There is a principle in Halakha (Jewish law): If a person sends a messenger or an agent to perform a certain action for them, and the agent does it, it is considered to have been done by the sender. The agent is his proxy. But in terms of an aveirah, a sin, that principle does not apply, because we have another principle: You cannot send an agent to do a sinful action for you. If a person sent an agent to commit a sin and the agent followed through, then the agent would be responsible, not the sender. The agent should have told the person who sent him that he was not going to listen, that an aveirah cannot be done, and therefore the person is responsible. The agent takes on that responsibility; he is the one who did wrong.
Here we’ll talk about how it applies. The Mishnah says, “If an agent was sent out to do an action that involved Me'ilah (misappropriation of sacred property), and he did what he was supposed to do and followed the assignment, the person who sent the agent is liable for Me'ilah.” The agent himself is not liable, even though we just said that an agent cannot be sent to commit a sin, and that the person who sent him is liable for Me'ilah. Me'ilah is the exception to the rule. Even though Me'ilah is an aveirah, we say that, in this one scenario, the actions done by the agent are considered to have been done by the sender, and therefore the person who sent him is guilty of Me'ilah. We learn this from a Pasuk (verse): “Lo asah shelichuto, ha-shaliach ma'al” (If he did not carry out his assignment, the agent commits Me'ilah).
But if the agent did not carry out exactly what his assignment was, then we consider the agent, and not the sender, liable for Me'ilah. If the agent did not follow the sender’s instructions exactly, he is not considered to have done the sender’s bidding. He is not considered to have acted as the sender’s agent, and therefore the agent would be responsible for his own actions.
We’ll give an example of an agent who did not carry out the assignment correctly. If the Baal HaBayit (householder) told an agent, “Go give meat to the guests,” “ve'natan lahem kaved,” and the agent gave them liver instead, “kaved ve'natan lahem basar”; or if the Baal HaBayit told the agent, “Go give liver to the guests,” and the agent gave them meat instead—if they did not know that the food was hekdesh (consecrated property) at that time, “ha-shaliach ma'al.” The agent is the one who did the act of Me'ilah. He did not carry out his assignment correctly, and therefore he would be responsible for Me'ilah, not the person who sent him.
In the next case, everybody did Me'ilah. “Amar lo, ten lahem chaticha chaticha.” If the Baal HaBayit told the agent to give the guests one piece of meat each, “ve'hu amar telu shetayim shetayim,” but the agent told the guests, “Everyone take two pieces each,” “ve'hem natlu shalosh shalosh,” but the guests did not listen to that either, and they took three pieces each. If all of the people here did not know that the meat was hekdesh, because we know that, in order to violate Me'ilah, it's something we should be saying over and over again, but the use has to be unintentional, they don't really know that it's hekdesh—the person benefiting from it. In this case, “kulan ma'alu,” all of them—the Baal HaBayit, the agent, and the guests—they all did Me'ilah.
The first piece that the guests took is the householder’s, the Baal HaBayit’s Me'ilah, because the agent was following the instructions when he told them to take that one piece. So it flowed through: The Baal HaBayit said to take one piece, and they ended up taking more than one piece, but they took at least one piece when the agent told them to do it. Therefore, for that first piece, the Baal HaBayit was the one who committed Me'ilah. For the second piece, the agent told them to take two pieces. That was the misinformation he gave them: He was only supposed to give them one, but he gave them two. That’s his achrayut, that’s his responsibility; he added that on his own. Therefore, he is responsible for the second piece they ate. The third piece the guests ate is their responsibility, since they took that on their own.
Another case: If the Baal HaBayit told the agent, “Bring me coins from the window and buy something with them,” or, “Bring me coins from the box and buy something with them,” “vehevi lo,” and the agent brought him coins of hekdesh, the agent took coins from one of the cubbies or boxes in the house and spent them. Even though the Baal HaBayit later says, “I only intended you to take coins from this cubby, or this window, or that box, and he brought me coins from a different one,” the Baal HaBayit is the one who did Me'ilah when the agent spends the money. Even though the agent went against the Baal HaBayit’s real intentions, since he never stated his intentions clearly, those thoughts he had have no significance in Halakha. The agent is considered to have carried out the assignment, and therefore the sender, the Baal HaBayit, would be chayav, he would be the one who’s liable.
But if the Baal HaBayit told the agent, “Bring me coins from the cubby, from the window, and buy something with them,” and the agent brought coins of hekdesh from the box instead, “o min ha-deluskema” (or from the box), or if the Baal HaBayit said, “Bring me coins from the box,” but the agent brought him coins from the window, the agent is the one who is liable here; he’s the one who came in Me'ilah, since he did not follow the Baal HaBayit’s instructions.

