Moshe ben Dinah (Moses son of Dinah), Ya'akov ben Dinah (Jacob son of Dinah), and Yitzchak ben Dinah (Isaac son of Dinah): neshamah (soul), ilui nishmat (for the elevation of the soul) Avraham Elizem ben Morgenson; zivugim (matches) for Tamar bat Yehudit, Rivkah bat Yemimah, and Mazal bat Michal. We also have the gashmiyut veruchniyut (materiality and spirituality) program for Chayim ben Simchah, David ben Ester, and Ya'akov ben Henriette, as long as we keep learning.
We are on daf mem heh (folio 45). We’ll start with ashkachan tum'ah (We find impurity) on mem heh amud bet. We found tum'ah (impurity): the issur achilat kodashim be-tum'ah (prohibition of eating sacred offerings in impurity) applies even to things that do not have a matir (that which permits). We said that pigul (disqualified offering) applies specifically to nes davar ha-nitar, or davar she-yesh lo matirin (an item with a permitting factor). Therefore, the kometz (handful offering) is not subject to pigul: the kometz does not have a matir; it is a matir. But the shirei minchah (remains of the meal offering) will be subject to it.
The meat of the altar offering and the meat eaten by the priests are included. When it comes to tum'ah, we said it applies to every part of the korban (sacrifice), including the kometz, the levonah (frankincense), and the wood. The Gemara said that the same applies to notar (leftover sacrificial meat). It asks, “We find tum'ah; from where do we know notar?” And “harei no notar” applies to every part of the korban. It is derived through gezerah shavah (verbal analogy): “chilul” from “chilul” of tum'ah. It says “chilul” by tum'ah and “chilul” by notar.
The Gemara objects: “I don’t understand. You have a gezerah shavah? ‘Ve-leilaf avon avon mi-pigul’”—as if it were so easy to make a gezerah shavah on demand. If you learn “avon avon” from pigul, it will apply only to something that has a permitting factor. The Gemara will essentially say that tum'ah is more similar to notar. The sign is “gezel”: guf, zerikah, chilul. What is gezel? Rashi explains: “guf.” Notar and tum'ah are disqualifications of the object itself. Pigul, by contrast, is a disqualification of thought. The meat itself was left over; the tum'ah is in the meat itself. That is the guf in gezel. Pigul is a disqualification of thought.
“Notar ve-tum'ah ein zerikat ha-dam mevi'ah lidei pesul.” Notar and tum'ah have nothing to do with the consequences of the blood service. With pigul, the blood service establishes that the service was done improperly. “Ve-notar ve-tamei ne'emar bahem chilul.” So there are connections there.
The Gemara says, “Oh, yeah? We have more connections to pigul. Aderaba!” Someone asked, “Before, we did bring ‘avon avon’ from pigul as a gezerah shavah to learn from. So they did stretch it?” The answer was, “Yes, they did.” The Gemara is just saying that it was extended. Anyway, the Gemara says, “Aderaba, mi-pigul havah leh lemeilaf, she-ken hutar, tzitz, tahor, bi-zman, karev, and hanei nefishan.” Gezel has only three signs; here there are more: hutar, tzitz, tahor, bi-zman, and karev.
Rashi explains: “she-ken hutar, tzitz, tahor, bi-zman, karev.” Notar and pigul were not permitted as exceptions in cases of tum'ah, whereas tum'ah is permitted for a communal offering. The tzitz (forehead plate) does not effect acceptance for pigul or notar, but it does for tum'ah. Even though we are discussing impurity of the person, for which the tzitz does not effect acceptance, the name “tum'ah” does effect acceptance through the tzitz. In other words, although this type of tum'ah might not be accepted by the tzitz, the category of tum'ah is accepted by it.
“Tahor”: both pigul and notar are tahor; they have nothing to do with tum'ah. They are simply disqualified. “Ushenehem nifsalim bizman”: both are matters of time. Notar is a matter of time, and pigul is a thought about time. “Shenehem psulim bekarev”—both are disqualified in the offering—excluding impurity of the person, where the person performing the service is disqualified. One disqualification is in the meat, and the other is in the person. Therefore, with tum'ah, the disqualification is in the person, not the meat.
So it is more reasonable to learn notar from pigul than from tum'ah. We are back to the question: if we learn it from pigul, it should apply only to things similar to pigul, things that have a permitting factor, but not to the permitting object itself. The Gemara says, “You’re right. Ela midekatni Levi.” Levi teaches: “Minayin she'af bipsul zeman hakatuv medaber”—how do we know that the verse is also speaking about disqualification through time? Notar is a disqualification through time. The answer is: “Talmud lomar, velo yechalelu et shem kodshi asher hem makdishim li.”
Rashi explains that this verse, “veyinazru” and “velo yechalelu,” is written regarding tum'ah, but it also refers to other things. “Bishnei chillulim hakatuv medaber”: “velo yechalelu” refers to two kinds of desecration, one involving disqualification through notar and one involving disqualification through tum'ah. The verse plainly refers to both tum'ah and notar.
“Chutz min hadam.” They are not liable for eating blood on account of notar or tum'ah. Blood is a matir, and we said that these laws apply to the permitting objects, but blood is the exception. There is no law of notar if one eats blood, and there is no law of tum'ah. Of course, you cannot bring it, but the point is that the prohibitions of notar and tum'ah do not apply to blood.
From where do we know this? The Gemara gives three sources. Ula says, “Amar Ula, amar kra, va'ani netativ lachem”: I gave you the blood to put on the altar; “shelachem yehe”—it is yours. Regarding misuse of sacred property, the blood has the status of ordinary property; it is yours.
Second, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: “Amar kra, lechaper.” The blood was given for atonement: “lechaper netativ velo lime'ilah”—I gave it for atonement, not for misuse of sacred property.
Third, Rav Yochanan says, “Amar kra, hu banefesh yechaper.” “Hu” sounds constant, something that does not change: “lifnei kaparah kel'achar kaparah.” Its status before atonement is like its status after atonement. After atonement, there is no misuse of sacred property. The commandment has been fulfilled. So, too, before atonement, there is no misuse of sacred property, even before the blood has been sprinkled, while it still has sanctity.
The Gemara asks whether we might compare the status after atonement to the status before it: “Eima d'le'achar kapparah kelifnei kapparah.” If before atonement there is misuse of sacred property, perhaps there is misuse after atonement as well. That cannot be: you never find an item subject to misuse of sacred property after its service has been completed. “Ein lecha davar shena'asit mitzvato mo'alin bo.” You never find an item whose mitzvah has been performed that is still subject to misuse of sacred property.
“Oh, some general rule!” What about terumat hadeshen? Every morning, they would go to the altar, shovel up some of its ashes, and put them at the side of the ramp. The verse says, “veheniacham sham”—they must leave them there. This implies that you may not touch them, even though the mitzvah has been performed. If someone does, it is misuse of sacred property. So this is a case where the service has been completed, and there is still misuse of sacred property. Why do they have to leave it there? Why not move it? You cannot touch it; you have to wait until the ground absorbs it.
The answer is that this is because of terumat hadeshen and bigdei kehunah. The priests’ garments include the white garments worn on Yom Kippur. What do you do with those garments? You bury them. The service has been completed, yet they are buried. So there are two verses: “shnei chetuvim haba'im k'echad,” and two verses that come together do not teach a general rule. These are the two exceptions; you cannot learn anything else from them. Everything else, once the service is done, is not subject to misuse of sacred property. But in the cases of the priestly garments and terumat hadeshen, even after the service is done, there is misuse of sacred property. Those are two verses, and they do not teach a general rule.
“Oh, yeah? Hani cha lerabanan de'amrei: ‘veheniacham sham’ melamed shete'unim genizah.” This works according to the Rabbis, who say that “veheniacham sham” teaches that the garments must be stored away. Before we even discuss whether two verses that come together teach a general rule, this verse is being used for something else: the garments must be left there and, according to some, stored away. Then that is fine; there is a law of storing them away even after the service has been completed.
“Ela le'Rebbi Dosa de'amar mutarot hen leKohen hedyot”—a regular priest may wear them, since he wears white garments too—“uvelvad shelo yishtamesh bahem b'Yom Hakippurim acher.” The only issue is that “veheniacham sham” teaches that the High Priest cannot wear the same clothes the next year. But they do not have to be stored away. So there are not two verses that come together; there is only one verse. We see that even after a service, it is possible for there to be misuse of sacred property. Therefore, perhaps the same applies to blood. What can we say?
Could we say that there is misuse of sacred property after the service, just as there is before it, and return to Rabbi Yochanan’s interpretation? No. It is because of terumat hadeshen and eglah arufah (the heifer with a broken neck): two verses that come together do not teach a general rule. After the service of the eglah arufah, when it has been slaughtered, you cannot benefit from it, even though the mitzvah has been performed. So sometimes, after the mitzvah has been performed, there is still a prohibition against benefit.
The Gemara says, “Hani cha leman de'amar ein melamdin”—that works according to the one who says that two verses that come together do not teach a general rule. “Ela leman de'amar melamdin, mai ika lemeimar?” But according to the one who says that they do teach a general rule, these are not exceptions; there could be other cases. Why not say that, just as the blood is subject to misuse of sacred property before atonement, it may be subject to it after atonement as well?
After the service of the eglah arufah, it is not sacred property, but the mitzvah has been performed. The Gemara is not trying to prove something about sacred offerings. It is trying to prove that we never see a case where the mitzvah has been performed and there is still a prohibition against benefit. Here the mitzvah has been performed, and you are still not allowed to benefit from it. I agree that it is not sacred property; it is done at the nachal eitan (rugged valley). But we are not trying to prove something about sacred offerings; we are trying to prove something about the mitzvah. If you benefit from it, that is prohibited. It is prohibited to benefit from it, though it is not called misuse of sacred property in the sense of a sacrifice for misuse of sacred property. The Gemara’s assumption is that misuse of sacred property is a term for deriving benefit from sacred offerings. But the Gemara is not asking about misuse of sacred property specifically. It is asking whether we ever see a mitzvah that has been performed and is still subject to a prohibition against benefit. Yes, we do.
The Gemara says these cases are exceptions because two exclusionary expressions are written: “Trei mi'utei ketivi.” Here it says “ha'arufah”—not “arufah,” but “ha'arufah,” suggesting this heifer as opposed to something else. And regarding terumat hadeshen it says, “vesamo etzel hamizbe'ach.” “Vesamo”—as if to say, place this next to the altar, this as opposed to something else. So these are not simply two verses that come together to teach a general rule. They have exclusionary terms, which tell us that these cases alone are included.
Let’s go back. We now have three verses teaching that the blood of the korban is not subject to misuse of sacred property. Do we honestly need three verses to teach the same thing? “Vesamo” was about terumat hadeshen: “vesamo etzel hamizbe'ach.” “Vesamo oto”—as if to say, this and nothing else. “Utlata kera'ei bedam lama li?” Why do we need three verses about blood to teach that it is not subject to misuse of sacred property? One would be enough. So each verse can be used for something else: one excludes misuse of sacred property, one notar, and one tum'ah. That is the source for the question we had earlier: how do we know that blood is not subject to the laws of tum'ah or notar if someone eats it while impure? From here.
“Aval pigul lo tzarich kera.” Why do we not need a verse to exclude the blood of the korban from pigul? We know it already: it is not something that the matir permits; it is the matir. It cannot be subject to pigul. The Mishnah teaches, “Kol sheyesh lo matirim,” everything that has a permitting factor, whether for a person or for the altar, is liable on account of pigul. But the blood itself is a matir, so it is obvious that it is not subject to pigul. That is that discussion.
Now, what do you want to do? Let’s go further. Rabbi Yochanan says: Why are there three statements of karet regarding shelamim? Rashi says the three verses are used to exclude notar. We saw three statements of karet: “emor aleihem ledoroteichem”; “vehanefesh asher tochal basar”; and “nefesh ki tiga bechol tum'at adam.” Basically, there are three verses saying that if someone eats a shelamim offering in impurity, the punishment is karet. Why do we need three?
The Gemara says: one is for the general category, one for the specific case, and one for things that are not eaten. One is for the general category and one for the specific case, to derive the principle that something was included in a general category and then singled out from it to teach: it did not come out to teach about itself alone, but to teach about the entire general category. We have that principle in the daily prayers, in the teaching of Rabbi Yishmael.
Let’s apply the rule. “Vehanefesh asher tochal basar mizevach hashelamim.” Weren’t shelamim already included among all sacred offerings? You cannot eat any sacred offering in impurity. So why were shelamim singled out from the general category of sacred offerings? To compare other offerings to them and teach that just as shelamim are offerings placed on the altar, so, too, are all offerings placed on the altar. It limits the general category to things similar to sacred offerings placed on the altar, as opposed to offerings dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple. If a person ate those, there would be no karet.
That is the first verse—or, rather, the first two: one for the general category and one for the specific case. These two verses allow us to derive this through one of the interpretive principles of the Torah. One verse includes the general category of sacred offerings, and the other specifies it and reveals what the general category is. The third verse includes even things that are not eaten, such as wood, levonah, and incense—sacred items that are not fit to be eaten. If someone ate them while impure with the impurity of the person, he is liable according to the Rabbis of the Mishnah. As we saw, the Rabbis of the Mishnah say he is liable to karet.
So the three verses are accounted for. If someone eats wood in impurity, he is liable to karet. That person really has to be a major transgressor. It is not edible. If you have nothing better to do, you might as well eat a cheeseburger. You would get a negative commandment, and at least enjoy it. Why go out of your way to eat a piece of wood?
Someone asked, “Rabbi, I bet they weren’t talking about eating wood, but about using it as a toothpick.” No, they mean eating it. The whole point is that a toothpick is what you use it for. The novelty is “devarim she'einam ne'echalim”—things that are not eaten. If I use a rock as a doorstop, of course I am benefiting from it. You do not eat a rock. The point is that eating is not the relevant way to use it. Rashi says, “kegon etzim she'einam re'uyim la'achilah”—for example, wood that is not fit to be eaten. “Im achal mehem”—if he ate some of them.
Someone said, “The altar eats it.” It is fit for the altar; the fire consumes it. Wood is the food of fire, but it is not food for a person. The person who eats it is really a bad guy. “Termites too, Rabbi.” Termites too. The point is that a person is eating wood.
According to Rav, things that are not eaten do not make someone liable on account of tum'ah. So the verse is available: what does it include? It includes internal sin offerings, the sin offering that is brought inside. What does that mean? We might have thought, according to Rabbi Shimon, that anything not placed on the outer altar like shelamim does not make one liable on account of pigul. Remember that rule? He wanted to learn from shelamim that pigul applies only to offerings on the outer altar. We might therefore have thought that the same applies to tum'ah, and that one is liable to karet only for offerings brought on the outer altar. The verse teaches us that all offerings, even internal ones, are subject to tum'ah.
Now let’s go back to the Mishnah. It says, “Omer Rabbi Shimon: mechayev et shedarko le'echol.” Rabbi Shimon argued that you are not liable for eating things that are not edible in impurity. So now we have accounted for the verses. We have the prohibition against eating sacred offerings in impurity, whose punishment is karet, and, second, a person cannot eat sacred offerings that are impure. Either way, whether the person is impure or the item is impure.
“Itmar.” Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish—famous rivals, in a good way, for the sake of Heaven—and Rabbi El'azar and Rabbi Yosi berabbi Chanina. Two of them say one thing, and the other two say another. Rashi says, “amrei chad milta ve'inach terei chada milta.” His text reads, “chad mehai zuza vechad mehai zuza.” Is it zuza or zuga? Some say zuga, because one is from this pair and one from that pair. Rashi gives the versions. Zayin, vav, gimmel, alef. Is that “corner”? That would be zavit, and it would need a tav. Zuza is a pair.
One rabbi says the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon in the Mishnah, about whether one is liable for things that are not fit to be eaten, concerns impurity of the meat. That is where the korban itself became impure. The Sages say that if the item itself became impure, it is subject to the laws of tum'ah, because we have an extra verse that includes these items. But regarding impurity of the person—where the person himself is impure and eats these items while they are pure—everyone agrees that he does not receive lashes. Even the Sages agree with Rabbi Shimon that a person who eats wood, levonah, and the other such items while impure does not receive lashes. The novelty of including inedible items applies only when the items themselves are impure, not when the person is impure.
The other rabbi says, “Kemachloket bazu kach machloket bazu”—the dispute applies in both cases. Rashi explains that the Sages and Rabbi Shimon disagree about liability when someone eats impure wood or levonah. He receives lashes on account of the negative commandment, “vehabasar asher yiga bechol tamei,” because “vehabasar” is extra and includes wood and levonah. But when the person is impure and the items are pure, everyone agrees that he does not receive lashes, because they were not included there.
What is the reason for the other rabbi’s view, that the Sages say a person is liable even for inedible items when the person is impure? Since we read “vehabasar asher yiga bechol tamei,” we also read “vetum'ato alav.” Rashi explains: since the Rabbis say that one receives lashes for wood and levonah when the meat is impure, they also hold that one receives lashes when the person is impure, because these verses are written next to each other.
Someone asked, “But it says ‘venichretah.’ Why does it say ‘lokeh’?” It means he receives lashes. The verse says venichretah, karet. If he receives karet, does he also receive lashes? The question is whether receiving lashes exempts him from karet, or whether that would be a double punishment.
First, let’s get to the derivation. In Vayikra 7:19, it says “vehabasar,” where we learn about impure meat; in the next verse, it says “vetum'ato alav.” So whether the tum'ah is on the meat or on the person, it is the same context: “vehabasar,” including the extra items that are not edible, such as wood. The question is how we know that the rule applies when the person is impure. According to the second opinion, the next verse is speaking about impurity of the person, so the rule applies there too.
How does an inedible item become impure? Someone might ask: the priest was impure and touched it, or the item itself became impure. He picked up a piece of wood and put it on the altar; the priest was impure, and the wood became impure. A creeping creature might have jumped on it. That is how.
But is it karet or a negative commandment? The verse says “venichretah,” and the Gemara says “lokeh.” “Tum'at haguf divrei hakol eino lokeh.” I think “lokeh” here is a way of saying it is a negative commandment, one punishable by karet. Let’s see what it says. It says that it is necessary to conclude that even for things that are not eaten, one is liable on account of impurity of the person; the discussion in the Gemara here is specifically about lashes, not liability for karet. Even according to those who say that the Sages agree with Rabbi Shimon that there are no lashes for eating sacred offerings in impurity when the items are not fit to be eaten, there is still support for the derivation that includes items not fit to be eaten. According to that view, however, the verse has been explained only with regard to karet, not lashes. They add that this does not seem to be the meaning of the Gemara.
Could there be a dispute about karet, where they do not receive it, while the question is whether they receive lashes? Maybe the additional items get lashes or not, while for edible items there is certainly karet. How far do you take the rule? He says it does not seem to mean that. The wording suggests that the verse says what it says; we will see in a moment.
Now let’s go back to “Liftei byomi matni hachi.” Let’s go to “Liftei byomi” for a minute. “Nafka minah matni hachi.” What is the practical difference? One says the dispute concerns impurity of the person: the person ate it while impure, but the meat was pure. In that case, the dispute is whether he receives lashes. But regarding impurity of the meat, everyone agrees that he receives lashes. The other says, “Kemachloket bazu kach machloket bazu.”
Rava says it is more reasonable to follow the one who says the dispute applies in both cases. According to Rabbi Shimon, one is not liable on account of tum'ah for eating things that are not fit to be eaten, whether the person is impure or the item itself is impure. Why? “Keivan dela karinan beh vetum'ato alav venichretah.” Since we cannot read “vetum'ato alav venichretah” about it, once we have excluded it from karet, we do not read “vehabasar asher yiga bechol tamei lo ye'achel” about it either. It is not included in the prohibition. Rashi explains that the verse says “vehanefesh asher tochal basar”—basar is something edible. Once you exclude it from basar, you also exclude it from the punishment, so the rule does not apply either way.
The Gemara objects: “Veha meribbuya debasar deka rabitiye derabbanan.” We said that “basar” was extra; that was how we learned about inedible items. The answer is, “Lefsula be'alma.” The verse “vehabasar” teaches only that if these items become impure, they are disqualified, not that eating them incurs lashes. Rashi says that perhaps the word is an asmachta (textual support), but it is not teaching a special Torah prohibition against eating them. It teaches only that they are disqualified. It may be a rabbinic stringency, with the verse serving as an asmachta.
So we have a dispute about how to understand the dispute. It is not enough that there is a dispute; we have a dispute about where the dispute is. Where did Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree in the Mishnah? Does the prohibition apply if someone eats inedible items while impure? The Rabbis say it does, and Rabbi Shimon says it does not. The question is: who is impure, the person or the meat?
In the first version, one view says that the dispute concerns impurity of the meat, but regarding impurity of the person, everyone agrees that he does not receive lashes. That is the lenient view. Rabbi Shimon says that just as there is a dispute in one case, there is a dispute in the other as well. The second version says that the dispute concerns impurity of the person, but regarding the meat, everyone agrees that he receives lashes. That is more stringent about impurity of the meat. The Rabbis say that just as Rabbi Shimon argues in the case of an impure person eating it, he also argues when the item itself is impure. The Gemara says it is more reasonable to say that Rabbi Shimon argues in both cases. Why? The verse says “vehabasar,” which sounds like the edible part, and immediately afterward discusses the person becoming impure. So it must be speaking about edible parts, whether the meat became impure or the person became impure.
The Gemara asks, “What are you talking about? The verse ‘vehabasar’ is actually teaching about inedible parts; it is extra!” No, it is extra only to teach that the korban is disqualified, not that someone who eats it is liable. That is Rabbi Shimon’s view. The extra word “vehabasar”—perhaps the extra is the “veha”? No, the whole word is extra.
Rambam addresses the question of karet and lashes in Hilchot Sanhedrin: every negative commandment punishable by karet, but not by a court-imposed death penalty, is punishable by lashes. Number 13 is eating forbidden fat and blood; number 14 is eating pigul. Does that mean there is an issur that gets karet? He just lists them; he does not say anything else. Do you get lashes and karet? Normally, those who receive lashes are exempt from karet. They get both? The lashes were added too? That is like “kam leh.” We had another case where a person was liable to karet and was wrongly given lashes, and still he was exempt from karet. I thought the Marranos wanted atonement for what they were doing, so they asked for lashes. They wanted the rabbis to get together and reinstitute the practice? That is why they wanted to reinstitute it, so they could receive lashes? Amazing.
“Marranos” is an offensive word. In Spanish, it means “pig.” I once gave a shiur and said “Marranos.” Someone who identifies as a Marrano texted me, “I love the Rav and listen to him all the time, but I was very offended. That is a negative term to call us. Marrano means pig. We call ourselves Conversos. Please don’t use that term; it’s slang.” I said, “Fine, no problem.” What people thought of us—well, don’t tell them; say “piglet” instead. You can probably look it up, but he said it meant pig, and I trust him. The reason they called them pigs is that they showed that they were kosher, but really they were not; they were pretending. I had heard that, but the term is used so often that I didn’t think it would be offensive. No offense intended. I accept the rebuke.
All right, we continue with the Mishnah: “L'shem shishah devarim hazevach nizbach” (For the sake of six things the sacrifice is offered). Now we are talking about kavanah (intention). When you bring a korban, you have to bring it with six intentions: “l'shem zevach,” for the kind of korban you are bringing; “l'shem zove'ach,” for the person bringing it, Re'uven ben Ya'akov; “l'shem Hashem”; “l'shem ishim,” meaning that the parts meant for the altar should be consumed by the fire; “l'shem re'ach”; and “l'shem nicho'ach.” “L'shem ishim” means that the parts of the korban intended for the altar should be consumed by the fire. Does the person need that intention when he is putting it on the fire? He needs the intention that the parts of the korban are for that purpose. He slaughters it so that the kidneys and the lobe of the liver will go on the altar.
“L'shem re'ach” means for the smell. “L'shem nicho'ach” means that it should give God nashat ru'ach (contentment). The Gemara will explain what those two intentions are.
“Veha'chatat veha'asham”—for a sin offering and a guilt offering, you have to add something: “l'shem chet,” for the sin it is coming to atone for. Rabbi Yosei says, “Af mi shelo hayah belibo l'shem echad mikol eilu, kasher”—even someone who did not have in mind any one of these is valid. You need all six, but if you did not have them, it still works. Why? “Shehu t'nai beit din.” The rabbinical court established this condition.
Someone put the kavanot of the Ari on the mikveh. All the do-gooders are trying to save the world. So perhaps it is better not to have an intention, because you might get it wrong. Let the rabbinical court do it. If there is a shelamim and you thought it was an olah, that is not just a thought. Rashi says, “Af mi shelo hayah belibo sheshachat stam, kasher,” even if he did not have a particular intention and slaughtered it without specifying, it is valid, because the court established that he should slaughter without specifying. That is the condition of the court—not to have a particular intention. It is not a condition designed to catch people who did not have an intention. The condition is: do not direct your intention; do not think.
As we say in the first chapter, “hitnu beit din dela leimar lishmo, dilma ati lemeimar shelo lishmo.” The court stipulated that the person should not say that it is for its sake, lest he come to say that it is not for its sake. Once you tell someone to do things, he might say lishmo, shelo lishmo, lishmo, shelo lishmo.
But the wording is “af mi shelo hayah belibo”—even if someone did not have it in mind, it is valid because the court’s condition takes care of it. If a person had the wrong intention, does the court’s condition cover that? It might; you have to know how strong the court’s authority is. Once we say not to have a particular intention, perhaps your intention does not apply. But they told him not to have an intention. Are you asking about a negative intention?
The comment says that the court’s condition not to think at all applied only to the name of the offering and the name of its owner, because only in those cases is there a concern that the person will mistakenly change it to another offering. For the other four matters, there is no concern that he will make that mistake, so initially he should have those intentions. Rabbi Yosei nevertheless proves that even those matters do not invalidate the korban after the fact. If an unspecified act were not valid after the fact, the Sages would not have established that people should avoid specifying the name of the offering or the shelamim.
Why? If an unspecified act were not valid as an act done for its sake, the Sages would not have established a practice of not thinking about the name of the offering. It must be that an unspecified act is valid, and the court’s condition supplies the intention. If an unspecified act were invalid after the fact, the Sages would not establish a practice that depends on the court stepping in to fix something that would otherwise be invalid. That is a stretch: the court is asking you to do something that would be invalid after the fact, and then stepping in to supply the intention. If it were invalid after the fact, they would be turning an after-the-fact situation into a proper one by adding the intention. From this, he sees that the other intentions must not invalidate the korban either.
How do we read the last line of the Mishnah? “Shehu t'nai beit din she'ein hamachshavah holechet ela achar ha'oved.” Rashi will explain it. “Ein hamachshavah holechet ela achar ha'oved.” Therefore, if he intended that it not be for its sake, even though the owners say that it is for its sake, it makes no difference, because the matter does not depend on them. It says, “hamakriv oto lo yechashev.”
Who is the one performing the service? The priest. If he has an intention that it not be for its sake, while the owners are shouting, “No, lishmo, lishmo!” it still follows the one performing the service. The owners’ intention does not help. The intention does depend on the person performing the service—the priest. So we can establish the practice because the owners’ intention is not effective. We tell the person performing the service, whoever is doing it, to act without specifying. Then it is valid. A non-priest may perform the slaughter, correct? Whoever is permitted to perform that service. The same applies to slaughtering, even if it is not done by a priest.
Let’s go back to the Mishnah. It said, “L'shem shishah devarim hazevach nizbach,” and we listed the six. For a sin offering and a guilt offering, we added more. Rabbi Yosei then said that even if someone did not have any of these intentions, but brought the offering without specifying, it is valid. Why? The court established that the slaughter should be done without specifying the intention, because we are concerned that he might have a different intention. If he did, he is the one performing the service, and the owner shouting will not help. So the person performing the service could invalidate it. We tell him to act without specifying, and the court fills in the intention.
But why did they have to establish that he should act without specifying? Why not tell him, “Do whatever you want”? Did they nullify his thought, or did they just say that an unspecified act fills in the blanks? If the person says, “I am doing it shelo lishmah,” can the court undo that too? That is the question. “Amri vezeh af mi shelo hayah belibo”—it sounds like that. All right, that is a question.
Let’s go to the Gemara for a moment. We have one minute. Rav Yehudah says in the name of Rav, regarding the verse “vehiktir hakohen et hakol hamizbechah olah isheh re'ach nicho'ach l'Hashem”: “olah” means for the sake of an olah, excluding an offering brought for the sake of shelamim. When you bring an olah, it has to be for the sake of an olah.
Rashi says the verse is expounded as: olah, isheh, re'ach, nicho'ach. Although this is not written concerning slaughter, we find slaughter mentioned regarding shelamim: “mizbach hashelamim,” “zevach leshem Hashem.” That refers to slaughter for the sake of shelamim, for the sake of the fire, and for the sake of the Name. Even so, the verse cited here is the one about olah, because all the required elements are written there. Shelamim does not have a verse about re'ach nicho'ach. So we learn all six from olah. Why not learn all six from shelamim? Shelamim does not include all six. Slaughter is mentioned for both, so we can learn olah from the slaughter of shelamim, but olah also says re'ach nicho'ach, so we learn that from there.
“Olah leshem olah,” excluding an offering done for the sake of shelamim. “Isheh”—what does isheh mean? For the sake of the fire. The korban is intended to be consumed on the altar, not made into kebab or roasted meat. Rashi says, “ade'ata dila'asoto chatichot tzeluyot”—with the intention of making it into roasted pieces over coals, like “mata bei rovei.”
Next: “re'ach,” for the sake of the aroma, excluding limbs that were roasted and then placed on the altar. Rav Yehudah says in the name of Rav that limbs roasted away from the altar and then placed on it have no requirement of re'ach. I suppose the aroma has to come from the altar itself. Rashi says that since they were roasted first outside the altar arrangement, they no longer produce an aroma when placed there. The aroma has to come from the altar.
One more line: “nicho'ach,” for the sake of giving contentment. What gives contentment to HaKadosh Baruch Hu? To Hashem, to the One who spoke and the world came into being. We always give a verse for mitzvot: we give God contentment by doing His will. But here it is specific because the verse says so. Does that mean it does not apply to other mitzvot? Regarding tefillin, if you did not say that you were doing it to give contentment to God, you still fulfilled the mitzvah. Here, if someone did not have the intention to give contentment to his Creator and to do His will, could he still fulfill it? The court’s condition would take care of it. But what could you tell the priest? “Make sure you have the intention.” Yes, because here it is essential.
Ad kan (up to here). We did it. Be'ezrat Hashem yitbarach shemo.