering is slaughtered with the intention that it be a burnt offering, it is invalid. This does not prove that a burnt offering slaughtered with the intention that it be a sin offering is invalid.
The response is that the comparison to a sin offering is not valid. A sin offering can be slaughtered with the proper intention throughout the year, whereas a Passover offering is valid as a Passover offering only at its designated time. Since the Passover offering is limited to its proper time, its rules are more stringent, and the case of a sin offering cannot serve as a proof.
We then come to the teaching of Shimon ben Azai. His innovation is that when an offering is slaughtered in the name of a more sacred category, it remains valid if it moves upward in sanctity, but not if it moves downward. This is different from the general rule, which does not distinguish between moving upward and moving downward.
Rav says that this teaching was transmitted in the name of Rabbi Yohanan. Others transmit it in the name of Rabbi Yannai. What is the reason for Shimon ben Azai’s position? The verse says that something which is destined to be separated does not become profane as long as it has been elevated. The wording indicates that if it goes upward, it remains valid; if it goes downward, it does not.
The Gemara challenges this derivation. Perhaps the verse is speaking about produce from which a portion still has to be separated. If that portion is eaten before the separation, the produce is considered untithed. How can one use that verse to derive a rule concerning offerings?
The Gemara answers that if the Torah wanted only to teach Shimon ben Azai’s rule, it could have used a different expression indicating that the offering had already been elevated. Instead, the verse uses a future form, which allows two teachings: something that has not yet been separated is still considered untithed, and something that is elevated is not considered profaned.
There are two questions concerning Shimon ben Azai. First, is he arguing only that an offering moving downward is invalid, while agreeing that an offering moving upward is valid? Second, when he says that an offering moving upward remains valid, does he mean only that it is valid, or does he also mean that it fulfills the owners’ obligation and provides atonement?
Rabbi Zeira raises the question: Does the phrase “it remains valid” mean valid but not atoning, or valid and atoning? If Shimon ben Azai disagrees with the Rabbis only concerning the downward movement, then he may agree that even when an offering moves upward, it is valid but does not provide atonement. Alternatively, he may disagree on both points and hold that an offering moving upward is not only valid but also atoning.
The Gemara brings a proof from a firstborn animal and a tithe animal slaughtered with the intention that they be peace offerings. A firstborn and a tithe are not offerings brought for atonement. They are brought because of their particular status. If they are slaughtered with the intention that they be peace offerings, they move upward in category and remain valid.
But if a peace offering is slaughtered with the intention that it be a firstborn or a tithe offering, that is a downward movement. The case is therefore valid but cannot provide a proof concerning atonement, because a firstborn and a tithe do not provide atonement in the first place.
Accordingly, the example at the end of the Mishnah teaches that when an offering moves upward, it remains valid but does not necessarily provide atonement. The same should apply to the earlier example, in which offerings of lesser sanctity are slaughtered with the intention that they be offerings of greater sanctity: they remain valid, but they do not atone.
The Gemara asks why the Mishnah gives both examples. We already know the rule concerning movement upward and downward from the first case, where an offering of lesser sanctity is slaughtered with the intention that it be an offering of greater sanctity. The answer is that one might have thought the rule applies only when moving between different levels of sanctity. Perhaps within the same general category of offerings, all offerings have the same status.
The second case teaches that even within offerings of lesser sanctity there is a hierarchy. A peace offering is considered higher than a firstborn or tithe offering. We already know this from the rule that a peace offering precedes a firstborn offering when both are waiting to be brought in the Temple. A peace offering involves the placing of the blood on all four sides of the altar, the laying of hands, and the waving of the offering, whereas a firstborn offering does not have all these services.
The Gemara responds that the earlier source may have mentioned the precedence of the peace offering only incidentally. The primary place where we learn that there is an upward and downward hierarchy even within offerings of lesser sanctity is this Mishnah.
We now reach the Mishnah concerning a Passover offering slaughtered in the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan, before the proper time for the Passover offering. The normal time is after midday. If it is slaughtered in the morning with the intention that it be a Passover offering, Rabbi Yehoshua says that it is valid, as though it had been slaughtered during the rest of the year. Ben Beteira says that it is invalid, as though it had been slaughtered at the proper time but with an improper intention.
Ben Beteira’s innovation is that although the offering was slaughtered before midday, it is treated as though it had been slaughtered at the time of the Passover offering. Since a Passover offering slaughtered at its proper time with the wrong intention is invalid, this offering is also invalid.
Shimon ben Azai said that he received a tradition from seventy-two elders. The Gemara will ask why the Mishnah says “elders” in this wording. The tradition was that all offerings that are eaten, when slaughtered with an improper intention, remain valid, although they do not fulfill the owners’ obligation. The exceptions are the Passover offering and the sin offering. If either is slaughtered with an improper intention, it is invalid.
Shimon ben Azai did not add a burnt offering to the exceptions, because a burnt offering is not eaten. The Rabbis, however, who say that all offerings remain valid when slaughtered with an improper intention, include a burnt offering as well. This is another dispute concerning whether a burnt offering is included in the general rule.
We will continue with the discussion of the seventy-two elders. We have made excellent progress today.