We have Lamed Gimal, Moshe Ben-Tzara Semhal Ha'Atslaha, Arieh Ben-Dinah, Moshe Ben-Dinah, Yaakov Ben-Dinah, Yitzhak Ben-Dinah, Ne'elu Nishmat, Abraham Ben-Liza, Limon Ben-Gilson, Zivugim Islamar, Bat Yehudit, Revka Bat-Dinah, and Mazal Bat-Nichal. We also have Ha'Atslaha, Luchniyut Engashmit, Vahayim Ben-Soha, David Ben-Ester, and Yaakov Ben-Henriet.
Now we have the page. Where are we? We are in the discussion of the principle, “Since it was permitted, it remains permitted.” What was the case? A man is afflicted with tzaraat, and then he becomes a zav. We said that although a zav may not enter the Temple courtyard, since he had already been permitted to enter because of his status as a person with tzaraat, he may enter to place his fingers into the courtyard and perform the required act with his hand.
We explained that even if one maintains that partial entry is considered entry, and would ordinarily present a problem, here it was already permitted with regard to tzaraat. Therefore, with regard to the need to bring or eat the Passover offering, we allow him to enter. One positive commandment overrides another positive commandment, even when the prohibition carries the punishment of excision. Even if one says that partial entry is considered entry and would therefore also involve excision, we say that once it was permitted, it remains permitted.
The Gemara then says that Rav Yosef proposed a parallel case. Suppose the majority of the Jewish people were impure because of contact with the dead, and therefore they did not qualify to bring the communal offering in a state of impurity; afterward, they became impure as zavim. We might say the same principle applies: once it was permitted, it remains permitted.
The Gemara rejects this comparison. There, it was not initially permitted. They first became zavim, and a majority of zavim may not bring the Passover offering. The Gemara then reverses the case: suppose they first became impure through contact with the dead, in which case bringing the offering in impurity was permitted, and afterward they became zavim. Even then, the comparison is not necessarily valid. Since they began in a permitted state, they remain in a permitted state.
The Gemara asks: How can this be called a permitted status? It is not the same as the case of the person with tzaraat. In that case, the Torah explicitly permits the priest to place his hand into the courtyard even though he is impure. That is a clear permission. Many times, in our study of Tractate Pesachim, we have discussed the distinction between impurity being permitted and impurity being merely deferred. Some maintain that impurity is entirely permitted, while others say that it is only deferred. According to the latter view, the impurity is not removed; it is pushed aside with difficulty.
The Rambam maintains that impurity is merely deferred. Therefore, perhaps when the impurity resulting from contact with the dead was deferred, it was deferred only for that particular impurity and not for the later impurity of a zav. The fact that something was pushed aside with difficulty for one purpose does not necessarily mean that it is pushed aside for another purpose. By contrast, when there is an outright permission, one may say that the permission was granted for this case, but not for the other case.
There are therefore two ways to analyze the issue. If the status is one of outright permission, perhaps the permission is limited to the specific matter for which it was granted. But if the matter is merely deferred, then once it has been pushed aside, it has been pushed aside. Whatever the reason, the prohibition was deferred.
The central question is whether impurity is considered permitted or deferred. The entire discussion assumes that it is deferred. The question is whether that deferral is a reason to continue pushing the prohibition aside or, conversely, a reason not to extend the deferral. In any event, everyone in the Gemara is assuming that impurity is deferred.
We now return to the question of placing the hands on the offering, which we began discussing yesterday. The Gemara says: Let us bring a proof that partial entry is considered entry. It was taught that all acts of placing the hands on offerings that were performed in the Temple had to be immediately followed by slaughter, with one exception: the offering of the person with tzaraat.
Why was there an exception? The offering of the person with tzaraat was brought at the Gate of Nicanor, which was outside the consecrated area of the courtyard. The person with tzaraat could not enter the courtyard because he was impure. Only after they sprinkled the blood of his purification offering and guilt offering could he enter.
Thus, the offering had to be brought outside, and he placed his hands on it at the Gate of Nicanor. The animal was then brought into the courtyard, all the way to the north, where offerings of this type were slaughtered. This is the exception to the requirement of immediate succession: the placing of the hands did not take place immediately before the slaughter.
The Gemara asks: If you maintain that partial entry is not considered entry, why not allow him to place his hands on the animal by inserting his hands into the courtyard? In that way, the placing of the hands and the slaughter could still be immediately successive.
Let us first examine the explanation of Rashi. How do we know that the placing of the hands must immediately precede the slaughter? It is derived from the verse that juxtaposes placing the hands and slaughtering. The requirement is that there be no interruption between the two acts.
Why was the offering of the person with tzaraat brought at the Gate of Nicanor? The eastern gate was not consecrated with the same sanctity as the courtyard. This was intentional. A person with tzaraat could stand there, insert his hands into the courtyard, and place them on the offering. They would then bring the offering to the place of slaughter.
Rashi explains that the blood was not sprinkled directly on the person with tzaraat. Rather, the blood was sprinkled on the altar on his behalf, as was done with the blood of his purification and guilt offerings. Afterward, he would be able to enter the courtyard.
The Gemara asks again: What is the difficulty? Let him insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the offering. He can then bring the animal to the place of slaughter and preserve the required immediacy.
Moreover, the courtyard had several gates, five on the north and five on the south. The central gate was aligned with the entrance to the Sanctuary, but perhaps the person with tzaraat could stand near one of the northern gates, insert his hands, and have the animal slaughtered nearby.
This depends on the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that the entire area between the Sanctuary and the altar is considered north. According to him, there would be a place where the person with tzaraat could insert his hands and perform the placing of the hands immediately before the slaughter.
The Gemara therefore concludes that the fact that the person with tzaraat was not permitted to insert his hands indicates that partial entry is considered entry. That is a proof that partial entry is prohibited. Since he may not insert his hands, there is no choice but to say that the requirement of immediate succession does not apply in this case.
Rav Yosef rejects this proof. The question exists only if one follows Rabbi Yosei, who considers the area behind the altar to be north. According to Rabbi Yosei, there would indeed be a place where the person with tzaraat could insert his hands and preserve the immediate succession of the two acts. But the teaching may follow Rabbi Yosei’s opponent, who maintains that the northern area does not extend that far.
According to that view, the slaughter of the most sacred offerings must take place close to the entrance, and the relevant location is too far away. There is no gate through which the person with tzaraat could insert his hands and still have the animal slaughtered in the proper place. Therefore, the lack of such an arrangement does not prove that partial entry is considered entry.
The Gemara then asks: Why not make an opening? If the difficulty is that there is no gate providing access to the proper place, make a small opening or window in the northern wall. The person with tzaraat could insert his hands through that opening, place them on the offering, and the animal could then be slaughtered in the correct location.
Rashi explains that this would mean constructing a small opening in the wall. There were already two small openings associated with the Gate of Nicanor, one on either side, and perhaps one could make another opening on the northern side. The person with tzaraat could then stand there, insert his hands precisely where the slaughter would take place, and preserve the immediacy between placing the hands and slaughter.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion. The structure of the Temple was not subject to personal redesign. One cannot simply begin adding windows and openings to the Temple. The construction of the Temple was determined by divine instruction. As the verse says, everything was done according to the pattern given by God. A king cannot decide to add an opening or make a structural change merely because it would solve a technical problem.
That was the first version of the discussion. There is a second version, in which Rav Yosef says that the lack of permission to insert the hands does not prove that partial entry is considered entry. In reality, partial entry is not considered entry. The reason the person with tzaraat may not insert his hands is that the placing of the hands must be performed with the full strength of the person’s body.
When a person places his hands on an offering, he must place them with his full force. He cannot stand outside, extend only his hands, and fulfill the requirement. The issue is not that partial entry itself is prohibited; the issue is that such a posture does not constitute valid placing of the hands. The entire body must be involved.
According to this explanation, partial entry is not considered entry, but placing the hands requires more than partial entry. It requires at least the majority of the person’s body, because the requirement is that the act be performed with the person’s full strength.
The Gemara then says that the teaching can in fact follow Rabbi Yosei. According to Rabbi Yosei, the person with tzaraat could slaughter the offering in the rear northern area, and technically he could insert his hands there and preserve the required succession. Why, then, was this not done? The reason is the one just mentioned: inserting only the hands does not constitute a valid act of placing the hands.
The Gemara raises another question. What do you maintain regarding the placing of the hands on the guilt offering of the person with tzaraat? Is it a Torah requirement? The Gemara assumes that it is. If placing the hands and slaughter must immediately follow one another by Torah law, and if the Torah requires the person to place his hands on the guilt offering, why not simply have him enter and place his hands directly?
The Torah says that he must place his hands on the guilt offering, and it also establishes the connection between placing the hands and slaughter. One might therefore say that the two requirements should be fulfilled together, with the person entering the courtyard and immediately placing his hands on the animal before it is slaughtered.
Rashi explains that this would require the person with tzaraat to enter the courtyard, place his hands on the animal, and have it slaughtered immediately. The apparent implication is that both requirements are biblical.
Rav Abba bar Mattena answers that there was a rabbinic decree. The concern was that the person might take additional steps into the courtyard. The intention was that he should enter only as much as necessary to perform the placing of the hands and then leave immediately. The rabbis were concerned that, once permitted to enter, he might continue walking farther into the courtyard.
This is not the reward of taking steps; it is the concern that he might take unnecessary steps. Even one additional step could bring him into a situation involving excision. The rabbis therefore established that he should enter only minimally, perform the placing of the hands, and leave.
Even if priests were standing there and warning him not to proceed farther, the concern remained. One step is still one step, and even an inadvertent transgression would be a serious matter. The rabbis did not want to place him in a situation where he might enter farther than permitted.
The owner of the offering must perform the placing of the hands himself. It cannot be delegated to someone else, because this is a commandment performed with the person’s own body.
The Rashash makes an additional observation. Before the person performs the placing of the hands, he is permitted to enter for that purpose. Therefore, until he performs the act, we are not concerned that he may take an additional step, because he is still in the process of entering for the permitted purpose. Once he has completed the placing of the hands, however, he must leave immediately.
This is a fine inference. The concern may apply only after the placing of the hands, when he no longer has a reason to remain in the courtyard. The Rashash raises a further question: once he must leave, perhaps he may not linger even in the rear of the courtyard or take a longer route out. Once the permitted act is complete, he must leave.
There was some discussion about the classic editions of the Talmud and the placement of the Rashash, the Rosh, the Maharsha, and the Maharam. The older editions placed these commentaries in a way that made them easy to locate. Some newer editions provide collections of explanations and supplements, but it can be difficult to find the Rashash or other classic commentaries in the body of the page.
It would be useful to have a volume arranged by chapter, with the relevant Rishonim and Acharonim gathered together for that chapter. Something similar exists for certain works, and it would make the study much easier. The older editions are familiar to those who learned in yeshivot many years ago, where the Rosh and other commentaries appeared directly on the page.
Returning to the Gemara, the reason the person with tzaraat may not enter may be that the placing of the hands on the guilt offering is a Torah requirement, while the immediacy between placing the hands and slaughter may also be a Torah requirement. Rav Ashi suggests that perhaps the placing of the hands on the guilt offering of the person with tzaraat is not a Torah requirement. If so, there is no need to bring him into the courtyard for that act.
The Gemara then brings a teaching based on the juxtaposition of the verses concerning placing the hands and slaughter. Just as placing the hands must be performed by a pure person, so too the slaughter must be performed by a pure person. The same connection may indicate that placing the hands must be done in the consecrated area.
Rashi explains that the verses are juxtaposed to teach that the placing of the hands must take place in purity. The slaughter is performed before God, and the placing of the hands is connected to the slaughter. Therefore, just as the slaughter must take place in the proper area and in purity, so too the placing of the hands must take place in the proper area and in purity.
If, however, the immediacy between placing the hands and slaughter is only a rabbinic requirement, then the placing of the hands could be performed outside, at the Gate of Nicanor, while the animal would later be brought inside for slaughter. The fact that this arrangement is accepted would indicate that the placing of the hands does not itself require the person to be pure.
The Gemara reverses the possibilities. Perhaps the placing of the hands on the guilt offering of the person with tzaraat is not a Torah requirement, while the immediate succession between placing the hands and slaughter is a Torah requirement. In that case, the immediate succession would teach that placing the hands normally must be performed in purity, but there would be no need to require the placing of hands on this particular guilt offering.
Why would there be no placing of the hands on the guilt offering of the person with tzaraat? The Gemara explains that this is not the ordinary guilt offering whose function is to atone for a transgression. The offering of the person with tzaraat permits him to reenter the Temple and eat consecrated food. It is a different type of guilt offering, with a different purpose, and therefore it does not necessarily follow the ordinary model.
The verse concerning this offering is not being used to establish the ordinary laws of placing the hands on a guilt offering. It teaches that the person with tzaraat may regain access to the Temple and to consecrated food. Since its purpose is different, its laws may also be different.
Ravina offers another answer. We return to the earlier discussion, in which Ulla said that partial entry is considered entry. The Gemara had asked from the case of the person with tzaraat who became a zav. He is allowed to enter because a positive commandment that carries excision—the commandment of the Passover offering—overrides a positive commandment without excision, the prohibition against entering the Temple while impure.
We initially assumed that if partial entry is considered entry, it should carry the punishment of excision. The fact that the person with tzaraat is allowed to enter would then seem to prove that partial entry is not considered entry.
Ravina clarifies that Ulla did not say that partial entry carries excision. Ulla said that it carries lashes. Partial entry is considered a form of entry for purposes of the prohibition, but it is not equivalent to complete entry for purposes of excision. A complete entry carries excision, whereas partial entry involves the prohibition and carries lashes.
Therefore, there is no difficulty from the case of the Passover offering. The entire question was based on the assumption that partial entry would carry the same punishment as complete entry. But that assumption is not correct. Partial entry is considered entry with regard to the prohibition, while it does not have the full status of entry with regard to excision.
There was then a question concerning the source for this distinction. The answer was that Ulla explicitly stated that the person receives lashes. The comparison is therefore being made with regard to the existence of a prohibition, not with regard to the punishment of excision. It is a comparison concerning the prohibition itself, not a claim that partial entry is identical in every respect to complete entry.
We then turned to a related discussion concerning contact with consecrated food. The verse states that one may not touch sacred food while impure. The question was whether the verse refers to eating consecrated food, touching it, or both.
One approach derives the prohibition from the juxtaposition between impurity relating to entering the Temple and impurity relating to eating consecrated food. Just as entering the Temple while impure involves a prohibition, so too eating consecrated food while impure involves a prohibition.
The Gemara asks whether one can derive this through a logical inference. If a person may not touch consecrated food while impure, certainly he may not eat it while impure. The answer is that one cannot use a logical inference to create a prohibition that is not otherwise established by a verse. A logical inference can clarify the scope of a prohibition, but it cannot independently create a new prohibition.
Rashi explains that the verse may be teaching the prohibition against eating consecrated food while impure. The juxtaposition to entering the Temple establishes the relevant prohibition, and the language of the verse may then be extended to contact as well.
Another explanation is offered in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, who derives the matter through a verbal analogy between bodily impurity and impurity associated with the Temple. With regard to entering the Temple in a state of bodily impurity, the Torah establishes a prohibition. Through the verbal analogy, the same type of prohibition applies to eating consecrated food while bodily impure.
The question then arises: If the verse is speaking about eating consecrated food, how can it also teach that one may not touch it? The answer is that the verse is being used for two purposes. It teaches the prohibition against eating consecrated food in a state of bodily impurity, and through the juxtaposition it also teaches the prohibition against touching consecrated food in that state.
One might attempt to derive the matter by a logical inference: if a person may not touch consecrated food, certainly he may not eat it. But again, that would not be sufficient to establish a prohibition by itself. The verse is therefore understood as providing the necessary source.
The discussion also compares the matter to a person who has immersed in a ritual bath but has not yet waited until sunset. Such a person may still be prohibited from eating consecrated food. The verse teaches that consecrated food remains subject to a distinct level of restriction until the person has completed the necessary purification process.
The final point is that the verse is understood to teach both aspects: the prohibition against eating consecrated food while impure and the prohibition against touching it. The juxtaposition to the laws of the Temple helps establish the prohibition, while the wording of the verse allows the teaching to apply to both eating and contact.
That is where we will stop for today. Tomorrow we will continue at the scheduled time.