Sarah Simchah, Rachamim ben Dinah, Moshe ben Dalyah, Ya'akov ben Dalyah, Yitzchak ben Dinah, the entire Feinlis family, Yaron ben Gershon, and for matches: Smadar bat Yehudit, Rivkah bat Dinah, Mazal bat Michal, Chayim ben Simchah, David ben Ester, and Ya'akov ben Chanah, for a complete recovery and success, and for all the sick. Baruch Hashem.
All right, so we're on Good bit? Samech (the letter samech). Yeah, here's Samech. Samech, yeah. The Gemara says, “ve-Rabbi Yehudah (Rabbi Judah) ki gmir gezerah shavah (verbal analogy) berachbah hu degmir” (Rabbi Yehudah learned the verbal analogy broadly). Okay, so we get to the point: “ve-Rabbi Yehudah ha ka mitchazei kohen (priest).” So according to Rabbi Yehudah, we said that the kela'im (curtains) were only five amot (cubits) high, and the mizbe'ach (altar) was three amot (cubits) high. Apparently, they'll be able to see the kohen doing the service. So we said yesterday, if you say it's ten amot and there's an extra five amot in the kela'im, which makes 15, then you're okay. But according to Rabbi Yehudah, the mizbe'ach was three amot high and the kela'im were five amot high, so you have a problem of tzeni'ut (modesty).
So the Gemara says, “nehi dekohen mitchazei avodah (Temple service) debiyado lo mitchazei.” They can see the kohen, but they can't see what he's doing. They don't see his hands. They see the kohen; that's okay, but they don't see the avodah.
“Bishlemah le-Rabbi Yehudah”—that says what? That Shelomoh (Solomon) had to build the altar bigger, and the altar was not big enough, so he had to sanctify the ground. “Hainu dechtiv vekidesh,” or “kidesh.” Why? Because he had to sanctify the azarah (Temple courtyard). But according to Rabbi Yosei, who says that the altar was big enough, what did he have to sanctify the courtyard for? Like we said yesterday, “leha'amid bah mizbe'ach”: the altar has to be on holy ground. So therefore, you need an azarah. So the “leshem azarah,” so therefore the altar is in the azarah.
“Bishlemah le-Rabbi Yosei,” who said what? That the altar was “katan me-hachil.” So that's not referring to Shelomoh's altar; it's referring to the altar of Moshe Rabbeinu (Moses our teacher). So “hainu dechtiv katon”: the pasuk (verse) said “katon.” According to Rabbi Yehudah, who said no, the pasuk was actually talking about Shelomoh's altar, what does “katon” mean? It means Shelomoh's altar was not small at all.
“Hachi ka'amar”: “mizbe'ach avanim she'asah Shelomoh tachat mizbe'ach hanechoshet katan havah.” Right, the stone altar that Shelomoh built to replace Moshe's copper altar was small. That means the stone altar was the small one. Rashi says they were both small. I guess it was small because you couldn't bring korbanot (offerings) on that day; you needed to use the floor.
Rashi says: “hainu dechtiv katon,” the copper altar. “Vehachi ka'amar, he'emid mizbe'ach avanim keyvan demizbe'ach hanechoshet katan.” Right, he made a bigger one because the other one was small. But according to Rabbi Yehudah, who says, “kuleih ritzpah kidesh,” Shelomoh's altar couldn't accommodate the burnt offering. What does “katon,” written about the copper altar, mean? Why is it also saying that Shelomoh's own altar was small? Right, that's the point: they're both small. Because according to Rabbi Yehudah, even Shelomoh's altar wasn't able to handle it.
“Hachi ka'amar, mishum deka'i bimkom mizbe'ach hanechoshet vechilufo.” Since it replaced Moshe's copper altar, that's why it was called the copper altar, even though it wasn't. So really, “in hachi nami”: that altar was also small. “Mizbe'ach avanim she'asah Shelomoh tachat mizbe'ach hanechoshet katan havah.” But he's calling the altar—the big one—the copper one because it replaced it. Fine.
So the Gemara now goes back and says, “bimai palgei?” What's the machloket (dispute) here between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehudah? We had, basically, a gezerah shavah from Yechezkel. What was the gezerah shavah? “Ravu'a ravu'a.” It says “ravu'a ravu'a” by Moshe Rabbeinu's altar. So what was the verbal analogy? Rabbi Yosei says we learn “ravu'a ravu'a” from the golden altar. We know Moshe Rabbeinu's copper altar was outside, and we learn its measurements from the golden altar. Rabbi Yehudah learns, no: the golden altar, which is inside—sorry, Moshe Rabbeinu's golden altar, which is outside—he learns it from the outside altar, the large altar.
So the whole dispute is this: one opinion says, “danim chutz mechutz”—we derive from one outside altar to another. If you want to learn about Moshe's altar, which was outside, compare it to an altar outside. What does the other rabbi hold? “Ve'ein danim chutz mipenim”—we don't derive from an outside altar to an inside one.
Rabbi Yosei is going to say, “mar savar,” no, “danim k'li mik'li.” You judge a vessel from a vessel; we learn a vessel from furniture. “Ve'ein danim k'li mibinyan”—we don't derive a vessel from a structure. Therefore, you're right: it was Moshe Rabbeinu's altar, and although it was outside, it was a small altar, so it was like a vessel. So I'll judge a vessel against a vessel: I'll compare Moshe's outside vessel to the inside vessel of the regular Beit HaMikdash (Temple). But I'm not going to compare Moshe's vessel to a piece of a structure. The outer altar, Shelomoh's, is a structure. It's thirty-two by thirty-two; it's a structure.
Rava says that according to Rabbi Yehudah, who says Shelomoh sanctified the floor—we learned this yesterday—what did Rabbi Yehudah say about the blood? You can't sprinkle the blood on the floor. Blood belongs only on the mizbe'ach. “Detanya,” we learned this in Pesachim (tractate Pesachim), if you remember; we did this already: “Rabbi Yehudah omer, kos echad hayah memaleh midam hata'aravet.” Remember, let's say they were concerned that maybe some blood never got onto the altar. They were slaughtering so fast that maybe some blood fell on the floor. So what would they do at the end of the service? They would take a cup, get blood from the ground, and throw it on the altar.
If you hold that you don't have to put the blood on the altar, what's the difference? It fell on the floor of the azarah; let that be good. “Midam hata'aravet veshofcho al gabei mizbe'ach, she'im yishafech damo shel echad meihen”—if one of the bloods spilled, “nimtza zeh machshiro.” By picking it up and sprinkling it on the altar, you're making it fit.
So the Gemara says, “ei salka d'atach, savar Rabbi Yehudah kullah azarah mekadesha”: if you hold that the entire azarah is sanctified with regard to blood, why do you have to sprinkle it on the altar? “Ha it'avida lei mitzvato”—the mitzvah (commandment) was fulfilled; it fell on the floor!
Ah, “vedilma mishum dekasavar shefichah meko'ach adam.” Maybe he said, no, no, you need a pouring done by human action. This happened by itself, so you need human action. No problem, then pick it up and pour it back onto the floor! If you hold that the ground is sanctified, and you need human action, pick up the cup and pour it right back down again.
The Gemara says, “im kein, nishklei venishpchei aduchtei”—if so, let him take it and pour it back in its place. The Gemara says, “hachi nami”: you could have done that, but maybe you want to do it in the best way. “Vedilma mishum demitzvah min hamuvchar?” Maybe. “Hachi nami”: maybe the azarah will work. You have no proof. Maybe the azarah will work, and the reason they didn't throw it on the azarah is that they wanted the optimal way. If there's no mitzvah (commandment) to put it on the azarah floor lechatchilah, we try to do it the right way. So you have no proof from this story about whether the azarah is sanctified for blood or not.
So, moving right along. Correct. There's no proof that Rabbi Yehudah agrees that the altar is exclusive for blood. Maybe the azarah works for blood, too. Why did they do it initially on the altar? They were already on the altar; that's why. Correct. Instead of pouring it, throw it. It's sufficiently valid not to be invalid, which means it's valid enough. It's not the optimal way, but it's not an invalid way that would make it invalid by being on the altar.
No, but what do you have to explain? Why did they need to take the cup of blood from the floor? Right, so you need a proactive action. Good, so they were proactive. The Gemara says, if it was proactive, just pour it back on the floor! The Gemara says, while you're doing it, you can do it right. “Hachi nami”: if you poured it back, it would be valid. Why? You have the altar right in front of you. It's a commandment—why do it wrong?
Rabbi Elazar says, “mizbe'ach shenifgam”: if the altar became damaged and invalid, “ein ochlin begino shi'arei minchah (meal offering) (remaining offering).” You can't eat the remainder of the meal offering. What's the remainder of the meal offering? You put the kometz (handful offering) on the altar. After you put the kometz on the mizbe'ach, you have the shirayim. But the altar got ruined, so that's it: you can't eat the remainder.
Why? “Shene'emar”—I'm reading the whole verse from Vayikra: “kechu et haminchah hanoteret... ve'achluha matzot eitzel hamizbe'ach.” Is that so? You eat the remainder next to the altar? “Vechi, etzel hamizbe'ach achluha?” You can eat it throughout the azarah. Rather, what does “etzel hamizbe'ach” mean? “Bizman shehu shalem velo bizman shehu chaser”—when it is whole, not when it is lacking.
So then I guess that means it has to be next to the altar; the altar has to be functional. We're at the bottom there. “Veha lo kol ha'azarah kesherah lekach?” Isn't the whole azarah fit for this? It says regarding the meal offering, “Matzot te'achel bimkom kadosh”—it is to be eaten in a holy place. And that's the azarah.
No, it doesn't mean it has to be next to the altar in terms of proximity. But “etzel hamizbe'ach” is proximity. What I'm saying is that “etzel hamizbe'ach” means the altar has to be legitimate. That's what it's saying. If it's broken, it has to be a functioning altar. If it is damaged, it isn't an altar. “Etzel hamizbe'ach perush mizbe'ach”: it has to be an altar that isn't damaged. “Etzel hamizbe'ach velo chatzi mizbe'ach.” Chazak uvaruch! Heard it here first, huh?
We found the source for the remainder of the meal offering; it's explicit in a verse. What about kodshei kodashim (most holy offerings)? How do we know? They brought the handful offering, and then the altar broke. That's still standing—right, that's right. Because the remainder has to be eaten in the azarah, next to the altar.
What if they fix it? If they fix it, that's a question: what happens if they fix it? “Ba'asher hu sham” (as he is there)—you can't eat it. If you fix it, then we have a dispute about whether there is dichui or no dichui. That will be another discussion. But as long as it's broken, it's no good.
Your question is what happens if they fixed it. What's “ra'ui la'achilah”—fit to be eaten? What does that have to do with this? It's a handful offering. Now it's fit to be eaten, and then it broke. Okay, “ba'asher hu sham”—no good. Why no good? It's in the azarah, next to the altar. You're asking what happens if they fixed the altar. Okay, that's subject to a dispute: “nir'eh venidchah vechazar.” Yes, exactly. Go back; we'll go back. Exactly, exactly.
I don't think you'll have a dispute over that. I think even Rabbi Yehudah would agree, because it's not a living creature. He said here, “ba'alei chayim einam nidchin”—living creatures are not disqualified. But everybody agrees that objects can be disqualified, so it could be that everybody holds that it's disqualified. And does it not become disqualified again? But in this case, “ba'asher hu sham,” everybody says that right now you cannot eat this meal offering. That'll be—I'm saying it might not be a dispute. The dispute is only by living creatures. This is an inanimate object; this is flour. So it could be that everybody holds that it's disqualified.
Yeah, but it didn't get fixed. We don't know what happens if it got fixed. He's asking what happens if we fix the altar. “Ba'asher hu sham,” it's no good. I don't know what happens if you fix it. No, no, if you fix it, that's his question. That's Moshe's question. Yeah, okay, if you want to say that, they know that it's—Okay, I don't think so. Look at number 28, Moshe. Tosafot (Tosafot commentary) goes into that; that's why. Yeah, number 28 in your notes goes into it too. Right, so no dichui because it's not an animal. No dichui ba'achilah, because that's not the mizbe'ach, right? I accept gladly. Okay, beautiful.
We found the source for the shirayim. What about kodshei kodashim? I guess you can't tell one from the other. How do you know that if the altar is damaged, you're out? “Minalan?” We have a parenthetical passage that we're not going to read. We have a parenthetical passage: “atya kodesh kodesh.” It says “kodesh” by the meal offering, right? It says, “kodesh kodashim hu.” Rashi says, “kodshei kodashim bega"sh, dekodesh kodashim yalif mehadadi.” So it's a verbal analogy.
How do we know about kodashim kalim (lesser holy offerings)? Rav Ami says, “atya miderasha de-Rabbi Yosei.” Okay, what did Rabbi Yosei say? “Detanya, Rabbi Yosei misheloshah devarim mishum zaken,” three things from an elder; “sheloshah zekenim,” three elders. Three items for three elders, and this is one of them.
Rabbi Yishmael says, “yachol...” We're talking there about ma'aser sheni (second tithe). Can you eat ma'aser sheni today in Yerushalayim (Jerusalem), assuming the person is ritually pure? Yeah, why not? You don't have a Beit HaMikdash. Well, you don't even have to eat it in the Temple; you just have to eat it in Jerusalem. But, right: “ya'aleh, vechi yachol ya'aleh adam Ma'aser Sheni biYerushalayim veyochlenu bazeman hazeh”—can a person go up to Jerusalem and eat second tithe nowadays, when there's no Beit HaMikdash?
“Mishum degamar matzinu?” A bechor (firstborn offering) requires bringing it to the place; a bechor has to be brought to Yerushalayim. Ma'aser requires bringing it to the place. So we have a hekesh (scriptural juxtaposition) between the two things: ma'aser and bechor. “Mah bechor eino ela bifnei haBayit, af ma'aser eino ela bifnei haBayit.” A firstborn offering applies only when the Temple is standing, and so does the tithe. That's it, fair and simple. So we derive it from the firstborn offering: the firstborn offering is “lifnei Hashem,” before Hashem, so the tithe also has to be before Hashem, and “before Hashem” means in front of the Temple. No Temple, it's forbidden.
So the Gemara says yes. Very good, then. “Mah lebechor”—stop, Masoret HaShas: “bechor yoter.” “Mah lebechor sheken ta'un matan damim?” Maybe the reason a firstborn offering requires a Beit HaMikdash is that you need to put its blood on the altar. But there's no blood in the second tithe. And the portions burned on the altar? The Gemara says, no, Bikkurim (first fruits) prove otherwise. Bikkurim require the Beit HaMikdash even though there's no blood, so you see it has nothing to do with the blood.
Yeah, but Bikkurim require placing them down. “Mah leVikkurim sheken te'unim hanachah?” What about first fruits, which require placement? So both of them need something connected to the Beit HaMikdash: this requires placement, and this requires blood and portions burned on the altar. How can you derive it from the tithe? “Talmud lomar.” So therefore we can't learn it from those two; we learn it from verses.
“Va'havetem shamah oloteichem vezivcheichem ve'et ma'asroteichem.” The Torah juxtaposes the tithe to the burnt offering. What does the juxtaposition teach us? And to the firstborn offering, because it says, “ve'et terumat yedchem uvechorot bekarechem.” It juxtaposes the tithe to the firstborn offering. “Mah bechor eino ela bifnei haBayit,” as we just said, “af ma'aser eino ela bifnei haBayit.” So nowadays, guess what? We cannot bring the tithe to Jerusalem.
So the Gemara says, what did you need to bring the verse for? “Venehedar dina”—why do these back-and-forth derivations? Why did you say, “lo harei zeh keharei zeh”—this one is not like that one? This one needs blood; the firstborn offering proves otherwise. What about the firstborn offering, which requires placement? Whatever. We could just have brought a verse, and then we're good.
No, you don't need a verse; that's what the Gemara is asking. We're going back to the stage where you derived it from the firstborn offering. “Mah lebechor,” maybe first fruits prove otherwise. “Mah leVikkurim?” Then go back and say, “lo harei zeh keharei zeh,” and what's the common denominator between them? They're holy and they need a Beit HaMikdash. The second tithe is also holy and needs a Beit HaMikdash. No, no, not a scriptural juxtaposition. I don't know—why do we need the back-and-forth derivation? Why do we need the verse? Why didn't we just derive it from the common denominator, from the two of them?
The Gemara answers the obvious answer: “mishum de'ika lemifrach, mah lehatzad hashaveh shebahem sheyesh ken tzad mizbe'ach.” You can challenge the common denominator because they do have an altar-related aspect. The firstborn offering has blood, and first fruits have placement. They may not have the same altar-related feature, but they both have an altar-related feature. So that's why you can't derive it from those two, as opposed to the second tithe. The second tithe has nothing to do with the altar, so you might say it's permitted. The verse teaches us that it isn't.
It's backwards. You would think the Gemara would bring that first, and then I would agree. Usually the Gemara says that while it's working out the argument: “Learn it from the common denominator.” They were done; they did it. Now they're going back: “By the way, why did you do that? How come you didn't do that in real time?” It's like, “Going back to that thing, why did you quote the verse? You could have done a back-and-forth derivation.” They couldn't have done a back-and-forth derivation. You have to understand when things look out of order. That's right, this looks out of order, but that's what it is. When I was looking at it last night preparing, I got to “venehedar dina”—what? Done, verse! The Gemara was anxious to hear the verse: “Give me the verse!” I did point that out. Okay, still early. We could finish the next page too. We might be able to, yes. Let's see.
Okay, now we go to kiddusha, the great, great, great subject, boys. What does Rabbi Yishmael hold? That the firstborn offering does not apply nowadays. He had a doubt about the second tithe, but if he holds that the first sanctity sanctified the place for its time and for the future, then the sanctity of Jerusalem is still there and you can bring offerings there as if the Temple were there. The second tithe—what does it say? “Ve'achalta lifnei Hashem Elokecha.” So maybe it's still considered to be before Hashem? If you say the sanctity remains for the future, you don't need a building. What does “before Hashem” mean? The sanctity—the place! So therefore, it's still there. The spot is still holy.
Then, if that's the case, wouldn't the firstborn offering also apply? It's still considered “lifnei Hashem.” So then the firstborn offering would apply too. Why do you have a doubt only about the tithe? No, you don't need a building; you can put it there. You're on the floor, and that's—yeah. If the place is still holy, put it on that spot. If you hold that the sanctity remains for the future, you can bring offerings; you don't need a building. Look at Rashi. “Afilu bechor nami.” Rashi says, “Afilu bechor hayah makriv veye'achel deha man de'it lei kadshah le'atid lavo it lei shemakrivin af al pi she'ein bayit.” There you have it. You can bring it even though there's no building.
That would mean every offering. Right! No altar? You still need an altar. You still need the spot. Build a pile, build a pyre, whatever you want, or mud, or whatever you have to do. The sanctity is there. You don't need the regular building; the building is extra.
Huh? Because obviously if we go there it's a punishment of excision, like everyone—well, that's testimony. Ours were hedging, maybe, you know. I'm going to ask the Knesset guys. Maybe they have it. He goes there every single day. There's a bunch of—what? There's a bunch of people who have been ruled out because of a punishment of excision. Unbelievable. That government went crazy on the guy. I thought he came to America and they wanted to bring him to the synagogue here. I mean, the guy goes to Har Habayit, liable to excision, the guy. I mean, a guy eats leavened bread on Pesach, I mean, a guy—I'm saying, there are three rabbis to rely on, but not our rabbis.
“Ve'ei kasavar lo kidshah le'atid lavo.” And if you hold that after the destruction the sanctity left, then what's the doubt? Look at Rashi: “ve'ei kasavar lo kidshah”—if you hold it wasn't sanctified for the future, then even the firstborn offering should be in doubt. “Ve'ei kasavar kedushat bayit batlah lah umeba'ya leh bema'aser.” So what's the reason you would have a doubt about the tithe? “Ho'il ve'eino tzarich lebayit mi mita'chel biYerushalayim velifnei Hashem karina beh o lo?” Fine, you don't need a building. The question is whether it's still considered “lifnei Hashem” or not.
“Afilu bechor kei hai gavna nami tibei leh, kegon shekarvu damah ve'imureha vehuchrav habayit, vehabasar od kayam.” Okay, hypothetically, why wouldn't you have a doubt about a firstborn offering? They sprinkled its blood on the altar, then the Beit HaMikdash was destroyed, and the meat still exists. Can I eat the meat in Jerusalem? That would be the same case as the second tithe. The altar is out of the picture now. Is it considered “lifnei Hashem”? If it's “lifnei Hashem” enough for the tithe, it should be “lifnei Hashem” enough for the firstborn offering.
I'm not talking about needing an altar. It did have an altar; it's a hypothetical case. I sprinkled the blood on the altar, and then the Beit HaMikdash was destroyed. Now I have the meat. I want to know: can I eat this meat in Jerusalem, or do I have to burn it? So we're taking away the given that the firstborn offering—correct. Now we're asking about the firstborn offering too. Again, if you hold there's no sanctity, there is a case of a firstborn offering where we should have a doubt. How do you eat it if there's no sanctity? It's “lifnei Hashem.” It's just as much “lifnei Hashem” as the tithe.
However, the tithe is “lifnei Hashem.” No, it says you have to eat it “lifnei Hashem.” So the fact that there's no sanctity anymore is considered to be—whatever you're going to say about the tithe. That's a good question, but you were entertaining that possibility about the tithe. But it doesn't say to eat it outside. No, it says you have to eat it “lifnei Hashem.” Right. Well, no—maybe we think it means you have to bring it and eat it. But the point is, you have to eat it “lifnei Hashem.” Maybe that means the Beit HaMikdash has to be there. Whatever. No, no, but we had a doubt. You didn't need a Temple, and you didn't even need sanctity, and you still had a doubt that maybe it's enough to be called “lifnei Hashem”—meaning in the former location, the spot of the Beit HaMikdash. That's already called “lifnei Hashem.” The location!
Okay, so then the firstborn offering also has a hypothetical case. Do you understand the question? Treat it the same. That's why you can't derive it from the firstborn offering. You must say, “mimah nafshecha” (whichever way you look at it): if you hold the sanctity is there, then the firstborn offering should already be okay; it's not a problem. And if you hold the sanctity isn't there, you had a doubt about the tithe, so you should have the same doubt in a case of a firstborn offering where you don't need an altar. “Mima nafshech.” So you can't derive it from the firstborn offering, right?
“I kasavar lo kidshah le'atid lavo,” the Gemara continues, “afilu bechor nami tibaye,” even the firstborn offering should be in doubt in the case we just gave. The Gemara answers: Ravina says, “le'olam kasavar lo kidshah le'atid lavo.” Okay? “Hacha bemai askinan? Bevechor shenizrak damo kodem churban habayit.” It's the case we just said: they sprinkled the blood, and then the Temple was destroyed. The guy got the last sprinkling in as the Romans were coming in. “Ve'adayin besaro kayam.”
So according to Rabbi Yishmael, it's simply not eaten. Why? Apparently, it should be okay? No. “Itkash besaro ledamo.” We have a scriptural juxtaposition between the meat of the firstborn offering and its blood. It says, “Et damam tizrok uvesaram yihyeh lach.” So once we're juxtaposing the meat and the blood, it's a decree of Scripture: “Mah damo bemizbe'ach, af besaro bemizbe'ach.” Just as its blood is associated with the altar, so too its meat is associated with the altar. So you can eat the meat only when it's possible to sprinkle the blood. Since you can't sprinkle the blood at that time, that's right: I'm going to say that it wasn't sanctified for the future.
Oh, so then why do you have a doubt about the tithe? You should have the same doubt about the firstborn offering. By the firstborn offering we have no doubt, even though technically we don't need the altar because we already sprinkled the blood. But you need an altar there to eat the meat. Why? Because the Torah juxtaposes the meat and the blood. We don't have that juxtaposition by the tithe. However, the tithe learns from the firstborn offering. The new point of the verse is that even though the tithe on its own doesn't have that issue, once the Torah juxtaposes the tithe to the firstborn offering, now the tithe also can't be eaten. Now we have a double hekesh problem. That's the Gemara's question on the next line: first we learn a hekesh, and then we take that hekesh and apply it to ma'aser. Double hekesh.
“Vechi davar halamad behekesh chozer umelamed behekesh?” We know how much you missed that! The derivation of the tithe from the firstborn offering is a juxtaposition; they're next to each other in the verses. And the first one was also a juxtaposition: blood and meat. Blood and meat are a juxtaposition, and then we're saying the tithe and the firstborn offering are right next to each other. So it's a double juxtaposition, right? It's a partial double juxtaposition. No, no, it's a double juxtaposition. It's a partial derivation.
The Gemara answers: “ma'aser dagan, ma'aser dagan chullin hu.” So that's a dispute with Rabbi Meir, actually. Right, that's right; the Gemara is going to say that. If you say ma'aser dagan is chullin (non-sacred produce), we have no problem deriving one juxtaposition from another, because the rule against deriving one juxtaposition from another applies only to sacred offerings. For non-sacred things, you're allowed to do it. And produce tithes are—I know one side is holy. What do you mean by “tithe”? We don't mean a tithe offering; we mean the second tithe. Yeah, the second tithe. We're not talking about an offering.
“Hanicha, hanicha leman de'amar batar dalamed azlinan”—that's fine according to the one who says we follow the item being derived. My unknown is the tithe, so since the unknown is the tithe, that's non-sacred. “Ela leman de'amar batar melamed”—but the source is the firstborn offering, and that's sacred offerings. So then you have a problem again: it's a juxtaposition derived from a juxtaposition. What can be said?
You understand? In the firstborn offering itself, we have a juxtaposition between the meat and the blood. Then the firstborn offering teaches me about the tithe. So do you go according to the teacher or the item being taught? If you go according to the item being taught, it's non-sacred. But if you go according to the teacher, which is the firstborn offering, you have a big problem. It's a double juxtaposition.
“Dam uvasar chada milta hi.” Ah, come on, they say. It's not a double juxtaposition. It's not a double juxtaposition. Now what? It sounds like a double juxtaposition. It's one giant juxtaposition. That means meat and blood are the same thing. What do you mean? You've been telling me we had a derivation; we learned meat from blood, didn't we? Yeah, that was—saying we went up, we did Rashi. He's another juxtaposition. Where's Rashi? We don't have it. We have a small Rashi in the—oh, that's it. Rashi was good with this. The “Ein Zeh” didn't know either how we learned it. Number 27 is correct. The Aruch LaNer says, “omnam vadai shehaTorah chelkah otam zeh mizeh”—the Torah certainly separated them from each other. “Ach kevan shehabasar asur ba'achilah kodem zerikat hadam, im ken harei zeh ke'ilu habasar hu echad im hadam vetaluy bo.” Since the meat can't be eaten unless the blood is sprinkled, it's dependent on the blood, so they're together. It's not a random item; I'm talking about the meat. Meat and blood always have a connection; they're dependent on each other.
Why did they ever need a derivation, didn't we say? Yeah, but we make the juxtaposition. We need the juxtaposition to tell me that even after I sprinkle the blood, if the altar isn't standing, I can't eat the meat. But meat and blood are the same item. It's not a new derivation; meat and blood go together. So whatever I say about the blood, I say about the meat. That's obvious. It's obvious because the meat is dependent on the blood. Half a step: it is a juxtaposition, but we're not considering it a juxtaposition. We're not considering it one because it's so obvious that these things go together. So, if you want to call it half a step, okay.
The Aruch LaNer has to finesse it. What does that mean? It sounds like two things. It's not that, you know, a juxtaposition counts as a juxtaposition after a juxtaposition. Homemade juxtaposition? Homemade meaning it's the same family. Exactly, exactly. The lawyers are upset about this, but what should we do? This is what the Gemara is telling us.
How good would these rabbis be if they were reading documents? They would see all the fine distinctions. Scalia wrote a book, lehavdil, about the 200 canons of the English language. He wrote a book for lawyers to teach them how to read documents. So he's telling them, lehavdil, about the rules, the canons of the Gemara. What's a juxtaposition? What's an inference? What's a precise inference? We have the canons of the Gemara. There are 200 canons of the English language about how to define a word or a sentence when you read it. You're supposed to try to read the Constitution in—right, that's his whole purpose. He wants to read the Constitution following the canons. He's saying Washington must have followed Rabbi Yishmael's thirteen principles, so you have to read it as he wrote it. He's writing it assuming you're going to understand it like this. These wise guys, the liberals, want to take it out of context. He says, that couldn't have been his intention, because for sure they followed the—
The guy who interviews Scalia tells him: “You write a book for lawyers, to teach them all these basic things. It sounds like you think they're stupid.” He says, “You'd be surprised.” This guy—he had, I would say, the outlook of a rosh yeshiva, for a Justice. He had a good outlook for a Justice, truly. I mean, he's a non-Jew at the end of the day, but he's a non-Jew. A hunter, like a regular non-Jew. Guys, guys, all the non-Jewish stuff he did: he hunted, he went and killed animals, he did all kinds of crazy stuff. But he says he's an opera fan, an opera fan with Ginsburg.
But you get more upset from Ginsburg, because when they interview her, they ask her, “When your husband died, how do you eat? What do you do for dinner?” She says, “No, no, I have my meals ready-made.” She opened her refrigerator: “Monday night I have clams, Tuesday night I have oysters, Thursday night I have pig.” Now Scalia isn't going to have a heart made dull. Right, he's a non-Jew, so he can think straight. Maybe his brain is working better than Ginsburg's, because she's got the—And then you see why she got all those cockamamie opinions. She was the biggest liberal in the history of the court. All that—I saw it was all in the freezer. We found the source of her liberalism right there. I rest my case, right there.
So that's it? That's why secular Jews are so precise! Secular Jews go off the path because of what? It's all in the diet. Dullness of the heart! That's got to be it, dullness of the heart. It's all in the diet. The secret of liberalism in America—I see it. It's all in the kosher laws. You are what you eat.
Okay, gentlemen, so that was that. “Ki selik Rabi Avin,” when Rabbi Avin left Babylonia and went up—where did he go? He went to Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel). “Amar lishmata kevateh de-Rabi Yirmeyah.” So he said: this ruling, that you shouldn't eat kodashim kalim next to a mizbe'ach that's damaged—go back. We know three things: we know that you shouldn't eat the meal offering, the remainder of the meal offering, and the most holy offerings. Then we said lesser holy offerings.
Then he told them very respectfully, “amar: Babla'ei tipsha'ei”—you foolish Babylonians—“amtul deyativtu be'ara chashocha,” because you sit in a dark land, “amritu shemateta demachshechan”—you say dark rulings. It affects your opinions. That's not just about kosher meat. Yeah, so probably, yes. Meaning, you live in the valley, so you have opinions of valley people. Oh, it's not darkness? “Chashocha” means low, the low-lying areas. Still, come down. But it's facts, for sure.
So the Gemara says, what was the problem? “Lo shemi'a lechu ha detanya”—didn't you hear what it says in the baraita (early rabbinic teaching)? “Besha'at siluk masa'ot”—at the time of the departure for the journeys. Exactly! This happened every day in the wilderness. They took the mishkan (Tabernacle) apart. So it is a time when there's no altar. Right, because they disassembled the Tabernacle.
So the Gemara says: now you can picture it. Damaged altar, not damaged altar—what was the case? No altar! At the time of the journeys, when they took the altar apart, sacred offerings become invalid. So obviously you couldn't eat the meat of the most holy offerings because there were no curtains. You have to eat it within the borders of the Tabernacle. No Tabernacle, you can't eat it.
And not only that: “ve-zavin u-metzora'in mishtalchin chutz la-mechitza.” Even though they took down the Tabernacle, there is still sanctity in the camps, as we said. The person with a discharge can't go into the camp of the Divine Presence or the camp of the Levites, and the person with tzara'at has to be sent out of all the camps, even the camp of Israel. So what do you see here? The reason the meat of the most holy offerings becomes invalid is not that it's outside the boundary, because the sanctity of the camp is still there. Rather, it's because the altar is not there.
And we have another baraita. It has nothing to do with the sanctity; the sanctity is still there when they took down the Tabernacle. How do I know? We're sending out all the people with discharges and everybody else to their assigned locations. So if the sanctity is still there, you should be able to eat the most holy offerings in that spot. Rather, you can't eat them because there's no altar.
And we have another baraita: “Bishnei mekomot kodashim ne'echalim”—sacred offerings are eaten in two places. When it comes to eating offerings by the Tabernacle, there are two options: one is the place prescribed by the Torah when the Tabernacle is built, within the curtains, whatever that is; the second place is wherever they are. Exactly, wherever they're traveling—go to that spot. That's a contradiction! How do you reconcile this? Could you eat it in its original place, or do you need it in its place with the curtains?
The answer is: “Ha be-kodshei kodashim, ve-ha be-kodashim kalim.” One passage is about most holy offerings, and the other is about lesser holy offerings. For most holy offerings, you have to have the Tabernacle standing. But for lesser holy offerings, if you don't have the Tabernacle standing, even if you have an altar, it's okay. That's how we reconcile it.
Rashi? Do you want to read that Rashi? “Kodashim nifsalim besha'at siluk masa'ot,” the first wide line: “Besha'at siluk masa'ot, keshemoridin et ha-mishkan u-mesalekin et ha-mizbechot be-et ha-masa'ot ba-midbar. Kodashim nifsalim, pasal kodshei kodashim ve-kasavar hai tana mipenei siluk ha-mizbe'ach.” Right. How do I know it's because of the removal of the altar? Because everybody else has to get out of the way. The people with tzara'at have to get out of the way; people with discharges have to get out of the way. So the sanctity must still be there. Then why can't I eat the most holy offerings? It must be because there's no altar.
“Venasa ohel mo'ed.” You see that even though they were traveling, they still had the Tent of Meeting. So you can't say it's invalid because it went outside its permitted area. It's invalid because there's no altar.
But let's see the other baraita. We have another baraita that says what? Now the Gemara is going to answer that it's about the most holy offerings. Ah, there's a contradiction. How could you eat it in its place and not in its place? Rather, it must be that the first one also requires an altar, and the latter one, which is about lesser holy offerings, doesn't require an altar. But what do you mean? You just said that the lesser holy offerings also—That's the question against Abaye. Abaye learned that it was about lesser holy offerings, and what's the answer? Ravina says, “idi ve'idi, idi ve'idi bekodashim kalim.” Both cases are about lesser holy offerings. How could that be? It's not a contradiction. Let's see how.
Now, 61, gentlemen, reminds us of Nazir. Yep, these are the big ones. We have these pages over here in Nazir, 33. Whoa. Tosafot starts at the top of the page before, right? One long Tosafot, wow. You know, when we do Tosafot in the next round, we're going to have to budget for it. Enjoy turning the page this time. Yes, it's going to be an early day, boys. That's the goal, boys. Next round you're going to pay, so I don't want to hear any excuses.
In 120 years, they're going to ask you, “Did you learn Gemara and Rashi?” You're going to say, “So far, yes, more or less, we learned Rashi well.” Then they're going to say, “And Tosafot?” You're going to say, “We're doing the daily page; we didn't have enough time.” So you wore Rabbeinu Tam tefillin, and you kept Rabbeinu Tam on motza'ei Shabbat. That's always a joke I say. But you didn't know what he said. You kept all his stringencies, but the man wrote commentaries on the Torah; you didn't take the time to read what he said. So Tosafot is very, very important. It has a lot to offer.
Well, with God's help, that's a goal. And you shouldn't think of it as a stringency. You have to learn the commentary of Tosafot. How long did it take Hacham Yosef, 20 years? I think 30. Thirty years. No rush; it's 30 years. He has done more commentaries than that. I know, but he does the Bach and all that; he does the Rif and all that. But Tosafot, that's what they did. I'd like to do it to make it worth recording. I feel that once you have Tosafot recorded clearly—To be part of that historical movement, just like we were part of the historical movement of putting the daily page on tape. That was our group, our crowd. Baruch Hashem, we were there live.
But look at the work—it changed the work. It's work for the rabbi, but if we can clarify Tosafot, I didn't do tractates, but if I can clarify it in all the tractates, then a regular person who's learning and wants to hear Tosafot would have a great resource. Hashem gave us the ability to explain things, so we have to use it. This would be a great resource and bring it to the next level. So that's the project, with God's help.
Anyway, we'll finish this page. You weren't wrong; we can finish it. You made your point; you were right. “Ha Rabbi Yishmael veha Rabbanan.” Okay, what's “Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis”? More Rashi on this page. Yes. “Rabbi Yishmael diyalif basar midam, batrayta Rabbanan.” So let's see. Rabbi Yishmael would say what? They learn that the firstborn offering is a lesser holy offering, and there's a juxtaposition of the meat to the blood. Okay, very good. If they learned the juxtaposition of the meat to the blood, then just as the blood needs an altar, the meat needs an altar. That's lesser holy offerings according to Rabbi Yishmael.
And what about the Rabbis? They didn't make the juxtaposition between the meat and the blood. Therefore we have no proof about lesser holy offerings needing an altar. So here too, you sprinkle the blood on the altar, they took the Tabernacle apart, and you could still eat the meat there. It's no problem.
Wait, is the dispute about the law of the juxtaposition or not? “Iba'it eima.” “Iba'it eima, ha ve-ha be-kodshei kodashim.” They're both most holy offerings. “U-mai bi-shnei mekomot?” What does it mean that you're eating the most holy offerings in two places? It doesn't mean that you can eat them in the place where they were after you disassemble the Tabernacle. Rather, the altar is there: one case is before the Levites set up the Tabernacle, and the other is after the Levites dismantle it. In both cases the altar is still there. Right, the altar is still there. They just took apart the Tabernacle; it wasn't taken down yet. Right, exactly. So the first case is before the Levites set up the Tabernacle, and the other case is after the Levites take it down, while the curtains are still there. The altar is still standing in its place. So they took down the Tabernacle, but they still have the perimeter. That's okay.
Look at Rashi. What does Rashi want here? We don't know. Let's see. “Be-varaita,” both cases, “nami be-kodshei kodashim.” And “u-vi-shnei mekomot”—it doesn't mean after they traveled, when the altar had been removed. That certainly can't be what he means. Rather, one case is when the Tabernacle is still standing as required, and one is after they dismantled the boards, while the courtyard curtains and altar are still in their places. And when it says, “kodem she-ya'amidu Levi'im et ha-mishkan,” before the Levites set up the Tabernacle, Rashi says, “lav davka nakat”—he didn't mean that literally.
You don't find a case where, before they put it up, the Kohathites, who carried the altars, had arrived, while the sons of Gershon and Merari, who carried the Tabernacle, had already set it up. When they traveled, they took down the Tabernacle first. The sons of Gershon and Merari traveled after one camp, and the sons of Kohath after two camps, so that the sons of Gershon would arrive first and set up the Tabernacle before the sons of Kohath came, as it says, “ve-achar nasa degel Bnei Yehudah...” and then the Tabernacle. After the two camps, it says, “ve-nas'u ha-Kehatim nosei ha-mikdash”—that is, the Ark, altars, and utensils used in the service—and the sons of Gershon set up the Tabernacle before the sons of Kohath arrived.
Fine, so when Kohath finally got there with all the equipment, the Tabernacle was already built. So it can't literally mean “before the Levites set up the Tabernacle.” Rashi says “kodem she-ya'amidu Levi'im et ha-mishkan” but didn't mean it literally. It isn't literally before the Levites set up the Tabernacle. The way Rashi explains it, one case is when the Tabernacle is still up, and one is after they dismantled the boards and the courtyard curtains while the altar remains in its place.
So it sounds like the altar is still there. If the altar is still there, even though you don't have the curtains, why can't that be? What's the problem with that? Rashi says it can't mean literally before the Levites put up the Tabernacle. The altar is still there? Of course the altar hasn't arrived yet—that's the point. How can the altar be there before the Levites set up the Tabernacle? Kohath is carrying the altar, and the order was that they would build the altar first, and then deliver the Tabernacle, then deliver the parts. So it's out of order.
Rashi is just asking about the reality: you don't have this situation. Gershon was always ahead of Kohath. They would set up the Tabernacle first, and then the altar would arrive. That's how they traveled. So how could you have a case where the altar is there and the Tabernacle isn't? When they left at first, at the beginning—when it says, “kodem she-ya'amidu Levi'im et ha-mishkan,” “ya'amidu” means they build the Tabernacle. So before they set it up, how could the altar be there? That would mean Kohath got there first. Rashi just said that doesn't work. That's his first question: the sons of Gershon built it, and then Kohath carried the altar. So how could the altar be there before they built the Tabernacle? In reality, chronologically, it doesn't fit the system.
Furthermore, if they changed the order and brought it out of order, how could they slaughter offerings before the Levites set up the Tabernacle? “Ha bimsi'ei mekoman, bishlamim sheshechatan kodem sheya'amidu Levi'im, pesulin.” It won't work. We need a case where they brought the animal, and now we want to know who can eat the meat. How could they have brought it? You can't bring it if there's no Tabernacle. So it's not literal. You have to say they built it first; the Tabernacle was set up and the altar was there. Of course that's okay. The other case is where they dismantled it and the altar is still in its place. Exactly: the altar is still in its place, and those are the two places. One is when the altar is fully in place, and one is when it's there without the Tabernacle.
Okay, “a shkoach.” “Yihyu leratzon imrei fi” (May the words of my mouth find favor). “Rabbi Chananyah ben Akashya omer: Ratza HaKadosh Baruch Hu lezakot et Yisrael, lefikach hirbah lahem Torah umitzvot” (The Holy One desired to grant merit to Israel, therefore He gave them many Torah commandments), “shene'emar: Hashem chafetz lema'an tzidko yagdil Torah veyadir” (Hashem desired, for His righteousness, to magnify Torah and make it glorious).
Tomorrow morning, page 6:42.