A person who borrows something becomes responsible for that item the moment he grabs onto it, the moment he takes possession of it. Here we'll talk about what happens when he does not take the item directly, but the lender sends it to him through somebody else. We'll list six different cases where the lender chose the person who was going to bring the cow to the borrower, and then tell us the halakha (the ruling).
Ha-sho'el et ha-parah, if somebody arranges to borrow a cow, v'shilcha lo b'yad beno, and it's sent to him by the lender in the hands of the lender's son, b'yad avdo, b'yad shelucho, or in the hands of the lender's servant, or in the hands of the lender's messenger. Or b'yad beno, b'yad avdo, b'yad shelucho. Or it's sent to him in the hands of the borrower's son, in the hands of the borrower's servant, or in the hands of the messenger. But in all of these cases, it's the lender who's arranging it. Maybe the borrower sent his son over there to arrange how things were going to happen, but it was the lender who decided to hand off the item to the son, the eved (servant), or the shaliach, the messenger, of the sho'el, of the borrower. And then the cow died, v'meta. And it died. Before it reached the borrower's hands, patur, the borrower here is exempt. In all of these cases, the lender was the one who chose who was going to bring the cow to the borrower. That person is therefore considered to be acting on behalf of the lender. And therefore, it's still within the possession of the lender. The borrower here would not be responsible for the cow until it reaches him, until it gets to him.
Now we'll list six cases where the borrower chose the person to bring the cow. Therefore, he would be responsible for whatever happened to it. If the borrower said to the lender, “Send the cow in the hands of my son, in the hands of my servant, in the hands of my messenger,” or said, “Send it to me in the hands of your son, in the hands of your servant, in the hands of your messenger,” the borrower is choosing how the cow is going to be brought to him. Or, in the following situations, if the lender said to the borrower, “I'm sending it to you in the hands of my son, or in the hands of my servant, or in the hands of my messenger,” or told him, “I'm sending it in the hands of your son, or in the hands of your servant, or in the hands of your messenger.” And here's the kicker. And the borrower consented. The borrower said, “Send it.” He is now giving his approval. He wants it to be given to these people.
And then the lender sent it. And then the cow died on the way, before it reached the borrower. The borrower would be obligated to pay for the cow in all of these situations. The one bringing the cow is acting on behalf of the borrower. Since the borrower gave his consent, it's as if it's in the borrower's hands, and therefore he's responsible for it immediately. So the borrower's obligation starts right at that time.
But what about the endpoint? When does the borrower's responsibility for it end? So too, when the borrower returns the cow. If the borrower is sending back the cow with someone that he's choosing, then he would stay responsible for it until it reaches the hands of the lender. If it dies on the way, he would be responsible, and he would have to pay for it. If the lender tells him, “Send the cow back to me with a certain person,” that person would be acting as the proxy of the lender. So if it dies on the way, the borrower would not have to pay, because it's as if he already returned it to the lender. So everything flips, really, on the return. It's the same mechanism. Who's the one sending it? Who's the one giving over their approval? The same Mishnah would apply not only to the giving of the cow to be borrowed, but also to the return of the cow as well.