Page 44b. Let’s get to the Mishnah quickly, so we can move on. Tanya (It was taught): Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: pigul (a disqualified offering) applies to an act performed outside. So now we’re talking about pigul. Pigul applies only to the parts of a korban (sacrifice) whose service is performed outside. We’re not talking about a korban performed on the mizbe’ach hachitzon (outer altar) or a korban performed on the mizbe’ach hapenimi (inner altar); pigul applies to both. Rather, it applies to the service of that korban that is performed outside—that is, outside the heichal (Temple sanctuary)—as the Gemara will explain.
“If he had in mind to disqualify it during an act performed inside,” however, if he had in mind to disqualify the item of that korban, whether an outer or inner korban, while it was being performed inside the heichal, lo pigel (he did not disqualify it). How so? If he was standing outside the azarah and said, “I am slaughtering the korban in order to sprinkle its blood in the heichal, on the mizbe’ach hapenimi, tomorrow,” lo pigel. Why? Because he had in mind an act performed inside. “A thought outside about an act performed inside does not disqualify it.”
Suppose, though, that he was inside the heichal and said, “I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of burning the fats and pouring the remainder of the blood tomorrow.” He was inside the heichal, and he had in mind an act performed outside. But he was disqualifying the burning of the fats or the pouring of the remaining blood on the altar, and that does not work. Why? Because he was inside and had in mind an act performed outside. Basically, for pigul to work, you had to be outside-outside. “This is a thought inside about an act performed outside.”
But if he was standing outside and said, “I am slaughtering it in order to pour the remainder of the blood tomorrow,” or to burn the fats on the mizbe’ach hachitzon tomorrow, he disqualified it. Why? “A thought outside about an act performed outside.”
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: What is the verse? Where do we learn this from? The Torah says, regarding the bull of the Kohen Mashiach (anointed priest), “Ka’asher yuram mishor zevach hashelamim” (as the fat is removed from the ox of the peace offering). So it compares it to the korban shelamim (peace offering). “What have we learned from the ox of the peace offering, then?” What are you learning from the korban of the shelamim that you want to apply to the Kohen Mashiach? Rather, we learn by scriptural juxtaposition: the bull of the Kohen Mashiach is compared to the ox of the peace offering. Just as the ox of the peace offering requires its acts and thoughts to be on the outer altar—clearly, because there is no inner service for a korban shelamim, and everything is done outside—so, too, the bull of the Kohen Mashiach, even though it is performed inside, requires its thoughts and acts to be about the outer altar. So he has to have an intention outside for something he is going to do outside, meaning pouring the rest of the blood on the altar. Therefore, from the shelamim we learn the law of outside-outside.
Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha, in the name of Rav: The halachah (law) is like Rabbi Elazar, who said it in the name of Rabbi Yosei. Okay, now you know the halachah, boys. You were worried about whether this was the halachah, so the Gemara says: Rava and Rav Yosef said, “Hilcheta limeshicha?” What are you telling me halachah for Mashiach? What do you need to come and tell me this for?
What does that mean? What are we learning Zevachim for? Why did they write the whole tractate? The whole tractate is hilcheta limeshicha! Abaye said: “If that’s so, don’t teach any of the laws of slaughtering consecrated offerings.” Who decided to write Zevachim if you’re concerned only with giving practical knowledge, and you get all upset because someone said a halachah that might apply in the time of Mashiach? “It’s a ruling for the Messianic era!”
Rather, why are we learning Zevachim? For one reason, gentlemen: derosh vekabel sechar. We’re doing it for the reward. Listen, it doesn’t apply to you. Most of you guys don’t lose any sleep over any of this stuff, although I’m enjoying it a lot. Derosh vekabel sechar. You get reward; you’re learning. When you’re learning something, derosh vekabel sechar; here, too, derosh vekabel sechar.
So, you’ve learned the halachah. The halachah is like this last halachah. What halachah did it say? “The halachah is like Rabbi Elazar, who said it in the name of Rabbi Yosei.” Every one of those words is a word of Torah. “The halachah is like Rabbi Elazar, who said it in the name of Rabbi Yosei”—you have just learned five extra, six extra words of Torah; you get reward. Anybody have a problem with that? Six more words of Torah.
So the Gemara says, “No, that wasn’t my question.” He says, “Hachi ka’amina lach, hilcheta lama li?” Which means, I have no problem learning Zevachim, but then you’re presenting it as if there’s a pressing issue. That was my point—not that you can’t learn theoretical things, but that you took it as if somebody called you up and said, “Now what do we do? Halachah?” That was my question.
The Gemara says, “Lishna achrina”: Rabbi Yosef said to him, “Tena’ei halachah ka’amina.” Right? Which means, I was just concerned about the halachah element of it, not the Zevachim element, or the theoretical part of it. It’s not a halachah issue. All right, it’s the same point, just another way of saying the same thing.
Savrei maranan. “Baruch Atah Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha-olam she-hakol nihyah bi-dvaro.” So the rabbis were practical. What are you giving me halachot for? The Mishnah—that was a question you could have asked 2,000 years ago, when they wrote this Gemara: hilcheta limeshicha. Today you can’t ask that question. Today we’re on the cusp of Mashiach. Chafetz Chaim wrote a book. He presented all these halachot. How come nobody asked the Chafetz Chaim, “Hey, hilcheta limeshicha?” Rambam wrote all these halachot. What is he presenting them for? Once you start getting close, there’s no more question of hilcheta limeshicha. Already, the question is the opposite: What are we going to do? That was the Chafetz Chaim’s question: What are we going to do? Mashiach is coming; we need kohanim to know the halachot. Kohanim and Levi’im. Everybody’s ready, right here at the door. “Al mah anachnu somchim,” as we say in Musaf (additional prayer), “acheinu, al mah anachnu somchim.” Okay. You’ll have a whole world that’s going to represent. You’re going to be with Eliyahu ha-Navi (Elijah the Prophet), you’re going to be with Aharon ha-Kohen (Aaron the Priest). Baruch Hashem. Gary is going to be where? Harry—Mr… No, Harry. Harry went to Monroeville, right?
Okay, the Mishnah: kodshei ovdei chochavim (offerings of non-Jews). Non-Jews who bring a korban to Hashem are not liable on account of pigul, notar (leftover sacrificial meat), or tamei (ritually impure). Okay, that doesn’t apply. If the korban was performed with pigul, they ate from its meat, or there was notar—all the leftovers—you’re not liable like you are for the offerings of Jews. If a tamei person ate from it, you’re not liable. And one who slaughters them outside the azarah is exempt from karet (spiritual excision). Those are the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose makes him liable. Okay, Rabbi Yose says: equal-opportunity pigul.
So we’ll go straight to the Gemara, rabotai; we’re moving right along. The Rabbis taught: “Kodshei ovdei chochavim lo nehenim ve-lo mo’alim.” Okay, you’re not allowed to have hana’ah (benefit) from them. However, if you went and benefited from them, you are not liable for me’ilah (misuse of sacred property). “And they are not liable on account of pigul, notar, or tamei, and they do not make temurah (substitution offering).” If, let’s say, you made a temurah for an animal of a non-Jew, it does not take effect. The other korban remains chulin (non-sacred property).
“And they do not bring nesachim.” Non-Jews do not bring wine libations as a korban on its own. They can bring libations with the korban; they just can’t bring them alone. “But their korban requires libations.” Yes, the korban requires libations. Those are the words of Rabbi Shimon.
Rabbi Yosei said: “I see all of these cases stringently.” I am stringent: whatever applies to us applies to them. As it says about them, “Ish ish mi-beit Yisrael u-min ha-ger be-Yisrael asher yakriv korbano le-chol nidreihem u-le-chol nidvotam asher yakrivu la-Hashem” (Any person from the house of Israel, or from the stranger among Israel, who brings his offering for all their vows and all their freewill offerings that they bring to Hashem). So it sounds like everybody is included here. “Ish ish”—it says, “Ish ish mi-beit Yisrael u-min ha-ger.” “Beit Yisrael” is a key phrase. Yes, “Beit Yisrael” means Jews. But he is saying that he is stringent. Where does he see from this verse that offerings of non-Jews are included?
Rashi says: “In all of them, I see that we should be stringent regarding the offerings of non-Jews, as it says about them, ‘la-Hashem,’” because it is written, “Ish ish mi-beit Yisrael.” And we derive in Hakol Shochtin: Why does it say “ish ish”? The verse teaches us to include non-Jews who make vows. “Nodrim”—the Torah considers them; they make vows and freewill offerings like a Jew.
So the Gemara comes along and says: Rabbi Shimon said that you are not liable for me’ilah if you benefited from the offerings of non-Jews. And according to Rabbi Shimon, we said there is a distinction. In what case? With offerings for the altar. That applies only to something that goes on the altar. But with offerings for the upkeep of the Temple, they are subject to me’ilah. So he makes a distinction here.
What’s the difference? Rashi says, stay tuned. “Lo nehenin ve-lo mo’alim”—there is no law of me’ilah. “Lo nehenin”: why can’t you have benefit? If there is no me’ilah, ostensibly you should be able to have benefit. It is rabbinic; the Sages made an enactment. “Ve-lo mo’alim”—because the law of me’ilah is derived from terumah (priestly gift) through the verbal analogy of “chet, chet.” Where do we learn the laws of me’ilah from? Terumah, the verbal analogy of “chet, chet.” Regarding terumah, it says, “Velo yechalelu et kodshei Benei Yisrael asher yarimu la-Hashem” (They shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel that they raise up to Hashem). So what does it say there? You should not desecrate “the holy things of the children of Israel that they raise up to Hashem.” What do we learn from that? Terumah is for the children of Israel, not non-Jews. “Benei Yisrael” teaches us that terumah belongs to the children of Israel, not non-Jews. Therefore, from terumah we learn by verbal analogy that the laws of me’ilah also apply only to the offerings of Jews, not the offerings of non-Jews.
What is this verbal analogy, Rashi? “Dibetrumah ketiv Benei Yisrael”—regarding terumah, it says “Benei Yisrael.” “Veyinazru mikodshei Benei Yisrael.” Okay. And therefore, just as terumah applies only to the children of Israel, and “chet” is said regarding terumah and “chet” is said regarding me’ilah, we know that terumah applies only to Jews, and so me’ilah also applies only to Jews. “Chet, chet mitrumah.” Huh? Where’s the word “chet”? Where’s the word “chet”? A great question. Where’s the word “chet”? Yeah, we’ll find it. It says in the verse. It says in the verse. That’s by—That’s by me’ilah? Okay, what’s the verse about terumah? Bingo! “Velo yis’u alav chet” (They shall not bear sin on account of it). Look at 21a at the bottom. You see note 21a? Beautiful, you got it. Fantastic! We’re moving right along, rabotai.
We’re only talking about the korban that he brings, right? Because the non-Jew himself obviously isn’t liable. Correct. Correct. He isn’t bound; he has only seven commandments. “And they are not liable on account of pigul, notar, or tamei.” There is no pigul, tamei, or notar. What is the reason? Pigul is derived by a verbal analogy from notar, “avon, avon.” The laws of pigul are learned from notar. Now here we go. How do you know notar? “Chillul, chillul” from impurity. Okay, but how do you know impurity? Regarding impurity, it says “Benei Yisrael,” not non-Jews.
So you said… Yeah, but didn’t we say we don’t do this? No, we just did. Oh, you did, you did, you did. It’s a long trip. Rashi here—it’s beautiful. We didn’t see temurah; that’s straightforward. No, Rashi’s over here. By the way, Rashi brought the two verses for terumah and me’ilah. Mark, if you look at the dibur hamatchil “Degamrinan me’ilah chet chet mitrumah,” Rashi brings both verses you were asking about.
This is an interesting thing. You can do this? It’s a three-way item. The Gemara has no problem. You’re basically taking your learning from “avon, avon” in notar, and then notar takes you to impurity, and regarding impurity it says “Benei Yisrael,” and that’s it: not non-Jews.
“And they do not make temurah.” What is the reason? Temurah is juxtaposed with ma’aser behemah (animal tithe), and ma’aser behemah is juxtaposed with ma’aser dagan (grain tithe). Regarding ma’aser dagan it says “Benei Yisrael,” not non-Jews. So here we jumped around three ways.
Ah, so the Gemara asks the question: “Vechi davar halamed behekesh chozer umelamed behekesh?” Can something learned by scriptural juxtaposition then teach something else by scriptural juxtaposition? Because here you’re doing a double juxtaposition. We said temurah is juxtaposed with ma’aser behemah. Okay, that doesn’t tell me anything. How do I know ma’aser behemah doesn’t apply? Ma’aser behemah is juxtaposed with ma’aser dagan.
We didn’t have a problem in the last case, because that was a verbal analogy. With a verbal analogy, we can make a triangle. But once you start doing juxtapositions: “Vechi davar halamed behekesh chozer umelamed behekesh?” You doubled up, as they say in the—
So the Gemara says, “Ma’aser dagan chulin hu.” Okay, there’s the answer. Remember I said yesterday that the rule that something learned by juxtaposition cannot then teach something else by juxtaposition applies only to consecrated offerings. But if there’s a non-sacred element in the mix, it’s okay. Ma’aser dagan is non-sacred property, so you can learn it.
Also, the question is, you’re right, it’s in the mix, but who is the teacher here and who is the student? The Gemara says: “Hanicha leman de’amar batar melamed azlinan.” That rule—that something learned by juxtaposition cannot then teach something else by juxtaposition when it comes to consecrated offerings—follows the first source, the teacher. So if the first teacher was consecrated offerings, that’s it; you can’t learn anything from it. But if the first teacher was non-sacred property, then it’s okay.
I understand: ma’aser dagan is non-sacred property, so ma’aser behemah can be learned from it, and then you can learn about temurah. Your starting point is non-sacred property. I start from ma’aser dagan; ma’aser dagan teaches me about ma’aser behemah, and ma’aser behemah teaches me about temurah. As long as your starting point is non-sacred property, you’re right: you got out of the problem.
However, “Ela leman de’amar batar lamed azlinan”—according to the rule that says you don’t follow the first teacher, but instead follow what is being learned, ultimately you’re learning something about consecrated offerings. So you’re back to the question. It’s like “davar halamed behekesh ein chozer umelamed behekesh.” I don’t care if there’s a non-sacred element in there. What are you learning about?
“Mai ika lemeimar?” Rather, ma’aser behemah is an obligation that does not have a fixed time. Ma’aser behemah is an obligation; there is no set time for it. An obligation without a fixed time: Jews bring it; non-Jews do not. So that’s a rule: Jews alone bring an obligation that is not bound by time. Non-Jews do not bring it. Therefore, non-Jews are excluded from ma’aser behemah. So it isn’t learned by juxtaposition. Therefore, I can learn directly from ma’aser dagan that ma’aser behemah is not subject to temurah. That is a regular juxtaposition. How do I know non-Jews aren’t included in ma’aser behemah? Because it is an obligation without a fixed time. Therefore, I can also learn from ma’aser behemah that the law of temurah does not apply to non-Jews.
Why? Rashi. Look at Rashi: “Hanicha leman… la, ovdei chochavim lo maitu.” How do we know non-Jews don’t bring things that don’t have a fixed time? “Dela itrabu ovdei chochavim ela linedarim unedavot, kedichtiv bikra lechol nidreihem.” It is the same law that they do not bring obligations with a fixed time, such as the festival burnt offering and the festival peace offering.
Okay. So they can bring vows and freewill offerings, but they can’t bring obligations… with a set time. “Ela lo pesika leh.” So, right, it isn’t conclusive, because they do bring a freewill burnt offering and freewill peace offerings. But ma’aser, a sin offering, and a guilt offering don’t apply to them at all. When it comes to a freewill peace offering, they can bring it because they can bring freewill offerings. However, they can never bring a sin offering or a guilt offering, and therefore they can never bring ma’aser behemah either. Why can’t they bring ma’aser behemah? Because it isn’t fixed by time? Okay, but they bring vows and freewill offerings. Those aren’t fixed by time either. Vows and freewill offerings—what about bal te’acher (do not delay)? Maybe it is fixed by time because if they don’t—are they subject to bal te’acher? I don’t know; I’m wondering. I don’t see why they would be, but what if they aren’t? They aren’t obligated in the commandments and so on.
He says here, “Ish ish mi-beit Yisrael u-min ha-ger be-Yisrael asher yakriv korbano le-chol nidreihem u-le-chol nidvotam.” From there the Sages said that non-Jews can bring voluntary offerings, but they weren’t included in bringing obligatory offerings. Fine. So even offerings that have a fixed time are obligatory; they can’t bring them. That includes the festival burnt offering and festival peace offering. So why did the Gemara say “an obligation without a fixed time”? Even an obligation with a fixed time is not something they can bring. That’s Rashi’s question.
He says, “Mishum shebe’elu le’olam ein nochrim mevi’im korban.” Non-Jews never bring those obligations without a fixed time. With obligations that have a fixed time, they may bring the same type of offering. I guess that’s the vows and freewill offerings: they have a certain time to bring them. Right, he’s obligated to bring it. No, not— I guess you have to say that ma’aser behemah is an obligation without a fixed time, and for sure he’ll never bring it. But he’ll never bring an obligation with a fixed time either. We know because we say he can bring vows and freewill offerings, and vows and freewill offerings, I guess, are sometimes bound by time, maybe like you said. Why are they bound by time? Right, that’s what Benny was saying; that might be it.
He says, “Mah she’ein ken bechovah shekavu’a lahem zeman matzinu shemevi’im nochrim mimin zeh.” Oh, maybe it means the type of offering: a freewill burnt offering, a freewill peace offering. So you can bring that type of offering, which has a set time. But ma’aser behemah has no fixed time; they never bring it.
But what does the Gemara want with all this, by the way? The Gemara wants to say, “Ela ma’aser behemah chovah she’ein kavu’a lah zeman hu.” Fine, which is true. And what? Do non-Jews bring an obligation that has no fixed time? “Ovdei chochavim lo maitu.” Okay. So what does that teach us? Non-Jews don’t bring ma’aser behemah. Therefore, we don’t learn their exclusion from a juxtaposition; we learn it from the subject itself. So go back now: ma’aser dagan tells me there is no temurah by ma’aser behemah; it isn’t subject to temurah. And I know a non-Jew does not bring ma’aser behemah—not from a juxtaposition, but from the subject itself, because it has a fixed time. Therefore, just as they don’t bring ma’aser behemah, wherever ma’aser behemah applies does not apply to them—which includes temurah.
Okay, okay, beautiful, beautiful, beautiful. Why do you need an exclusion? As far as we know, ma’aser behemah isn’t one of the Sheva mitzvot bnei Noach (seven Noahide commandments). No, would it take effect after the fact? For that matter, vows and freewill offerings are neither, but they do take effect. Something like that.
“And they do not bring libations.” Okay, which means they can’t bring libations alone, without a korban. The Rabbis taught: “Ezrach, kol ha’ezrach ya’aseh kachah et eleh lehakriv isheh la-Hashem nicho’ach” (The native shall do these things in this way, to bring a pleasing fire-offering to Hashem). That’s the verse that talks about libations. What is “ezrach”? A Jew. A Jew brings libations, but a non-Jew does not bring libations. Could you think that his burnt offering, if he brings one, would not require libations either? The verse teaches “kachah.” What is “kachah”? This is the way it is done. You bring the korban; it has to come with libations.
“Kachah” is Rashi. “Ezrach”—it is written in the section about libations, from which we learn this: “Kol ha’ezrach ya’aseh kachah.” From this we learn, according to the one who says in the chapter Kol Hatadir that “ezrach” teaches that people may make a voluntary offering of libations and bring it by itself. Jews. The verse teaches “kachah ye’aseh lashor,” that even though the obligation depends on the korban, it doesn’t matter whether it’s a Jew or a non-Jew. Therefore, if he sent the money for its libations, they bring them from his funds; if not, they bring them from communal funds. This is a stipulation made by the court, as we learned in Masechet Shekalim.
Wow. Which means, if he sent money for the libations, they’ll bring them. If not, the community picks up the cost. What are you going to do? We have to pay for these libations. The Democrats. Yeah, he says one of the things the Sages established: if a non-Jew sent his burnt offering from overseas and sent its libations with it, they are offered from his funds; if not, they are offered from communal funds. It’s an amazing novel insight.
And what would a Jew do with that? He sends a burnt offering? Maybe we pick it up too. But here it is the non-Jews whose costs we pick up. The Rambam says that the libations offered with the sacrifice of a non-Jew come from communal funds. Specifically, they come from communal funds. I guess we don’t want them to pay for their own thing. They come from communal funds. You have to bring the korban “kachah.” So if you have to bring the korban “kachah,” but the problem is that non-Jews don’t bring libations, you have a quandary. How do you get around “kachah”? The community picks it up. So your tax dollars are paying for non-Jews’ libations.
No, no, no, no. They’re not doing the libation themselves. They go and give a ticket to the guy, and then the wine guy gives it to the kohen. No, they don’t have any contact with it. They’re not walking with a bottle of wine. Yeah, could be. There’s a kiosk in the Temple. They go with a ticket and show the guy which korban they’re bringing, and they deliver the wine to the altar.
Okay, so that’s a novel insight: who pays for it? Some say that they pay for it; if they don’t, the community pays. The Rambam says we always do it—the community pays for it. Rashi implies that it depends. Okay.
Rabbi Yosei says, “I see all these laws stringently.” In all these laws we mentioned, he is stringent. But what? All the laws apply to them: me’ilah and all these things. In what case? With offerings for the altar. But offerings for the upkeep of the Temple—oh, so wait. Rabbi Yosei is saying “in all of them”—that all these laws should be stringent, and that the laws should be like they are for a Jew. Rabbi Shimon said no. Rabbi Shimon said there is no me’ilah for offerings of non-Jews. And then we said that in the case of offerings for the altar there is no me’ilah, but for offerings for the upkeep of the Temple there is me’ilah.
So the Gemara says: What is the reason he makes a distinction about me’ilah between offerings for the altar and offerings for the upkeep of the Temple? He holds that, yes, the law of me’ilah is learned through “chet, chet” from terumah, as we just said—something like terumah. What is terumah? It has bodily sanctity. It has bodily sanctity, right? Therefore, there is no redemption and all that other stuff. But offerings for the upkeep of the Temple have monetary sanctity. Okay, and therefore what? You can redeem them? No? That’s the difference, Rashi.
“Mai ta’ama”—another explanation from Rabbi Shimon. Three lines from the bottom: “Ein me’ilah dekamar bekodshei bedek habayit de’ovdei chochavim mo’alin?” He says there is no me’ilah, but for offerings of non-Jews for the upkeep of the Temple there is me’ilah? “Vechi gamra me’ilah me’ilah mitrumah lema’utei ovdei chochavim dumya detrumah, kodshei mizbe’ach degamra kodshei gufayhu kitrumah she’ein lahem nifdim?” We only learned it from terumah, which has bodily sanctity and cannot be redeemed.
The Rabbis taught: “Dam shenitma uzrako.” Okay, the blood became impure, and a kohen threw it on the altar. If he did it inadvertently, it was accepted. If he did it intentionally, it was not accepted. No good. “Bemezid, lo hurtzah.” The Sages imposed a penalty for this. Rashi says it is a rabbinic penalty. “Velo sheyehe, velo sheyavo acher, she’im ken nimtza beit din matnim la’akor davar min haTorah ulehavi chulin la’azarah.” Yeah, what does “a rabbinic penalty” mean? Now it means they’re going to say it’s no good, so now you have to bring another korban. But that korban isn’t required by the Torah. So how could you bring a korban that isn’t required by the Torah on the altar? You’d be slaughtering non-sacred property in the courtyard.
Rashi is bothered: how can the Sages come along and say that if the korban was valid by Torah law, it is invalid? Rashi says, “Velo she-yavi acher”—we’re not saying it’s invalid in the sense that you have to bring another korban. “De-im ken nimtze’u Beit Din matnin la’akor davar min haTorah u-lehavi chullin la-azarah.” Now the rabbis would be uprooting a law from the Torah, because they would be allowing the person to bring another korban that isn’t consecrated by Torah law, and it would be non-sacred property in the courtyard.
Rather, “lo hurtzah le-hatir basar be-achilah.” All it means is that you can’t eat the meat, but the owners receive atonement. “Aval be’alim nitkaperu.” Okay, that would take us into Masechet Yevamot afterward. So the atonement is accomplished; it’s just that the law is that they can’t eat the meat, and that doesn’t uproot a Torah law. “Lo hurtzah le-inyan basar.” That’s all we mean: “lo hurtzah le-inyan achilat ha-basar.” But as far as the atonement is concerned, he receives atonement.
In what case? With an individual offering. When is this talking about? Only an individual offering. But a communal offering, whether it was done inadvertently or intentionally, was accepted. And they can even eat the korban; there are two opinions. Non-Jews, whether it was done inadvertently or intentionally, it was not accepted. Non-Jews are different. This is a case where we are stringent with non-Jews.
The Sages said this baraita in front of Rav Pappa and asked, “According to whom? Not according to Rabbi Yosei?” Because if it were Rabbi Yosei, he said, “In all of them I see that we should be stringent.” The laws for Jews and non-Jews are the same; there’s no distinction. Ostensibly, we should say that the offering was accepted. Just as we said that for a Jew it was accepted, at least if it was done inadvertently, so too for a non-Jew. But here he said that for non-Jews, whether it was inadvertent or intentional, it was not accepted. So it can’t be Rabbi Yosei, because Rabbi Yosei equates the laws of Jews and non-Jews. This baraita separates them and makes the law for non-Jews more stringent.
Rav Pappa said to them: “Even if you say it is Rabbi Yosei, the case there is different,” because the verse says “lahem”—“lahem,” and not non-Jews. When the Torah talks about the tzitz (High Priest’s forehead plate) atoning for blood that was impure, for whom does the tzitz atone? Jews. “Lahem”—the tzitz does not atone for them. Finished.
Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: “If so, if you’re telling me that you have a verse, ‘lahem,’ which excludes non-Jews—‘asher hem makdishim, hem makdishim, hacha nami hem’”—does that also apply to the law that if a person eats the korban while ritually impure, a Jew is forbidden to eat it while ritually impure, but non-Jews are not? Rabbi Yosei said that we are stringent even with the offerings of non-Jews, like the offerings of Jews, regarding eating while ritually impure. So what do you mean? Just as you used the word “lahem” to limit the law of the blood, exactly, why don’t you also apply the same derivation to ritual impurity of the person, which you said does apply to non-Jews, even though we have the same derivation, “lahem”? So scratch that from the record.
Rather, Rav Ashi said: The verse says, “Le-ratzon lahem,” and non-Jews are not fit for acceptance, since Hashem does not accept them. Who says we’re prejudiced? That’s Rashi’s wording: “lav benei hartza’ah.” “Lav benei hartza’ah le-ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu.” Baruch Hu—which means the Creator of the World—we have the favor of the Holy One, blessed be He, and they don’t.
See? You come to the morning shiur, and we make you better people. Teach you how to hate. That’s not hating; it’s a fact! It’s a fact! It’s a fact, Moshe, and some of my best friends are non-Jews. It’s a fact; the Gemara says here, “lav benei hartza’ah.” It’s just the facts.
How? What does that mean? Hear this: the Griz, in the stencils? Well, they initially thought that the acceptance of the tzitz—does it apply to non-Jews or not? “Im yesh chiluk bi-kedushat korban nochri li-kedushat korban Yisrael.” If you say there is a difference between the sanctity of a non-Jew’s korban and the sanctity of a Jewish korban, then perhaps you can say that it will affect the acceptance of the blood if it was done in a state of impurity.
“Lefikach le-Rabbi Shimon she-kedushat korban nochri shoneh mi-kedushat korban Yisrael, mema’et hu mi-ritzui ha-tzitz.” Aha! Once you start making distinctions, right? Rabbi Shimon is the one who said there is a distinction: regarding me’ilah, it applies only to bodily sanctity; monetary sanctity is excluded. So he starts making distinctions between the bodily sanctity of a non-Jew’s offering. Therefore, once you make a distinction in the bodily sanctity, perhaps the tzitz does not atone for it; it’s not on the same frequency. It’s a different kind of sanctity. The tzitz atones only for certain frequencies of sanctity, and if the sanctity of the non-Jew is lesser, perhaps the tzitz doesn’t atone for it. That is the logic for thinking that perhaps the tzitz would not atone.
“Lefikach le-Rabbi Shimon she-kedushat korban nochri shoneh mi-ritzui ha-tzitz.” And according to Rabbi Yosei, since the sanctity of a non-Jew is like the sanctity of a korban, he does not exclude them from the atonement of the tzitz. Right? That was good. Therefore, if their sanctity is equal, Rabbi Shimon has no problem, because he has already placed the sanctity of non-Jews lower. But according to Rabbi Yosei, when they’re equal, why shouldn’t the tzitz atone?
Rav Ashi said: Is the acceptance of the tzitz dependent on the sanctity of the korban? It is on the owners of the korban. Nice distinction. And they never have impurity. Right. No, and they never have acceptance. Which means, indeed, regarding the korban, they are equal. But regarding the person who brought the korban, who is the non-Jew, that is where the distinction lies.
“Af le-Rabbi Yose she-kedushat ha-nochri korban nochri shaveh, mi-kol makom ein ha-tzitz mertzeh al korbanot ha-nochrim, she-ha-nochrim atzmam einam benei ritzui.” Beautiful, Brisker Rav! That means the initial assumption was that if the korbanot are the same, they should have the same law of acceptance. Yes, the korbanot are the same, but the people are not the same. The owners are not the same.
No, no, but the korban. The question is about the korban: if the kohen sprinkled the blood while ritually impure, does that affect the non-Jew’s korban? We say that for a Jew, if he did it inadvertently, it is accepted. You can even eat it. If he did it intentionally, no; rabbinically, whatever, he can’t eat it. But for a non-Jew, never. Why? The acceptance does not affect them. The acceptance of the tzitz works only on the frequency of Jews. The acceptance of the tzitz does not impact non-Jews, for whatever reason.
“Baruch Hashem she-lo asani goy.” Another thing you have to be thankful for: we have the tzitz; they don’t.
The Mishnah. But interestingly, they can bring korbanot. We’re bringing korbanot on their behalf, but they themselves can come to the Temple and bring korbanot, and actually—yes, a vow and a freewill offering. They can come—right, right, right. Cataracts in the eye. But I think they had a separate section. You wouldn’t want to go to the Temple and have your kids see some enslaved person from Kenya bringing a… Yeah, you wanted it to be… A partition. If you’re partners with a non-Jew, will the tzitz atone for half of it? Ah! A question, a question. Partners—before you ask about the tzitz, shouldn’t you ask about the partnership in general? Okay.
Things that permit. Things for which one is not liable on account of pigul. Who can give me an example of an item that cannot become pigul? The kometz (handful offering). Very good, Elliot, the levonah (frankincense). Why? Because those things are the matir (that which permits). Pigul applies only to the item that is permitted. Okay, very good. Incense. Incense doesn’t permit anything. Right? The blood is the— the blood is the matir. I’m sorry, the incense is the matir. Therefore, pigul applies only to the item that is permitted. To eat the meat—that was the item permitted. To put the meat on the altar tomorrow—that is the item permitted. The sprinkling allows you to put the material on the altar. Altar consumption, human consumption.
So the Gemara says: things for which one is not liable on account of pigul. I was listening the other day to a shiur by one of the rabbis, one of the Brisker rabbis. It’s in Yiddish, actually. I’m trying to catch what he says because they said he had a big novel insight about pigul. He’s talking about pigul, pigul, pigul, pigul. I’m watching: What the heck is he talking about? Pig? Listen to the shiur—I had the right question. You always stop; I’m always stopping like that. Pigul, pigul, pigul, pigul, pigul. It was pickled, a pickle—not a pickle, not a pickle. Not a pickle, not a pig. Pigul. Of course, what is pigul? I told you I can’t explain pigul to you now. Pigul—one day you’re going to need all the laws of pigul. You always tell me, “Leave me alone, stop that.” I’m going to explain the laws of pigul to you now. What is pigul? Famous question. Pigul. What is pigul? Let’s take—here, go ahead, here, go, learn it, go read it, go read it. We’ve been waking up at 5:30 in the morning for a month trying to figure out what pigul is, in one quick explanation. Even the convert didn’t have the guts to ask Hillel or Shammai that question.
“Things for which one is not liable on account of pigul, one is liable on account of notar.” Aha! Just because the law of pigul doesn’t apply, don’t think it means you’re exempt from all the other problems. You are liable on account of notar. Certainly the incense can become notar; it can become impure, and if somebody ate it while impure—except for the blood. Ah, blood is an exception. Blood is an exception.
Rashi: “Chayavim aleihem mishum tum’ah karet”—one is liable to karet for them on account of impurity; that is, one who eats them while ritually impure, and for an inadvertent violation one brings a sin offering, except for the blood, which is explicitly excluded. Okay, we have a special exclusion for blood. There is no pigul with blood either; the blood is the matir. But we have a special scriptural decree saying that these other laws don’t apply to it.
Rabbi Shimon makes one liable for something that is normally eaten. Fine! Rabbi Shimon says a person is liable to karet only for things that are edible. “But for wood, frankincense, or incense, one is not liable on account of impurity.” Okay, because they aren’t eaten. But the first rabbi says, so what? The person eats the wood off the altar. The Rabbis disagree with him, since we include them from “kol habasar” (all the meat). Right, we learned that already. “Mikol” includes even the wood and the frankincense. It’s an amazing thing.
Okay, go back to the Gemara now. The Rabbis taught: “Could it be that one is liable on account of impurity only for an item that has something that permits it, either for a person or for the altar?” Maybe you would think the laws of impurity apply only to something that has a matir—which in our language is an item that is permitted—such as meat that goes on the altar. It has something that permits it: the blood allows that meat to go on the altar. Or meat that is eaten. But not the matir itself. So you might have thought that one is liable on account of impurity only for an item that has a matir.
Maybe I would put it in our language like this: perhaps the laws of pigul, notar, and impurity are parallel, and therefore wherever pigul applies, impurity applies, and wherever pigul doesn’t apply, impurity doesn’t apply. Would you think that? And to be honest with you, I could learn it from an a fortiori inference.
“Umah pigul shehu bikvi’ah”—if a person violates pigul inadvertently, he has to bring a fixed sin offering, whether he is poor or wealthy. Whatever you did, you bring a fixed korban. “Uvidi’ah achat”: if a person ate pigul inadvertently, that’s it; he is liable with one awareness—that is, he knows that he ate it inadvertently, and he is liable. “Velo hutar miklalo”: we never saw a case where it is permitted. For example, with impurity we have permitted cases, as we’ll see in a minute. But with pigul we never have a permitted case. There’s no “pigul hutrah betzibbur” or “pigul dechuyah betzibbur.” And still, what do you see? With pigul, even with all these things, one is liable only for an item that has a matir, but it is limited to certain cases: things that have something that permits them for the altar, whether for human consumption or the altar.
Impurity, by contrast, is subject to a sliding-scale offering. It varies according to a person’s economic status: a wealthy person brings one type of korban, a poor person another. And it requires two acts of awareness. Not only does he have to know that he ate while impure; he also has to know that he was impure at the time. He had to know he was impure, then forget that he was impure when he ate, and later remember that he ate while impure. There are two acts of awareness. Once again: first he has to know that he was impure; that is one act of awareness. Then he forgets, eats the korban while impure, and then has to remember that he ate the korban. That is the second act of awareness.
And, by the way, impurity is sometimes permitted. Didn’t we learn that impurity is permitted for a communal offering? “Eino din?” Shouldn’t it follow? You have all these leniencies here: sometimes the korban isn’t expensive, it isn’t fixed, impurity can be permitted, and you aren’t liable until you have two acts of awareness. So certainly it should be limited in what you are liable for. It should have the same limitations as pigul: one is liable only for an item that has a matir, whether for a person or for the altar. I would have thought that if pigul, which is so stringent, still has limitations, impurity, which is more lenient, should certainly have those same limitations. It should not apply to more things.
The verse teaches us that it does. So don’t make the a fortiori inference: “Veyinazru mikodshei Benei Yisrael velo yechalelu et shem kodshi asher hem makdishim li” (They shall separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel, and they shall not profane My holy name, which they consecrate to Me). The verse comes to say that anything you consecrate to Me, even if it doesn’t have a matir, is subject to impurity. “Kol devarim shemakdishim.” Rashi: “Talmud lomar asher hem makdishim li, ribah kol hamukdashim.” The verse says “hamakdishim” and includes all consecrated things. “Vegabei veyinazru ketiv”—that is, I guess, regarding impurity.
Oh, so the Gemara has one more question. Do you understand? If not for this verse, I would have made an a fortiori inference. The verse teaches us this. “I yachol miyad?” Why not immediately? Maybe all consecrated offerings are included, and a person is liable immediately. The verse teaches “yikrav.” What does that mean? Rashi: Maybe, as soon as they were consecrated, a person would immediately be liable if he ate them while impure. No: “sheyikrav,” from “mikol zar’achem.” You have to bring it. What does that mean? It means sprinkling the blood or doing something. We’ll see what that means.
The verse teaches “yikrav.” If you eat it immediately, straight away, before you’ve done something, it isn’t subject to the law of impurity. It isn’t immediate; there’s a wait, a grace period. What does that mean?
Rabbi Elazar said: “Vechi yesh noge’a shehu chayav?” Is there a person who becomes impure by touching the sacred offerings and is liable to karet? Because what does the verse say? “Ish ish, emor aleihem ledoroteichem kol ish asher yikrav mikol zar’achem el hakodashim vetum’ato alav, venichretah” (Any person, throughout your generations, who approaches the holy things while his impurity is upon him shall be cut off). Where is the “venichretah”? Is there a case where a person who touches the sacred offerings is liable to karet? I guess there isn’t. It’s a prohibition, right? It’s a prohibition.
Rather, what does “yikrav” teach? The verse is speaking about something that has been made fit to be brought. How so? It has something that permits it: the fats on the altar, or the meat that the kohen will eat, which the blood permits; or the remainder of a meal offering, where the handful offering is the matir. Once its permitter has been brought, you are liable if you eat it while impure.
If it has no permitter—for example, a kohen’s meal offering, which has no matir because the whole thing goes on the altar, or libations and things like that—then once it has been placed in the sacred vessel, it is subject to the laws of impurity.
Stop right there for a second; let’s see. “Vechi yesh noge’a chayav?” “Vahalo eino chayav ela im ken achal.” Right, eating sacred offerings while impure is liable to karet, not touching them! So how can you say that?
The verse is speaking about something made fit to be brought, and the sacred offerings are here. This is what it means: “asher yikrav”—he approaches the sacred offerings, and afterward eats them while impurity is upon him. Ah, so it is talking about eating! But what is it talking about? Not “yikrav” meaning that you touch it. Rather, it’s talking about the case where you actually brought the matir. The case is something that has a matir, such as the fats, or meat that the blood permits, or the remainder of a meal offering, where the handful offering is the matir. Once its permitter has been brought. And something with no permitter, like a kohen’s meal offering: once it has been placed in the vessel.
Okay, very good. So we’re learning a novel insight here: when it comes to impurity, the law really applies to all the parts of the korban. Right? And touching while impure does not incur karet. Why does the verse say “misheyikrav”? “Misheyikrav” doesn’t mean when he touches it. It means that once you brought the matir, a person who eats it while impure is liable to karet. Certain things have no matir; for them, once you put them in the sacred vessel, the law applies.
So you have to do something; you have to consecrate it, you have to permit it. For other things that have a matir, liability to karet for eating them does not apply until you have performed the matir. Other things that don’t have a matir, like the meal offering of the Kohen Gadol that goes entirely on the altar, have no matir. Once they’ve put it in the sacred vessel, if he eats it while impure, that is subject to karet.
Okay, beautiful. Oh, that means pigul applies only to certain parts of the korban. With impurity, it applies to all parts of the korban. Right, but once it’s consecrated—that’s what we’re saying. We don’t have the— I would have made an a fortiori inference, but we have a verse that comes along and says no: the law of impurity applies to “hamakdishim,” to everything that they consecrate.
Then the Gemara asks the question: even though all consecrated offerings are included, it applies only after the matir has already— All right, we’ll stop here. We’ll start tomorrow with this. Beautiful. Rabbi Chananya ben Akashya says…