Arakhin (valuations), Daf Kaf (folio 20). The last thing we were discussing was a person who donated the worth of his arm or his foot to the Beit HaMikdash (Temple), and how that was done. Then we asked a series of questions, and we were left with no answer. The last one was whether, if a person was assessed for no reason, that counted. Meaning, if later on he said, “I’m going to give my worth,” would that count or not? I would try to bring a proof from yerushin (inheritance), but we didn’t bring a proof.
With that, we’re going to start Kaf Amud Aleph (folio 20a), at the Mishnah, which is about 14 lines in. This time, we’re going to discuss the stringencies of Nedarim (vows) compared with Arakhin. Kitzad, how? If a person said, “I’m going to give my erech (the worth) to Hekdesh (consecrated property),” and he died, the yorshim (inheritors) have to give Damai alai umet ([uncertain fragment concerning a vow of one's value and death]). If he said, “I’m going to give my worth as a donation,” and then he died, there’s no worth for that, because he has to be assessed, and he was assessed; he had already died. The erech is an erech that’s written in the Torah; there’s no way around it, so he’s assessed on the spot. When it comes to neder (vow), he has to be brought to Beit Din (court) and assessed, and that’s something that cannot be done after death.
If someone says, “The erech of my arm or my leg,” he didn’t say anything; he’s patur, exempt, because there’s no erech. The erech applies only to a whole body. “Erech roshi ve’erch kivedi alai”—my head or my liver—then “noten erech kulo”; then he has to give the erech of his entire body. “Zeh haklal,” this is the rule: “davar shehaneshama teluya bo, noten erech kulo.” If he donated something that his entire life or being is hanging on—his head, his liver—the person can’t do without it, so he has to give the worth of his entire body. This is learned from the words that say if it’s something that your body is living on, then you have to give the whole worth.
If a person said, “Half my worth I’m going to give,” he gives half his worth. If he said the worth of half my body, then he has to give the entire worth. If a person said half of my worth, he gives half his worth. If he said, “I’m going to give the worth of my half to Hekdesh,” he needs to give his entire body. And again, the rule is that if it’s something that your neshama (soul) is hanging on, then you have to give the entire thing.
If a person says, “The worth of this person is on me,” and either the vower or the person who has been vowed on dies, then the yorshim have to give the person’s worth. If someone says, “I’m going to give as a vow,” and the person making the vow dies, the yorshim have to give, because they’re responsible for their father’s obligations. But if the person on whom the vow was made dies, then the vower’s yorshim don’t have to give, because there’s no price on someone who died. Remember, they have to assess him, and he’s already dead.
The Gemara starts: “Tanu Rabbanan” (The Rabbis taught): “chumrot baNedarim mebaArakhin”—there are stringencies in the Nedarim that are not in Arakhin—“shehaNedarim chalin al behemah chayah va’of”: vows go on animals, wild animals, and birds. If someone says, “The worth of my animal is on me,” he has to pay it. There’s no Arakhin for an animal. “Ve’ein nidonin beheges yad.” If someone says, “I’m vowing this or that, or the worth of this or that,” he has to actually pay it. There’s no—if you’re rich or you’re poor, you pay less. That doesn’t apply. However, there are stringencies involving vows. If he dies, his yorshim have to give it. It’s as if he was already assessed. If he says he vows his worth and he dies, the yorshim don’t have to give it. His inheritors don’t have to give that money. There is no—there is no monetary worth to someone who’s dead.
Try to understand: someone says the yorshim have to give. What do you understand? If there is a loan that’s ba’al peh, meaning without any document, and the borrower died, the lender is allowed to collect payment even from the land of the inheritors, the land they inherited from their father. So the Gemara says, no. It’s different here when it comes to Nedarim. You can’t learn from there, because when it comes to erech, it’s written in the Torah. The minute someone says it, it’s as if he was already assessed, because the Torah gave it a worth. But with a regular loan that’s ba’al peh, where a person obligated himself, maybe he doesn’t automatically get payment from the yorshim’s land. So we understand that if there’s a loan that’s written in the Torah, meaning an obligation to pay from the Torah, it’s as if it’s written in a document; you even get payment from land.
The Gemara says, no. What are we talking about? The person who said the erech had already come to Beit Din. Beit Din had already assessed what he had to pay. The Gemara says, if that’s the case, he already came to Beit Din, so let’s say it’s the same case, but with vows. If he already came to Beit Din and Beit Din assessed him, then why shouldn’t the inheritors give the money? So the Gemara explains: in both cases, he came to Beit Din and Beit Din said, “You have to pay.” However, when he says, “My worth as a vow,” then he still needs to be assessed to determine how much he’s worth, and they hadn’t gotten to that part yet. If he says that, okay, the assessment is already from the Torah; we already know how much he has to pay—20, 30, whatever it is—and that’s it. So that’s why he has to pay it on the spot.
Next, he said, “My hand, my foot on me.” Although he’s exempt, he still has to pay whatever it’s worth as a vow. But the Mishnah said he didn’t say anything. That means he’s even exempt from that. So the Mishnah says, you’re right: according to Rabbanan, he didn’t say anything. When it says he has to pay the worth, that’s according to Rabbi Meir. To him, it doesn’t make a difference; you still have to pay if you said—you still have to pay like a vow.
Rav Gidal said this already once. According to Rav Gidal, if someone says, “The worth of this keli (utensil) is on me,” or “the erech of this keli,” we know there’s no erech for a keli. Erech is for human beings, not for utensils. He still has to pay. That’s according to [unclear], so he already said this.
So the Rima explains: I would have thought that, over there with the utensil, a person knows there’s no erech for a utensil. So he really meant a Zaveu. He’s going to pay the money with a Zaveu. But over here with the hand, maybe he made a mistake. Maybe it’s the same as my head and my liver: that’s one of those body parts the body can’t do without. Maybe he really meant the whole body, and the same rules apply even though it’s only one body part. But he didn’t say that; he only meant to be—he didn’t mean valve with the money’s worth. “Kamashma lan”—that’s what I’ve got trying to tell me—that yes, he did mean the money’s worth also. If he said the worth of my head and my liver, he has to give his entire body.
Mai ta’ama, what’s the reason? The pasuk (verse)—this is a body part that the neshama is hanging on, and therefore he has to give. “Zeh haklal,” this is the rule: if it’s a body part that the soul is hanging on, meaning it’s something you can’t do without, then you have to give the whole body. Anything from the knee up, if he says, “I’m going to give that,” then he has to give his whole body. If he says the worth of half my body, then he has to give half his worth. He gets makot (lashes), and he has to give his full worth. Why does he have to get makot? Amar Rav Papa: he loses his money by having to pay; that’s his makot. He loses his money by paying full.
Mai ta’ama? That’s the reason: if you say, “Half my worth,” you might say—you might say, “The worth of my half.” And the worth of my half is something that your neshama is hanging on; you have to give everything. So it’s just in case he said the money’s worth of my half; he needs to give his entire body. Again, it’s the same reason: it’s a body part that the soul can’t do without. This is the rule: if it’s something that the soul can’t do without, from the knee up.
If someone donates half of the assessment of the utensil, saying, “You give half the worth of this,” he didn’t say anything. There’s no such thing as erech for utensils. It applies only to people. And the rabbis came to visit him and said, “I understand. According to Rabbi Meir, a person doesn’t just say words. He really meant to give the worth as a vow, but he said the word erech; it was a mistake, but we understood what he meant, so he gives half.” “Lo shana kulo, lo shana chatzi”—doesn’t make a difference, all of it or half of it. That’s what Rabbi Meir understands. And the chiddush (novel point) is that even if it’s just half of a keli, that’s still—this is what Rabbi Meir holds. They make sense; I get it.
What do the rabbis hold? They hold that a person doesn’t say words for no reason, so why are we talking about half a utensil? “Afilu kulo nami?” Even if he says, “I’m going to give the erech of the entire cup,” he still didn’t say anything. “V’i ina damot si davarad batara afilu haqzi o nami?” And if a person doesn’t just say words, and he really meant what he said, then even with half a cup he would have to give. So why are they exempting him completely in the case of half a cup?
So “Amar lehu,” Abaye Ibn Aba told the Bnei Yeshiva (students of the yeshiva), “Rabbanan deha haker.” The rabbis here hold like Rabbi Meir and like Rabbi Shimon. They hold like Rabbi Meir, that a person doesn’t just say words; he really meant to give that as a vow. On the other hand, they hold like Rabbi Shimon, who said that if someone said, “I’m going to give a mincha (meal offering) from barley,” he’s patur, because he didn’t donate in the normal way. The normal way is to give a mincha of wheat. It’s the same thing here: nobody gives halfway. Nobody donates half a cup or the worth of half a cup, and therefore he’s patur from paying altogether. However, if he did it the normal way, which is a full utensil, then they would agree that he has to pay.
Next: if someone says, “The worth of this person is on me,” and the vower dies, then his children have to pay. What are we talking about? If we’re talking about a case where he came to Beit Din, that’s the same case as in the reisha (first part). Why repeat yourself? So the Gemara explains: no, we need the end of the Mishnah. We need the case where he said, “This person’s worth is on me,” and then the vower died. What is the theme? I would have thought that, since they didn’t evaluate him or assess him while the vower was still alive, maybe his assets had not been liened to this vow. Meaning, he vowed, “I’m going to give this person’s worth,” and then the vower dies. Do his children have to pay whatever this person is worth? Do we still have to bring him to Beit Din and assess everything or not? I would have thought that the person’s assets weren’t obligated to pay for him; the person died, and the whole story was over. The story’s not over. Once we brought the vower to Beit Din and we’re trying to figure everything out, his assets are now obligated to pay, so they’re liened to this vow. And whatever assessment they arrive at is just a revelation of what he owes. Whatever he owes, he already owes. It’s as if the money has already been set aside in the bank account.
Next Mishnah: sure, if someone says, “This cow is going,” or “This house is a korban (offering),” meaning he’s going to give it as a korban, and the ox dies or the house falls, he doesn’t have to pay. But if he said, “This shor (ox) is on me as a korban,” and the ox dies or the house falls, he has to pay. Why? Because once you said it, the obligation is on you; it’s not on the ox anymore to be given. Now it’s our responsibility to give an ox or a house.
The Gemara starts: when do we say you have to pay? You have to say, “The money of this ox is on me.” Why? Because it’s not this cow anymore; your money is now liened to this. Now, I’m not sure if you just said that this ox is on me. Once you said that, you’re talking only about this cow, nothing else, so your money isn’t liened to it. What you really meant to say was, “I just have to bring this cow.” But you’re talking about this cow, so this cow isn’t here; you don’t have to give it.
But the problem is that we have a source that says you are not responsible to bring another korban instead of it. Why? Because he never said he was going to bring it to the Beit HaMikdash. If he said this—if someone misuses it—he has to give that korban. If it died or got stolen, you are responsible. You see, the word alai is a little bit more. It means you’re obligated and responsible for it. If anything happens, you just have to give another one. So it’s not the zeh (this) that matters anymore; it’s the alai (upon me). That’s more important.
We ended up fixing our Mishnah and saying that he was talking about the money’s worth of this shor. So I can—I mean, they come out of here also—he’s changed and says we’re talking about giving the money’s worth. Meaning, if we’re fixing the Mishnah, for sure we could fix the Baraita (early rabbinic teaching). Well, if the seifa (latter part) is talking about the money’s worth, and the reisha is not talking about the money’s worth, there has to be a difference between the reisha and the seifa. It’s not saying the same thing.
The katani seifa: the seifa says, “If he said, ‘The money of the shor is olah (burnt offering),’ the shor is chullin (non-sacred property).” It’s not even kodesh (sacred property). “Ein moalin”—if someone benefits from it, there’s no me’ilah (misuse of sacred property); it’s not misuse of kodesh. “Met o nignav”: if it got stolen or died, “eino chayav ba’achrayuto”—you’re not responsible to bring another one. It’s not like this. “Aval chayav ba’achrayut damav”—but you do have to pay the money’s worth. So if the seifa is talking about money, then the reisha is not talking about money. So my answer is not—and the seifa is talking about where he said the word “money.”
In the reisha, we’re talking about where a person said the shor is going to be kadosh (consecrated) now for its money’s worth, meaning the money that the ox is worth is kadosh from now. So if it dies or gets stolen, I’m responsible. The seifa is talking about when the money comes; then it will be kadosh. So the money isn’t kadosh from now; it’s going to be kadosh when I get the money. In the reisha, the money is kadosh before it even comes. In the seifa, when it comes, then it’ll be kadosh.
But the Knesset says a person can’t be makdish—consecrate—something that’s not in the world right now. Meaning, the money isn’t here right now, so how could you be makdish it? So Amar Rav [unclear]. How many? Rabbi Meir. This is Rabbi Meir. The Amarav person—it could be something that’s not here yet. Some say they bring this whole back-and-forth on the following case: someone rented out a house to his friend, and there’s nega tzaraat (tzaraat lesion) on the house. Even after the Kohen (priest) said so, the owner of the house could tell the person renting, “This house is here; you could live over here.” Meaning, as long as they didn’t break the house apart or take out that stone, he could tell him, “This is the house; you could live in it.” It is what it is; you could be time if you want. However, “nitatz ha-bayit,” once the Kohen took out that stone and broke up that part, and now you can’t live in it anymore, at that point the owner has an obligation; he has to give him a house to live in.
Meaning, when someone rents from an owner, he’s basically telling him, “I’m renting a house from you.” And if it’s not this house, then it has to be a different house. You have to find me a place. If there’s something wrong with your house, you have to find me a different place to live. If there’s tzaraat (ritual skin or house affliction) in a house, it’s the owner’s responsibility. You probably stole from someone, or you’re speaking lashon hara (evil speech), you have bad mazal (fortune), or you put an ayin hara (evil eye) on someone. Now you’re getting punished for it. It’s something wrong with you. And since it’s a you problem, you have to get me another house to live in.
But until something happens to that house, the owner can say, “You live in it if you want.” If the renter—the person living inside, the person renting it—makdish the house, then he has to give the money to Hekdesh. Now they might ask the question: “Hekdesho hadar bo? Heichi matzi makdish lah?” How can the renter be makdish? It’s not his house. The pasuk says you can only be makdish your house; you can only rent out what’s in your possession, and it’s not your house; it belongs to the owner.
So the Gemara explains the Baraita: if the owner is makdish the house, then the person living inside has to give the money to Hekdesh. And before the Gemara asks the next question, Tosfot asks: how could the owner be makdish a house that he’s renting out? When he rents it out, he gives the entire possession to the person living in it, so he can’t be makdish it. So Tosfot explains: whatever the house is worth, that’s what belongs to the renter. Anything more—if he’s getting more than what it’s worth—that extra amount is going to Hekdesh. So that’s what he means. Interesting. Tosfot, very clear. Take a look.
So now the Gemara asks the [Abish] question. How could the owner be makdish? How could the person living there be me’ilah? It’s me’ilah. You’re misusing kodesh. He said, “This house is Hekdesh.” You can’t live in it anymore. And again, Tosfot brings up this whole concept that there’s no me’ilah on something connected to the ground, but this Baraita is according to Rav, who said that if something is not exactly connected to the ground, there is—there is very Kedah (holiness). Look at these two spots, okay? And the two—here’s another question, even better, like this: why should the person renting pay? Even better, once he misuses kodesh, and this is now not kodesh anymore, and now it becomes—so you have to give the money to—meaning, he has to give whatever it’s worth plus another fifth to Hekdesh, and that’s it. At that point it’s holding.
So the Gemara says, no. What are we talking about? “De’amar, keshe’yavo secharo, yikdash.” We’re talking about what the owner said: “When I get the rent money, then that money is going to be kadosh.” That’s what we’re talking about. And again, we asked the question: how could you be makdish something that’s not in the world? I mean, you don’t have it yet; it doesn’t exist yet.
“Amar Yehuda, amar Rav” (Yehuda said in the name of Rav): “Ha mani? Rabbi Meir hi, de’amar adam makdish davar shelo ba la’olam.” Who’s this like? It could be Rabbi Meir, who says a person can consecrate something that’s not in the world. Some say—some say, “Who’s this writer like?” And we said it could be a person consecrating something that’s not in the world. And who else could it be? We’ll stop right here. Baruch Hashem. Amen.