We need to move on and finish this material. We are discussing the laws of pigul. If a person slaughters a sacrifice with the intention of eating something beyond its allotted time or outside its designated place, but the item is not edible and is not normally placed on the altar, the sacrifice is still valid. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and invalidates it.
What if he intends to eat something that is normally eaten, or to burn something that is normally burned, but his intention concerns less than a kezayit? The sacrifice remains valid, because the law of pigul applies only when the requisite measure is present.
What about combining different types of consumption? Suppose he intends to eat half a kezayit and to burn half a kezayit. Do the consumption of a person and the consumption of the altar combine? Does eating and burning combine? The question is whether the two halves join together for the purposes of pigul.
The Mishnah then discusses a person who slaughters a sacrifice with the intention of eating a kezayit from the hide, from the gravy, from the residue at the bottom of the pot, or from the cartilage. The residue at the bottom of the pot consists of the small pieces that dissolve during cooking and remain there afterward. The cartilage is interpreted in different ways. Some identify it as the cartilage around the neck, while others identify it as the sinew of the neck.
According to Rashi, the cartilage is the sinew of the neck, which is very hard and therefore inedible. According to Rambam, it refers to shreds of flesh that remain attached to the hide when the hide is separated from the animal’s body. Those shreds are insignificant, and proper intention regarding them does not affect pigul, even though they are technically edible. According to Tosafot, it is dead flesh that a veterinarian would cut away if the animal were alive. This is even less significant than the shreds of flesh that remain on the hide.
All of these opinions are dealing with items that are, in one way or another, edible. The bones, however, are the animal’s bones. The same applies to the sinews, veins, horns, and hooves. They may perhaps be edible, but they are not considered food. Therefore, intention regarding them does not affect the sacrifice with the law of pigul.
The Mishnah repeats that there is no pigul in such a case, and then adds another point. If these parts were left until the following day, the law of notar does not apply to them. If a person ate them while they were impure, or while he was impure, the law of impurity does not apply to them either. Since they are not genuinely considered food, the laws of pigul, notar, and impurity do not apply to them.
The Mishnah then discusses another part of the sacrifice: the embryo and the placenta. If a person slaughters an animal with the intention of eating the embryo or the placenta outside its allotted time or place, the sacrifice does not become pigul. The embryo is inside the animal, so the question is why it should not be treated as part of the animal itself.
The answer is that the embryo is considered part of the animal, just as an embryo is considered part of its mother. Nevertheless, the intention does not render the sacrifice pigul, because the embryo is not something that people ordinarily eat. The same applies to the placenta. It is edible in some sense, but it is not ordinarily consumed.
There is a distinction here between causing pigul and becoming affected by pigul. If a person begins with a proper intention concerning the edible part of the animal and the intention then extends to the embryo, the embryo can be included in the pigul. However, if he begins with the embryo, the embryo cannot initiate the pigul, because it is not ordinarily eaten. It can become affected by genuine pigul, but it cannot create the pigul in the first place.
The same principle applies to the cartilage and the crop. If the person begins with the cartilage, which is somewhat edible, the intention can extend to the crop. But if he begins with the crop, which is not ordinarily eaten, the crop cannot render the cartilage pigul. Everything depends on where the intention begins.
The Mishnah then turns to birds. If a person performs the ritual slaughter of a turtledove with the intention of eating its eggs outside their allotted time or place, the bird does not become pigul. The eggs are inside the bird, but they are not considered part of the bird in this respect. The same applies to consecrated milk. If a person slaughters an animal with the intention of drinking its milk outside the allotted time or place, the sacrifice does not become pigul.
Thus, if a person had a proper intention concerning the sacrifice and then ate from the milk or from the eggs, he would not be liable for excision. The question was raised whether these items are entirely permitted or merely exempt from the laws of pigul. The point being made is only that they are not subject to those laws.
The Gemara explains the principle through the teaching of Rabbi Elazar. If a person first creates pigul in the sacrifice and the intention then extends to the embryo, the embryo is affected by the pigul. However, if he begins with the embryo, the sacrifice itself does not become pigul. The embryo is edible only in a limited and unusual sense, and therefore it cannot initiate the pigul.
The same applies to the cartilage and the crop. If the intention begins with the cartilage, it can extend to the crop. The cartilage is at least somewhat edible, while the crop is not ordinarily eaten. But if the intention begins with the crop, it cannot extend back and render the cartilage pigul. Again, an item that is not ordinarily eaten cannot initiate the process, although it can become affected after genuine pigul has already been created.
The Gemara then discusses the possibility of pigul concerning the parts of bulls that are burned outside Jerusalem. These are bulls whose flesh is not eaten but is taken outside Jerusalem and burned. Their internal fats and other designated parts are placed on the altar, while the remaining flesh is burned outside the city.
If a person has the intention of eating or burning the internal parts outside their allotted time, the question is whether that intention can affect the flesh that is burned outside Jerusalem. The burning of that flesh is part of the sacrificial service, but it is not the same as placing an offering on the altar.
The Mishnah states that if a person creates pigul concerning the internal parts, the flesh of the bull becomes subject to pigul. If, however, he has the intention concerning the flesh that is burned outside Jerusalem, the internal parts do not become pigul. The internal parts can bring the flesh into the category of pigul, but the flesh cannot bring the internal parts into that category.
This raises a difficulty. The flesh of these bulls is not eaten; it is burned. If pigul is based on the intention to eat something outside its allotted time, how can an intention concerning the flesh create pigul? The answer is that an intention concerning the internal parts, which are consumed on the altar, is a genuine intention of consumption and can affect the flesh. But burning the flesh outside the altar is not called consumption for this purpose.
The discussion distinguishes between burning on the altar and burning outside the altar. Burning on the altar is described as a form of consumption, which is why an intention concerning it can create pigul. Burning outside the altar is simply burning and is not called consumption in the relevant sense. Therefore, an intention to burn the flesh outside its time does not create pigul.
This also explains why the flesh can become pigul through the internal parts, even though the flesh itself cannot initiate pigul. The same pattern appears with the cartilage and the crop: one component can bring another into the status of pigul, while the second component cannot bring the first into that status.
The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from a teaching concerning these bulls. It states that they can become disqualified through various circumstances, including being left overnight. One might infer that just as leaving the actual internal parts overnight disqualifies them, an intention to leave them overnight could create pigul and affect the flesh.
The Gemara rejects the proof. Perhaps the reference to leaving the offering overnight concerns only the internal parts themselves. The text does not necessarily mean that an intention concerning the internal parts will affect the flesh. The fact that the actual parts become disqualified through being left overnight does not prove that an intention concerning them will create pigul in another part of the sacrifice.
Another detail is then examined. The flesh of these bulls remains subject to the laws of misuse of consecrated property until it is burned and reduced to ashes in the place where it is burned. This shows that the later part of the Mishnah is explicitly discussing the flesh that is taken outside Jerusalem. The question is whether the earlier reference to being left overnight should likewise be understood as referring to the flesh, or whether it refers only to the internal parts.
If the earlier statement refers to the internal parts and the later statement refers to the flesh, no proof can be brought from one to the other. The Gemara therefore concludes that the attempted proof for Rabbi Elazar’s position is inconclusive.
The Mishnah then lists items that neither initiate pigul nor become pigul through another part of the sacrifice. These include the wool, the hair of the goat, the hide, the gravy, the residue at the bottom of the pot, the cartilage, the crop, the bones, the sinews, the horns, the hooves, the placenta, the milk, and the eggs of birds.
These items do not initiate pigul, and they do not become pigul as a result of the sacrifice. If a person takes them outside the Temple courtyard, he is not liable for taking consecrated property outside. They do not create pigul in the sacrifice, and intention concerning the sacrifice does not render them pigul.
There is a question about the wording. Perhaps when the Mishnah says that these items do not create pigul, it means only that they cannot initiate pigul. It might still be possible for them to become pigul through the central, edible part of the sacrifice. Alternatively, perhaps the repeated wording teaches that they neither initiate pigul nor become pigul through the sacrifice.
The repetition appears to be significant. The Mishnah has already taught that these items do not initiate pigul. When it lists them again, it may be teaching the additional point that they do not become pigul even as a result of an intention concerning the sacrifice. This would be a challenge to Rabbi Elazar’s distinction.
The Gemara then returns to the earlier case of the embryo and the placenta. The Mishnah says that if a person slaughters a consecrated animal with the intention of eating the embryo or placenta outside the allotted time or place, there is no pigul. It then repeats that there is no liability for pigul, notar, or impurity concerning consecrated milk and the eggs of birds.
Why repeat the point? One possible inference is that the embryo and placenta cannot initiate pigul, but they can become pigul through the sacrifice. That would support Rabbi Elazar’s position. The milk and eggs, by contrast, may be excluded entirely. The Gemara therefore examines whether the wording can establish that distinction.
The conclusion is that the wording does provide support for Rabbi Elazar: the embryo and placenta cannot initiate pigul, but they can become affected by pigul that was created through the sacrifice. The milk and eggs are treated differently in the Mishnah.
The discussion then turns to animals with physical blemishes. Rabbi Akiva permits an animal with a blemish in certain circumstances. For example, he permits a bird with a cataract in its eye, and the principle is extended to other cases involving an animal with a blemish, provided that the animal was consecrated before the blemish appeared.
When an animal is consecrated after already having the blemish, however, it is treated differently. In that case, the blemish preceded the consecration. The animal was never in a valid state for the relevant offering, and it is not treated as though the blemish developed only afterward.
This raises a question concerning a female animal designated as an elevation offering. Ordinarily, an elevation offering comes from a male. Since a female is not valid for that offering, perhaps it should be viewed as though its disqualification existed from the outset. One cannot argue that a female should be permitted merely because a female bird can serve as an elevation offering. The category of a female bird is different from that of a female animal.
The point is that the disqualification of the female animal was present from the beginning. It is not comparable to an animal that was initially fit and only later developed a blemish. Therefore, a female animal designated as an elevation offering cannot be treated as a valid offering merely by analogy to a bird.
Rabbi Zeira raises a further question from the teaching concerning items that do not initiate pigul and do not become pigul. The list includes the embryo. The teaching also says that if these items are taken outside the courtyard, there is no liability for taking consecrated property outside.
If the embryo itself is not considered part of the offering, that is understandable. But perhaps the mother remains subject to the law when it is taken outside. If the animal contains an embryo, the animal must be female. Since the female animal itself may be disqualified as an elevation offering from the outset, the question is whether the mother is nevertheless liable when taken outside.
One possible answer is that the reference is not to the flesh of the mother but to the internal parts of the mother. For example, the internal parts of a female sin offering are offered on the altar, even though the flesh of the animal is not placed there. The embryo’s own internal parts are not offered, because the embryo itself is not a valid offering. Therefore, taking the embryo outside would not create liability, while taking the mother’s internal parts outside could create liability.
Another possibility is that the wording refers to the internal parts of the embryo itself. Since the embryo is not offered, its internal parts are likewise not offered, and taking them outside would not create liability. The internal parts of the mother, however, remain subject to the relevant laws.
The Gemara is forced to refine the inference in order to avoid a contradiction. It cannot simply say that the mother’s flesh is liable while the embryo is exempt. Instead, the inference must concern the internal parts of the mother, or alternatively the internal parts of the embryo. The exact wording is therefore examined carefully so that the conclusion does not exceed what the Mishnah supports.
The discussion demonstrates how precise the distinctions are. An item may be inedible, yet still be physically attached to the sacrifice. It may be part of the animal, yet not be considered an item that can initiate pigul. It may be affected by pigul created elsewhere, or it may be excluded even from that secondary effect. The result depends on the nature of the item, the type of sacrifice, the location of the service, and the point at which the intention begins.
Accordingly, there is no concept here of “half” a sacrifice becoming pigul while the other half remains unaffected in the ordinary sense. Rather, the question is which component can initiate pigul and which component can become affected by pigul that has already been created. When the internal parts bring the flesh into pigul, the entire relevant sacrifice is treated accordingly. But an item that cannot serve as the initiating object cannot create pigul merely through the person’s intention concerning it.